



## **ESDP operations**

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In 2003 the EU engaged in three missions – in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo – performing a variety of tasks, from law enforcement and ceasefire monitoring to security and humanitarian crisis management. Over 2,000 police and military personnel have been involved in the three operations.

The military operations, in particular, are important test cases for the Union's ability to apply some of the military policy instruments it envisaged under the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal. Although limited in scope and time, the current engagements are the first hands-on manifestation of the EU's security and defence dimension, which may lead to more ambitious interventions within and beyond its periphery.

### **European Union Police Mission (Bosnia-Herzegovina)**

Launched on 1 January 2003, the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina represents the EU's first-ever civilian crisis management operation under ESDP. Taking over from the United Nations' International Police Task Force (IPTF), which had been in place since December 1995, the operation seeks to establish local law enforcement capabilities that can contribute to the stability of the region. 531 police officers – about 80 per cent from EU member states and 20 per cent from third states – perform monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities.

<b>EU MEMBER STATES</b>	
<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>Total</b>
Austria	7
Belgium	10
Denmark	14
Finland	23
France	85
Germany	83
Greece	11
Ireland	5
Italy	47
Luxembourg	3
Netherlands	37
Portugal	10
Spain	22
Sweden	15
United Kingdom	70
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>442</b>

<b>THIRD STATES</b>	
<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>Total</b>
Bulgaria	3
Canada	6
Cyprus	4
Czech Republic	6
Estonia	2
Hungary	5
Iceland	3
Latvia	(*)
Lithuania	2
Norway	8
Poland	12
Romania	9
Russia	5
Slovakia	4
Slovenia	4
Switzerland	4
Turkey	12
Ukraine	5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>94</b>

**Deployment of Police Officers, 24 April 2003**

Source: EUPM MHQ / Personnel Office

(\*) to be deployed

The EUPM has a mandate for 3 years (until 31 December 2005) and an annual budget of €38 million, of which €20 million are financed from the Community budget.

The police officers are supported by about 400 support staff. The EUPM, whose headquarters are located in Sarajevo, is divided in three departments, namely Operations, Planning and Development, as well as Administration and Support Services. The Danish Commander Sven Frederiksen was appointed Police Commissioner for the operation, which is run in close coordination with the Union's (and UN) Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lord Ashdown.

The EUPM is based on a Council decision from 11 March 2002, following the United Nations Security Council's endorsement (Resolution 1396 of 5 March 2002) of a EU engagement. On 4 October 2002, the EU signed an agreement with the Bosnian authorities that defined the conditions and terms of the EUPM.

### **'Concordia' (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)**

On 31 March 2003, the EU launched the *Concordia* mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), its first-ever military operation. EU forces took over NATO's *Operation Allied Harmony* with the aim of contributing further to a stable, secure environment in the FYROM and ensuring the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, the political accord which settled the mounting conflict between Macedonian Slavs and Albanians. The EU force, within which France has initially acted as 'framework' nation, patrols the ethnic Albanian-populated regions of Macedonia that border Albania, Serbia and Kosovo.

The operation, requested by the FYROM and backed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1371, was expected to last six months. Its initial budget amounted to € 6.2 million. 13 EU member states (all except Ireland and Denmark) and 14 non-member states have contributed forces to the mission, totalling 350 lightly armed military personnel.

<b>EU MEMBER STATES</b>	
<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>Total</b>
Austria	11
Belgium	26
Finland	9
France	145
Germany	26
Greece	21
Italy	27
Luxembourg	1
Netherlands	3
Portugal	6
Spain	16
Sweden	14
United Kingdom	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>308</b>

<b>THIRD STATES</b>	
<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>Total</b>
Bulgaria	2
Canada	1
Czech Republic	2
Estonia	1
Hungary	2
Iceland	1
Latvia	2
Lithuania	1
Norway	5
Poland	17
Romania	3
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
Turkey	10
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>49</b>

#### **Participating Personnel by Country (357 overall)**

Source: EU Council

While *Concordia* constitutes an EU-led mission, the Union has drawn on NATO assets and capabilities under the so-called 'Berlin-plus' arrangement. The EU Operation Headquarters are located at the Supreme Headquarter Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium. Deputy SACEUR, Admiral Rainer Feist (Germany), has been appointed Operation Commander while General Pierre Maral (France) held the position of Force Commander on the ground until 1 October, before handing it over - following a Council decision, on 21 July 2003, to extend the mandate until 15 December 2003 - to Major General Luis Nelson Ferreira Dos Santos (Portugal) from EUROFOR. They have all worked in close coordination with the EU's Special Representative in FYROM, the Belgian diplomat Alexis Brouhns. The EU's operation in FYROM, therefore, represented also the first test case for the strategic EU-NATO partnership for crisis management that was made possible by the long-awaited bilateral 'Berlin-plus' agreement of December 2002.

Finally, *Concordia* has been succeeded by a police operation (EUPOL) also run by the EU. *Proxima*, as the 200-strong EUPOL is called, was launched on 15 December 2003 on the basis of a Joint Action adopted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council held on 29 September 2003. It followed an invitation from Branko Crvenkovski, FYROM's Prime Minister, to the EU through SG/HR Javier Solana. *Proxima* aims to help FYROM authorities develop their police forces to European and international standards and will focus, in particular, on supporting the government's efforts to fight organised crime. The total cost of the mission amounts to EUR 15 million for the first year, including start-up costs of EUR 7.5 million, all funded through the EU budget.

#### **'Artemis' (Democratic Republic of Congo)**

With the aim of preventing a large-scale humanitarian and civil crisis in Ituri, a region in the North-East of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the EU responded to an appeal by the United Nations Secretary General and launched a military operation on 12 June, 2003.

In accordance with the mandate set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003), the *Artemis* mission sought to contribute to the stabilization of security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, the Ituri capital. The multinational force was mandated to protect camps of internally displaced persons, secure the Bunia airport as well as ensure the safety of the civilian population, UN personnel and the wider humanitarian presence. The force encompassed about 1,800 soldiers, mostly French.

The operation ended on 1 September 2003. The last elements of the force left Bunia on 6 September, after handing over full responsibility back to the UN mission (MONUC), now provided with a wider mandate, more robust rules of engagement, and a 18,000-strong multinational force.

The rapid deployment of the interim EU force followed an escalation of violence and increasing acts of atrocity in the Ituri region. Fighting between ethnic Hema and Lendu militias caused chaos in and around Bunia since early May, with hundreds of people killed and tens of thousands fleeing their homes. The unrest threatened to derail the DRC peace process and to destabilise the wider Great Lakes region further.

France was, once again, the ‘framework’ nation for the *Artemis* mission: Major General Neveux was appointed EU Operation Commander and Brigadier General Thonier EU Force Commander. Both worked in close coordination with the EU’s Special Representative in the region, the Italian Aldo Ajello. The Planning Headquarters were located at the Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations (CPCO) near Paris, France, the Operational Headquarters in Entebbe, Uganda, with an outpost in Bunia. In addition to France, the United Kingdom and Sweden contributed combat troops. Belgium and Germany provided non-combat forces, while non-EU contributors include Canada, South Africa and Brazil.

*Artemis* was the EU’s first military operation outside Europe and, unlike the other two missions, did not rely on NATO assistance. Talks are under way regarding the possibility for the EU to launch a **police mission** in the Democratic Republic of **Congo** in order to assist the interim government in Kinshasa in setting up a country-wide police force.

Furthermore, the Copenhagen Council of December 2002 indicated the EU’s willingness to lead a **military operation** in **Bosnia** following SFOR. Proposals for what such a mission would look like are currently being elaborated.

### **Open Questions**

The three EU operations launched in 2003 have represented a major breakthrough for ESDP. For the first time, the Union is proactively engaging in security affairs, covering a variety of tasks that stretch from policing tasks to military intervention. The missions show that the EU is capable of reacting to ongoing or emerging humanitarian/security crises and to contribute to peace enforcement, reconstruction and stabilisation.

The EUPM and *Concordia* operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM are examples of where the EU has taken over responsibilities from other international organisations, in order to increase its commitment to security in its periphery. Going beyond the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, the most recent engagement in the DRC is a sign for the Union’s nascent willingness to ‘go global’ with ESDP.

Moreover, by requesting an EU intervention in Bunia, the United Nations has shown that it considers the EU as a ready and capable security actor/provider. The Secretary General Kofi Annan’s call to Javier Solana finally answers Henry Kissinger’s famous question of 1981 about Europe’s “telephone number”. Not only was the EU asked to act but it also did so – and quickly. Within a week, the Council approved the Congo operation: a few days later, troops were on the ground.

Maybe paradoxically, this surge of ESDP activity came at a time when the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was perceived to be in shambles. Indeed, disagreements in Europe over Iraq and especially over the US policies made a common European response on this specific issue very difficult. However, as current ESDP operations illustrate, EU member states continue to share a wide array of common interests and are willing and, at last, also able to pursue common policies through joint actions. The current success of ESDP must put the Iraq debacle into perspective, allowing us to be more optimistic about the scope of shared interests and policies under CFSP.

At the same time, it is important to remember that EU missions thus far remain very limited in scope and depend heavily on the leadership and commitment on the part of major EU member states. The EU has no common military capabilities of its own at its disposal. Moreover, significant command and control capability shortfalls among member states mean that any complex, high-end operation will have to rely on NATO support. While the *Concordia* mission successfully implements the Berlin-Plus agreement between the EU and NATO, the long-term relationship between the two organisations remains to be fully defined. The controversy surrounding the question of which organisation should assume responsibility for military operations in Bosnia (post-SFOR) reflects a degree of uncertainty about how a changing EU and a changing NATO will work together in the future.

Moreover, EU operations thus far, while important symbolically, are not complex operationally. None of the current operations, with the exception of *Artemis*, pushes EU military capabilities and political will to the limit. In this sense, the EU remains untested across the full spectrum of peace support missions.

Another critical factor may soon become the financing of such EU-led operations. To date, in fact, the relevant *acquis* is minimal and the letter of the Treaty (Art.28) is extremely fuzzy: it keeps the door open to different solutions but it separates rigidly operations “having military or defence implications” from purely or mainly civilian ones. In turn, the practice for financing external actions in general has been varied and mostly ad-hoc: the first EU-led operations look no different. However, future peace building tasks are likely to be mixed, encompassing both military and civilian components and involving both EU and national resources. It is also likely that not all (present and future) member states will have the same willingness and ability to participate in them. This is why it would be particularly important to agree on both sustainable budgetary provisions and flexible arrangements based on clear mutual obligations.

A final element of uncertainty has to do with the openness of ESDP operations to third parties, i.e. non-EU members. The three operations have involved a high degree of third state participation, encompassing both EU acceding or candidate countries and non-European states. The *Artemis* mission, for example, included South African, Canadian and Brazilian troops. The real limits of third party participation will be tested with regional powers, such as Russia, with which the EU will need to interact should it decide, for example, to deploy a OSCE-mandated peace support operation in Moldova. Arrangements for third party participation were agreed at the Seville European Council, but questions remain: How many troops are acceptable from third states in a EU-mandated operation? How involved may third states become in the development of a concept for operations? How heavy may be a third party’s role in daily command and control?