NATO’S RETIREMENT?
Essays in Honour of Peter Volten

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The Man behind the Greenwood Papers

Resting his fists on the lectern, he would fix his audience with a glare and pronounce: “REVEAL, EXPLAIN AND JUSTIFY.” It was his golden rule of democratic governance. David Greenwood was born in England in 1937 and died in 2009 in Scotland. He first worked for the British Ministry of Defence, then went on to teach political economy at Aberdeen University, where he later became the director of the Centre for Defence Studies.

In 1997, David Greenwood joined the Centre for European Security Studies in the Netherlands as its Research Director. For 10 years, he was the principal researcher and teacher at CESS, and a friend and mentor to his colleagues. To borrow a phrase of his own, David Greenwood was a construction worker on the building site of democracy. This series of research reports, formerly called the Harmonie Papers, is affectionately dedicated to him.
Table of Contents

Introduction. Peter Volten: Bridge-Building between East and West in Theory & Practice 5
Margriet Drent, Arjan van den Assem, Jaap de Wilde

PART 1 – State Perspectives

Chapter 1. NATO’s Advanced Partnership with Ukraine. Cooperation Without Guarantees 19
Anatoliy Grytsenko

Chapter 2. NATO’s Role in the Consolidation of South-East Europe 27
Velizar Shalamanov

Chapter 3. Turkey’s Alignment with NATO: Identity and Power Politics 37
Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu

Chapter 4. Friends Both Close and Distant. Transatlantic Perceptions in the Early Years of the Cold War 49
Doeko Bosscher

Chapter 5. NATO’s Retirement? A Club-theoretical Approach to the Alliance 61
Herman Hoen

PART 2 – IO Perspectives

Chapter 6. Europe the Reluctant Security Actor 75
Willem van Eekelen

Chapter 7. The European Defence Community and NATO. A Classic Case of Franco-Dutch Controversy 83
Jan van der Harst

Chapter 8. IKV, Pax Christi and NATO in a Post-Cold War World. A Political-Ethical Comment 95
Menno R. Kamminga
Chapter 9. NATO and Humanitarian Organisations: *bien ennuies de se trouver ensemble*  
Joost Herman

Part 3 – Security Policies & Actions

Chapter 10. NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning Mechanism and Crisis Management Theory  
*Marjan Malešić*

Chapter 11. Responsibility to Protect in Territories under Disputed Rule  
*Hans J. Giessmann*

Chapter 12. Can Defence, Development and Diplomacy Go Hand in Hand? A Practitioner’s Thoughts on the Challenges of Security Sector Reform  
*Sami Faltas*

Chapter 13. NATO Interventions in the Balkans. History, Perceptions and Analogical Reasoning  
*Sipke de Hoop*

*Ine Megens*

Part 4 – NATO’s Retirement?

Chapter 15. Europe’s Virtual Security Debate and a New Transatlantic Relationship  
*Hugo Klijn*

Chapter 16. NATO in 2029: Retired or Rejuvenated?  
*Nienke de Deugd*

About the Authors

Curriculum Vitae Peter M. E. Volten
Introduction

Peter Volten: Bridge-Building between East and West in Theory & Practice

Margriet Drent, Arjan van den Assem & Jaap de Wilde

This book reflects on retirements. Real ones and potential ones. Normally, age is the indicator. End of career is often implied. NATO’s retirement can be expected in 2014. According to myth and a bit of historical evidence, in 1889 Bismarck introduced 65 as the proper age for retirement for the very reason that on average most people didn’t reach it. Peter Volten will. Nowadays, social welfare states – and also less social ones – have fear for old people. ‘Ageing’ has been securitized. It forms a threat to the stability of Europe, if not the entire world. The UN’s Vienna International Plan of Action on Ageing dates back to 1982. But despite its continued attention and relevance, alarming reports keep appearing. “Why an ageing population is the greatest threat to society”, The Independent wrote in 2002 when the UN Second World Assembly on Ageing took place in Madrid: “Of all the threats to human society, including war, disease and natural disaster, one outranks all others. It is the ageing human population. No invading army, volcanic eruption or yet undreamt of plague can rival ageing in the breadth or depth of its impact on society” (Jeremy Laurance in The Independent, 10 April 2002). Still, up to now, ageing has not been listed in the strategic reports of NATO about the new, non-traditional threats. After the Cold War, NATO appeared quite creative in listing new risks and threats, and it still is. The New Strategic Concept adopted in November 2010 tries to provide an answer to “regional disputes or efforts of political intimidation ... along [NATO’s] borders ... acts of terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear and other advanced weapons technologies, cyber attacks ... the sabotage of energy pipelines, the disruption of critical maritime supple routes”, and, yes, the Official Report of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO also mentions “demographic changes that could aggravate such global problems as poverty, hunger, illegal immigration, and pandemic disease” – but ageing is not specified in this context (NATO, 2010). The growing sum of pensions, however, puts the working classes under pressure. It burdens the competitive edge of the European economies. Greying is an economic security issue, and Peter Volten is going to contribute to it.

The central issue in this book, written in honour of Peter Volten, is whether NATO is at the end of its official career too. Ever since the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, its ability to survive as a collective security arrangement for its member-states has been questioned. Existential
crises seem to be part of NATO’s identity. In its initial years, NATO’s future was questioned on theoretical grounds mainly. The issue if military alliances could institutionalize successfully existed only in the abstract. History had no experience with institutionalized alliances yet. In a distorted version, Karl Deutsch’s theory of ‘security communities’ was and is used to show the pacifying internal qualities of the alliance (Adler and Barnett 1998). How strong the ties would be if tested, remained guess work.

Trouble Inside
All but one of the tests so far have come from the inside. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty Organization formed a robust raison d’être that helped to keep the ranks closed. The only test, therefore, that came from the outside was when the common enemy disappeared. “Back to the Future” predicted classical Realist John Mearsheimer in 1990 in a by now likewise classic article. Europe and the transatlantic ties would collapse together with NATO’s biggest if not sole enemy: “it is the Soviet threat that provides the glue that holds NATO together. Take away that offensive threat and the United States is likely to abandon the Continent, whereupon the defensive alliance ... may disintegrate” (Mearsheimer 1990, 52). History proved him wrong – for the simple reason that classical Realism is essentially wrong in its assumptions and analyses. NATO survived the death of its enemy, and in fact became, together with the European Union, pivotal in discussions about Europe’s new political and military order. All other challenges to NATO originated from conflicts within.

In the 1960s France provoked a crisis in the alliance by leaving the military part of NATO. President Charles de Gaulle’s nationalism (chauvinism to be more precise) and ambitions to restore the French grandeur in world politics required a European version of the Monroe Doctrine: Europe for the Europeans – dominated by France, of course. He feared misuse of NATO by its hegemonic leader, the USA. The conditions of the Cold War in Europe kept France politically on board, but its military independence, symbolized by its nuclear force de frappe, and underpinned by its veto power in the UN Security Council, clearly set limits to NATO’s Musketeer logic of ‘one for all, all for one’. In 2009, France rejoined the military structure of NATO. But how to interpret this? Does it prove NATO’s vitality and strength or its decline? If the USA has to find coalitions of the willing rather than direct NATO troops to its war fronts, there is no harm by joining NATO’s integrated military structure.

Meanwhile the USA have not always been enthusiastic about NATO either. From its very beginning up to the present, the USA have been concerned about Transatlantic burden sharing and free-rider behaviour. The underlying problem here is how to establish what the minimum ceilings for ‘required’ military spending are. The perception of the US in this respect differs from all other states on earth, except, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union. In 2009 the US
were spending some 661 billion US$ on what traditionally is called defence. The European NATO member-states together spent some 306 billion US$. Potential traditional enemies, like the Russian Federation for old sentiments, and the Peoples Republic of China for new ones, spent each about 53 (Russia) and 100 (China) billion US$ per year (Sipri 2010). In face of the figures, a debate about American overspending would be more rational than debates about burden sharing. But politics seldom follows a logic of consequences – as Peter Volten discovered himself in face of responses to his rational choice and cost/benefit based analyses about task specialization (Volten 1987). Politics follows a logic of appropriateness, not of consequences (Kratochwil 1989). Hence NATO still has its friction about burden sharing across the Atlantic – and still lacks progress in task specialization (although budget cuts in France and Britain seem to provide a new stimulus for true integration of defence efforts, as shown by the Declaration on Defence and Security issued at the UK-France Summit 2010).

Related to the issue of minimum ceilings for credible defence, another internal conflict questioning the future of NATO has come from public opinion. In the late 1970s and early 1980s public opinion in Western Europe widely protested against nuclear weapons and NATO’s flexible response strategy to use them if need be, including first use. The protests were backed by peace movements and peace research. Already in the 1960s the famous Dutch professor in peace research and international law, Bert Röling – founder of the Polemological Institute of the University of Groningen – wrote with great concern about ‘weapons insecurity’: “the mad escalation of armament and the mentality that goes with it, will sooner or later inevitably trigger off the ‘accidental war’, the total war accidentally unleashed” (Röling 1969, 155). Rational choice stands no chance in case of accidents, miscalculation or blunder – as was powerfully illustrated by the Hollywood movie Dr Strangelove (1964). And even if Ratio has a choice, the right one is hard to make – as was convincingly shown in the British series Yes Prime Minister, when in the first episode the newly elected Prime Minister is confronted with scenarios when ‘to push the button’ (Gregg 1998). Moreover, during the Falkland/Malvinas war in 1984, Margaret Thatcher seems to have considered a nuclear strike on Argentine indeed. It is the theory of the hammer: possessing it, makes every problem look like a nail; and even if it clearly isn’t a nail, you can at least hit it. The mass demonstrations put the governments of the member states under pressure to reconsider the logic of their rational policies. But again NATO survived the high waves.

At the end of the Cold War, NATO feared for its own future and started to broaden its concept of security to include all types of existential threat, trying to carve out new roles for the military to deal with them. An existential crisis was avoided for external reasons once again: the wars in former Yugoslavia showed that the military had not lost their role in European politics, and the end of
deadlock in the UN Security Council opened routes to new military roles in world politics – at first in the form of peacekeeping, later in the form of peace enforcement, humanitarian interventions and peace building. Crisis management in former Yugoslavia showed the continued hegemonic position of the USA in Europe. They took the lead, and all NATO members had to follow, however reluctantly. But the legitimacy of NATO was seriously jeopardized by the open breach of international law by bombing Belgrade in 1999. Notably Greece and Italy were critical of the NATO operations. The Greeks had historical ties with Serbia, while Rome was fearing the refugee flows to their country. NATO’s new members Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic were also reluctant to agree to the intervention, but they all had to comply.

On the other hand NATO’s legitimacy was kept alive by the new membership requests. All former Warsaw Pact countries, except for Belarus and the Russian Federation, were eager to join. Many of them achieved membership indeed. Even Russia – let’s not forget: also experimenting with democratization – had a clear interest in developing good ties with NATO. It signed the Partnership for Peace program and in 2002 got its own special relationship in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).

Since the enlargement from 16 to 28 member states, the original outside support has now become an internal problem. The strict intergovernmental formula of reaching consensus among equal sovereign states has become problematic, and tends to turn the organization into a debating club. Article 5 was successfully raised within days after nine-eleven. But what this solidarity clause implied is debated ever since. There may be an easy explanation for this: the attacks of nine-eleven 2001 on the symbols of US power (the Twin Towers, the Pentagon and, failed, the White House, symbolizing its economic, military and political power) were extraordinary but remained so. The enemy was invisible, and whether invading Afghanistan was the right way of tracing Bin Laden or was just treating any problem as a nail can still be debated. Hence, second thoughts about the immediate US response were reasonable. But the explanation can also be that in functional military terms NATO belongs to the Cold War indeed, and retired with it. Closing the ranks worked in a bipolar world, a discourse on total war, and a frozen front in Europe. Does this imply that Mearsheimer is right after all? Not at all, NATO is still pivotal in all debates about military security; it has a clear dynamics of its own, and it is operationally more active than ever before. It merely implies that the test of solidarity requires more manifest and concrete threats than those the alliance has witnessed since the implosion of the Soviet Union.

A new type of challenge to the future of NATO comes again from mainly its own member states, i.e. those who are also member of the EU. The urge to decorate the EU with statist symbols like its own constitution, flag and anthem (failed, but still) is also visible in the debate about a European army. At last, some may say. The failure of the European Defence Community in the 1950s is
history. Using the WEU as a diplomatic vehicle, the EU ever since its birth in 1992 has developed the ambition to create a security and defence policy of its own, backed by its own forces, i.e. excluding North America. Can it be successful? Probably. But when it is, what does this mean for NATO? So far discursively only, the EU is arms racing NATO, and in particular the most equal among its sovereign member-states, the USA. Various chapters in this volume reflect on this development.

In sum, outside developments keep saving NATO’s continued existence either by posing new threats or by validating its legitimacy. Whereas internal conflicts (who is willing to send troops to Afghanistan, and for how long?) and competition (will the EU surpass NATO in importance?) keep the alliance under pressure.

A Career to Follow
This book contributes to this internal/external duality of NATO’s existence, and in doing so follows the main line in Peter Volten’s career. In a way, he also experienced NATO’s dilemmas, crises and developments from both the inside and outside. Academia and its ‘real life’ impact have always gone hand in hand in Volten’s long and distinguished career. After receiving his degree in Political Science at the Free University of Amsterdam (a university that insists to be called Vrije Universiteit in English), he had a two year stint as a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University. There he laid the foundations for his dissertation on Soviet security and defence policy. He finalised his dissertation, Brezhnev’s Peace Program – with the rhetorical subtitle: Success or Failure?, with the University of Amsterdam in 1981, while working at the Dutch Ministry of Defence’s Directorate of General Policy Affairs. Eventually, he became the Ministry’s Director of Studies and Strategic Planning and was, i.a., involved in the work of NATO’s body which takes decisions on the Alliance’s nuclear policy: the Nuclear Planning Group. On leave from the Ministry from 1985 to 1987 at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, Volten wrote a book, More Value for Defence Money, which still today is notable for its relevance and timeliness (Volten 1987). In addition to his work at the Ministry, Peter stayed well within the academia through a Professorship in the History of War at the University of Utrecht (1984-1989).

NATO tends to pride itself as a strictly intergovernmental organization: its credibility is its consensus. All sovereign members have to agree about its policies because without collective support NATO’s raison d’être will end. This implies continuous diplomatic efforts to create such a consensus. Especially during the Cold War, when NATO counted 16 members only, the permanent representations were almost locked up together in a gated compound in Brussels. Completely sovereign, but also completely socialized. Not being invited at a reception or other signs of exclusion from the ‘club’ were important
indicators of trouble, and were reported back to the capitals with great concern. Tensions between Greece and Turkey, e.g., at times had to be controlled by collective diplomatic pressure, backed-up by the leading sovereign, the USA. As senior official for the Dutch ministry of Defence, Volten knew that the fate of NATO depends on the support of its member states indeed. Also after the Cold War, this is still the case. It can even be argued that the eagerness of former Warsaw Pact countries and former Soviet republics to join NATO’s ‘consensus club’ has proved to be a lifeline for the alliance. Its continued attractiveness for non-members in its environment is crucial added value for NATO. Part I of this volume therefore focuses on “State Perspectives”.

In the first chapter Anatoliy Grytsenko makes a critical analysis of NATO’s partnership with Ukraine. Although the partnership has until now been beneficial for both parties, the author shows that the current framework is in need of rationalization. Moreover, he wonders how much security NATO could provide for their partners in return. Velizar Shalamanov’s chapter on NATO’s role in the consolidation of South-East Europe is equally critical on future developments. The alliance evidently helped the region to further peace and democracy, but the future stabilization and integration of the region is only possible through a synchronized approach of political, military-technological and societal aspects of comprehensive security. As usual, NATO should provide the framework, but NGOs are needed to provide for societal awareness and public support.

Whereas the first two chapters offer a view from the outside, the next two chapters analyse NATO from the perspective of a member-state. In chapter 3 Ali Karaosmanoğlu clarifies why Turkey joined NATO, and why it still remains a dedicated member. The Soviet-threat played of course an important role in the process, but Turkey’s security culture and problematic identity should also be considered a major driving force. The author thus combines both Realism and Culturalism and is therefore capable of understanding Turkey’s growing activism in the alliance despite the demise of the Soviet Union. Doeko Bosscher, in chapter 4, uses the idea of culture and image in order to understand the developments in the transatlantic relation in the early years of the Cold War. He eloquently shows that the creation of images of Self and Other, or better, American and anti-American, is dynamic and reciprocal, and certainly not as clear-cut as one would expect.

The part on “State Perspectives” is concluded by the chapter by Herman Hoen in which he uses a club-theoretical approach to alliance formation. He addresses the same type of questions as the first two chapters: how can NATO survive its increasing heterogeneity? According to this approach NATO has become too large, meaning too many members, to be useful as a club per se. But when the alliance transforms itself into a ‘club of clubs’, with a certain degree of homogeneity within the sub-clubs, it could still postpone its retirement.
The second part of this volume focuses on “IO Perspectives”. IO stands for International Organizations – another field in which Volten has worked actively. Leaving government in 1989, he joined the EastWest Institute in New York as Director of Research. He became Senior Vice President for Programs and Policy in 1990, responsible for the substantive work of the Institute’s research programme. He stayed in New York for three years, which proved to be very formative years. Volten landed in the midst of the end of Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe and the ensuing transition process of the region. Upon return to the Netherlands in 1993, he founded a Dutch branch of the EastWest Institute to contribute from The Hague to the democratic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in the field of the functioning of the armed forces in a democratic society. When he was appointed Professor of History and Theory of International Relations at the University of Groningen in 1994 Volten also took his growing activities in the Central and Eastern European region with him, and in 1995 he founded the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS). Being Chair of the Department and Director of CESS was his double hat for thirteen years. The Centre soon became a well-established NGO and a steady presence in, at first, the Central European region, but later on also in East and South-Eastern Europe. Education and research programmes were implemented from Poland to Ukraine, Slovenia and Kazachstan and most countries in between. Throughout all this, Volten played a crucial role as inspirator, networker, researcher and fundraiser.

Volten’s involvement with International Organisations was mostly in his the capacity of the last three roles. Particularly the European Union, which was gaining a more prominent security role in the last two decades, became available as a sponsor for CESS, as stability and democratic civil-military relations became issues in the accession processes.

It is this branching out of the EU into an International Organisation with a security and defence dimension and how this relates to NATO that is addressed in Chapter 6 by Wim van Eekelen. The title of this Chapter, “Europe as a Reluctant Security Actor” already betrays the slow and cumbersome path from the Brussels Treaty to, eventually, a European Security and Defence Policy. Van Eekelen concludes that the EU is better equipped for tackling the post-conflict stabilisation phase from a ‘whole of government’ approach than NATO. Conversely, however, large military operations can only be undertaken with participation of the USA. This makes a broad EU-US consultation mechanism necessary, which lies beyond the remit of NATO. In Chapter 7, Jan van der Harst, delves deeper into the background of European defence cooperation by looking at the early phases of NATO’s existence and the closely related plans for a European Defence Community (EDC). The French and Dutch positions on EDC feature as the extremes in his Chapter, which Van der Harst to a large extent regards as persistent to this day. Nevertheless, in recent years the
staunch Atlantic ally the Netherlands has gravitated towards supporting a European role in security as the US are no longer prioritising NATO. Van der Harst also underlines the continuing relevance of Volten’s early work on military task specialisation for European countries to maintain relevant armed forces.

Menno Kamminga, in Chapter 8, takes a political-ethical angle and assesses the post-Cold War attitude of the peace movement to NATO. His point of departure is Peter Volten’s advice from 1986 to the peace movement to function as an intellectual hornet and keep politics on its toes by pointing out the ethical standards that should inform its choices. Unfortunately, Kamminga has to conclude that Volten’s challenge has not been met by the peace movement. In the two cases he investigates, IKV Pax Christi’s attitude towards the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the recent discussion on the future of nuclear weapons, the positions by IKV Pax Christi fall short politically-ethically.

The final Chapter of the second section is by Joost Herman. Herman goes into the complex relationship between NATO and non-governmental organisations, who increasingly find themselves in the same conflict areas. In an attempt to find a *modus vivendi* of cooperation and coordination it turns out that both NATO and the NGOs have conceptualized civil-military relations in terms close to their core beings. In doing so, both sides have put forward a notion of civil-military relations which are in practice incompatible.

Part III focuses on “Security Policies and Actions”. In Chapter 10, Marjan Malešič uses Crisis Management Theory to analyse NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning (CEP). This is one of NATO’s answers to the new spectrum of threats that has been defined. More and more NATO is focussing on manmade and natural disasters in national contexts, i.e. moving away from the traditional military roles in interstate conflicts. There are planning groups in civil protection, transport, public health (including food and water), and industrial resources and communications – all coordinated by the Civil Emergency Planning Committee at NATO Headquarters. This development acknowledges the blurring of traditional divisions of labour between the military, the police and intelligence. The security sector is responding in its organisation to the youngest phase in globalisation, triggered by the micro-electronic revolution. ‘Sovereignty’ still is the name of the game, but in functional terms territorial borders have lost their protective value almost completely. The ‘iron curtain’ between North and South – quite literally so at the borders between Mexico and the USA, and between Spain and Morocco – is of symbolic value mainly (Anderson & Snyder 2000). The south of the US is bilingual, while smuggling of people and illicit goods merely profits from the higher risks involved. Walls don’t work – at least not the way they are intended. Even North Korea hardly feels secure behind its fences. Similarly, the wall erected by Israel against the Palestinians has not solved but rather contributed to the conflict. Hence, the role of the military to keep unwanted foreigners out has changed. Civil Emergency Planning is one of the answers, and Malešič concludes that it is becoming a pivotal task of NATO.
Hans-Joachim Giessmann (Chapter 11) applies the same logic by emphasizing a new role for NATO across the borders of its member-states. The UN’s attempt to operationalize the responsibility of governments to protect their subjects – R2P – creates new incentives for humanitarian interventions. He focuses on ‘territories under disputed rule’; popularly phrased the ‘no-go areas’ within otherwise relatively stable countries. In this context he analyses the dilemmas of isolation, of territory, and of responsibility in the context of the UN Millennium Goals and traditional concerns about state sovereignty. The Millennium Goals can be seen as a benchmark for R2P. Yet the conflicts of a failing national government with often successful local rulers overshadows the centrality of the people, whose well-being is at stake. The international community – made up of sovereigns – still has hard time to put the ethics of well-being before the formal integrity of states.

So, both within NATO’s own area and out of its area, the characteristics of domestic contexts are determining a large share of today’s international security dynamics. In particular the quality of the security sector in each country is a strong indicator of stability. Sami Faltas has become a leading authority in the field of security sector reform. His reflections in Chapter 12 are linking the issues raised in Chapters 10 & 11 to the general question if diplomacy, development and defence can go hand in hand. This so-called 3D-approach is cherished by i.a. the Dutch government, and is also basic to the human security approaches in countries like Canada, Norway and Japan. Moreover, the UN, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Union and also NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme all adhere to such comprehensive approaches. His conclusions, however, are quite sceptical. By drawing a parallel to the successful security sector reform in West-Germany after the Second World War, he shows that the conditions for success are hard to meet: integration within NATO was essential as was acceptance of the conditions by the German government; there was local ownership of the process, and, in contrast to the contemporary donor community, there was a united allied effort.

The difficulties of achieving such coherence is well illustrated by the Western involvement in the former Yugoslavia. In Chapter 13 Sipke de Hoop takes stock of NATO’s interventions in the Balkans. In laying bare the decision-making process about the interventions, he highlights the misuse of historical analogies. Politicians mobilize images of the past to interpret the apparent motives of the actors in the region. Misled by these analogies, a new chapter in the history of the Balkans has been written.

Part III ends with a chapter by Ine Megens about NATO’s Annual Review procedure. Policies and actions are in the end valued by future generations, but the evaluation begins with the organisation’s own reports. By focusing on the reviews from 1952 and 1953, Megens shows how delicate the composition of NATO’s track record is. The complex bureaucratic process involves multiple
levels of government, showing that recorded history has a history of its own. What ‘really’ happened is buried in language and thus largely unknown. Obviously this is even more so for the future: the crystal ball cannot but reflect our limited understandings of past and present. But on that basis we are able to build scenarios and to highlight developments that seem crucial. In Part IV, Hugo Klijn (Chapter 14) highlights one of these developments: the prospects for the Transatlantic relationship in face of the EU’s growing military identity. He rightly puts his finger on the sore spot, by showing how amazing it is that NATO and EU are living in two completely different institutional worlds. A Brussels Wall stands between them. Will then an EU-US framework replace NATO? He is cautious in putting his money on this, but raising the question opens the horizon. In one of Nienke de Deugd’s scenarios the road to this horizon is sketched out. She completes this volume by returning to its central question: what about NATO’s retirement? A retired or a rejuvenated NATO depends on two crucial developments, she argues: NATO’s track record in world politics, and its enlargement process. Will NATO’s mission in Afghanistan come to a successful end? Will NATO’s Kosovo Force be able to build an effective multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force? Is there a future for its counter-piracy missions? Will NATO continue to assist other regional organisations in their missions, like it does with the African Union in Somalia? It seems that, just as in the past, NATO’s future finds its strongest support from the outside challenges, whereas its strongest obstacles will be internal. Building consensus among a growing number of members demands ever higher diplomatic skills. Finding active support for the missions at times even looks harder.

Volten retires at 65, three years before NATO reaches that age. His life and career evolved in the same historic context as NATO did. Both needed to adapt to the structural changes triggered by the end of the Cold War. Both embraced the chances offered by the end of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO’s enlargement gave it a second life. Volten organized his new insights in the CESS and in the teaching programmes of IRIO. We are confident that Peter Volten will contribute to improving pan-European ties between scholars and practitioners for the rest of his life. Let’s hope NATO will do the same.

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PART 1 – State Perspectives
Chapter 1. NATO's Advanced Partnership with Ukraine. Cooperation Without Guarantees

Anatoliy Grytsenko
The author is grateful to Leonid Polyakov for support in preparation of this article.

In the past decade, Ukraine’s course towards building democracy and NATO membership and its close security cooperation with Western democracies provided opportunities to gain valuable foreign experience and practical support in democratic and defence transformations, as well as in peacekeeping and antiterrorist operations. The example of Ukraine is one among many others that demonstrates NATO’s ability to assist a country through the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) in implementing a major transformation of its security posture. At the same time, the mutually beneficial relationship between NATO and Ukraine has contributed to regional and global security. However, the changing scope and nature of the PfP overall and the NATO-Ukrainian partnership in particular, puts forward the need for reevaluation and adjustment of this framework in order to preserve and promote its positive security impetus. I will present some observations and thoughts on how progress can be continued at the current stage of NATO relations with Ukraine and other partners.

NATO Partnership in General
Today, NATO is the most powerful collective security alliance in the world. Its political influence, military might and prosperity altogether radiate security confidence for the allies’ population and security expectations for the aspirants. In spite of the differences among NATO members on several fundamental issues, like the interpretation of the exact meaning of Article 5 or the exact value of the consensus principle of decision-making, the primary mission of the Alliance will remain the collective defence of its members’ population and territories. However, the nature of the current threats makes it clear that such a mission cannot be fulfilled successfully within the allies’ territorial borders. While traditional dangers of military conflicts, proliferation, and terrorist attacks remain relevant, new issues such as energy security, cyber-defence, and climate change knock on the door and call for security efforts beyond the Alliance borders.

Outside of the national borders of the member-states NATO can use either its own capabilities or support from its partners, or both. Openness of NATO to cooperation helps to develop the relationship with many, and its devotion to
democratic values helps to build deeper relations with some. At this point, it makes sense to recall the meaning of partnership at its start, when in January 1994 the PfP programme was adopted. By signing the Framework Document the non-member countries committed themselves to ensuring democratic control of defence forces, facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes, maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the OSCE, the development of cooperative military relations with NATO for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the field of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of NATO members.

More than fifteen years later, the overall institute of NATO partnership is even more important, due to the generally positive security effect of keeping contacts, maintaining dialogues, promoting democratic values and performing real missions and operations. However, geographical and functional frameworks of partnership have become almost too wide to manage. They stretch from Morocco to Japan, and from Australia to Ireland. Statistically, there are 37 countries today that are considered to be NATO partners: 22 members of PfP, seven participants in the Mediterranean Dialogue, four Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries, and four Contact Countries.

While at the start participation in PfP was associated with a possible invitation to join the Alliance, today this is no longer the interest for most partners. Recent experience calls for better and more appropriate differentiation among the numerous partners. Limited resources and growing needs naturally request higher effectiveness and better efficiency of relations between NATO and partner states. Today’s dilemma for NATO partnership is how to promote the partnership, while avoiding ‘resource overstretch’ – as happened with its former competitor, the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union spent tens of billions of dollars to support many ‘friendly’ regimes worldwide, often for mere slogans and declarations against capitalism, flattering the Soviet communists’ ideological zeal against the capitalist West.

In recent years many observers emphasise the desirability to distinguish more and encourage those NATO partners who are willing and capable to contribute to the practical security efforts – be it in military operations or humanitarian assistance. Since the Prague Summit in 2002, each next summit

1 PfP: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Republic of Macedonia, Russian Federation, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. MD: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia. ICI: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Contact Countries: Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand.
in Istanbul, Riga and Bucharest – focused on specific issues related to the partnership. In these years, many officials and independent observers addressed the possible approaches to a modern partnership agenda at conferences and in the press: John Colston (former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning), Christopher Donnelly (former Special Adviser to NATO Secretary General for Central and Eastern European Affairs), Ron Asmus (executive director of the Transatlantic Centre at the German Marshall Fund of the US in Brussels, and former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State), Prof. Julian Lindley-French (Netherlands Defence Academy, and senior associate fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom), James Townsend (director of the international security programme at the Atlantic Council of the United States), Dr. Graeme P. Herd (Geneva Centre for Security Policy), Prof. Carlo Masala (Bundeswehr University Munich) and many others. The range of opinions on the future of partnership spreads from an ambitious option of further promotion under a Global Partnership Initiative (GPI) to a very limited option of marginalizing the partnership in case NATO decides to reduce its out-of-area role. As the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Giampaolo di Paola (2009), put it: “We are faced with a truly potent cocktail of choices, and options. But, given the realities of resource and capability constraints, reinforced by the economic crisis, how should we identify which are the most urgent priorities? How do we optimise the allocation of resources between them, and between current and future tasks?” In this regard, in order to better substantiate further reasoning, it will help to consider in detail one particular case of NATO partnership: my native country Ukraine, which, if considered both individually and in a broader context beyond its current geopolitical and functional specifics, is quite representative.

NATO Partnership with Ukraine

NATO partnership with democratic Ukraine is the largest in scope compared to other partners. In recent years, especially after the NATO Bucharest Summit of April 2008, NATO-Ukraine relations became a key factor of European and Euro-Atlantic security agendas. The basic aspects of this partnership are: defence transformation, democratizing of the security sector, and regional security cooperation.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine appeared to be an emerging democracy living next to several violent conflicts and trying to avoid one on its own territory. In 1994 it became the first CIS country to join the PfP. The principle document for NATO-Ukraine cooperation is the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, which was signed in Madrid in 1997. It stipulates the principles, the scope, and the mechanisms of cooperation. The Charter paved the way to establishing the key institutions for coordinating defence and security
cooperation: the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform and the NATO Liaison Office.

In 2005, after the democratic political process in Ukraine was consolidated, NATO agreed to discuss the issue of Ukraine’s accession and to start the Intensified Dialog. NATO and Ukraine maintained the Intensified Dialog for the next three years, until early 2008, when Ukrainian leadership applied for a Membership Action Plan (MAP). However, instead of a MAP, NATO offered Ukraine another substitution, called Intensive Engagement.

The term Intensive Engagement first appeared in April 2008, in the Bucharest Summit Declaration. Most significant, Article 23 of the Declaration says that Ukraine (and Georgia) “will become members of NATO”. At the same time, due to certain political and security developments, both inside and outside of Ukraine, the country was not invited to a MAP. At least in the defence sector, NATO recognized Ukraine’s significant progress. Though Ukraine was not granted MAP status, the mechanism of a MAP was de facto introduced under the name of Intensive Engagement. In order to formalize this mechanism, as well as to strengthen the mechanism of security consultations, the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership was complemented.

Ukraine noticeably benefited from the PfP programme mechanisms. Addressing the practical side of NATO-Ukraine relations, it is evident, that the NATO-Ukraine partnership encouraged building a functioning system of democratic control, developing institutions and procedures of policy, planning, and resource management in the Ministry of Defence, and improving effectiveness of command and control system in the Armed Forces. By 2010, NATO-Ukraine cooperation played an instrumental role in implementing the comprehensive reforms in Ukraine’s security sector.

Modernisation of the armed forces of Ukraine in cooperation with NATO, though incomplete, made them more relevant to security needs – both national and international: The operational chain of command has been modernised in line with experiences of NATO members such as Germany, France, the UK, and the USA; Joint Operational Command has assumed the responsibilities of three former territorial operational commands; three Army Corps, formerly controlled by the territorial operational commands, have been put under direct control of the Army Command; a new command structure, the Command of Special Operations Forces, has been created at the branch level in response to the changes in the threat environment; and the General Staff has been restructured in accordance with standards of modern military headquarters. Moreover, the NATO-Ukraine partnership was not only about documents, meetings, exercises and structural reforms. It was also about many practical cooperative mechanisms, including domestic support, resettlement, disposal of ammunition, professional development, etcetera.

Most prominent of all these activities were of course operations. The transformations facilitated Ukraine’s contribution to NATO’s peacekeeping
missions. Ukraine became the only partner country participating in all NATO operations: KFOR, ‘Active Endeavour’ in the Mediterranean (OAE), ISAF, and NTM (Iraq).

**Kosovo** At the start in 1999, Ukraine contributed to KFOR transport helicopters, and mechanized and engineer troops. Early 2010 there were some 200 peacekeepers, who served as part of the joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion and in KFOR Headquarters.

**Iraq** In 2003-2005, over 1,700 Ukrainian troops were deployed to Iraq. About 300 were deployed as CBR-protection unit in Kuwait for several months in 2003. Since March 2005, Ukraine is contributing officers to the NATO Training Mission. Its contribution in 2010 is eight officers, though it was over forty in the past.

**Afghanistan** Since 2007, Ukrainian medical personnel supports the Lithuanian-lead Provincial Reconstruction Team. In 2010 Ukrainian officers also serve in the ISAF Headquarters with ten officers, but it has been decided to raise this number to thirty.

**Mediterranean** Ukraine offers support to the NATO Operation ‘Active Endeavour’. The Ukrainian corvette URS *Ternopil* was the first ship to be deployed in June 2007, followed in the same year by the corvette URS *Lutsk*, and a frigate, the URS *Hetman Sahaidachnyi*, in the summer of 2008. Late 2009 and late 2010 the URS *Ternopil* was deployed again.

Additionally, Ukraine offers NATO an airlift, over-flight clearance, and intelligence sharing. In the 1990s Ukraine also contributed to NATO’s IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia.

The past experience of the NATO-Ukraine partnership is a success story. There is no reason why Ukraine and NATO should not continue it in the future. Continuation is both logical and desirable: in operations; in further developing interoperability and transformation (under the PfP Planning and Review Process, PARP); and in many other areas, like providing robust domestic support, disposal of obsolete ammunition, science, etcetera.

Military-technical cooperation between Ukraine and NATO countries has developed quite slowly. However, there is a great room for, and some interest in, more intensive cooperation with NATO countries in weapons development and production. The first positive signs of emerging future cooperative ties already appeared between Ukraine and France, as well as between Ukraine and the Visegrad countries. Provided that Ukraine consolidates its political emphasis on the cooperation with NATO, and improves certain financial and judicial mechanisms, it is possible to expect the improvement of cooperation with other Western countries, including the USA as well.

Utilizing Ukraine’s unique capabilities is not really a new area. Rather, it should receive a new emphasis. Ukraine has a proven capability and
experienced personnel in CBR-protection, combat engineers and military medicine. Ukrainian science and industry still possess many unique capabilities, like, for example: air transport, technical intelligence, radio and hydro location, missiles, and space satellites. Already Ukraine became the first partner country to contribute its units to the NATO Response Force (air transports, CBR-protection platoon, etc.). The Information Agency Ukrinform reports that Ukraine has been invited to join the NATO Response Force (NRF) as a partner country in 2015-2016, a spokesman for the NATO Military Committee said on 20 January 2010. Colonel Massimo Panizzi said that Ukraine would become “the first non-NATO country to join the Response Force” (TV Channel 1+1). Panizzi added that Ukraine would submit its proposals to NATO regarding its participation in the Alliance’s rapid response force at a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of the chiefs of staff on 26 January 2010. He described the move as “a significant step forward in the implementation of military reform” that NATO is expecting from Kiev “on its way” toward NATO membership. When asked if other NATO partners could join the Response Force, Panizzi said: “All partners are invited to cooperate within the framework of the process” (NIDC Weekly Media Report, 15-21 January 2010). So, greater emphasis on Ukraine’s unique capabilities makes sense and it will be just a matter of time when Ukraine will be invited by NATO to offer more of its capabilities.

These future cooperative options and contributions are about improving regional and international security by Ukraine in partnership with allies and non-members. If successful, it can be a model for a number of other emerging democracies, which have developed a distinctive practical mutually beneficial partnership with NATO beyond military diplomacy, but short of membership.

**Advancing Further**

The steps in the direction of structuring the partners in accordance with their desire to share the values and burdens of the Alliance are likely to help in making the partnership more manageable, and, consequently, more effective and efficient. At the moment, however, as Carlo Masala and Katarina Saariluoma (2006, 25-26) have noted: “Partners are placed into a partnership according to their geographical location, thereby neglecting the different contributions they are or could be making to help NATO fulfil its core missions. Current frameworks do not differentiate between countries that are security contributors (providing significant force contributions to NATO-led operations), and those that are security consumers.” To mend this problem, Prof. Masala suggested for NATO to adopt the mixed approach based on differentiating partners on geographical, as well as functional and value-based criteria. Indeed, while clearly differentiating partners according to geographical criteria, NATO seemingly hesitates to adopt a similarly clear differentiation according to its
partners’ operational and/or financial contributions. So far, opinions of officials and experts on this issue generally recognise the problem, but give different explanations and suggest different solutions for it.

In summary three major points can be indicated:

– There is a suggestion that security today “cannot rely solely on military assets and capabilities” and therefore a “truly comprehensive approach is required” (Colston, 2007: 12-14). Indeed, the invitation to participate in NATO operations can be extended to countries which do not strive to build democratic regimes (monarchies, autocracies), or to democracies which are not ready for membership or do not intend to apply for membership. As such, cooperation programmes with partners in security sector reform, in joint training of personnel, or just in maintaining political dialogue are as important modalities, as participation in operations; of which the importance for NATO should continue to be valued and recognised. If, for some reasons, an individual partner, like Georgia, Russia or Ukraine, is exceptionally important for regional security, then the proven mechanism of special (or distinctive) partnership can be initiated through a NATO-partner agreement beyond PfP and similar geographical frameworks.

– There is a concern that promotion of the practical contribution by partners through, e.g., a membership in GPI can be too sensitive for NATO. “How does NATO avoid alienating those states that are excluded and, more generally, avoid the creation of a ‘the West is best versus the rest’ syndrome that is divisive and undermines the agendas of defence and security sector reform?” It is further noted that too much emphasis on missions versus diplomacy can be detrimental to NATO image as an honest broker (Herd and Kight, 2007).

– Further broadening of the options is needed for those actively supporting NATO operations. Key partners already have the option to contribute to the NATO Response Force. More elaborated and specific venues have to be developed to regulate an access for contributing partners to NATO planning and intelligence, securing for them the appropriate channels to participate in NATO’s decision-making process.

So, at present, in 2010, the option of joining the NATO Response Force or concluding ‘distinctive partnership’ agreements are the best options available to NATO to recognise the importance of the individual partner and formally differentiate the partnership beyond the geographical criteria. However, the question remains how much NATO can give back to contributing partners in terms of security. This is clearly illustrated by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai’s comment on the question whether accepting the Ukrainian contribution to the NATO Response Force means that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty will now be applicable to Ukraine: “No, this does not mean the application of Article 5, but this also does not mean that NATO will not be able to come to help if there is an emergency situation” (Kyiv Post. 20 Jan. 2010).
Conclusion
Modern NATO has a global reach, but its effectiveness is still limited due to resource constraints and other factors. One of the factors, which define the Alliance’s effectiveness, is NATO partnership with countries all over the world. At the moment, it is widely recognised that there is a need to rationalize this framework. As the example of the Alliance’s distinctive partner Ukraine among other partners has shown over the years, in order for NATO to be more effective, its partnership on the one hand needs to better serve goals of the Alliance, but on the other hand it needs to better serve the needs of the partners – providing them with better opportunities to participate in NATO’s decision-making process and better options in receiving security rewards.

At the current stage, NATO has good chances to improve the mechanisms of cooperation. The Alliance can ensure a basis in joint planning and participation, for instance through its Response Force or through individual ‘distinctive partnership’ agreements. It can also ensure that crisis consultations with partners could provide real possibilities for concrete action. However, it is unlikely that today’s NATO will advance beyond consultations in order to resolve the concerns and expectations of key contributing partners, like Ukraine, on the issue of security guarantees. While the progress in further promoting NATO partnership will be evident soon, for the near future it will concentrate on improving the mechanisms of cooperation. The question for adequate (formal or informal) security guarantees to the active participants in NATO operations will remain for later times.

References
Chapter 2. NATO’s Role in the Consolidation of South-East Europe

Velizar Shalamanov

Steps Towards a Euro-Atlantic Community
About two decades ago, South-East Europe (SEE) was perceived as a region dominated by conflicts, policy stagnation and unwillingness for cooperation. Today, the region seems a safer and more secure place to be: the main conflicts are eliminated, some countries are already members of NATO and the EU, and things seem to be getting better. It was a long and difficult road that made all this possible. Most that was done in the region was due to the engagement of NATO and the decision of the Alliance to start out-of-area operations, such as the ones in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many people have argued that the NATO missions in SEE are problematic. However, NATO seems to be the only international organization that has significance in SEE, especially in the Balkans, as the organization is the only international actor that can help in preventing future conflicts in the region.

Over the past two decades a lot was going on in SEE. There were many conflicts that even developed into wars. Even though the number of casualties is quite high, one cannot dismiss the fact that without the NATO interventions, things could have been even worse. Many analysts referred to the region as ‘troubled’, even in the beginning of the year 2002, when most of the conflicts had already calmed down. This might be because even then there was a lot going on in the region and none of the countries had been admitted in the Alliance. Nevertheless, after 2004, the situation started to improve and cooperation between SEE-countries began to develop after the admission of Bulgaria and Romania to NATO together with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. Then in 2009, Albania and Croatia were accepted, which was a huge step ahead towards the Euro-Atlantic consolidation of the region.

There are at least three vivid examples of how the Alliance helped the region and the establishment of peace and democracy. The first one is actually the first ever out-of-area operation of NATO, SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where in 1995 there was a war, with lot of victims and refugees, caused by ‘ethnic cleansing’. Today, this country has its first non-nationalistic government. It is experiencing peace and security, which was ensured by the huge international civilian and military presence. Another example that shows how important the role of NATO is in the SEE, is Kosovo. In 1999, in Kosovo human rights violations, mass killings and violence were present. While today, after the efforts of the Alliance, Kosovo is in peace, free elections were conducted, and
the country gained international recognition – something quite hard to believe ten years ago. Last but not least is the example of Yugoslavia and the regime of Milosevic which had not ended if not for international intervention. All three examples show that without the help of NATO and other international organizations and their willingness to provide help to the region and help in its European and North-Atlantic integration, today the region would still be in conflict (Robertson, 2001).

The perception of society at large is that a lot has been achieved, but that SEE still is not at the end of the transition process, while new challenges lie ahead. The positive developments provided the opportunity to enlarge and deepen the South-East Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) Process that is considered here as the main regional instrument of consolidation of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework. Two other instruments will be looked at: first, technological cooperation, in particular in the area of command and control (or in jargon C^4ISR: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and second, the activities of NGOs. These two aspects are complementary because SEDM is going beyond pure defence matters (as is NATO itself) and in direction of operationalizing the Comprehensive Approach to security and defence that requires new C^4ISR capabilities on one hand and a new level of understanding of security and security cooperation (including on the technology level) in society. The former is a challenge for specialized agencies and industry, the latter for NGOs. Only synchronized work on political and military, technological and societal aspects of this process of change can provide a basis for success in finalizing the transition of SEE in the next five to ten years. NATO with its new Security Concept of 2010 will play a key role as it has done with the Strategic Concepts from 1991 and 1999.

Regional Cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic Context
In the beginning of the 1990s, the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and dissolution of Yugoslavia, the situation was really critical. Great powers, the UN, and the EU were not able to find a solution and political leaders from the region were not ready to propose and implement regional arrangements. NATO and US leadership stepped in with a three phases approach: (1) stop the war in Former Yugoslavia, stabilize Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, start democratization of Serbia and Montenegro with taking out President Milosevic to the tribunal in The Hague; (2) approve a common security assessment for the region, and invite in NATO countries ready to join through the Membership Action Programme (MAP); (3) improve the SEE security environment politically and militarily through several initiatives. Most of these were in the framework of PfP, established by NATO in 1994.
The Key to integration is the South-East Europe Defence Ministerial, which is based on both regional ownership and a NATO role (including US support). It is therefore important to consider other forms of cooperation in the SEDM format, which together contribute to the further consolidation of SEE security. In addition, the SEDM provides positive influence on Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, being participants in the process. Political, operational and mil-to-mil cooperation through NATO involvement were after 1999 followed by Stability Pact activities, led by the EU containing many NGO programs as well. The South-East Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities (SEECAP, 2001) was a serious achievement to provide a basis for the implementation of stabilization and good neighbourly relations.

The process started in early 1990s as the strategic reorientation of the countries of the former Eastern Block towards NATO and the EU led to a considerable geopolitical restructuring of the European political space. In the beginning, the instability and tensions confirmed the principle of security as the main priority for stability in the region. This led to the SEDM Process, which began with a meeting of six Ministers of Defence in Tirana (Albania), in March 1996. Currently there are twelve full SEDM member states: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Ukraine and the USA. The four SEDM observer nations are: Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, and Serbia. The SEDM structure is presented below:
The activities within the SEDM are developed with the idea to strengthen politico-military cooperation and to enhance stability and security in SEE by:

- Promoting regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations
- Strengthening regional defence capabilities as well as cooperation through collective efforts
- Establishing links to facilitate the integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions and organizations.

Among the SEDM initiatives, one that carries the most significant prominence is the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE), established with the MPFSEE agreement, also known as the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG). The Brigade consists of a land force that acts on an on-call basis and has an operational nucleus staff. In 1999, an Engineering Task Force was added to provide capability for disaster relief operations. The SEDM's objectives are directly focussed on SEE consolidation from a security perspective and include the improvement of the member states interoperability; Euro-Atlantic integration of the SEDM member states; and the facilitation of SEEBRIG employment in peace support operations.

In 2004 Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia, and later, in 2010, Albania and Croatia joined NATO and practically all other nations in SEE are part of MAP (except Serbia, which is not interested in joining). Moreover, KFOR is in Kosovo (even though not recognized by all NATO members). So the political and military dimension of consolidation has significantly progressed. Now we could consider another key challenge the technological integration of the SEE NATO-members in the Euro-Atlantic domain from Alaska to the eastern border of Turkey.

It is clear that for SEE NATO-members the adaptation of military capabilities is much more difficult than it is for the long-standing NATO-members. Most of these nations first have to deal with the challenge of converting existing national military capabilities to be interoperable with NATO and also to develop new ones to meet the minimum requirements for collective defence and expeditionary operations. The challenge for the NATO partners is even higher. What is really missing, and we now face challenges because of it, is the technological level of cooperation to provide real capabilities for integrated air, maritime, border security, emergency management, and a capacity for expeditionary operations. These challenges are not of a technological origin only, but are also related to the development of industry, quality of acquisition and program management processes and the integrity of governance.

The role of NATO in this new area is threefold: political encouragement through Secretary General leadership and NAC decisions; military advice through JFC Naples and Brunssum; technological and programmatic support from the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) in defining and implementing critical C^4ISR regional projects. This process should be
matched with public awareness and support. It even demands to effectively achieve the required minimal capability in a cooperative and clean environment.

**Cooperation in C^4ISR**

The success of NATO missions increasingly depends on sophisticated C^4ISR capabilities and the ability to integrate national and NATO owned systems. The costs of the capabilities and their integration with NATO can be significant and national defence budgets are coming under increasing pressure. In order to square this potentially vicious circle, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has called for multinational cooperation and a smarter use of available funding. “Making savings includes doing more together, and that will deepen the solidarity between Allies”, he recently said (NATO News, 5 Feb 2010). With the current security challenges, especially in the area of Cyber Defence, Missile Defence and Energy Security, it is obvious that nations need to pool their resources facing these new threats. Nations need to act in line with Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lester Pearson’s observation from 1949: “peace and freedom can be secured only if those who love peace and freedom pool their resources and stand together” (quoted by Secretary General Rasmussen; NATO Speeches & Transcripts, 2010).

During the last SEDM Ministerial in Sofia in October 2009, host nation Bulgaria proposed the concept of a project for C^4 Cooperation in South East Europe (C^4ICSE). Its main objective is the enhancement of security and confidence building and improvement of interoperability amongst SEDM nations. As stated at the SEDM Coordination Committee on 24 March 2010 in Sofia, there is urgent need to harmonize current projects or transfer current projects in to the C^4ICSE, e.g. transfer of South Eastern European Simulation Network (SEESIM) into South-Eastern European Education and Training Network (SEEETN). Management of the C^4ICSE Project could be under the SEDM process when endorsed by the Ministers in Tirana in October 2010. The aim would be to identify the C^4ISR requirements amongst the nations, which could differ between countries.

NATO could support the process by offering the potential role of Executive Agency to itsNC3A to coordinate the management of activities funded by the participating countries. These countries would then retain financial accountability for inputs to the joint projects/programs. It must be noted that, even though a project or program is adopted under the SEDM umbrella, it does not imply that all members are required to participate, only those with a common interest and appropriate resources. As the Executive Agency for the SEDM, NC3A could play an important role in the capabilities review package for SEEBRIG as well and provide that C^4ISR systems of the brigade to become reference for tactical C2 systems. It could also guarantee the interoperability
required for the NATO Response Force contribution as well as for the contingents involved in NATO operations.

The mission of the NC3A is to “enable NATO’s success through the unbiased provision of comprehensive Consultation, Command & Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities”. The word ‘comprehensive’ has been added to NC3A’s mission statement to explicitly recognize the fact that NATO’s success will be increasingly dependent on the capability of NATO agencies, and in particular for NC3A, to deliver coherent, high quality C4ISR capabilities to the whole security sector. NC3A works to efficiently and transparently leverage different sources of funding for the benefit of NATO member states, and addresses the needs and requirements of not just the Ministry of Defence but the larger integrated security sector. It covers, in partnership with other NATO agencies and entities, all aspects of the capability provisioning life-cycle, from the identification of the requirement to the continued support and upgrade of the delivered capability. Also the new NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is now taking into account non-military disciplines or domains, such as Air Traffic Management, Military Medical, Research & Technology, Logistics, and Civil Emergency Planning (NATO C3 Agency Strategic Plan 2011 – 2013, 2010).

The NATO C4ISR Comprehensive Approach takes into consideration the different functional areas (Land Forces, Air Forces, Maritime Forces, Special Operations Forces, Intelligence, Logistics, CBRN, Joint/general functions), having in mind a ‘joint’ approach, in adherence with the principles of the NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC). The NNEC ‘joint’ vision provides that the acquisition of a capability for a specific force (for example, the Air Force) takes into consideration from the start its integration with the other forces, in order to avoid stove-pipe acquisitions and systems which are not able to integrate to form a common operational picture and situational awareness. In addition, the NNEC speaks in terms of ‘Services’ and not ‘Technologies’, favours the adoption of common (NATO if possible) standards for better and wider interoperability amongst the member states, and the building of services using a modular approach in order to leverage on existing services and to avoid reinventing the wheel each time. This is the paradigm of Service Oriented Architectures (SOA), which is an integrating part of the NNEC (NATO C4ISR Comprehensive Approach, 2010).

As a tool to foster multinational cooperation and opportunities, NC3A has conducted international Chief Information Officers (CIO) Conferences. These regional conferences bring together national CIOs and NATO leaders with the objective to facilitate C4ISR interoperability amongst the countries through a wider adoption of NATO Standards and wider adherence to NNEC principles and roadmaps. The aim is to conduct at least one CIO International Conference per year with the location varying between the South-Eastern European region.
and the Central/North-Eastern European region. The first CIO Conference took place on 24 and 25 February 2010 in Sofia, Bulgaria.

The NC3A Industry conference provides a venue to meet with the industry of NATO nations and to exchange information on upcoming projects and acquisition activities. The CIO International Conference and the Industry Conference includes high-level participation from key NATO organizations or bodies such as the Allied Command for Transformation (ACT), Allied Command for Operations (ACO), the Infrastructure Committee, the International Staff (IS), and NC3A.

At the programme, portfolio and project (P3) management level, NC3A established a P3 environment, which permits and provides traceability of the programme of work over the life cycle of the projects and monitors the progress of the projects. This allows a stringent control over the time, scope and cost aspects of project management. Relatively unique among NATO entities is the fact that NC3A employs a Time Accounting System (TAS). TAS entries allow NC3A to measure and monitor monthly ‘productivity’ at the individual and group levels. The Project management, time accounting and the accounting systems are integrated in an overall management information system. The overall system for monitoring and control includes oversight and guidance by a P3 Board composed of NC3A senior staff. In January 2010, NC3A published its C⁴ISR catalogue – a compendium of expertise and services provided by the Agency in all domains of C⁴ISR, with the intent to provide the nations a description of what the Agency does in order to support NATO member states and to facilitate multinational cooperation (NC3A C⁴ISR Catalogue, 2010).

Closer cooperation between SEDM and NC3A is a very good example of the NATO role in the further consolidation of SEE in the area of new technologies as a basis for better and a cooperative way of developing capabilities for lower costs to the taxpayers.

The Role of NGOs

The last twenty years were the period of transition from the Cold War arrangements in SEE to integration in the Euro-Atlantic space from Alaska to the eastern border of Turkey. The process is not finished yet, but we can say it was shaped by the NATO framework. However, the process of change is larger than security sector reform and includes a shift in attitudes, perceptions, culture, the development of a Western type civil society that has an active role in governance, also when security policy and capabilities development are concerned.

In this sense the role of NGOs and university research centres has been and will be quite important. NATO was able to set up a framework through Science for Peace (SfP) and Security through Science programs. The PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Study Institutes created a large
enough network of experts. At a smaller scale, the NATO Defence College, the George C. Marshall Centre, and the NATO School contributed to building capacity in civil society. The main focus of these institutions is education and training of people in administration and military, but they start to be more open to civil society year by year. Even the EU in its Framework Programme 7 (FP7) established the ‘Security’ theme in its horizontal research program and is thinking to link security and defence research in FP8. In parallel there are two NGOs – DCAF and CESS – that are highly recognized in SEE with their contribution.

While DCAF is focusing on research and consulting on parliament and government level, CESS, being closely related to the University of Groningen and part of a large NGO network, is contributing more to the preparation of the next generation and building capacity in local SEE NGOs. Being situated in the Netherlands, the centre is combining very effectively Dutch funding with NATO and EU sources to ‘export’ knowledge to SEE and to acquire through field experience and closer cooperation with local NGOs a unique understanding of the processes in this part of Europe. An effective internship programme is contributing to a flow of information between the CESS and SEE academic institutions and NGOs.

Key topics in the last 10-15 years are transparency, accountability, civilian/democratic control, good governance at large, and recently integrity-building in defence institutions. Regional cooperation and development of security policy are other topics of interest to NGOs. Step by step the issues of intelligence services, police (including border police), and emergency management services were covered by projects and contributed a lot to develop knowledge and understanding in SEE. This was reflected in new legislation and implementation of good practices in governance and management (ESCADA Report, 2003).

Problems of defence procurement were addressed through a special study by Willem van Eekelen with DCAF, which was further developed in the research of CESS. Still there is a lack of publications on the role of technology and the industrial base for security. As an example: in the US National Defense University there is the Information Resource Management College, Industrial College and Centre for NS and Technology Studies – something lacking in Europe and for sure missed in the SEE consolidation process. It is a challenge for NGOs to address this problem, which is technical only at first glance. If we really try to implement a comprehensive approach to this topic, it will prove to be critical for security, stability, economic development and as a result for the further consolidation of SEE.
A New NATO Strategic Concept and the Consolidation of SEE

At the end of 2010 we will have a new NATO Strategic Concept to replace the one of 1999 (NATO Official Texts, 2010). The last eleven years were years of many changes, including in SEE. Currently we have a clear perspective of practically the whole region to be integrated in NATO and later in the EU. But as we know from the experience of Bulgaria and Romania, this will not solve all the problems of transition in one night (the one of celebration). In parallel with the new strategy of the Alliance, active political dialogue and military cooperation, the efforts for technological integration will be required in order to face emerging security challenges – especially in SEE and the Black Sea region. In other words, we need a new level in the integration process and respectively a new area for NGOs and academic institutions to prepare society.

SEE and Central Eastern Europe (CEE) are different, but not as much as SEE and Western Europe. Having in mind the successful transition of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary it is good to consider close technological cooperation between these two regions as well as NGO cooperation in the NATO/EU framework. Later on, the transfer of experience between SEE and the Black Sea region will be growing. CESS is well situated to support this process. At the same time, NC3A will play a critical role in technology integration of the SEDM C^4SIR systems and their further integration into the NATO federation of systems, both territorially and for expeditionary operations. Having in mind that a large part of NC3A is located in The Hague, gives additional stimulus for CESS to bring the technological integration aspect in the transition process.

The New Strategic Concept will call for a comprehensive approach, missile defence, partnership and an open door policy and a readiness to address emerging security challenges. For SEE it will require closer NATO and EU cooperation, technological integration of the nations in the region with more multinational projects on a regional base or within a larger NATO/EU context. Again, NATO will provide the framework and instruments, but NGOs as CESS have to be able to provide societal awareness and public support and even demand for new ways to implement new technologies in a cooperative way in order to have both better capabilities and healthy, competitive industry, working in environment of integrity of governance. We cannot expect to succeed anywhere in the world if we are not able to finalize the consolidation of SEE and its full integration in Euro-Atlantic space.

Current positive developments on the level of political and military consolidation of SEE is giving us the opportunity in the light of the New NATO Strategic Concept to look more actively to the area of technological consolidation through the process of cooperative development of capabilities. To succeed in this area, as was required for the political and defence reforms, we will need a new endeavour from NGOs to prepare society for this challenge. A challenge that is more complex and controversial in times of financial
difficulties. The SEDM could move this process forward supported by NATO bodies such as NC3A and with the contribution from civil society.

References


Chapter 3. Turkey’s Alignment with NATO. Identity and Power Politics

Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu

This chapter seeks to explain Turkey’s alignment with NATO after the Second World War. Attempts to explain Turkey’s alliance behaviour have so far remained within the framework of (neo)realist theory. Although such an approach is not completely irrelevant, the reality is more complex. Turkey has a deep-rooted national security culture which reflects a problematic identity as well as a tradition of realpolitik. Both dimensions of Turkey’s strategic culture have had an impact on its NATO membership. This chapter will answer the question why Turkey aligned with NATO after the Second World War. The first two sections will be devoted to a brief survey of the theory and a brief examination of Turkey’s national security culture and its identity. The rest of the chapter will explain Turkey’s alliance behaviour with reference to (neo)realism and culturalism. This will include Turkey’s growing activism in the alliance despite the demise of the Soviet Union.

Realism and Culturalism in Alliance Theory

Mainstream alliance theory is based on (neo)realist assumptions. It takes actor identities for granted and usually treats cultural factors as irrelevant. Material capabilities, military and economic, are the main constitutive element of the international system and alliances are caused by power imbalances, threats or struggle for survival.

However, radical systemic changes in the Soviet Union and the resurgence of ethnicity after the Cold War induced scholars to question the relevance of realist approaches for understanding and explaining contemporary international affairs. Recent neoclassical realist writers argue that there are possibilities of ‘cross-fertilization’ between culturalists and realists (Glenn 2009, 523-551). Events also encouraged scholars to promote cultural explanations for state behaviour, including national security policies (Desch 1998, 144-150; Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999). Katzenstein and his colleagues emphasize culture and identity as important determinants of national security policy. They argue that states define their security interests by responding to cultural factors.

Identities in an international system provide each state not only with a certain understanding of the ‘self’, but also with an understanding of other states, their interests, roles and motives (Hopf 1998, 193). Differently put, definitions of identity depend on a distinction, and possible conflict, between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, implying definitions of threat and security interest. State behaviour,
including responses to threats, is determined by the state’s identity which is intersubjectively constructed in relation to other states’ identities. Consequently, this conceptual linkage between identity and threat has considerable effects on national security policies and alliance patterns (Katzenstein 1996, 18-19). In other words, it is not the threat in objective terms, but a shared perception resulting from the similarity of identities which brings about an alliance. Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that alliances such as NATO coalesce around shared norms and a common identity rather than responding to mutual threats. NATO, he further argues, “represents an institutionalization of the transatlantic security community based on common values and a collective identity of liberal democracies” (Risse-Kappen 1996, 395). Shared norms and regulative practices, such as consultation and consensus-building, affect interaction processes among democratic allies and strengthen a common identity (Risse-Kappen 1996, 369). Furthermore, the security community argument allows the prediction that NATO will persist despite the disappearance of a mutual threat.

Turkey’s Security Culture and Problematic Identity
In the past two decades Ottoman/Turkish historiography began to dwell on change and continuity between the Empire and the Republic, instead of earlier scholarship which emphasized a radical break with the Empire (Deringil 1987; Zürcher 1993). From the ongoing debate it is possible to extrapolate a significant degree of continuity in Turkey’s security culture despite the radical republican reforms. Continuity is observable in a certain tradition of realpolitik as well as in identity problems reflected in Westernization and Western-oriented policies. In the Ottoman Empire, the security culture evolved from an offensive realpolitik to a defensive one. The latter continues to dominate the foreign policy and defence planning in the Turkish Republic. The process of modernization had two interrelated aspects: (1) state reform, and (2) integration in the European state system. These policies led to the imperial elite’s, and later the republican elite’s, opening up to European ideas and values and eventually to a comprehensive policy of Westernization which realized a breakthrough with the Atatürkist reforms (Karaosmanoğlu 2009, 27-46).

Modern Turkey, however, has been the principal heir of Ottoman diplomatic tradition. The Republic inherited the imperial bureaucratic and military elite, who did not carry the psychological burden of colonialism and was never anti-West in the sense in which former colonies of Western powers were. The young republic confined itself to Anatolia and Eastern Thrace where the majority of the population was Turkish-speaking, and repudiated revisionist doctrines such as pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism. A certain distrust towards the West, however, was a notably lingering trend, given the imperialistic behaviour of Great Power bargaining over a third party.
Another Ottoman legacy was the balance of power diplomacy pursued by the republican elite, who often sought support from an outside power to counter the threat of another. For instance, during the war of independence from 1919 to 1922, the Ankara government received military, financial and diplomatic support from Soviet Russia against the occupying powers. When Moscow became an imminent threat to Turkey following the Second World War, Ankara sought diplomatic support from the United States and Britain. This resulted in American economic and military assistance in accordance with the Truman doctrine. Turkey had declared war on Germany to qualify for participation at the San Francisco Conference of April-June 1945 which laid the foundation of the United Nations. When the new world order was to be defined by Western democracies Turkey had serious doubts about the conformity of Western designs with its own interests. That the Allies would accommodate the Soviet Union by acknowledging spheres of influence had not fared in Turkish diplomatic calculations. Now that the Soviet Union was one of the Allies, Turkey's suspicion over whether it might be subject of bargaining aroused its traditional fear of abandonment (Gardener 1994).

The Ottoman Empire's experience with Russia greatly influenced the Turkish Republic's approach to security matters. The emergence of Russia as a great power in the 18th century brought about a significant change in the European balance of power to the detriment of the Ottoman Empire. This image softened somewhat after the Bolshevik Revolution and during the Turkish War of Independence. Despite the common interests that brought about this rapprochement between Turkey and Soviet Russia, their policies differed in a fundamental way. The new Turkish leaders pursued Western-oriented reformist policies and they had no intention to adopt a Marxist-Leninist socio-economic system. Furthermore, Atatürk never ceased to show his distrust of communism and despite his friendship with Moscow, he pursued an anti-communist policy within Turkey.

Given the rigors of transition from the empire to the republic and the security culture predicated upon the ruling elite who witnessed the demise of the Empire, continuity of distrust with the North as well as the West was perhaps inevitable. Turkey was not about to feel at ease until it joined a serious and structured military alliance, NATO, in 1952. In general, the Cold War froze previous security concerns. But Turkey's distrust toward Europe does not result only from its long experience as part of the European balance of power but also, and probably more significantly, from the fact that Turkish and European identities have been constructed through an intersubjective process which can be defined in terms of a 'self and other' dichotomy. Since there is an interaction between identity and security interest, threat formation depends upon the definition of the 'self' and of the 'other'. Turkey's identity formation can be traced back to relations between European states and the Ottoman Empire. Turkey's long Westernization process on the one hand, and its tapered but
insurmountable Islamic and Eastern characteristics on the other, have resulted in a complicated and ambivalent identity.

Through wars, alliances, and economic policies, the Ottomans became significantly involved in the continent’s international affairs. Their state was formally included in the European state system after the Crimean War by the Treaty of Paris in 1856: “That simple formality codified a century and a half of precedent, embedded in an even longer process.” But the Ottoman state was never fully accepted as an integral part of the European system. European statesmen and political theorists consciously or unconsciously assumed that the European balance of power was a culturally homogenous system and that the Ottoman state, representing a different culture, could at best be “an irregular and peripheral member of the European framework” (Gulick 1967, 10-18).

Joining NATO
The classical arguments explaining Turkey’s quest for NATO membership emphasize the ‘Soviet threat’ as the main determinant. However, the notion of an unqualified ‘Soviet threat’ acting only as an international constraint, isolated from Turkey’s historical and cultural milieu, cannot by itself explain Ankara’s position. The ‘threat’ of growing Soviet power would, and in fact did trigger a Turkish response in general terms. But it did not determine the nature of the response. Ankara’s way of perceiving this threat and its ensuing choice of NATO membership, among other alternative policies, can only be understood by reference to Turkey’s national security culture and its problematic identity.

It is commonly argued that an important cause of Turkey’s alignment with the Western block were Stalin’s demands for a joint Turkish-Soviet defence arrangement for the Straits, compounded by territorial claims over the Turkish provinces Kars and Ardahan on the Caucasian border (Vali 1971, 173). At first sight, it is impossible to refute Ankara’s perception of a Soviet threat. After the Second World War, Turkish policy-makers focused on the Soviet Union which, in their eyes, could constitute an effective threat given its geographical proximity, the capabilities at its disposal, and Turkey’s own past experience with imperial Russia. This Turkish concern was confirmed by Moscow’s demands toward Ankara. The Turks, therefore, could hardly interpret Moscow’s actions on the assumptions that the Soviet Union would behave peacefully and without any intention to extend its sphere of influence at the expense of Turkey. It is, however, important to elucidate the nature and extent of the threat.

Immediately after the Second World War, Western countries regarded the Soviet Union as their wartime ally. Therefore, the Western governments did not expect the Soviet Union to enlarge its own sphere of influence (Gaddis 1997, 32). The Western governments did not take a firm stand against Soviet intentions, even when those intentions became obvious. This led to Turkey’s feeling of insecurity when faced with Soviet pressures, because there was no
firm Western commitment to Turkey. Based on the historical experiences of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey thought that it could again be subject for bargaining between great powers.

The United States regarded Soviet policy toward Turkey as an issue between Britain and the Soviet Union and, on 29 June 1945, declared its policy toward Turkey in a report. According to this report, because of its geographical position, Turkey had always been “an area of diplomatic, economic and military conflict between Britain and the USSR”. This raised Turkish anxieties that Turkey could be abandoned by the West, which meant that it would assume a Middle Eastern identity, and remain as a country vulnerable to pressures from both blocks. This feeling of insecurity led Ankara to criticize US policy and claim that the Soviet Union was a serious threat (FRUS 1945, Vol. 1, 1029-1030).

On 2 August 1945, the Postdam Protocol provisions concerning the Black Sea Straits were signed at Berlin. Significantly, the USA, the UK and the USSR agreed that the Montreux Convention should be revised since it failed to meet present-day conditions. It was also agreed that the next step in this matter should be the subject of direct conversations between the three governments and the Turkish government (FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, 1236-1237). In August and September 1946, the Soviet Union sent two diplomatic notes to Turkey regarding the revision of the Montreux Convention. Both notes were rejected by Turkey with American and British support. The latter two had been amenable to revision, provided that the issue was discussed at an international conference; but the Soviets, by insisting on bilateral talks with Turkey on the matter, caused the USA and Britain to change their course.

In 1946, the US government announced that it would have a permanent naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean (Campbell 1960, 5, 32). Turkey was gaining in importance for the United States, because its firm stance against the Soviets showed that it would be a barrier to Soviet expansionism in the Near and Middle East. From a general perspective, American Cold War psychology corresponded with Turkey’s long-term policies. If one of these policies was to avoid diplomatic and military isolation, another was its quest for Westernization. Turkey’s NATO membership would strengthen the country’s Western identity as well as its position in Europe by adding an institutionalized transatlantic dimension to its security policy (Athanassopoulos 1999, 108-110, 145). Turkey’s recognition as a European state had become “almost a matter of honour” for the Democrat Party Government after 1950 (Athanassopoulos 1999, 242).

On 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. The Turkish government, once again, expressed its willingness to join. Inclusion of Italy, a Mediterranean country, and territory in North Africa comprising the Algeria departments of France in the scope of NATO, led to increased Turkish objections and public uneasiness. Turkey felt abandoned, because the USA pledged, in terms of Article 5 of the Washington treaty, to come to the aid of
Western European countries in case of attack, but such a guarantee was not offered to Turkey (FRUS 1949, Vol. VI, 1652).

Most scholars agree that Turkey’s decision to send 4,500 soldiers in 1950 to assist the UN/USA war effort in Korea was prompted by its desire to join NATO. One concern was to eradicate its image as an unreliable ally, because Turkey had declared non-belligerency in the Second World War despite its treaty alliance of 1939 with Britain and France (Turan and Barlas 1998, 647-662). The Korean War, then, was a propitious occasion to demonstrate that Turkey was ready to assume and execute military obligations.

While both Greece and Turkey wanted to join NATO, European members of the alliance, especially the British and Scandinavians, objected to their admission for ideological as well as practical reasons. As a Muslim country Turkey did not belong in a Euro-Atlantic block, and the frontiers to protect would stretch to the Caucasus, making burden sharing more burdensome (Vali 1971, 116-120).

The question of Turkey’s policy in case of a future war was the main reason for the USA and its allies’ acceptance of Turkey’s full membership in NATO. They feared that Turkey, with a vital strategic importance, might remain neutral in case of a war with the Soviet Union. Since Turkey had no means to defend itself against a Soviet attack, it could even make concessions to the Soviet Union, which would hamper defensive policies of the USA. The best way to guarantee Turkey’s alliance with the West was to include it in NATO (Gönülüböl 1971, 1-38). After its contributions to the Korean War, Turkey could choose neutrality because of disappointment with the West. The same question was asked by the Turkish Foreign Minister during his Washington visit in April 1949: “Why should Turkey take such risk if the USA would not promise to defend it? Why provoke the Kremlin if the Soviets might otherwise avoid war with Turkey, like they had done during World War II?” (Leffler 1992, 289-290). Finally, on 15 May 1951, Washington proposed NATO membership to Greece and Turkey. Both acceded to the Atlantic Alliance on 16 February 1952. Turkey’s national security policies thus became embedded in the Western alliance.

Alternatives to NATO

Nevertheless, there were alternatives to the Western military alliance. Neutrality was certainly an option. It could help to reassure Moscow and reduce Turkey’s vulnerability. Learning theory argues that states ally or refrain from alliances based on the previous formative experience in war (Reiter 1994, 490-526). By this token, since neutrality served Turkey fairly well in the Second World War, one might think that Ankara would have stayed neutral in its aftermath. If one takes into account a longer period of historical experience, however, Turkey’s security culture, formed since 1878, shaped its preference for a serious and lasting military alliance. In essence, neutrality would increase Turkey’s isolation
even further. The Turkish elite plausibly concluded that neutrality would be of no avail given its geostrategic position. Neutrality definitely would not provide immunity against trespassing and against the Soviet violations of the Montreux Convention.

Non-alignment might be another option. There were similarities between Turkey and the Third World countries: Turkey was underdeveloped; the Turkish Republic had emerged from a conflict with the European powers; and Turkey's War of Independence and Atatürk's reforms had presented a model to Third World countries. Ankara, like other non-aligned capitals, was very jealous of its own independence. The distinctive characteristic of Turkey, however, was that its national security culture was not imbued with a colonial past. Non-aligned countries viewed their policies as the expression of 'real' independence. They felt the necessity to demonstrate that their independence, recently obtained from colonial powers, was not nominal but real. Thus the exercise of this independence “could be put in evidence by the regime's refusal of formal alignment which presented the danger of the renewed control of the strong over the weak and meant a renewed loss of voice and identity” (Korany 1976, 271). Yet the Turkish Republic had inherited a security culture which was heavily inspired by realpolitik and balance of power practices. Moreover, Turkey had an identity problem which it traditionally tended to overcome not by distancing from the West but by joining the West.

Assuming a role solely in a Middle East defence formation was not appealing to Turkey either. Apart from its quest for Westernization, the Turkish elite did consider their country not belonging to the Middle East except as a geographical extension. To be part of a Middle East collective defence arrangement, albeit with Western participation, would have imposed upon Turkey a Middle Eastern identity, something which Ankara wanted to avoid. Consequently, Ankara did not accept the British idea of making Turkey's NATO membership conditional upon its inclusion in the Middle East Command and did convince Washington about the impracticability of such a proposal. Finally, Turkey was integrated into the European Command of General Eisenhower instead of the Middle East Command (Athanassopoulou 1999, 230). It is to be noted that, during the Cold War, Turkey never was favourable to the extension of NATO's area of responsibility to the Middle East and Persian Gulf region. Nevertheless, it did not see any problem in joining the Middle East security organizations, completely separate from the Atlantic Alliance, such as the Baghdad Pact and CENTO.

Exogenous realities as conceived in light of Turkey's national security culture as well as its problematic identity came to a full cycle and brought about Ankara's choice of alliance. It was not the Soviet threat or demands per se which caused Turkey to seek NATO membership. The Soviet demands had begun to fade away five years before Ankara's admission to the Atlantic Alliance. Nonetheless, the geographic proximity of the Soviet Union, its
offensive capabilities such as air power, and Soviet assertiveness, when combined with Western complacency towards Turkey, revived the fear of abandonment ingrained in Turkey’s strategic culture. This feeling of strategic vulnerability was the core of Ankara’s threat perception after the Second World War. Neutrality or non-alignment would not be an acceptable option for Ankara, because both would imply self-isolation. Although the Soviet option would help overcome isolation, it would distance Turkey from the West, hence was equally unacceptable. A Middle East collective defence arrangement or the Middle East Command would bring Turkey’s precarious Middle Eastern identity to the forefront, although it could provide a security guarantee from Britain, and even the United States. While a realist case for the impact of international constraints – Soviet power and assertiveness, and the fear of isolation – on the formation of Turkey’s security policy can be made, Ankara’s decisiveness to join a specific alliance, which was NATO, derived mostly from a profound belief in Western values and in the virtues of Western political systems. Exclusion of the Soviet and non-aligned options, as well as the Middle Eastern option, did not result primarily from international constraints, but rather from a combination of the peculiarities proper to Turkish identity and the heterogeneity of the bipolar system. Options other than NATO would imply for Turkey the abandonment of its Western orientation. On the contrary, NATO membership would solidify its Western orientation by establishing a long-lasting institutional and functional link with the West. As Bernard Lewis puts it: “The Turkish alignment with the West is not limited to strategic and diplomatic considerations. It is the outward expression of a profound internal change extending over a century and a half of Turkish history and sustained attempt to endow the Turkish people with these freedoms, economic, political and intellectual, which represent the best that our Western societies have to offer” (Lewis 1990, 15). “NATO membership solidified Ankara’s Western orientation by establishing a long-lasting institutional and functional link with the West” (Karaosmanoğlu 2000, 209; Yılmaz and Bilgin 2005-2006, 39-59).

The Interplay of Realism and Culture
This chapter does not take an a priori stance on the debate between realism and culturalism. The challenge of culturalism or the relevance of realism should not be defined in absolute terms. Michael C. Desch asserts that the key question is “whether the new strategic culturalism supplants or supplements realist explanations” (1998, 143). The problem, however, is more complicated than Desch’s forthright statement. As Katzenstein puts it, “without a particular political problem or a well-specified research question, it makes little sense to privilege cultural context over material forces. By the same logic, it makes little sense to make the opposite mistake, focusing exclusively on material resources or assuming that state identities can be taken for granted” (Katzenstein 1996,
499). Simply put, the problem is not whether culture and identity matter in alliance theory, but rather where, when and how they supplant or supplement realist explanations. This way of posing the problem implies that culture and identity are empirical questions to be analyzed within a historical context and in relation to specific issues.

The explanation of the initial response of Turkey to Moscow’s highly assertive policy after the Second World War could well be based on the realist notions of balance of power, balance of threat or survival. The reality, however, was more complex and could not be convincingly explained just in terms of the (neo)realist theory. The external world constituted only a part of the reality. What was at least equally significant was the interpretation of that reality through the prism of the Turkish elite’s national security culture, emphasizing Moscow’s centuries-old geopolitical ambitions and Turkey’s traditional fear of abandonment. It would, however, be a mistake to draw a sharp distinction between culturalism and realism. In the Turkish case, the former has developed to a great extent as a result of a long practice of realpolitik, and in response to international factors. In return, the national security culture affected Turkey’s threat perceptions and alliance behaviour. The main threat, in the Turkish case, was isolation or abandonment in the face of Soviet power. In this sense, culture shaped Turkey’s sensibilities and refined the explanatory value of realism by qualifying the threat perceived by Ankara. But, at the same time, it blurred the demarcation line between realism and culturalism.

As A.I. Johnston suggests, “a wide variety of disparate societies may share a similar realpolitik strategic culture. This strategic culture may have an observable effect on state behaviour, but contrary to much of the existing literature on strategic culture; it may not be unique to any particular state” (Johnston 1995, 33). This statement implies that the link between national security culture and strategic behaviour is vague and that culture may not have a direct independent effect on strategic behaviour. In other words, in this context, culture does not supplant but, at best, supplements the neorealist alliance theory. Indeed, this was the case when Turkey found itself in a vulnerable position after the Second World War. Ankara’s evaluation of the Cold War environment was indirectly affected by its realpolitik culture.

The Cold War international environment combined with Turkey’s realpolitik security culture determined Ankara’s perception of a certain threat, but it did not determine Ankara’s choice of NATO membership. Turkey’s national security culture reflects not only a tradition of realpolitik, but also a deep-rooted problematic identity. Since the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has gradually adopted Western institutions and values. Moreover, the Turkish elite has hankered for making their country an integral and equal member of the Western community of nations. Thus, Turkey’s centuries-old Western vocation had a direct, independent and societal-specific effect on Ankara’s choice of NATO membership. At that level, culturalism supplanted neorealism.

45
Turkey has remained strongly committed to NATO after the Cold War. Moreover, it has enthusiastically participated in the Alliance’s efforts of adaptation to new circumstances. From a (neo)realist standpoint, this can be explained by Russia’s uncertainties and other instabilities originating from neighbouring countries, and also by Turkey’s desire to remain in a structured institutional security relationship with the United States and the West-European allies. Although this (neo)realist explanation reflects only one of the aspects of Turkey’s continuing alignment with NATO, it is far from being adequate to explain Ankara’s new activism within NATO.

First of all, NATO membership continues to be a cornerstone of Turkey’s Western identity. Therefore, Ankara is not willing to give it up. Although there are at present a number of problematic issues, such as the decreased relevance of Article 5 commitments, they do not overshadow the positive identity that Turkey has developed with the West through NATO. Furthermore, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme of NATO in which Turkey actively takes part, is a process of socialization through which the Alliance projects its values and norms to its partners. Therefore, Ankara’s active participation in the implementation of the PfP programs as an old member of the Alliance makes it an active promoter of Western values and, in return, promotes Turkey’s own identification with the West. Turkey’s participation in peace operations such as ISAF also produces the same effect.

With the end of the Cold War, culture and identity have undoubtedly become more salient in security affairs. Consequently, interactions between security interests and cultural factors have become increasingly significant in explaining alliance politics. NATO’s identity-constructing and identity-consolidating functions have come to the forefront. The Central and East-European countries’ accession to NATO mainly fulfils their need of identification with the West. On the other hand, however, it would be a mistake to ignore the risks and uncertainties emanating directly from the post-Cold War environment, including Russia’s perceived uncertainties which have also motivated the Central and East-European countries’ search for NATO membership.

The Turkish case suggests that a multi-perspective methodology, legitimating diverse theoretical approaches, would enhance the explanatory relevance of a study on the alliance politics. Against one-sided positions, the Turkish case suggests that a combination of (neo)realism and culturalism would more convincingly explain states’ alliance behaviour. The Turkish case confirms that we should seek to avoid the characteristic deficiencies of neorealism that result from an excessively mechanical view of international affairs and, also, from a generalizing political discourse that ignores differences. On the other hand, however, we should not adopt an extremist view of identity politics that overlooks any realist concept. Both (neo)realism and culturalism have merits and limitations. Neither of them can provide a convincing explanatory framework by excluding the other.
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This chapter deals with America’s self-image and American perceptions of Europe after the Second World War. Masses of Americans traversed Europe, some as tourists, others as GIs providing security, still others as diplomats bringing nations together or businessmen searching out opportunities. Together they explored the space of other and self. Post-war Europe confronted Americans with their own identity as much as with the realities of other cultures. The process of Americanization was not a one-sided affair, but one of mutual influences.

The questions raised in this chapter mostly deal with diplomacy. How American or un-American did the US government and American diplomats in Europe consider the old continent to be? And how European was America? What, if anything, did Americans think was needed to overcome political differences?

Good to be beaten?
At the time, Germany struggled hard to cope with the fate of a humiliated and divided country. The moral guilt for the death of millions of Jewish and other innocent civilians weighed heavily. The born-again democrats in Germany bent over backwards to prove that they could do better for their country than the Nazis. The people worked long days and weeks to regain a fair degree of wealth, (self-)respect, and independence, and to forget the recent past. It was not easy to lie down defeated, not even if the main enemy had been Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, or Dwight Eisenhower. The same counts for Austrians and Italians and other peoples on the losing end. As Europe as a whole, including the Axis states, grew prosperous rapidly, the memory of the war gave Germany and its former allies plenty of reasons to feel unease, if not desperation.

In the final stage of the war and in the months immediately after the war, the United States and its allies went to great lengths to explain their war aims to the European public. Understandably these were put forward in the most favourable light. It was a time when ‘good’ propaganda to prevent misunderstandings was of primary importance. Books were among the means applied to transmit the message, selected by the Office of War Information. Let us take a closer look at just one of them. Between 1942 and 1944 the American journalist Walter Lippmann wrote two books that perfectly fit the purpose of convincing the
sceptics in Europe who still thought that America had a selfish agenda for the future of the continent or that reconstruction could be completed without American intervention. The first was *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*; the second *U.S. War Aims*. After being published initially for an American audience, they were given a second life as a combined publication: *U.S. Foreign Policy and U.S. War Aims*.

Lippmann was no literary hack. He had learned about foreign policy the hard way, and internationalism had become his creed. Confessing his own ignorance and “mistaken judgments” in the past, he tried to convince his readers that “the effortless security” of the “Victorian Age” which had created “an unconcern with public responsibilities”, was gone and that “fate has brought it about that America is at the centre, no longer at the edges, of Western civilization” (Lippmann 1944, 248-249). In Lippmann’s view relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were paramount. Given the wide geographical separation of the two superpowers he considered the prospect of peace to be extremely good. Yet he would not let down his guard as it was impossible to prove Stalin’s peaceful intentions or disprove the hypothesis of Soviet Russia’s aggressive nature. The US, therefore, would have to rely on the solidarity of Western Europe and the Americas (Lippmann 1944, 201). The American democratic impulse he defined as the main source of strength for peace in the future world, but it should be linked to the strategic and economic realities of the times. Lippmann proposed a clear agenda for American diplomacy: peace through strength. He dismissed Wilson’s disregard for French fears and his crusade for the League of Nations after the First World War as misguided, and envisioned a world order based not on trust but on a close cooperation between the victors in the war and forceful furthering of democratic ideals.

Was Lippmann’s formulation also a clear agenda for American diplomats who had to implement this mission in Europe? The agenda appeared clear enough, but those assigned to carry it out needed flexible minds and alert ears on widely divergent political views among the European populace. In Europe the war struck deeper and differently than in the United States. It had made people more conservative and paradoxically prone to sweeping changes in political outlook. Public opinion was charged with insecurity and therefore volatile.

**The United States and Europe: More than Oceans Apart**

Theoretically the worldviews of the United States and Europe – their thinking about democracy, politics, civil society, and governance – had not drifted far apart in wartime. They still belonged to the same democratic family. The countries liberated from the German yoke had all been democracies for a long time. The Axis states, to whose populations Lippmann also spoke, knew or at
least remembered a democratic tradition as well. Understandably no American policy maker deemed it necessary to ‘translate’ Lippmann’s publications for Europeans or to tailor the message to their intellectual grasp and tastes. European eyes and ears were supposed to catch the same meaning as American eyes and ears. All the publisher, Overseas Editions, Inc., took upon itself to do was to make sure that the European public got hold of books which had been denied to them by censors during the war.

But that was theory. On closer examination, the fairly unspecific ideological rift between the two continents and systems that had existed before the war had become more distinct and more complicated. Take the danger of communism. Whereas America had maintained and even built up its hostility towards that doctrine, European electorates were much more divided on the issue. Although Europe had learned to appreciate Americans as liberators, they were not generally looked upon as ‘kin’ or ‘friends’. On the whole people lacked the self-confidence they had possessed before the war and also the self-understanding one needs to understand ‘strangers’. Europe was in a kind of limbo. Not America.

After the war several years elapsed before Europe was won over to the view that the world had to be interpreted as a dichotomy; that communism constituted a mortal danger; that the American side was their side. Only after the coup d’état in Prague in 1948 was the general public converted to anti-communism. In many countries the communists at first joined coalition governments of the popular front model. After 1948 they had been thrown out everywhere except Iceland (Laqueur 1982, 158).

How did this contrast occur? Before 1939, few people in Europe regarded communism as something alien to the continent or talked about it in terms equivalent to the description of ‘un-American activities’ in the official American political language. The war increased rather than decreased the mental separation between America and Europe on this issue. When Nazism disappeared from the scene in 1945, many people at first did not know what ‘ism’ to love or to hate. As a result of the war, Stalin and his ideology had become popular among many by 1945. After all, the Soviet Union had borne the brunt of the Nazi aggression and had suffered enormously doing the right thing. Capitalism was still compromised by the lingering memories of the Great Depression with its many social injustices. As the US took the lead in the Cold War with the Soviet Union, Europeans questioned why they should side unequivocally with America.

Linked to the moral and political uncertainty was an unclear self-image. There was no concept of ‘Europeanness’, and some people would say such a concept still does not exist today after fifty years of European unification. In most of Europe people identified solely with their own nation, but during the war so much had happened that made people less proud of their country and fuelled a rethinking of nationalism. Identification with the state became relatively weak.
in many countries. For want of a strong sense of self, the idea of Americanness also remained rather vague. Only at the end of the 1940s notions of ‘freedom’ versus ‘slavery’, ‘communism’ versus ‘capitalism’, and ‘Europe side-by-side with America’ became less abstract.

This is all broadly speaking of course. Reactions to America’s presence were as diverse as Europe. Varieties of anti-Americanism were everywhere, and relatively strong from the start in some countries. France, struggling to be recognized as a great power, discovered that America was an obstacle and reacted bitterly. The French people did not stay neutral in that debate. American opposition, however weak, to the resurgence of France to great power status was an insult added to injuries inflicted previously. After the First World War America had resisted endorsement of the Versailles Treaty, which was to a certain extent a French project. Although Woodrow Wilson was on the French side on this issue, he was, says Simon Schama in his recent but already famous essay in *The New Yorker*, “perhaps the most detested of all American presidents by the French, for whom his self-righteousness was compounded by his failure to deliver results” (Schama 2003, 38).

Schama provides some clear and in their silliness almost frightful examples of conspiracy theories which were popular in France in the 1920s and 1930s. They dwelled on plots of capitalists and other sinister elements in the United States to dwarf Europe by increasing its financial debts. These French anti-Americans were inspired among other things by American willingness to let Germany off the reparations hook for the sake of peace in Europe. Both in the First and Second Wold War there were French who felt that America opened a second front unnecessarily late and all too reluctantly. Some of them joined the Soviet government in suggesting that the US delayed joining the war to bleed Europe and the Soviet Union white. Whatever the roots and forms, French anti-Americanism following the Second World War was another cause for the communist party to rise in popularity (see also Kuisel 1993).

In the United States, interruptions or modifications in opposition to communism had been relatively marginal. Between 1941 and 1945 a sizable number of people had grown to admire the Soviet war effort, most of them in the wake of a government drive to rally the people behind American-Soviet military cooperation. Even so, the campaign against ‘fellow-travellers’ had never halted. The vast majority of Americans mistrusted Stalin and his comrades. After the war Stalin’s reputation had improved, but a lot of distrust remained. Capitalism had won the war. Communism was thought to be plainly un-American.

What exactly the terms ‘American’ and ‘un-American’ stood for was manifest to all Americans. Even a person with the best of anti-fascist credentials could not always escape the wrath of ‘real Americans’. Under these circumstances, American diplomats who arrived in Europe after the war to represent their country and market their government’s ideas about the future of Europe had a difficult task. Most history books say that they were received with
open arms, but that is just one side of the picture. The other side is the gradual forging of resistance of some importance to the US on the basis of a different wartime experience. Economic misery and other adverse conditions made people susceptible to the lure of easy solutions, such as ‘the inevitable victory of the masses’ that would come about if only the class struggle were kept going.

**Limited Ambitions in Germany**

The diplomats learned fast. Their most valuable training ground was Germany, where the US became the leading power in the occupation. In his famous book on that era, *The United States in Germany*, Harold Zink, the official chief historian of the US High Commission in Germany, wrote about America entering this adventure immature and inexperienced in international relations but adapting so well to its new responsibilities that after ten years a good many people “would place the United States in the top category of nations on the basis of knowledge of world affairs and expertise in handling difficult international situations” (Zink 1957, 2). His estimate is that the total number of Americans involved in the occupation reached “into the millions”. To conquer and occupy a country was an affair of complex reciprocation. Many people trying to make an imprint on Germany discovered also receiving an imprint from their stay in Europe. Zink concludes that the impact on Americans and the American way of life has “not been negligible” (Zink 1957, 4). Some had their “outlooks broadened immeasurably”, while others “have not been able to survive the stresses and temptations of the occupation”. Many thousands of German brides became the mothers of Americans. In all, Zink sees a positive result, as the vast majority of Americans went home with the firm conviction that “communism is a snare and a delusion, having little to offer humanity other than misery”.

In light of what we know today about operation *Iraqi Freedom* (2003) with all the rivalry between the military and the State Department, we might expect a similar struggle between the American High Command and the diplomats for control of the occupation of Germany. The reverse, however, was true. General Eisenhower wanted to hand over the army’s responsibility for all non-security matters to civilians as soon as possible, but the State Department declined the offer. With tensions increasing between the US and the USSR, the diplomats foresaw that the nature of the occupation needed to remain military. Not until 1949 did military rule end and did authority transfer to the State Department (Zink 1957, 45).

As relations with the Soviet Union worsened and the Cold War reached a threatening level, it became more and more necessary to treat the Germans as allies instead of subordinates who had to follow orders. This awareness resulted in various shifts in the organizational structure of the occupation authority. Civilian-oriented military personnel gained the upper hand within a framework
which remained only formally. The more military-oriented specialists in the armed forces, as Zink phrases it, “found little to attract them unless they had become wedded to life away from home, had few prospects in the United States, or had entered into domestic arrangements of various sorts with European women in preference to returning to their families at home” (Zink 1957, 42).

Zink seems critical of the Americans who, after having worked for military government in the initial phase, were hired again in the more civilian-oriented phase, saying with so many words that “having lost touch with current developments at home”, they were becoming less valuable (Zink 1957, 50). Though he admits that this attitude was almost impossible to avoid after a stay in Germany of several months, he thinks they went too far in taking on “the ways of victors in a conquered land”. Zink also criticizes representatives of American businesses who took their share of the revenues of American government in Germany, but particularly on “‘wine, women, and song’ boys who were so notorious in their exploits that they often brought a bad name to the entire military government organization” (Zink 1957, 76). However small their number, relatively speaking, “the depraved manner in which some of these openly flaunted their mistresses in their contacts with their fellows as well as with the German people” was a great embarrassment.

But enough about individual soldiers. Many of them were young and immature, and their behaviour can be dismissed as typical of their age. Zink wanted the military to be good ambassadors of the United States. Most of them were, some were not. For the purpose of this chapter it suffices to point at his explicit and implicit observation that the more detached from realities in the home country they became, the more difficult it was to live and act in accordance with the aims of American intervention in Europe. Any awareness of dissonance between America’s intentions and what could be achieved by American individuals under the circumstances is absent in the official language of the American High Commissioner or in the political rhetoric of high-ranking government officials who visited Germany at the time. Political and administrative pronouncements strictly conformed to the American agenda in which there was no place for any serious contrast or discord between American political goals and preoccupations that were typical for Europeans.

A Cultural Cold War
Hundreds if not thousands of books and articles tell us the story of the Cold War, the Truman Doctrine (1947), the Marshall Plan (1947/1948), and concerns in the United States that Europe might fall like ripe fruit from the tree of freedom into the hands of the communists. Without those worries, America would not have invested so much in a ‘cultural’ Cold War fought inside the ‘big’ Cold War to win the hearts and minds of Europeans and stave off Soviet domination of
the world. We cannot deduce from this massive cultural, political, and economic offensive in Europe that America concluded that Europeans needed special treatment. After all Americans at home were also put under FBI surveillance. The single most important reason behind the special attention for Europe was that it was battlefield and frontier territory. There, not in the United States, the Soviets would gain ground or be thwarted. There was no need to mount a large-scale defence against communism in the United States proper. But in terms of quality rather than quantity the means applied to fight the cultural Cold War in Europe were practically the same as the means used in America in the McCarthy era (Whitfield 1991).

America’s own security was a major consideration within a more generally formulated and heart-felt responsibility for the well-being of the world and Europe in particular. To help Europe in its distress, to “salvage the victors as well as the vanquished”, as Truman put it in his memoirs, was in keeping with a long tradition (Truman 1965, 134). This is not the place to go into the exact assessment politicians in Washington made of the magnitude of Europe’s plight and the political risks involved. They concluded that the balance of power was in danger and that free Europe should be kept within the American zone of influence. To achieve this, they started the European Recovery Program (ERP). However enormous this operation was, its ambition to create new people was limited. It was launched as a primarily technical project to improve the lives of human beings who were considered to be roughly the same as Americans.

The ERP paid little attention to differences in culture or psychology. Improvement of material conditions, not brain-washing of any kind would be needed to do the job. Even in Germany the approach was practical and far from intent upon the ‘conversion’ of an entire population. At a very early stage the American, and in their wake the British authorities, decided that the Germans could stand on their own feet again. So they let them go. The Germans were ready to work as hard as Americans. That was sufficient evidence that they were capable of charting their own future. The denazification effort never really took off, not because the United States condoned the Nazi philosophy, but because it would be counter-productive if it were not limited to catching the bigger fish. Plans for a major overhaul of the German education system were executed lukewarmly, not because America found it good enough as it was, but for the simple reason that the Germans took it upon themselves to do the work. The establishment of contact with the outside world, and especially a program to let German teachers and professors visit American schools, turned out to be enough to get them going.

Paradoxically and in view of the big and bloody war they had just fought, the Germans did better in the eyes of most Americans than the French. Although General De Gaulle, who briefly led France after the war and returned to power again in 1958, eventually accepted an important role for Germany and Franco-German rapprochement, he and the other French governments obstructed the
America-inspired reconstruction of Germany and its promotion to great power status short of UN Security Council membership. This was a major bone of contention between the two countries.

Meanwhile the Cold War progressed. Feelings of solidarity between the United States and Germany became stronger. After the Second World War there had been a brief period in which Americans serving in occupied Germany awaited confirmation of their assumption that the Germans had not changed profoundly. As Robert Murphy, who was in Berlin, wrote in his memoirs: “In addition to three million Germans in Berlin, thousands of displaced persons were roaming around the shattered city. None of us could be sure how these people might behave, whether their experiences had made them apathetic, revengeful, or crazy” (Murphy 1964, 264). But things turned out right. The Germans behaved. They were not Huns, but perfectly normal human beings. The Berlin blockade from June 1948 until May 1949 and the airlift organized by the United States to help the Berliners survive, was the final moment of truth: the definitive end of all divisions the war had brought about. It was a time when an alliance between Washington and the provisional government of Germany developed into an allegiance between peoples. This marked the elevation of Germany to the rank of most favoured nation in Europe (Murphy 1964, 298).

For America, Germany was no longer an exceptional case as soon as ‘Bizonia’ came into being, and it became all the more ‘normal’ once it had elected to join the community of nations in Europe which received Marshall aid. From then on American policy makers in their rhetoric even more emphatically included West Germany in what they called the free world. When Harry Truman in his inaugural address of 1949 spoke about the spectre of communism threatening big parts of the world, he expressed no qualms about counting Germany among the free nations of Europe in company with which the ERP, “the greatest cooperative economic program in history” was carried out (Truman 1949). If it goes too far to say that the US considered them as Americans in German clothes, to say that they thought them to be as American as Europeans could be comes close to the truth.

**Ugly Americans?**

To this day the term ‘ugly American’ serves to depict foreign service officials who know little and do not care to learn anything about the faraway countries where they nonetheless do their work with utmost dedication to the American cause. Not only in Asia but everywhere across the globe, these types have shown up. But very many American diplomats were aware of the danger to become, or to come across as aloof and culturally insensitive, and therefore did their utmost to avoid it.

How real is the concept of the ‘ugly American’? When I was working on this chapter I tried to get in touch with people who have served in Europe during the
Cold War in some diplomatic capacity. Nowadays that is not so difficult, as retired diplomats have discussion lists of their own on the internet. The answers I received when I asked what the State Department did in terms of teaching sensitivity, and what they themselves had done to be accepted by the locals, make clear that indeed a serious effort was made in this respect. Their self-study went well beyond teaching them ‘not to sneeze on the Mona Lisa’ and ‘when in France not to start shouting at the manager of your hotel when you get hot water after turning on a faucet marked ‘c’, the things you will find in guidebooks for tourists”.

In Foreign Service Assignment Notebooks published by the State Department, future diplomats were (and are) encouraged to become more aware of their own culture, “the concepts in the American way of life which influence each of us to some degree”. That was considered to be the ideal starting-point for learning how to respect other cultures, by focusing on the most likely points of cultural differences. One former diplomat, who has served in Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia throughout the Cold War, told me that in basic training (the course all aspiring diplomats called ‘the 200 course’) there was considerable emphasis on how to avoid the ‘ugly American’ syndrome. “Woe to anyone who would do anything stupid that would come to the attention of the ambassador”. All trainees were urged to blend into the local scene as well as possible, on the basis of a list of country specific 'dos' and 'don’ts. This same correspondent sharply distinguished between ‘officers’ and ‘staff’. The latter category was expected to remain within the expat community, or was even expressly forbidden to interact with the local community, so as to avoid any risks of recruitment as agents by foreign intelligence services. Another former diplomat said, “While there were not, to my knowledge, formal classes on ‘not being an ugly American’ we were all pretty clearly told that we were representing our country at all times, not just at work. Most diplomats I was in contact with were by inclination very sensitive to that issue. I know that I felt and tried to behave as though I was constantly in a fishbowl with a large ‘US diplomat’ sign on my back”.

‘Ich bin (ein) Berliner’
The first cycle of the Cold War ended with the ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ speech of John Kennedy in June 1963. Kennedy was an expert in softening up opponents and rivals and making friends like him even more than they had done before. Although President Eisenhower had never managed to find any soft spots in fellow-general De Gaulle, the President of France since 1958, Kennedy shrewdly threw in Jackie Bouvier’s good French language competence to charm the old giant. And it worked. When Kennedy visited Paris, he made sure she would accompany him everywhere he went and made a point of publicizing the fact that her dresses were designed by French couturiers. In Germany Kennedy
did need his wits that much. Even before he visited, his popularity was more than secured. On a state visit, the American President saw cheering crowds, and nothing but cheering crowds. In Bonn he said that the United States would risk her cities to protect German cities because America needed German freedom to protect her own freedom. This was excellent and very welcome rhetoric. The masses loved it. As his biographer Richard Reeves writes: “The Germans went wild ... [I]t was as if he [Kennedy] were being crowned Prince of the World” (Reeves 1993, 535).

Then Kennedy flew to West Berlin. His motorcade covered more than 50 kilometres in the city under siege. Again he spoke to a huge crowd at City Hall, and again the people waved and cheered. We do not know for certain whether the ‘Berliner’ part, and particularly the fact that he used the phrase twice, was pure improvisation by a man who got mesmerized by the ecstasy of those all around him, or that it was carefully designed to be the very high point of this already successful public relations campaign. Kennedy abandoned some parts of the speech he had in his pocket. He had thought up new lines while on the road, but we just cannot tell exactly the new from the old. To be sure, he did not claim to be an inhabitant of Berlin as straightforwardly as many people think. It was purely symbolic, and Kennedy made no secret of it. This is what he said: “Two thousand years ago the proudest boast was ‘Civis Romanus sum’. Today, in the world of freedom, the proudest boast is ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’.” Further down his speech he repeated the punch line in a slightly different manner, and this time he came closer to a personal claim: “Freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect, but we have never had to put a wall up to keep our people in ... All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words, ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’.”

Did Kennedy give up his American citizenship with this speech? Of course not. Did he apply to be registered as a taxpayer in Berlin? I do not think so. Did he speak terrible German, as the story goes? Well, his German was not entirely correct. ‘Ein Berliner’ is a German jelly donut without a hole in the middle. If Kennedy had said ‘Ich bin Berliner’ he would have been right on target and no-one would have perceived a double meaning. But by saying ‘ein Berliner’ the president was not committing a terrible gaffe. Those who found reason to fault Kennedy for what he had said, took his words out of context and deliberately misinterpreted him. What is much more important than this kind of word-splitting, is the fact that at this very tense moment, just eighteen years after the war, and less than two years after the Berlin Wall was built, the president reaffirmed American solidarity with Berlin. He could not have done it more eloquently or more effectively. He proclaimed himself a soul mate of the average person in Berlin. Not many times before in history had different identities of different nationalities and backgrounds been officially and so emphatically intertwined as on this day in June 1963. Kennedy was quite right when, on his flight to the next country on his whistle-stop tour of Europe, he said
to Theodore Sorensen: “We’ll never have another day like this one, as long as we live” (Reeves 1993, 537).

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949 by twelve founding nations. The signatories – Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Iceland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA) – set the task to build a defence arrangement between North America and Europe. The alliance was based on the treaty signed on 4 April in Washington DC and was meant to provide peace and security for its member states. Article 5 of the Treaty is pivotal to the alliance. It states:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. (NATO 2010).

Guaranteed mutual defence as stated in the treaty, of course, needed military resources as well management and control mechanisms in order to be secured as a genuine international organization rather than as a treaty. This required, first of all, financial support from the USA for the European NATO-members, which after the Second World War were left in economic and military disarray. To that end, President Harry S. Truman launched the Mutual Defence Assistance Act, which passed Congress in October 1949 (Henderson 1982, 24). Secondly, European integration was deemed necessary. Europe needed to become less vulnerable to the Soviet threat. Thirdly, North Atlantic integration was seen as a prerequisite for NATO to become a genuine international organization. It was not just a matter of financial means, but the international alliance had to overcome differences in operational procedures and techniques and communications incompatibilities as well.

The idea of international alliances by means of organization is extensively studied in International Relations (IR) and, in particular, security matters still dominate leading IR journals, such as International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution and

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2 I am grateful to Joachim Ahrens and Todd Sandler for discussing the arguments on club theory and the NATO alliance.
World Politics. Currently, the economics of alliances is gaining intellectual support, but the market share of these publications still remains relatively low (Kaul, Grunberg and Stern 1999; Sandler and Hartley 2001). Moreover, despite the fact that all of these studies refute the classical distinction between ‘high politics’ and ‘low politics’, they rather scarcely address the economic incentives of whether or not to join an alliance. The scope of security is ‘economized’ rather than that the trade-off between costs and benefits of an international alliance, such as NATO, is scrutinized.

This chapter seeks to fill part of that scholarly gap by addressing NATO as a club. International Political Economy (IPE), as sub-discipline in IR, acknowledges club goods. These are excludable goods that are non-rival in consumption. The NATO alliance can very good be conceived of as a club that provides these exclusive but non-rival goods. Article 5 of the Treaty, concisely summarized as ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’, perfectly fits the definition of a club good. Moreover, Article 5 presents the club good, whereas other international clubs, such as the European Union, provide numerous services to their members, some of these fit the definition of club goods, whereas others do not (Ahrens, Hoen and Ohr 2005). NATO is there to secure the safety of its members – it is exclusive – and the members are homogeneous, since there will be guaranteed equal treating in case one of them is militarily offended – the service is non-rival.

The chapter applies a club theoretical approach to NATO and focuses on the problems that emerged after the latest enlargement rounds. These have triggered the question of NATO’s retirement. Formulated differently, are there economic arguments that underpin the notion that NATO has reached it optimum size or even expanded beyond that? The next section, in a slapdash fashion addresses the history of NATO and its expansion. It focuses in particular on the nature of the services the alliance provides and underlines that these can be conceived of as a club good. The subsequent section elaborates on club theory. Based upon Buchanan’s seminal work (1965), his theoretical model will be reframed to fit for NATO’s global alliance. The argument is that, given the level of international security integration, the optimum number of member states of NATO is a dependent variable that, in principle, can be determined. Enlargement rounds come along with additional costs of control and, therefore, the third section addresses these additional costs by focusing on increasing heterogeneity of preferences in the alliance. From a club-theoretical perspective it is unclear whether NATO has already moved beyond the optimum amount of member states, but that leaves unaltered the task to economize on costs. Besides, it scrutinizes the possibility to economize on governance costs, which leads to the conclusion that NATO need not necessarily retire, but should move towards becoming a club of clubs.
NATO’s Past Expansions

After NATO was established, several rounds of enlargements followed in the sixty years of its existence. Table 1 presents an overview of the six rounds of enlargements since the establishment in 1949.

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Source: http://www.nato.int/.

Some of these rounds were rather straightforward, such as the first, the second and the third. These entailed the accession of one (West-Germany in 1955 and
Spain 1982) or two countries (Greece and Turkey in 1952). But the fourth, fifth and sixth round, that took place as a consequence of the collapse of the communist systems in Central and Eastern Europe, were much more intricate. These involved a larger number of relatively poor countries. Besides, the twelve countries that since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact (1991) have joined NATO reveal a much larger heterogeneity in their preferences regarding their role in Europe and the world.

A relatively easy accession of Greece, Turkey and West-Germany did not imply that there was no discussion in NATO. On the contrary, enlargement was far from obvious, since from its incipient stages the danger of overstretched commitments and resources in the alliance was at stake. But Greece and Turkey entered in 1952, since there was the communist threat. In Greece, the threat was internal (during 1946–1949 there was a civil war with strong communist involvement), whereas in the case of Turkey external Soviet pressure was decisive. The accession of West-Germany was convoluted, among other things, by the occupation of German territories by allied forces. To many of the NATO-members, Germany remained a tantalizing candidate. But since European integration was seen as a sine qua non for NATO and Germany was the fence towards the East, it was invited to become NATO-member. After the status of an occupied country came to an end with the signing of the Bonn-Paris convention on 5 May 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO as from the next day (Henderson 1982, 33).

Spain’s accession to the alliance did evoke an enormous amount of discussion in Spain rather than in NATO. NATO was especially convinced about the strategic importance of the Iberian country, but Spanish politicians in the post-Franco era hotly debated the issue. The standpoints were divided between and within the parties. Since NATO was perceived as a necessary step for joining the EEC, a majority for NATO-membership emerged in the autumn of 1981. Spain joined NATO as from May 1982.

Since the demise of communism, there were three rounds of expansion. All of them included the accession of formerly communist economies. It took a decade before a group of three Central European countries joined NATO: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. These countries were most outspoken in their attitude to participate in European integration processes – and to become a member of the European Union – and as a prerequisite to that, to become a full-fledged NATO-member. The accession to NATO, therefore, was instrumental. It was a tool to achieve EU-membership. The countries’ preferences were slightly deviant from the above mentioned original aims of NATO.

Dispersed preferences were even much larger in the subsequent round of enlargement. In 2004, seven countries joined NATO. Three of them – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – had a genuine interest in becoming a NATO-member. In the Baltic states the Soviet legacy and renewed independence was extremely
important and the countries want to safeguard their borders. For Bulgaria and Romania the motives were different. NATO-membership was seen as the ‘royal’ trail leading to EU-membership. Slovakia and Slovenia wanted to have become a member in 1999, but since NATO believed that the two countries were not ready for accession yet, they had to wait. Their NATO-accession coincided with the EU-membership.

In 2009, Albania and Croatia joined NATO. The accession negotiations were long-lasting and complicated, as has always been the case with countries from the Balkan region. Currently, Macedonia is knocking on NATO’s door and the invitation is expected as soon as the dispute with Greece about the name of the applicant is settled. Apart from membership, NATO also recognizes partnerships with a number of countries. The partner countries are classified in different structures of dialogue, such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Gulf Cooperation countries and, last but not least, the Contact countries. The latter includes countries that have similar strategic concerns as the NATO-members and share the NATO values. The emerging pattern of membership, partnership and contacts after the Cold War, on the one hand, reveals the success of NATO and, on the other, divulges the problems of further expansion. This trade-off, urges to optimizing the size of the alliance.

**Club Theory: Optimizing the Size of the Alliance**

NATO can be thought about as an intergovernmental organization that, based on Article 5 of the treaty, provides a non-rival good to its members, the benefits of which cannot be enjoyed by non-members. Given the limited number of military resources, there can only be quasi non-rivalry in consumption, but Article 5 can be perceived as club goods and NATO as the entity that provides its members with these good.

The application of club theory to international organization is still in its infancy, although there have been several attempts (Sandler and Hartely 2001). One of the problems is that many international organizations, intergovernmental or supranational alike, provide multiple club goods. The EU is an obvious example (Ahrens, Hoen and Ohr 2005). For NATO, the problem of multiple club goods is less mystifying, since it is a military organization and as such only provides one sort of service. In what follows, club theoretic analysis is addressed as a means to better understand the key problems of institution-building in NATO given the political imperative that both deepening and enlarging the alliance are to be pursued simultaneously.

As a point of departure, Buchanan’s (1965) seminal paper on club theory is taken. His original model developed is applied in a simple theoretical framework to questions of NATO integration against the background of the enlargement to
the East in 2004 and 2009. The assumptions are as follows:

- Club goods show two defining characteristics: They are non-rival — or only partially rival — in their consumption and non-members of the club can be excluded from their consumption;
- club members are homogeneous and share the costs of providing the club goods equally;
- there is no discrimination against any of the club members; and
- non-members can be excluded from benefiting from the club goods at no cost.

The critical variables to be optimized in the framework comprise (i) the number of club members and (ii) the provision of the club good, which refers to the degree of deepening or integration with respect to a particular club good. In the first step, only one club good that is provided by NATO is considered, for example, the good ‘Article 5’. The representative club member, i.e. a government of the current NATO-members, seeks to maximize its utility according to (1) subject to a binding budget constraint (2).

\[
U^i = U^i(G^i, X, n)
\]

\[
\bar{T}^i = pG^i + \frac{C(X)}{n}
\]

In (1), \(U^i\) denotes the utility of the representative club member \(i\), \(G^i\) represents real government expenditure of \(i\) as a proxy variable for the provision of national public goods. From a club theoretic perspective, \(G\) represents a ‘quasi-private’ good, because it can be only consumed by the citizens of country \(i\). The variable \(X\) represents the degree of integration with respect to the club good ‘Article 5’, i.e. different values of \(X\) can be interpreted as different stages of integration ranging from national military autonomy to a common NATO-border with fully standardized military procedures across all club members. Finally, \(n\) denotes the number of club members. While increases in \(G\) and \(X\) have a positive impact on \(U\), changes in \(n\) may be positively or negatively correlated with \(i\)'s utility. Basically, it appears to be plausible to assume a negative correlation between \(n\) and \(U\), because an increasing number of club members significantly raises political transaction costs, particularly organizational and administrative costs as well as costs relating to political bargaining and decision making. Yet, a positive correlation is assumed for a relatively small club, as long as the utility due to an enhanced allocative efficiency and increased political stability which are caused by political and economic cooperation exceeds the additional transaction costs of deeper integration.
Equation (2) is the side condition faced by the representative government. It represents a binding budget constraint holding that the exogenous tax revenue of i must equal nominal government expenditures plus i’s share of the cost for providing the club good at a given degree of deepening X. Costs are assumed to be positively correlated with the degree of integration.

Maximising (1) subject to (2) yields the following necessary marginal conditions for Pareto optimality:

\[
\frac{U_x}{U_G} = \frac{C_x}{p_n} \quad \text{Samuelson condition}
\]

\[
\frac{U_n}{U_G} = \frac{-C(X)}{pn^2} \quad \text{membership condition}
\]

Conditions (3) and (4) represent the optimal conditions that allow for a simultaneous solution for X and n. While (3) is the traditional Samuelson condition for the optimal provision of public goods, when satisfied implying that further substituting private goods provision for public goods, or vice versa, decreases social utility (Samuelson 1954), the membership condition (4) addresses the question of when it is beneficial for the club to admit a further member (Yew-Kwang 1973). Figure 1 portrays the simultaneous solution for X and n graphically.

Figure 1 (see overleaf) represents the case of homogeneous club members and considers one club good, for example, military support in case of external attacks and border violations. The variable X denotes the degree of deepening military integration, i.e. X=0 implies that there is no integration, so that – in the underlying example – all countries can be regarded as completely autonomous in their military operations and X=X_max can be interpreted as full military integration, i.e. all club members do have a common external border and apply fully standardized military policies. The latter implies that the notion of national armies is meaningless. One can only speak of NATO-troops.

In quadrants I and II of Figure 1, the utility function and the cost function of the representative club member are depicted given a variation of n and X, respectively; X and n are the corresponding shift parameters. The optimal values for X and n are achieved when the difference between the costs and benefits of a representative member is maximized. In quadrant IV, the curves X_{opt} and n_{opt} can be spotted, which correspond to equations (3) and (4), respectively. The optimal simultaneous solution for X and n is given in P.
Figure 1 Optimal Club Size and Optimal Deepening

At first sight, two conclusions follow from the graphical illustration. Firstly, the utility and cost functions will differ for different club goods, that may be provided by NATO, the derived functions for $n_{\text{opt}}$ and $X_{\text{opt}}$ will differ as well. This implies that the optimal club size will also differ for different club goods and that a single club, which provides more than one club good to its members, will be sub-optimal from a theoretical point of view. This point also triggers another problem, which will be even more difficult to overcome. Eventually, institutional reforms along the lines of addressing the ‘leftovers’ are necessary but insufficient to adequately deal with the problem of simultaneousness, i.e. ‘enlarging-cum-deepening’ the NATO. Since NATO provides several club goods and its members are by no means homogenous entities – in particular if one considers an enlarged NATO comprising more than thirty countries – the functions $n_{\text{opt}}$ and $X_{\text{opt}}$ depicted in Figures 1 and 2 will differ from one club good to another. This implies that the optimal club size will also differ contingent on the nature of the respective club good and various degrees of integration, i.e. deepening. In that case, a single club providing several club goods to all its members, all of which enjoy the same degree of integration, will neither be theoretically efficient nor will it be politically feasible.

Secondly, if it is assumed that $n^*$ equals the membership size of the NATO in 2009, i.e. $n^*=28$, then an enlargement of NATO will lead to a sub-optimal club size even if NATO restricts itself to providing only one club good. Of course, it is conceivable that NATO’s membership size of 28 was already too large and hence theoretically sub-optimal. In that case the derived conclusions and policy
implications hold as well, because, for political reasons, it would not be feasible to reduce the number of NATO-members. The second conclusion implies that enlargement will only be efficient if political transaction costs can be appropriately reduced. However, given that the envisaged NATO-enlargement is a political imperative which cannot be altered, an optimal club size would be only achieved if the utility curves in quadrants I and II can be shifted upwards. In that case, a downward shift of both the $n_{\text{opt}}$ curve and the $X_{\text{opt}}$ curve would be induced that yields a larger club size as the optimal solution. This case is depicted in Figure 2, in which it is assumed that the NATO-enlargement relates to the admittance of Macedonia as the 29th member, after Albania and Croatia entered the NATO in 2009.

Note in this context that, besides an upward shift of the utility curves in quadrants I and II, one needs also to consider a downward shift of the cost and utility curves in quadrant I, in which club size $n$ is regarded as a shift parameter. Hence, an increase in $n$, ceteris paribus, shifts both curves downwards. The economic rationale behind this is that (a) an increase in club size implies higher political transaction costs which badly affect the utility of the representative member; and that (b) the costs for the provision of the club good are now to be shared by a larger number of club members.

![Figure 2 Enlargement for a Given Degree of Integration](image)
Increasing Heterogeneity of Preferences Within the Club: What to Do?

The several rounds of NATO enlargements have revealed that increasing heterogeneity of member states’ preferences and costs of control gradually become a burden to further expansion of the alliance. The section addresses these both aspects.

The heterogeneity partly stems from the success of NATO over the last decades. What began as a genuine ‘North-Atlantic’ treaty has shifted to an alliance that has to serve the interests of members far away from the Atlantic. The fall of communism enabled the accession of former communist countries, but at the same time the Soviet threat was the main argument to seek accession. Since the beginning of the 1990s, that threat has gradually disappeared. With the exception of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania none of the post-1989 members did perceive NATO as a military safety net. NATO-membership was rather seen as a tool for entering in the EU.

Another bone of contention is the lack of financial means of the new members. In terms of military commitments, i.e. the costs of supplying the club good, there are sound arguments that many of the poorer members will be overburdened when facing their obligations (Thies 2009).

NATO is facing this problem for quite some time now and has come up with the idea of a partnership, which among other things implies friendly cooperation in the field of the military, as an alternative to membership. This can be an option to control for governance costs in the alliance indeed, but from a club-theoretical perspective there is an alternative that might be cheaper and more flexible. The idea is to create a club of clubs.

The case of multiproduct clubs with heterogeneous membership has been rarely discussed in the literature (Sandler and Tschirhart 1997). What seems to be uncontroversial, however, from both the preceding analysis and the theoretical research on multiproduct clubs, is that increases in allocative and dynamic efficiency can only be expected if one succeeds in partitioning the overall NATO-club area into smaller clubs including relatively homogeneous members. A formation of smaller clubs would need to be focused on particular club goods with respect to which relatively homogeneous ‘political and economic consumers’ can be identified. In that sense, ‘Article 5’ represents a club good which should be provided by NATO to all its members because the degree of heterogeneity can be neglected in this area. But this may be different if one turns to the club good ‘common military forces’. This club good includes a level of integration for which the costs cannot be paid for by the all member states, either due to their financial means or to the willingness to pay.

Given club-theoretic and political-economy considerations, it is not clear why all policy fields should be harmonized. On the contrary, a more flexible integration, i.e. the perception of NATO as a club of clubs, promises to be a suitable strategy to simultaneously realize optimal values for membership size n and the degree of integration X in smaller, more homogeneous clubs. As is
proposed in the case of the EU (Ahrens, Hoen and Ohr 2005; Ahrens and Hoen 2007) it might even imply a systematic and institutionally safeguarded splitting up into sub-clubs in which the possibility to compete with one another promises to yield more efficient economic outcomes and contribute to attenuate persistent political power struggles and distributional conflicts. Last but not least, such a decentralized, competitive process of club formation would be most appropriate to lower – national and regional – preference costs and to take advantage of the systemic competition as a discovery process.

Conclusion
NATO exists since 1949. The alliance is now over sixty years old and the question arises whether it should retire. The arguments to dissolve the alliance are twofold. Firstly, the focus on the demise of a Soviet threat. This has led to large heterogeneity in the preferences of the member states. Secondly, the several rounds of enlargements have increased the costs of control.

Starting from these two problems, this chapter has analysed NATO expansion with a club-theoretical framework. Club theory provides a tool to simultaneously optimize the size of membership and the deepness of integration for the provision of exclusive but not-rival goods. Article 5 of the Treaty is seen as the pivotal club good provided by NATO: an attack on one is an attack on all.

The analysis shows that expansion leads to larger costs of control. One of the assumptions in club theory is that preferences are homogeneous. It is quite clear that in an enlarged NATO this assumption is no longer sustainable and increasing heterogeneity in itself will lead to larger governance costs. It might well be the case that from a cost-benefit-analysis NATO may already have expanded beyond its optimum size. But given the political imperatives, the question then is how to control the marginal costs of control.

The argument has been put forward that NATO should move towards a club of clubs. In this club of clubs, Article 5 remains a club good provided for all the members, but in other fields this is not necessarily the case. This option ensures homogeneity with the sub-clubs and a most efficient tool to create the sub-clubs might be competition.

References
PART 2 – IO Perspectives
Chapter 6. Europe the Reluctant Security Actor

Willem van Eekelen

The security and defence dimension of European integration has developed very slowly over the decades and still lags behind the impressive progress in other fields. This Chapter will focus on how the European Community and later on the European Union slowly and reluctantly developed a security dimension. It also discusses how the resulting European Security and Defence Policy relates to NATO and maps the way forward for the two organisations.

The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was the first demonstration of European willingness to work closer together and contained a variety of issues, including an automatic military security guarantee in case of aggression between France, the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries. NATO was established the next year in the light of the growing Soviet threat. Europe proceeded with the Coal and Steel Community but faltered in the envisaged follow up with an European Defence Community and a Political Community. A French initiative failed in the French parliament and Germany became a full member of NATO, while accepting some limitations on its armaments and the prohibition of producing ABC weapons in the Modified Brussels treaty, henceforward called the Western European Union (WEU). Germany and Italy joined and Britain, which had not participated in the EDC negotiations, committed itself to station three divisions and a tactical air force on German territory. All WEU members agreed to inspections on their force levels, thus attenuating the discriminatory aspects with regard to Germany. The British commitment lasted until the 1990’s when it was terminated during my tenure as secretary general of the WEU.

In the aftermath of the Korean war the focus of defence and security policy shifted to NATO and European integration was pursued under its umbrella. It remained a political process – never again war between France and Germany – but the means were at the economic level. It would take until 1969, when president Pompidou accepted to negotiate again on British entry into the Economic Community, before the Netherlands agreed to start the European Political Cooperation in the field of foreign affairs. The closest it came to the issue of security was in 1975 with the rather successful coordination of positions on the Helsinki process of the Conference, later Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Some wanted to go further. An initiative by ministers Genscher and Colombo failed in 1982 because of opposition by Denmark, Greece and Ireland, which in turn led to a revitalisation of the WEU and joint meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs and defence. A new window of opportunity opened when after the fall of the Berlin Wall the priority of collective defence diminished...
as the overriding element in transatlantic relations. A brief period of uncertainty followed in which Germany was united and remained anchored in the west, but the relevance of NATO was questioned. NATO had served us well in providing the necessary American leadership in East – West relations, but as a security organisation would no longer provide the umbrella forum under which most politico-military issues were discussed and acted upon. Of course, even during the Cold War the umbrella did not cover every rainstorm, as was shown in the Vietnam war. But on the whole the US, with its nuclear deterrent and 300,000 soldiers in Western Europe as the best guarantee for their involvement, had a powerful impact in defining the issues. Even after the demise of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw pact and communism as an organising principle there were good reasons to maintain that link, much strengthened by the exemplary behaviour of the US with regard to German unification. Contrary to the reluctance of Mitterrand and Thatcher, president Bush senior and his secretary of state James Baker grasped the moment and supported chancellor Kohl. The unification of Germany meant the unification of Europe which avoided the drift of the former satellite countries of the USSR into a grey zone of chaos and instability.

After the paradigm shift of 1989 both NATO and the EU slowly moved towards a different notion of security, which focused on new risks and challenges, on inter-ethnic strife in former communist countries, on the restoration of stability and – in short – on peace support operations of many kinds. Peace support was a better term than the peacekeeping formula of the UN, which was conditioned by a cease fire in place and its continuation and the will of the parties to accept peacekeepers. That notion failed in Srebrenica when there was no peace to keep and the warring parties resorted to ethnic cleansing. The newly created European Union (EU) failed to act, in spite of claims that the hour of Europe had arrived, and NATO recovered its leading role. Or rather, the US did, with assistant secretary of state Richard Holbrooke clanging heads together and arriving at a Dayton agreement where Milosevic signed on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, but managed to keep the Kosovo issue off the table. Peace enforcement had become the new parameter, which would be demonstrated again in Kosovo in 1999.

Yet, NATO remained a security organisation which alone would provide insufficient cement to paste the transatlantic link together at a time of increasing globalisation and the emergence of new threats exceeding the military domain. The security environment was dominated by issues linking external and internal security (like terrorism, illegal immigration, drugs trade and organised crime) which required more a police response than a military one.

Moreover, NATO grappled with the ‘out of area’ problem, largely due to presumed German constitutional limitations, and had been unable to act during the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in 1990. For a brief moment that inability allowed the WEU to assume operational responsibilities like the mine-clearing
operation in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, the embargo flotilla against Serbia in the Adriatic and the surveillance of the Danube with police and customs officials. The WEU made a conceptual breakthrough with the definition of the new tasks as humanitarian, rescue (i.e. evacuation of nationals from a beleaguered city), peacekeeping and “the role of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking” (i.e. in current jargon peace enforcement). These so-called ‘Petersberg Missions’ entered the EU vocabulary in 1997 with the Treaty of Amsterdam at the initiative of Finland and Sweden, but this did not say much about the conditions under which they would be implemented.

Without much preparation the Treaty of Maastricht called into existence the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the successor of the European Political Cooperation. In the monetary sphere the momentous decision was taken on a timetable for the introduction of the Euro. In spite of these milestones, one could doubt whether the resulting framework deserved the title of Union. The CFSP and the judicial co-operation remained purely intergovernmental, without the communitarian characteristics of initiative by the European Commission, budgeting and control by the European Parliament and jurisdiction by the European Court of Justice. The most glaring shortcoming of the CFSP was its inability to include hard security within its scope. Again it proved impossible to square the circle between Atlanticists and European advocates. The result was a series of convoluted formulations, leaving military matters to the Western European Union. At Maastricht the WEU members issued a declaration containing the following elements:

- WEU members agree on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters. This identity will be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases.
- WEU will form an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance.
- WEU member states agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer term perspective of a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance.
- WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

In the Maastricht Treaty itself Article J.4 contained the following wording in its first two subparagraphs:

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.
2. The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement
decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.

At the time it looked rather complicated, particularly as the promised practical arrangements were not forthcoming. The monthly meetings of the Political Committee of those days, bringing the Political Directors of the member countries together, strangely enough had little affinity with defence matters. In any case it would have been better to talk about ‘security implications’ instead of defence. It was also unclear what the European identity and the European pillar of the Alliance would mean. NATO looked askance at these innovations and attempted to create a “right of first refusal” when operations had to be undertaken. A very artificial construct, which bore little resemblance to reality, for in a crisis all existing organisations would be consulting among themselves about possible responses, including mandates from the UN Security Council.

The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 removed the double conditional of Maastricht about the road towards a common defence and its article K.7 simply said that the CFSP “shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy … which might lead to a common defence should the European Council so decide”. This treaty entered into force in May 1999, one year and a half before it was amended again by the Treaty of Nice, which entered into force in February 2003, when the Convention drafting a Constitution had already been going on for a year.

This acceleration was due to the Franco-British summit at St Malo where Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac agreed that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”. This led to the Helsinki Headline Goals, a capability of 50-60,000 personnel, available within 60 days and sustainable for at least a year. In fact, it remained a catalogue of forces from which an operation could be mounted, but without an organised structure. A deadline of 2003 passed with the conclusion that many shortfalls existed. In the meantime NATO had organised the NATO Response Force of some 25,000 men, largely from European countries, ready to act within a few weeks. But again, this force has never been used except for humanitarian support after an earthquake in Pakistan. The next move was for the EU in creating 19 battle groups of some 1,500 personnel, two of which are standing on guard able to move within a week. This was mirrored on the successful Artemis operation in Bunia in the DR Congo where serious disturbances could be stopped before a larger UN force was assembled. Yet again the battle groups have not been used, which raises the question of the wisdom of keeping forces in reserve while an ongoing operation – as in Afghanistan – is short of support.
Much of the talk about a European identity or pillar within the Alliance lapsed after the Treaty of Nice had absorbed the functions of the WEU into the EU and extended the CFSP with a European (later under the Lisbon Treaty: Common) Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In response, the NATO summit of Washington in 1999 coined the Berlin plus formula which made NATO assets (primarily Headquarters and communications facilities) available to the EU for operations in which NATO as a whole was not engaged. Unfortunately, this arrangement was only implemented in Bosnia when the EU took over the SFOR operation from NATO under the name of Althea. But CSDP became the acronym under which the EU would deal with military matters. High Representative Javier Solana assumed responsibility for both CFSP and CSDP, the EU Military Committee took over from the WEU (in most cases concurrent appointment with the function of NATO MilRep), the WEU Planning Cell became the EU Military Staff and military uniforms became a common sight in the Justus Lipsius building in Brussels.

The Treaty of Lisbon did not change much in the proposals which the Defence Committee of the European Convention had drafted under the able chairmanship of Michel Barnier. The first paragraph of Article 24 came to read:

“The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.”

The CFSP would be put in effect by the High Representative (who would be double-hatted with the function of Vice President of the European Commission and would chair the Foreign Affairs Council) and by member states. The European Council would “identify the Union’s strategic interests, determine the objectives of and define general guidelines” for the CFSP including those having defence implications (Article 26). Article 42 repeated that the CSDP would be an integral part of the CFSP and then continued:

“It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.”

Member States also undertook “progressively to improve their military capabilities”. The Council may entrust the execution of a task to a group of

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3 In the spring of 2010 notice was given of the termination of the Modified Brussels Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty included a solidarity clause, albeit weaker than Article V of the WEU and particularly Britain did not want to spend money on the WEU Assembly which brought national parliamentarians together in a “consensus building” environment, including the non-EU European members of NATO. Thus the intergovernmental side of the EU will lose a parliamentary dimension.
Member States and the treaty opened the possibility of “permanent structured cooperation” among those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another with a view to the most demanding missions. It is still unclear whether this French idea will be followed up, for the smaller countries are weary of being excluded from common tasks.

Article 43 expanded the definition of the ‘Petersberg tasks’ which the WEU had listed in 1992 and which had been incorporated into the Union treaty in 1997 at the initiative of Finland and Sweden. They now read: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

In spite of the fact that the CSDP was part of the CFSP, the matter has not been fully clarified. The word security appears in both. Moreover, the CFSP is shared by all, while in the CSDP Denmark abstained and Cyprus and Malta did not fully participate. Meetings between the NATO Council and the EU Political and Security Committee were held, but usually without much substance. They mainly served to inform the NATO countries which did not belong to the EU about ongoing activities. These were not unimportant for the EU possessed instruments which NATO lacked, but the operations were small scale and (except for three of them) not of a military nature and oriented towards police action and security sector reform. Hopefully the new High Representative / Vice President of the Commission, Baroness Ashton, will be able not only to improve the coherence of EU policies and actions, but also to establish a constructive relationship with the Secretary General of NATO. A solution of the Cyprus issue should be a priority.

The New Security Agenda
NATO’s new strategic concept should clarify its future role in terms of threats, force planning and policies, and at the same time serve as an instrument of public diplomacy. With France back into the integrated headquarters and president Obama adopting multilateral policies the time has come for a new look. After all the last concept dates from 1999, well before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the first ever invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of 1949. At the time of writing the ambitions of the Alliance seemed subject to some tuning down. More emphasis on the consultative processes of Article 4, dealing with threats which were directed at most members and acting only if other organisations could not cope with a crisis (i.e. the opposite of a right of first refusal), better relations with Russia, and some contingency planning but in general terms in order not to be provocative.
Those trends are reinforced by the increasing connection between internal and external security in dealing with terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration, but also by the link between security and development. Following important work by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) it is now generally recognised that, without a basic level of security, development money will be wasted. Both trends underline the need for close cooperation between the military and the police and civilian authorities. They also stress the need for a process of security sector reform which follows an integrated sequence of intervention – post conflict stabilisation – rebuilding of institutions and a ‘whole of government’ approach. For these aspects the EU is better equipped than NATO, particularly at a time when defence budgets are under pressure.

Conversely, no large military operation can be undertaken without participation of the US. In fact, that does not only apply to the security sphere, but to virtually every problem in our globalising world. When the US and the EU see eye to eye on issues like the financial crisis, fighting protectionism, climate change and global warming, there is a chance of making progress. If not, our efforts are doomed to fail. This means that consultations with the US have to be organised on a broad front of issues, perhaps through new institutional devices. NATO as a security organisation will not be able to cover them all.

On our side, Europe will have to organise itself better. The EU now has the task to update the so-called Solana strategy of 2003 in order to match the new NATO Strategic Concept. In the current financial crisis the critics argue that without a political union the Eurozone will fail, but they usually do not indicate what that Union should entail. Both in economic policy and elsewhere we should prioritise our ‘minimalia’ which are sufficient for meeting our objectives. It is an illusion to think that we will ever be able to organise a European foreign policy on the pattern of national ministries of foreign affairs with the thousands of messages and information flowing in and out. Similarly we will need to preserve some flexibility in economic and tax policies. But we will have to agree on our priorities and on binding rules to achieve them together. The Greek deficit case was so bad because it shook our confidence in the trustworthiness of a partner. The same loss of confidence occurred with regard to the financial rating agencies and the risk management of the banks. So there we need control mechanisms which do not kill initiative and hamper growth, but can work effectively without unnecessary regulation. Otherwise the disconnect between voter and government is bound to grow.

In NATO we see a divergence between the old members, who look at new tasks like peace support and security sector reform, and new members who focus on the old NATO of Article 5 and collective defence. Solving that problem is closely connected with better relations with a Russia which currently passes

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through a nationalistic phase. The leaders in the Kremlin should be made aware of the fact that their Western border is the best they have, which we will never attack and could become an area of mutually beneficial trade, provided they stop heavy-handed attempts at political pressure in domestic affairs.

Finally, Europe will have to do more in the security field, if we want to be a reliable player. Still, equipment programs are lacking in meeting shortfalls. Together, the European countries have more soldiers under arms than the US, but too few of them are capable of deployment outside our borders. The possibilities for task specialisation should not be exaggerated. In past experience this often amounted to doing less and shifting burdens to others. Yet, there is scope for pooling of assets and maintaining a certain autonomy in their use. The European Defence Agency (EDA) has had some success in making the defence market more transparent and has composed a number of strategies. Yet, the objective of bringing together the supply side, research and development, and acquisition into a joint effort has not yet been reached. Hopefully, the current financial crunch might overcome some national sensitivities.

The Netherlands have conducted an intensive analysis of the foreseeable security situations over the next twenty years and defined a number of force patterns to cope with them. They range with increasing intensity from protection, to intervention, to stabilisation, and a multiple role combining the previous three strategic functions. For the short term the consensus seems to be that maintaining the current levels of effort will require more funding. As money is short everywhere, the only solution seems to be a better combination of funding both development money and part of the operational cost of the stabilisation effort, thus freeing funds within the defence budget.

Over the past fifteen years Peter Volten’s brainchild, the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS), has been leading in the field of security sector reform and democratic civilian oversight over the armed forces. CESS has established a niche for itself in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, many of which in the meantime have joined NATO and the EU. Much remains to be done and its emphasis is likely to evolve. Reform will switch to governance and oversight over the police and internal security services will gain in relative weight. Much of what our military are doing abroad can be compared to what the police is doing at home. Yet, the police work closer to the average citizen and have to gain his trust as an impartial and honest service. In the new triad of Defence, Diplomacy and Development – which should properly be Security, Governance and Development – the mantra of CESS – Reveal, Explain and Justify – will remain an essential element of democratic society. Ultimately the role of CESS should extend to a ‘whole of government’ concept.
Chapter 7. The European Defence Community and NATO. A Classic Case of Franco-Dutch Controversy

Jan van der Harst

In March 1954 the Dutch army major Feije Spits published an extensive survey - under the auspices of the European Movement in the Netherlands - entitled Naar een Europees Leger (To a European Army). At the time, it was the most detailed account - also for international standards - of the European army discussions taking place in Paris. Spits wrote his piece at a moment that the concept of a European Defence Community (EDC) was still alive, its treaty being subject to approval in the national parliaments. In his book Spits showed ambiguous feelings about the direction the European army debate was taking. He blamed the United States and Britain for giving inadequate support to France in ‘its legitimate quest’ for security against the possible threat of a reviving German military danger. Spits also asked for more sympathy for French ambitions to strengthen their position in the Atlantic framework of NATO (Spits 1954, 10). In the early 1950s, EDC and NATO issues were closely intertwined. NATO had just been created and was still in the process of developing itself into a proper military organisation. Many observers wondered to what extent the EDC could develop into a rival to the incipient Atlantic framework.

The EDC story is a curious one, full of inconsistencies and paradoxes. It also serves as a classic example of Franco-Dutch controversy in the European political domain. The positions of the two countries could hardly have been more apart. In October 1950 France launched the plan for a supranational European army, but four years later it was the French national parliament being responsible for the EDC’s tragic demise. Conversely, the Netherlands manifested itself as the fiercest opponent to the French European army plan, but in 1954 the Dutch parliament was the first of the six to ratify the EDC treaty. France and the Netherlands feature as the extremes in the EDC saga and hence deserve special attention in this chapter. The main questions to be considered are: how to explain the original French and Dutch positions on EDC, as well as their subsequent U-turns? How do we relate the European policies of the two countries to simultaneous developments in the Atlantic framework of NATO? And (in the concluding remarks) what are the EDC’s lessons for today’s attempts at European cooperation in security and defence matters?

5 Feije Cornelis Spits was (from 1973-1984) the predecessor of Peter Volten in holding the chair in Krijgsgeschiedenis (History of War) at the University of Utrecht.
6 For the Dutch side of the EDC history, see: Van der Harst 1988, 2003.
The Pleven Plan for a European Army, 1950-1952

The European Defence Community, or European ‘army’ as it was initially called, concerned a French initiative to make German rearma ment acceptable within the framework of an integrated European military force. Paris had become alarmed following an American proposal aimed at rearming the Germans in the context of NATO. The US initiative was prompted by the outbreak of the Korean War in the early summer of 1950, Washington fearing the emergence of similar calamities in central Europe, in the form of a Soviet-led invasion of West Germany. The French government was in an awkward predicament: it had to worry about the communist threat, but the simultaneous US-induced re-emergence of neighbour and long-time enemy Germany was perceived as a much more imminent and direct danger. Paris apprehended an independent development of the German army, without adequate control and supervision from the allies. It was only five years after the Second World War, and neither government nor public were convinced of a total disappearance of the German danger.

To cope with this predicament, the French government sought to apply the successful Schuman plan concept (launched in May 1950 to organise the production and distribution of coal and steel in Western Europe) to military matters. A proposal was drafted to supranationalise the management of European defence, by merging national - including German - army units into a unified European army. Regarding the required member states’ commitment this was a considerable step further than the Western Union (founded by the Brussels Treaty in 1948) and NATO, both purely intergovernmental institutions with no obligations concerning delegation of national sovereignty.

The initial reactions to the Pleven plan (named after the French prime minister of the time) were distinctly negative. The US government preferred its own scheme for German rearma ment within NATO. The United Kingdom, for reasons of principle, disliked supranational ‘adventures’, as demonstrated some months earlier by the government’s negative response to the Schuman plan. Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin also felt that Britain could “not afford to allow the European federal concept to gain a foothold within NATO and thus weaken instead of strengthening the ties between the countries on the two sides of the Atlantic” (Trachtenberg 1999, 117). The Germans were appalled that the French proposal heavily discriminated against them; some restrictions imposed on the German army did not apply to France or the other participants. The Netherlands anticipated that the Pleven plan would needlessly delay German rearma ment. The Netherlands strove for a ‘forward defence’ on the river Elbe in Germany to repel a possible Red Army attack away from the home country’s territory. The ready deployment of German soldiers was an absolute condition for implementing such a defence strategy, and NATO was seen as the appropriate instrument to achieve this. And military authorities Europe-wide felt that the proposed method of integrating national army units in European divisions was
grossly impracticable and would never work on the battlefield, given existing
differences in language, culture, habits, etcetera (Fursdon 1980, 92).

Faced with so much opposition, the Pleven plan was bound to fail. Even the
French military were against, preferring the NATO solution for German
rearmament instead (see Guillen 1983, 3-33; Vial 2000, 135-158). Bearing in
mind such widespread reticence, it is no small wonder that the European army
plan soon did get a firm place on the international agenda and indeed would
dominate the discussions in the European capitals and in Washington for the
next four years.

The principal reason was that during the first half of 1951 the US
administration changed its position on the European army. From initial
opponents, President Harry Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson
converted themselves into supporters of the French plan, for the following
reasons.

Firstly, ever since the Second World War, Washington had been looking for
ways to promote peaceful integration on the European continent. To her
disappointment the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
(predecessor of the OECD) – created for the distribution of Marshall aid – had
not succeeded in achieving a supranational leap. In the summer of 1950, the
Americans hailed the Schuman plan as – finally – a step in the right direction.
The Pleven plan was now seen as the next stage in a process that would –
hopefully and preferably, as far as the Truman government was concerned –
lead to some sort of united states of Europe on a federal basis (Dwan 2000, 69;

Secondly, after the Second World War the USA had maintained a
substantial number of troops in West Germany and this number was even
expected to increase after the start of the Korean War. The question raised in
Washington was for how long such a large-scale deployment overseas would
be sustainable, both in domestic-political and financial terms. As a matter of
fact, the secret hope was that the European army would lead, in the short run,
to a fairer method of burden-sharing and provide, in the longer run, an
opportunity to bring American soldiers back home (Cresswell 2000, 222).

Thirdly, the French government refused to accept any other solution than its
own European army plan and Washington realised that French collaboration
was indispensable for a credible build-up of post-war continental defence, in
the context of a politically marginalised Germany and a reluctant Britain. French
diplomacy, guided by the Monnet lobby in Washington (Harryvan and Van der
Harst 2008, 152-153), emphasised that the Pleven plan would help to tackle
several problems simultaneously: it would bring about German rearmament,
develop European integration, increase the chances of a responsible French
policy on the continent and, last but not least, contain German power
aspirations.
The American change of mind in the summer of 1951 proved decisive. From then on, the NATO solution for German rearmament was put on ice and the European army plan was the only concept left on the discussion table. The same six countries involved in the Schuman plan deliberations also convened for negotiating the Pleven proposal, at a conference held in Paris. For some of them, this was hard to accept. The Netherlands, for one, joined the negotiations, but reluctantly and under overt US diplomatic pressure. In February 1951, at the start of the discussions, The Hague sent only observers to the conference and it was not before the autumn of the same year that it upgraded the delegation in Paris to the status of full participant (Van der Harst 1990, 143-147). Britain refused to become involved at all, due to their fundamental dislike of supranationalism, especially in highly sensitive areas as security and defence (Ruane 2000, 30).

On the other side, and contrary to British and Dutch scepticism, Germany increasingly came to embrace the French initiative. During the negotiations some of the most discriminating elements had been mitigated or even eliminated. France made concessions on important dossiers and Germany gradually obtained the position of - almost - equal partner in the army discussions (Gauzy 2000, 39) Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was known for his support of European integration (Westbindung) and encouraged his national delegation to adopt a constructive approach at the conference. Italy's interest in military integration became more and more linked to its striving for a federal-political organisation of Europe. This was a long-held preference by Italian Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi, who advocated the creation of a European Political Community, functioning as a political ‘roof’ for ECSC and EDC (Varsori 2000, 182).

Curiously enough, the most reticent country was the one generally reputed for its federalist inclinations, namely the Netherlands. The Drees government was strongly in favour of economic and commercial integration on the European continent, but highly sceptical as far as political and military issues were concerned, preferring the valued Atlantic link with the United States instead. Dutch opposition to the European army failed to have the desired impact. In the first half of 1952, with the French and Germans in charge, and with a supportive America, European defence integration slowly but surely became a reality. In May 1952 the six countries involved proceeded to signing the EDC treaty.

French and Dutch U-turns, 1952-1954
The Treaty had been signed, but the real battle, the ratification procedure in the national parliaments, was yet to begin. As indicated in the introduction, the

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7 For some time, Dutch opposition to the EDC was shared by Belgium and Luxembourg. Duchêne (1994, 232) has written that at this stage “the Benelux countries were not at all their later federalist selves”. 

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French parliament - following protracted negotiations and endless shilly-shallying – decided to reject the treaty in August 1954. This meant effectively the end of the EDC, given the widely shared conviction that a continental defence community would not be workable without French participation.

How could this U-turn be explained? In the rich amount of literature on the EDC, many arguments have been provided for clarifying the French decision (see, i.a., Lerner and Aron 1957, Fursdon 1980, Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt 1985, Dumoulin 2000, Ruane 2000). One explanation is that Paris felt uncomfortable about London’s stubborn refusal to enter the EDC, because in case of a reviving German danger French territory would be exposed directly and unilaterally, without British support on hand (e.g. Young 1998, 74, 76). A similar argument was put forward by Feije Spits, as referred to in the introduction. The main problem with this line of reasoning is that in reality the French never showed any sign of enthusiasm about Britain’s membership. With the British involved, France would lose the privilege of steering the Community and moulding it according to its own preferences. Ruane (2000, 178) rightly observes that “even if the British had signed up to the EDC, there was no certainty that French ratification would have followed”. Another less convincing explanation is the one that holds that in 1953 the Cold War had entered a period of relaxation (‘thaw’) after the death of Joseph Stalin and the end of the Korean War, and that as a result, German rearmament was no longer an urgent requirement. In other words, the original motive for creating the EDC - the mobilisation of German manpower to counter the military threat from the East - had become obsolete. If this is true, how could we explain that the Federal Republic did become rearmed, and even very quickly, after the defeat of the EDC treaty in August 1954? In the immediate aftermath the country entered both WEU (successor to the Western Union of 1948) and NATO, followed by a rapid remobilisation of the Bundeswehr, all of which were signs of considerable urgency.

Hence, we should look at other and probably more plausible explanations, mostly concerning domestic developments in France. Firstly, there was the advance of Gaullism in French national politics. Until late 1952, the pro-European Mouvement Républicain Populaire (the Christian-democratic party of Schuman and Pleven) still played a leading role in the government, but this changed abruptly after the elections of late 1952 when the Gaullist and eurosceptic RPF (Rassemblement du Peuple Français) gained a substantial part of the popular vote at the expense of the MRP. The incoming Mayer government would depend on Gaullist support for its political survival. From then on, the momentum in the domestic debate on Europe worked against the integrationists and in favour of (Gaullist and other) anti-integrationists. Simultaneously, the standing and influence of Jean Monnet – the spiritual father of the Schuman plan and Pleven plan – eroded. By early 1953 Monnet had
become, as Alan Milward once phrased it, “politically speaking a dead person”. Moreover, at the same time France was confronted with new proposals, such as the European Political Community (De Gasperi’s brainchild) and the Beyen plan, which were seen as potentially harmful for the country’s position in Europe. The latter plan, named after Dutch Foreign Minister Jan-Willem Beyen, was meant as a blueprint for extending trade liberalisation and creating a customs union among the Six, and as such became an integral part of the discussions on EDC and EPC. France, fearing the lack of competitiveness of its business sector, looked askance at any initiative aimed at opening the domestic market (Vernant 1957, 112-113). The contrast between German economic strength and French stagnation “reduced French readiness to proceed further with the Six-Power organisation of little Europe”, as was asserted by the British Foreign Office (Ruane 2000, 177-178).

Secondly, the French showed increasing reluctance to sacrifice national sovereignty for the sake of keeping the Germans in check. We already referred to the results Adenauer booked in lifting discriminatory measures against Germany and securing a largely equal position for the German army. This provoked uncomfortable feelings in France: given the gradual disappearance of provisions favouring France, the remedy – a supranational European defence mechanism – became worse than the disease – German rearmament. For the Gaullist-dependent governments the delegation of power from the national level to Europe was unacceptable, especially so where the position of the venerable French army institution was at stake. Obviously, coal and steel were less sensitive than military matters, the latter touching the core of the nation’s independence and pride (Large 1993, 394). France also worried that the leeway for military operations outside Europe (in Africa and Asia) would be curtailed by obligations evolving from EDC membership. In case French forces were needed overseas, German manpower could easily dominate the European army, at least in quantitative terms.

Thirdly, a lesser known argument concerned French fears of allowing fellow Europeans to have control over the national programme for nuclear research. At that time French scientists were conducting advanced studies on developing a national nuclear force (both for civil and military use) and the early 1950s witnessed considerable progress in this area. The EDC treaty had provided for a powerful role by the central Board of Commissioners (a supranational institution comparable to the ECSC’s High Authority) in the spheres of scientific research and development. Paris apprehended that the Board’s activities might very well interfere with the nation’s nuclear programme. In other words, the Board’s substantial authority in controlling research activities in the member states was in striking contrast with French unilateral ambitions in the nuclear domain (Goldschmidt 1967, Scheinman 1965).

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8 At a seminar course The Reconstruction of Western Europe, EUI Florence, 30 October 1985.
For all these reasons, the EDC became increasingly unacceptable for both the French government and parliament. On 30 August 1954, the latter decided to get rid of the treaty. By then, France had manoeuvred itself in a completely isolated position. The parliaments of the three Benelux countries and the German Bundestag already had taken the decision to ratify the treaty, whereas Italy was about to ratify (Varsori, 2000, 183).

How was it possible that the Netherlands, originally the most reluctant participant, became the first of the Six to approve the EDC treaty (in January 1954)? Only to a small extent, this had to do with a more positive EDC approach by the Dutch government. The greater part of the Cabinet still considered the European army an unattractive phenomenon, an instrument to delay German rearmament. They kept prioritising the Atlantic solution for rearming the Federal Republic. So, how can we explain the Dutch change of mind?

Firstly, even though the majority of Cabinet members remained sceptical, there was one important exception. The pro-European Jan-Willem Beyen had been appointed Foreign Minister in September 1952. He came to see the EDC as a useful tool in the development of Europe, especially if combined with integration in economic matters. Beyen strove for a continental customs union and sought to further this aim by promoting EDC and EPC. Within the EPC framework Beyen had launched his own plan for regional trade liberalisation and he hoped that ratification of EDC and EPC would boost his own economically oriented goals. Hence, Beyen was by far the most disappointed Cabinet member when the EDC treaty was rejected in August 1954. He had to wait until the Messina conference of 1955 before his liberal trade concept was picked up again - in fact, it would prove, successfully.

Secondly, although his cabinet colleagues supported Beyen in his striving for trade liberalisation, they were by no means convinced of the need of combining this with having an EDC. Their pushing for a quick ratification procedure in the national parliament was done predominantly out of pragmatic, if not to say: opportunistic, considerations. The Hague noticed that from early

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9 Beyen’s conversion to Europe stands as a telling example of the irony of history. In 1952, Prime Minister Drees had given the job to Beyen, a former IMF official without party affiliation, because he preferred a prudent approach to European integration and simply abhorred the idea of having a Catholic member (of the KVP) as the new minister for foreign affairs. The Prime Minister feared the coming of a ‘Europe Vatican’, and he thought that under Beyen, European affairs would be in safe hands. Needless to say, it was an unpleasant shock for him to discover that Beyen soon after his appointment turned into one of the most pro-European foreign ministers of the post-war period, and would later die a devout Catholic. In wry contrast, the KVP foreign minister Luns (from 1952-1956 the Netherlands had two ministers for foreign affairs) was rather sceptical of radical integrational developments and developed into a convinced ‘atlanticist’, thus becoming a man much more after Drees’s heart.

10 With the exception of Sicco Mansholt, the minister of agriculture, a fervent supporter of European integration.
1953 – after the coming to power of the Mayer government in France – Paris was looking for ways to rid itself of the treaty. Part of the Dutch policy establishment sensed that from that moment on the EDC was virtually speaking ‘dead’. Seen from that perspective it was not harmful at all to speed up ratification at home, which, as a concomitant advantage, helped to portray the Netherlands as a reliable partner in the international arena. Connected to this was the outspoken US support for ratification. Acheson’s successor John Foster Dulles had made clear that he would reward a cooperative stance by the European partners, and punish non-compliance. The continued need of US support - in the form of army equipment and offshore orders - for the country’s defence build-up and economic reconstruction provided the Dutch government with an extra motive to welcome a positive decision on EDC by the national parliament. Another potential benefit was that it would help to keep the Beyen plan on the negotiating table (Weenink 2005, 338-341). But, as said before, when the French Assemblée took its ultimate decision to bury the EDC there was hardly any regret in the country. Neither did The Hague show overt signs of panic or nervousness about the vacuum the aborted EDC left behind. Unlike the British government, which showed serious concern about the possibility of an American retreat from Europe (Ruane 2000, 175), the Dutch never really believed that Dulles would enforce his threat of agonising reappraisal upon the continent (Van der Harst 2003, 304).

At the end of the day, after four years of delay and confusion, the NATO solution for German rearmament carried the day, eventually with French support. At about the same time Europe underwent a far-reaching re-launch at the conference of Messina, where the Beyen plan (in a new version) was brought back to the negotiating table and, as would turn out later, with considerable success.

In Conclusion
In the early 1950s, attempts at High Politics integration via the EDC utterly failed. In retrospect, this was no surprise because ever since, the countries of Western Europe have been reluctant to throw in their lot together in the sensitive areas of security and defence policies. The problems nowadays connected to a strengthening of CFSP and ESDP are telling examples. These issues, touching the core of the nation state and national independence, hamper the willingness to make decisions on the basis of intergovernmental – let alone, supranational – means and methods. In that respect, the EDC was an instructive experiment, because the usual and traditional problems surrounding defence integration manifested themselves clearly during the early 1950s.

The EDC saga serves as a classic case of the deep-ridden Franco-Dutch controversy in the areas of defence of security. France liked the idea of having an EDC for exactly the reasons why the Netherlands disliked it. Paris was
looking for ways to establish a leadership's position on the European continent and to reduce the American hegemony over European political affairs. In the longer run - as the French anticipated - the EDC could take over the main responsibilities of NATO. For the Dutch government of the time, this was a horror scenario. To their conviction, the Atlantic link with the United States was sacrosanct: the Netherlands preferred the hegemony of a geographically remote superpower to what was perceived as a less credible leadership and more immediate domination by France, Germany, Britain, or any combination of them, in a militarily autonomous Europe. The Dutch government therefore rejected the French European army proposal and changed its mind only after it came to realise that Paris was looking for ways to abandon the EDC. Eventually, the Dutch diplomatic strategy turned out to be successful: when the EDC treaty was rejected France received unilateral blame for the failure, while the Netherlands could portray itself as a reliable partner in international politics. Moreover, in line with Dutch preferences, German rearmament was achieved through NATO, rather than the unloved European alternative.

To a large extent, the Franco-Dutch controversy is still present today, France being the main champion of an autonomous European defence structure (although at times president Sarkozy - more than his predecessors - shows affection for NATO) and the Netherlands acting as the spokesman of Atlantic relations. Whenever the occasion arises, the Atlantic reflex still pervades Dutch policy-making, as shows the Air Force's choice for the Joint Strike Fighter (as the successor of the F-16) and the support for NATO-guided peace-keeping operations in Afghanistan. At the same time, circumstances have changed dramatically since 1990. The United States has withdrawn the greater part of its forces from the European continent and reoriented its foreign policies to the Pacific and other parts of the world. After the Cold War, Europe is no longer a strategic priority in American security policy and NATO has apparent difficulty to find a new and proper role for itself. As a consequence, even the staunch Atlantic ally the Netherlands has been forced to adapt its traditionally reticent position on European security, especially after the British-French agreement at St. Malo in December 1998. Shortly afterwards, the Atlantic primacy was seriously put in question by the self-willed international policies of the American president George Bush jr., leading to a deterioration of US-Dutch/European relations.

However, the decisive turn to a new European defence orientation has not really occurred, so far. Despite the launching of ESDP (after the treaty of Lisbon called CSDP), some small EU-led peace-keeping operations on the Balkans and elsewhere and the undeniable intensification of contacts between military experts at the European level, a development into the direction of a European army force has failed to materialize. At the Helsinki summit of 1999, the EU leaders agreed on the deployment of a rapid reaction unit of 50,000 to 60,000 men, to be sent within sixty days to theatres all around the world. Today, ten
years later, the EU member states have not come any further than the creation of small battle groups of 1,500 men and women each. The EU, described by some as the “good cop by default” (Van Staden 2010), relies more on soft than on hard power. As a consequence, the European military dependence on the US has not really decreased in the last two decades. For most important military matters, NATO is still the only game in town.

Yet, it would be unwise to think that the Atlantic priority in Dutch defence policy has remained untouched. The US no longer considers NATO an absolute precondition for maintaining their global position. At the same time, the political-military role of the Netherlands – like many other European countries – is affected by the continuing post-Cold War tendency to economise on national defence expenditure. In the longer run, this could lead to a (further) marginalization of the Dutch and European position internationally, at least in the view of the US military.

There may be a way out of this cul-de-sac. In the 1980s, Peter Volten published a booklet on, what he saw as, the necessity of taakspecialisatie (task specialisation) in the defence organisation of the Netherlands. He argued that the future international presence of the Netherlands in NATO could only be safeguarded by focusing on certain key sectors of domestic defence, at the expense of other, less productive or urgent tasks. Volten pleaded in particular for intensifying army cooperation with Belgium (or Germany), while simultaneously economising on fighter planes and frigates (Volten 1987, 1988).

Although taakspecialisatie is a controversial issue and in practice hard to realise, it could be challenging sense to translate some of Volten’s notions – ventilated during the Cold War – to what is happening in the post-Cold War Europe of today. In a situation of smaller defence budgets, the best way to guarantee a future role for the EU would be by combining and streamlining the military efforts of the member states through a far reaching process of taakspecialisatie. In such a division of tasks, some countries would have to focus on the modernisation of their army, others on naval and/or air force duties, while sacrificing superfluous activities. It would produce increasing efficiency, more ‘bang for the buck’, or as Volten (1987) himself phrased it: “voor hetzelfde geld meer defensie” (“more defence for the same amount of money”). Task specialisation forces European countries to work closer together and become dependent on each other’s input and commitment. The (unintended) by-product of such a development of creeping integration could be a supranationalization of the member states’ security and defence policies. After all, the European Defence Community revisited?

References


In March 1986, the Groningen Institute for Peace Research held a symposium, titled ‘The Future of the Peace Movement’. The feeling was that the church-based peace movement’s NATO-critical, anti-cruise missile campaign of the late 1970s and early 1980s had failed politically. At the symposium, Peter Volten, top-advisor of the Dutch Ministry of Defence, argued that the peace movement, influential as it had been nationally and internationally, could still continue to play an important role. However, Volten explained, the peace movement’s major contribution to politics is to function as an intellectual hornet, rather than to operate as a mass movement or quasi-political party. Quantity should give way to quality (see Tromp 1988, 195-197).

Has the peace movement since acted on Volten’s advice? This essay offers a short analysis of the post-Cold War attitude towards NATO of the leading Dutch peace organizations Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (IKV) and Pax Christi, or the single organization IKV Pax Christi from 2007. Thus, it will critically comment on two cases: first, the position of IKV Pax Christi regarding the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo; second, IKV Pax Christi’s attitude towards the recent international discussion about the future of nuclear weapons, particularly NATO’s role in it.

Church-based organizations such as IKV and Pax Christi – to be called mostly IKV Pax Christi below – have consistently intended to offer authoritative guidance to political choice. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to understand Volten’s challenge, with its emphasis on qualitative intellectual improvement, as one of meeting standards of political ethics (cf. also IKV/Pax Christi 2000, 18; Van Den Berg 2006, 155-161). ‘Political ethics’ entails empirical-ethical reflection on decision-makers’ choices, assuming that politics, domestic and international, is a domain of moral choice, not of pure necessity (Hoffmann 1999). Its ‘standards’ will be taken here to include the adequate use of two points of attention: ‘(philosophical or theological) ethics’ and ‘policy’. ‘Ethics’ aims to offer principal moral guidelines for action; ‘policy’ looks to what is desirable within the limits of what is possible. Taken together, these attention points express the insight that an adequate political ethics accepts that political action can almost never be entirely ‘good’ and that using ‘evil’ means may be justified at times (cf. Amstutz 2008; Walzer 1973). The use of ‘ethics’ may be called adequate if a position taken is based on clear and precise moral guidelines, which, moreover, are politically relevant by an employment of empirically based consequentialist arguments for the establishment of the
goodness and badness of policy forms. The use of ‘policy’ may be called adequate if a position taken rests on a sound empirical-political analysis of feasibilities and infeasibilities and good and bad action consequences, whereby serious attention is paid to power relationships and economic, historical, and cultural realities (Gustafson 1988; Krueger 1988). Thus, IKV Pax Christi’s attitudes in the two selected cases will be evaluated by both these standards.

**IKV Pax Christi and NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo**

During the 1990s, IKV Pax Christi began to reflect upon the theory and practice of ‘humanitarian intervention’. It came to believe that, whereas humanitarian intervention is not necessarily the means to end a conflict, it should at least be conducted in order to achieve the short-term goal of protecting citizens and creating safe havens. Designing good solutions for conflicts is important, yet a longer-term affair: ‘First things first!’ In January 1999, IKV Pax Christi argued for a strong international military presence in Kosovo in order to protect the Albanian citizens. In the spring of that year, it spoke out its disapproval of the way NATO operated, pleading, unsuccessfully, for ground troops instead of air bombardments (Van Den Berg 2006, 54-56, 63).

Important here is the IKV Pax Christi report *Humanitaire interventie* (Humanitarian intervention; 2000, especially 3-20, 45-47). Its guiding idea is that in the post-Cold War context the justification of armed forces lies in humanitarian intervention, rather than in traditional national defence. The UN involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1992, the NATO interference there since late 1995 (UN mandated), and the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo (not UN mandated) suggest a development in which not only competition and power but also justice and law – notably human rights protection in foreign countries – motivate political and military action. Hence the actuality of using military means ‘for the sake of justice’. Accordingly, the Netherlands must clarify why its defence organization should integrally be in service of the broader international community, and why Dutch military women and men, together with colleagues from other countries, should be willing to risk their own lives in conflict areas. Such questions require the development of just war criteria that offer normative guidance to military intervention for humanitarian goals, that is, for creating ‘justice’, ‘peace’, and ‘participation’. The report then suggests that the Dutch defence organization should be grounded in: security partnerships (NATO, but also EU and pan-European); building of mutual trust between peoples; strengthening of pan-European security structures; replacing power relationships by law relationships; accepting co-responsibility in the international community’s military performance; contributing to reconciliation and civil society building in conflict areas; supplying humanitarian aid. The backing criteria are to be derived from an ‘actualized’ religious view of the use of violence: just cause (against aggression or gross basic human rights violations); right intention;
urgent necessity; lawful authority (principally the UN Security Council, or mandated regional arrangements: OSCE, OAU, OAS, etc.); truth; comprehensiveness (use of armed forces as part of a broader diplomatic, economic, social, and cultural framework); last resort; reasonable hope of success; proportionality; discrimination. The use of violence, also for the sake of justice, should be judged according to such just war criteria, as a juridical legitimization of humanitarian intervention is no sufficient condition for its political-ethical legitimization. Accepting to risk one’s own soldiers’ lives for halting genocide and protecting civilians will demand the utmost of political creativity and responsibility – including the afterwards justification of decisions taken – as well as care and appreciation regarding the military concerned and their home base. In humanitarian intervention, the role of the UN (competent authority) as mandate giver (but not necessarily executor) remains important and most desirable. Even if the UN is internally divided by countries’ political self-interests and thereby paralysed, there should still be widespread consensus through international, regional committees. Participating countries should avoid following their own national agenda, the report insists.

IKV’s general secretary and undisputed peace movement leader Mient Jan Faber, who condemned the pacifistic (and anti-NATO) sentiments prevailing in the Dutch churches at the time, was supportive yet critical of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo (Faber 1999; cf. 2004; IKV/Pax Christi 2000, 40-42). In his view, indeed, the justification of armed forces was to be found in humanitarian intervention: the ‘global village’ needs armed forces capable of conducting interventions in situations where massive violations of human rights occur. In 1998 and early 1999, Kosovo was ethnically cleansed by Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic’s regime. NATO tried to stop this cleansing by starting an air campaign against Yugoslavia. However, according to Faber, NATO should not have declared at the outset to employ no ground troops for protecting the Kosovo Albanians. As bombardments cannot make the difference, NATO’s announcement effectively ruled out a humanitarian intervention. Politicians and generals should have stepped over their fear of ‘body bags’ and accept that soldiers could get killed. Worse still, Faber held, NATO’s air actions led exactly to what should have been avoided: ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo Albanians as Milosevic’s response. True, there were no victims on NATO’s side, and the air actions succeeded in expelling Milosevic from Kosovo and offering a home to the Albanian population. However, NATO did not pay any attention to protective measures for the civilian population, and its air actions were unjustly presented as a successful and legitimate form of humanitarian intervention. Whereas protecting people in distress should self-evidently take place where they find themselves – on the ground – NATO never seriously considered the use of ground troops. NATO saw ground troops as ineffective and dangerous, and, especially in the United States, as without political support. NATO feared an all-out Balkan war and a breach with Russia.
It also expected many victims, on both NATO’s and Kosovar sides. And it felt that speculations about the use of ground troops could have undermined the trust in the air campaign and would take too much preparation time. However, Faber objected, NATO did not really ask whether ground operations could have stopped the ethnic cleansing and could have offered protection to the citizens. Also, it did not examine the possibility of aimed ground operations with the explicit goal of creating ‘safe areas’ and ‘protected zones’ for the civilian population.

**IKV Pax Christi, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons**

Church-based organizations such as IKV and Pax Christi have always had a deep aversion against nuclear weapons. In their view, nuclear weapons are principally immoral, as they cannot be used discriminatory and proportionally. Their answer to the question of how to deal with a situation so immoral is: try to get rid of it. Some nuanced differences, however, do exist. Whereas Roman Catholic thought has emphasized conditional and temporary moral acceptance of nuclear weapons possession, Protestant thought has tended towards unconditional moral rejection. After the 1987 USA-USSR Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces agreement, which entailed that no cruise missiles had to be installed in the Netherlands, IKV Pax Christi remained worried about NATO’s continuing nuclear deterrence strategy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Van Den Berg 2006, 43-45). Yet IKV Pax Christi has maintained that a nuclear weapon-free world is possible as well as desirable, and that NATO has a key role to play in this regard.

Of key interest is the recent IKV Pax Christi report *Een kernwapenvrije wereld* (A world free of nuclear weapons, 2009, especially 19-43). Many things have changed since the 1980s, the report states, but not the principal, moral rejection of nuclear weapons: it stays ‘NO!’ More broadly, it bases its plea for total banishment on the following arguments: (1) moral and/or religious grounds: threatening with and employing nuclear weapons is a morally unacceptable violation of the right to live without fear, and actually using them is a gross infringement of creation and the right to life; (2) juridical grounds: possessing and using nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed by nearly all the world’s states, and also with the principles of humanitarian war law; and (3) political and military considerations: the threat of ‘mutually assured destruction’ has lost its meaning since the end of the Cold War: the logic of nuclear deterrence does hardly anything to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the risk of further proliferation of nuclear weapons towards state and non-state actors (terrorists) has only grown. Therefore, total nuclear disarmament is called for within a foreseeable period and in a careful, transparent, verifiable procedure. Also because of U.S. President Barack Obama’s positive stance towards
nuclear disarmament, the time is ripe for real change. The report, then, is particularly concerned with making a case for (3).

The report surveys and rejects major arguments against abortion. First, there is the view of the nuclear weapon as ‘just another weapon’ that could be used to win a battle and as a fighting weapon. This view is seen as factually incorrect and morally condemnable: nuclear weapons have a much larger, more unpredictable, and more destructive impact than other weapons. Also, they have proven to be practically unusable, precisely because of their enormously dangerous effects. Second, there is the argument of nuclear weapons as deterrent – the most common view, also within NATO, which, logically, has refused to deliver a ‘no-first-use’ declaration, as that would undermine its deterrence strategy. Whereas after the Cold War NATO briefly spoke of ‘weapons of last resort’, it now prefers to see nuclear weapons as an ‘insurance policy’ against an uncertain future, thereby allowing for far-reaching reduction but excluding wholesale abolition. This view is regarded as dangerous for a post-Cold War world facing an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies and chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of terrorists. Third, there is the view of the nuclear weapon as weapon of terror. The backing idea is that using it may demoralise and demote the population of an enemy state, so the enemy can be defeated faster – typically the reasoning of contemporary non-state terrorists. The problem here, the report claims, is that terrorists have more chance to acquire nuclear weapons (in politically weak nuclear states such as Pakistan); and, if they succeed in doing so, they will not be as reluctant as states in actually using them. Fourth, there is the view of the nuclear weapon as political symbol. Especially the no longer great powers Great Britain and France derive status from nuclear weapons possession. Here the problem is felt to be that the strive for power of non-nuclear states through nuclear weapons possession will only become stronger if established nuclear states refuse to give up their nuclear arsenal or decrease it drastically. The report concludes that more and more policy-makers have come to doubt the most popular (NATO) argument of deterrence, thinking that the chance is small that under current circumstances deterrence will function as a step towards progressive disarmament. All quarters point out the growing danger that they will be used. The call to abolish nuclear weapons is becoming louder.

Aiming at universal NPT compliance, and believing that only international cooperation in striving equally for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament may lead to the removal of nuclear weapons, the report applauds the Middle Powers Initiative that advocates: drastic and verifiable reduction of the number of nuclear weapons, especially by the United States and Russia (decrease of 90 percent in these countries is a prerequisite for a truly positive development); immediate cancelling of the ‘hair-trigger alert’ (the ability of the United States and Russia to launch, respectively, 1,600 and 1,000 nuclear warheads within a few minutes); starting negotiations on a treaty forbidding production of fissile
materials intended for explosions; implementing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; regulating the production of nuclear fuels and the peaceful use of nuclear energy; strengthening negative security assurances and introducing a no first use declaration (if all nuclear states signed such a declaration, following China’s lead, the door to abolition of nuclear weapons would be open); and strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition, the report opts for nuclear weapon-free zones in: the Middle East (more than ever in the security interest of Israel); Africa, Asia, and Europe. Such a European zone demands that: NATO ends any role for nuclear weapons in its security strategy; the U.S. view that the Americans have the right to supply NATO allies with nuclear weapons is rejected as legally unsound; and U.S. nuclear weapons are removed from Europe, as these have lost their military significance with the end of the Cold War and could technically be put into operation from the United States, and the threat from the Middle East is too vague and indirect to militarily justify their presence.

In its report, IKV Pax Christi acknowledges that nuclear disarmament requires a ‘realistic strategy’, one that contributes to a feasible change of course that is politically and militarily acceptable. Needed is courageous political leadership, particularly by the current U.S. President, to make the world nuclear weapon-free. A spearhead of European countries, including the Netherlands, can already take steps that will move nuclear weapon states, primarily the United States, to keep their promise to achieve a world-wide reduction and ultimately the abolition of nuclear weapons.

**Ethics**

The first question is whether the positions taken are based on clear and precisely formulated moral guidelines, which also are politically relevant by a use of consequentialist arguments regarding the goodness and badness of policy forms.

As regards the NATO and humanitarian intervention case, it should first be noted that IKV Pax Christi could have good reason to rely on just war thought. After all, the tradition of just war is long-standing and, in contrast to the pacifist one, commonly regarded as having guiding force for political action (Amstutz 2008). Yet IKV Pax Christi is vague about the applicability of just war to humanitarian intervention. Thus, it does not clearly define the advanced key principles of ‘(for the sake of) justice’, ‘peace’, and ‘participation’. And while IKV Pax Christi plausibly demands an analysis of why, actually, Dutch military women and men should be willing to risk their own lives for humanitarian goals, it fails to offer, or even suggest, a straightforward answer itself. But it is anything

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11 The Middle Powers Initiative is a coalition of eight non-governmental organizations that by putting pressure on ‘middle power’ governments attempts to encourage nuclear weapon states to disarm.
but self-evident why soldiers should be ready to die for purposes with which, in contrast to national self-defence, they can hardly identify, even if they somehow voluntarily choose to pursue an army career (cf. Achterhuis 1999, 54-56). Next, it is unclear how NATO could even in principle have conducted a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, if the competent authority criterion demands a UN mandate or at least some regional consensus (within the OSCE). Actually, it is unclear why a UN mandate should be emphasized so much, or even at all. Indeed, ethically, it is unclear why legal notions are important, and why the UN is to be seen as a competent authority if the Security Council is in fact a political body and an internally divided one at that (cf. Walzer 1999). Thus, it seems incoherent of IKV Pax Christi to criticize the way NATO operated in Kosovo if one does not supply an ethical defence of the use of ground troops oneself and is at best vague about NATO as somehow a competent authority.

Concerning the NATO and nuclear weapons case, while IKV Pax Christi seems consistently and sufficiently clear about its condemnation of nuclear weapons and NATO's possession of them, it is vague about the political relevance of this principled rejection. No systematic ethical analysis is provided about potentially good (say, lesser wars or global stability) as well as bad consequences of nuclear weapons possession or proliferation. IKV Pax Christi simplistically assumes that stating principal moral or religious objections to nuclear weapons is sufficient for an ethics relevant to a politics of nuclear weapons. One may ask why people, states, and NATO, who believe that nuclear weapons possession is bad yet morally justified in view of the on balance positive consequences ('lesser evil') fail ethically and even theologically. IKV Pax Christi tends towards dogmatism: nuclear weapons should be abolished, also by NATO, whatever the consequences.

Both positions taken do not rest upon ethically adequate foundations. In both cases, an ethics with demonstrably relevant action guiding force is lacking.

**Policy**

The second question is whether the attitudes rest upon a sound empirical-political analysis of feasibilities and infeasibilities, and of good and bad action consequences, whereby serious examination is conducted of power relationships and economic, historical, and cultural realities.

Concerning the NATO and humanitarian intervention case, the IKV Pax Christi policy analysis fails for at least two reasons. First, it includes no evidence or argument in favour of the feasibility of a ground war. It is not shown that it is somehow realistic, and particularly in the Kosovo case, to expect countries’ readiness to sacrifice their soldiers’ lives out of solidarity with victims of oppression if there is no direct national self-interest involved. Indeed, the organization (Faber) itself observed a lack of domestic support in the major NATO ally, the United States, in the Kosovo intervention. Second, no evidence
or argument is provided for the use of ground troops as having a reasonable hope of success in the Kosovo case, without (also) having certain unexpected, undesirable consequences. Again, the organization (Faber) itself pointed to the possibility of conflict escalation resulting from the employment of ground troops. Thus, IKV Pax Christi’s advocacy of NATO ground troops amounts to little more than wishful thinking.

As regards the NATO and nuclear weapons case, here, too, the analysis provided fails because of at least two defects. First, in heavily depending on juridical as well as principled moral arguments, IKV Pax Christi provides no systematic and historical examination of power relationships in international relations, particularly of why states possess, or want to possess, nuclear weapons in the first place. It is not made plausible that a world, or even a Europe, free of nuclear weapons is now suddenly feasible, having long been virtually impossible. Indeed, several observations and arguments to the contrary, ones that are not obviously weak, are not considered (De Wijk 2009). Thus, countries such as Israel, Pakistan, and India (no NPT parties) feel threatened in their existence without nuclear weapons, and will not abandon these if there will be no equal security guarantees – which are absent. And when other countries want to keep nuclear weapons, America and Russia will want to keep some behind as well. Moreover, conflicts in the Middle East strongly suggest that the concept of deterrence is not dead. During the First Gulf War in the early 1990s, Israel threatened with nuclear retaliation if Saddam Hussein would harass that country with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons; America did the same. For Iran, a potential nuclear confrontation with Israel is now an important reason for becoming a nuclear power itself. More generally, that deterrence is no longer valid is only partially true for the United States/NATO-Russia relationship, disputable with regard to China, and false between Pakistan and India (so that no first use declarations may remain self-undermining). Also, no NATO member states where American nuclear weapons are stored – the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Great Britain – really dares to ban those, if only because they do not wish to be seen as bad allies within NATO. The point, then, is that IKV Pax Christi makes no serious effort to address, let alone refute, such counter-claims, expecting the NPT, Obama’s anti-nuclear weapons position, and declarations by European countries to do most of the work.

Second, IKV Pax Christi’s proposals, many as they are, are not systematically defended concerning their desirability as well as their feasibility. For example, there is no discussion of International Relations scholar Kenneth Waltz’ influential – albeit controversial – ‘more may be better’ argument about the spread of nuclear weapons. Waltz argues that (gradual) nuclear weapons spread, very hard to prevent anyway, may (continue to) promote peace and global stability, because these weapons are great deterents. Certainly, the United States should by all means prevent acquisition of nuclear weapons or
materials by terrorists (as it already does somewhat by subsidizing Russia to enable it to partially dismantle and partially guard its nuclear weaponry), although even they will not be irrationally inclined to use these (see Sagan and Waltz 2003; for a recent update see Sagan and Waltz 2010). If Waltz is correct, NATO could have good reason to keep nuclear weapons. Thus, dogmatism, rather than broad and systematic analysis, typifies IKV Pax Christi’s nuclear weapons abolition view.

None of the positions taken appears to be based on an adequate policy base. In both cases, sheer idealism prevails over serious empirical-political analysis.

Conclusion
In the cases examined, IKV Pax Christi’s positions fall short political-ethically, as its analyses do not include extensive and rigorous attention to the discourses and demands of ‘ethics’ and ‘policy’. Indeed, moving unduly hastily from principled visions to policy proposals, IKV Pax Christi offers too little supporting analysis in between: its theological- or philosophical-ethical standards are insufficiently elaborated and its attention for empirical data and insights from the disciplines of political science and International Relations remains underdeveloped. References to the relevant academic literature are rather scarce or even absent. Unfortunately, the Dutch church-based peace movement’s post-Cold War views of NATO discussed in this essay do not seem to offer the intellectual quality that Volten’s challenge would have required.

References

12 Within NATO, the Netherlands, together with Germany, Norway, Belgium, and Luxemburg, has recently requested to start reducing the number of nuclear weapons – a step explicitly welcomed by IKV Pax Christi. Yet secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen has declared that NATO will still need nuclear weapons in order to deter malevolent countries, and thus should not dismantle all nuclear weapons. Also, he has stated that NATO member states should not independently chose for dismantlement, but that decisions should be taken within the overall NATO context. And while the Obama administration has recently declared to aim at a nuclear free world, it strongly rejects taking unilateral steps and including Israel in talks about a nuclear weapon-free Middle East, let alone in the NPT.


Chapter 9. NATO and Humanitarian Organisations: bien ennuyes de se trouver ensemble

Joost Herman

Humanitarian aid is ‘in fashion’ nowadays. Since the fundamental geopolitical changes of the early 1990s it is easy to understand why. Firstly, the global stalemate between the West and the East has disappeared abruptly. It has resulted in a considerably widened space for actors interested in the international (legal) order, amongst which goals are alleviating human suffering wherever it occurs in the world. Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) like the United Nations, the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (DG ECHO), willing states like, until recently, The Netherlands, and a mushrooming number of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) all have deemed it possible to profit from the so-called peace dividend after the Cold War (Dijkzeul and Herman 2009, 9). Secondly, the seemingly rising number of humanitarian crises and ensuing suffering has caught the attention of the ‘broad masses’ in the Western world. Exuberantly and explicitly broadcasted by the global media, public opinion has made moral appeals to their governments, IGOs and NGOs to act, to stop the suffering of fellow human beings. As a result, humanitarian aid has become trendy big business, with an estimated turnover of 9 billion dollars annually, and with the capacity of uplifting one’s organisational profile considerably (Herman 2009, 73-79).

The military have not been quick to catch up with these developments. Having outgrown their Cold War usefulness the military around the (Western) world have tried to redefine their right of existence. None the more so than NATO and its members. Since the early 1990s NATO has engaged in so-called ‘out-of-area-operations’, driven by a new interpretation of globally projected humane values and the dwindling importance of state sovereignty. Kosovo (1999) and Afghanistan (as of 2003) are the best known examples in kind (Minear, Van Baarda and Sommers 2000, v). The military’s window of opportunity has arisen due to the development of the (UN) concept of complex Peace Support Operations or integrated security and aid approaches in post-conflict areas. From a one-dimensional approach before 1991 (Peace Keeping Operations) in which the military were to keep the peace by (passively) standing in between conflict-fatigue warring parties the UN and like-minded countries have developed the integrated approach, Peace Support Operations – in NATO-speak Comprehensive Approach.13 In this approach the general military task of up keeping a secure environment has been coupled to wider tasks such

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13 In the following, Peace Support Operations, Comprehensive Approach, Integrated Approach and a 3-D Approach (see below) will be used interchangeably.
as dispensing humanitarian aid, generating favourable conditions to sustainable development, helping set up the rule of law, stimulating good governance and winning the hearts and minds of the locals. The overall aim has been to re-secure and fully reconstruct countries and put them on an irreversible road to normalcy. As a consequence, the military have come into much more frequent contact with NGOs that as of old fulfilled the civilian tasks of reconstruction with which the military now also started to meddle (Homan 2009, 262-63).

NATO’s Comprehensive Approach thus has intensified civil-military contacts in (post-)conflict areas characterised by human suffering and the need for its alleviation. Despite apparent common goals, these contacts have increasingly turned into misapprehension, conflicts and turf fights. From the viewpoint of traditional humanitarian principles (neutrality, impartiality, humanity and independence) cherished by the civilian actors, questions can be raised whether the military by definition are partial and biased and therefore unfit to fulfil humanitarian roles. However, from the viewpoint of the post-1990 conflict situation with its fragile and failed states, with its deliberately targeting of civilians by rebel groups for political and economic gains and with its use of global terror abusing the position of the most vulnerable populations one can also ask whether the military are quite useful, if not essential, for contemporary humanitarianism in an integrated approach. Do civilian and military parties, united in their aim to alleviate human suffering, listen to one another or do they only claim to do so? Do they appreciate each other’s role or are they quite annoyed to find themselves in the same humanitarian arena which before 1991 was so exclusively civilian?

In the following sections, the development of civil-military relations in the humanitarian arena will be outlined after which an attempt will be made to assess the compatibility of the military and humanitarian-civilian interpretation of this relationship against the background of parties’ mandates and ‘inner beings’ in the present day complex crises around the world. Although impossible to generalise, for the purposes of this text, NATO will be used as a representative of the military, while the humanitarian organisations are in reality a multitude of various NGOs with diverse ideas on civil-military relations. Such an approach, however, does not do damage to the ongoing principled discussion on the generic relationship between civilians and the military. A few words on the situation in Afghanistan since 2003 will be used to highlight both the military as well as the civilian position.

**Dawn of a New Era: NATO’s Humanitarian Cloak**

Since the early days after the Cold War NATO has sidelined with the UN and like-minded member states such as The Netherlands to plead for an integrated approach in crisis areas and post-conflict situations. Whereas the Dutch have labelled their approach the 3-D approach (Diplomacy, Defence,
NATO has dubbed its policy the integrated or comprehensive approach (AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine 2003, par. 102.1). Basically similar to the Dutch, NATO sees present day Peace Support Operations as an effort to (re)stabilise post-conflict areas through an amalgamated use of tools concerning security building, democratisation and development. As such it has been envisaged that the military would at a minimum facilitate reconstruction and development, but at a maximum would engage themselves in humanitarian-like operations such as the delivery of aid. Exactly because of their institutional characteristics the military would be capable to perform such tasks in unstable environments (Jansen 2008, 192).

Rightly so, NATO, like other actors, has realized the changing conflict setting. Contemporary conflict occurs mainly inside states that are fragile, on the brink of collapsing or have failed already. This may be one of the reasons why these conflicts and their aftermaths are so much characterised by extreme human suffering. A properly functioning state is absent, the state monopoly on violence from which should result a safe environment, respect for human rights and a policy of development is undermined by the presence of rebel groups, outlaws and other groups that use violence as a self-serving tool. Interference on behalf of the international community in these cases cannot be a mere traditional (static peacekeeping) military operation. A multidimensional approach encompassing military, political, humanitarian and economic elements is called for in these circumstances. Otherwise the fragile/failed state in question is prone to lapse back into conflict with humanitarian agony as a result.

On top of the realisation that NATO would be involved in a comprehensive approach, it soon has become apparent that the military are almost indispensable in every aspect of present day complex Peace Support Operations. Throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century international operations – whether in the former Yugoslavia, the Horn of Africa, Iraq or Afghanistan – have been characterised by increased input from and heightened visibility of the military in every aspect of Peace Support Operations. Such has been in line with the recommendations of UN-diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, who in 2000 reported to the UN Security Council that, were future Peace Support Operations to be successful, the role of the military and the use of their unique asset – force – had to be greatly enhanced in all phases of these operations.

Indeed, taking a closer look at the interference in the (post-)conflict areas mentioned above, one can see the validity of Brahimi’s recommendations. All missions have been characterised by international action in conflict-ridden countries where the situation has been neither peace nor war. The delivery of

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14 Originally, former minister for Development Cooperation Jan Pronk already in 1993 developed the idea of an integrated approach in his policy paper ‘Een wereld in geschil’ (A conflictuous world). One of his successors, Agnes van Ardenne, further developed his thoughts, leading up to the 3-D approach in 2005.
humanitarian aid and the commencement of reconstruction and redevelopment activities have occurred where local ill-disciplined rebel forces and criminal groups continuously have defied the pro forma cease fire arrangements or peace agreements. Gross human rights violations for political or criminal gain have been in abundance, resulting in massive internal displacement of the local population and human misery. All international actors, NATO included, thus have come to the realisation that in these areas of operation humanitarianism, reconstruction and redevelopment are linked to the permanent provision of hard core security (Homan 2009, 260). Moreover, long term military commitment would be needed if sustainable peace after armed conflict is the goal. Without this commitment experience has shown that countries have a fifty percent chance of falling back into conflict within a couple of years (Collier 2004). The Bosnia case has shown, for example, that NATO forces have been continuously and for a long period of time engaged in fulfilling task that normally come within the purview of civilian actors, such as public order, food distribution, reconstruction of houses and setting up basic medical care facilities (Zaalberg 2006, 15). Afghanistan is another example in kind, where NATO members are at the core of so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that represent the integrated support for security, reconstruction and good governance. Military and civilians on the face of it closely cooperate in these PRTs for the improvement of the situation in one of the most unstable countries in the world (Homan 2009, 273).

Increased, even intimate contact with civilian actors has thus become the new reality for NATO forces. As a consequence, based upon experiences in the 1990s NATO in 2001 and 2003 has decided to formalise this new reality in two policy documents: the MC 4111/1 document and the so-called Allied Joined Publication 9 (AJP-9 2003). In these documents the policy, procedures and implementation of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) have been codified to serve as guidelines for NATO forces engaged in comprehensive operations with civilian actors.

CIMIC is the military conceptualisation of the perception of civil-military relations in the comprehensive approach to Peace Support Operations. NATO’s definition is: “CIMIC is the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.” The goal of CIMIC is described as “The establishment and maintenance of the full cooperation of the NATO

The following paragraphs are based on AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine (Brussels 2003) and MC 411/1 NATO Military Policy on Civil Military Cooperation (Brussels 2002). In common speak CIMIC is often equated, by the military themselves, with Civil-Military Relations, but true to the definitions in the documents it is cooperation that is at the core of the philosophy, not so much relations. To create an image ‘as civilian as possible’ seems to be the reason for deliberately mangling the own definition (Homan 2009, 269).
Commander and the civilian authorities, organisations, agencies and population, within a commander’s area of operation in order to allow him to fulfil his mission.”

From these definitions the history of CIMIC and its adaptation to the new era are to be discovered. Already in the Second World War the Allies used the concept of Civil-Military Cooperation to streamline their dealings with civilian parties in conflict zones. However, before the 1990s civil-military relations were simply seen as a logistical challenge for the military mainly serving two goals. Firstly, the military had to make sure that civilian parties would not hinder the execution of military operations. Secondly, civilian authorities had to be co-opted to fulfil tasks in occupied space for which the military had time nor capacity to do so. Such an approach clearly indicated the underlying party in the realm of civil-military relations: the civilians. In the new reality of the 21st century, however, NATO has been at pains to bring more equality in its concept of civil-military relations through specifying a more facilitating role of the military vis-à-vis civilian parties.

Taking a closer look at the principles of present day CIMIC, three core tasks and ten underlying principles can be discerned. Firstly, NATO aims to cement together the military and civilian actors in the area of operation; secondly, to support the civilian sector; and thirdly, to facilitate civilians’ operations where possible. Key to these three core tasks is, according to NATO, mutual understanding and comprehensiveness so as to assure comprehensive planning, coordination and implementation. In its documents NATO goes at great length to stress the importance of open communication and continuous dialogue with the civilians to highlight its desire for equal cooperation and its support role in an integrated mission. Time and again it is stressed that the military should fully understand the mandate, structure, role, methods and principles of civilian organisations (IGOs, NGOs and local authorities) to establish an effective relationship with them, since they are the other half of the CIMIC equation. Time and again it is accentuated that building bridges of understanding is at the core of an effective relationship between the military and the civilians for the benefit of the successful comprehensive operation. Military execution of strictly humanitarian tasks is even recognised as possible only upon the request and approval of the civilian actors present in the area.

As such, the MC 4111/1 document and AJP-9 seem to radiate the spirit of the new era in which the military and the civilians jointly cooperate in comprehensive operations aimed at providing security, democratisation and development. However, taking a closer look at the underlying principles, NATO’s apparent willingness to be equal to civilian parties gives a more nuanced impression. In two categories – internal military processes and guiding civil-military relations – NATO defines the operationalisation of its idea of CIMIC. When it comes to internal military processes CIMIC is subject to the principles of mission primacy. It is stated that NATO conducts CIMIC activities
only in support of its military mission (emphasis added) and NATO’s commanders are admonished to direct CIMIC activities to maintain military effectiveness. As a consequence, only minimum resources – if at all available – should be used for CIMIC so as not to jeopardise the military operations. In the category ‘Guiding civil-military relations’ it is determined that constant and open communication is the method to explain and make acceptable the military priorities and interests in an area of operation with proper respect for other parties’ priorities and goals, without jeopardising the civilians’ willingness to keenly cooperate with the military.

NATO’s Civil Military Cooperation in Practice: The Afghan Laboratory
The Afghan conflict since 2003 has proven to be the laboratory for civil-military cooperation from the military’s perspective. NATO taking over the ISAF operation in 2003 has been keen to ‘use’ Afghanistan as a test case for the comprehensive strategy it had developed over the previous years. In its broadest mandate ISAF has been assigned to assist the Afghan government to create and maintain a safe environment for Afghan society to develop. More specifically, ISAF/NATO has aimed to support the Afghan government in security sector reform to stabilise society and to help with reconstruction and development. Comprehensive indeed, and the first NATO mission outside the Euro-Atlantic security area (NATO 2007). On top, civil-military relations have appeared to be crucial in NATO’s operations.

From the start NATO has formulated ambitious goals for itself under the comprehensive approach. In a nutshell NATO has assigned itself the task of restoring democratic order in a war-torn country, the reconstruction of the social and economic infrastructure and the support for operations that can be labelled humanitarian. Because of these very targets, cooperation with present NGOs has become the core of NATO’s effort, as a consequence of which NATO has created PRTs. These PRTs epitomise the principled military support for civilian operations through ‘force protection’, specialised help in the fields of engineering, public health and public policy (Frerks 2006, 45). However, it is clearly stated that the security situation determines whether the military or the civilian part of the equation dominates. At first, for a prolonged period of time, the military have to take the lead in creating a secure environment as well as (temporarily) getting humanitarian projects started, including projects that would gain the support of the ordinary Afghan and lure him away from the Taliban; so-called hearts and minds projects (Dutch Ministry of Defence 2008). The effects of this stance will be discussed in the conclusion, but first the attitude of the civilian actors leading up to civil-military cooperation needs to be outlined.
Civilian Response to Military Presence in the Humanitarian Arena

For a long time, NGOs have considered the humanitarian arena as a kind of exclusive zone for themselves in order to ‘do good’. The aftermath of the Cold War increased opportunities for civilian actors and boosted this attitude. Nevertheless, the NGOs soon discovered that also the military wanted to make use of the newly augmented opportunities in the humanitarian field, as a consequence of which they, just like the military, have come up with policy documents on civil-military relations.

Being one of the overarching NGO community organisations the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) has formulated in 2003 the Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies. In 2008 this document has been supplemented by the document of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (the forum of UN agencies and NGOs involved in humanitarian action) on Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2000). Finally, the paper exclusively written by NGOs, Position Paper on the Role of the International Peacekeeping Forces in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance, will be mentioned (Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response 2000).

In these documents the civilians are quite clear in what civil-military relations are about. According to them, these relations consist of the “essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistencies, and when appropriate pursue common goals”. The essence of civil-military relations is providing NGOs with a secure environment to facilitate humanitarian operations. Only on very few occasions the military should be allowed to implement humanitarian activities, but always under civilian guidance (Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response 2000, par. 3.2.2).

The humanitarian community is even more specific in its description of when and how to make use of military assets. Already being considered an exception the UNOCHA document adds to the distant relationship with the military by pointing out that NGOs should always be the ones to file a request, that such a request is to be considered as a last resort in order to relief intolerable human suffering, and that the military means used will always remain ‘civilian in nature’. Most important to the use of military assets is thus that the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence are visibly dominant. Any action on behalf of the military compromising these principles will be the cause of severing civil-military relations (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2008, par. 5).

All the NGO documents on cooperation with the military hence indicate a very troublesome if not split position on this type of collaboration. On the one hand, given the new types of conflict in which humanitarian workers are way
more exposed to targeted violence than in the pre-1991 situation, the willingness to accept military hardware for operating in a secure environment is clear. On the other hand, assistance based on actual needs and on the humanitarian principles almost by definition makes it impossible to allow the military a visible role except for in dire emergencies. The danger of politicised action (hearts and minds projects) as well as a quickly growing dependency of the NGOs on military assets is by definition considered to be overwhelmingly present (Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response 2000, par 3.2.1).

Looking into the Afghanistan experience once more, but now from a civilian perspective, the effects of the NGOs attitude to civil-military cooperation will become clear. Being a very insecure environment Afghanistan poses a great humanitarian challenge to the NGOs. Responding to the enormous humanitarian needs in the country most NGOs do accept their position as implementing partners of governments that operate according to NATO’s comprehensive approach. This results in an automatic relationship with the NATO forces present under ISAF-colours and within PRTs. Although in the short run beneficial in terms of a secure theatre of operation, in the long run most NGOs have experienced increased hostility vis-à-vis their staff from the Taliban and other armed groups, equated as they are with ‘the West’ and their military instruments. As a result, NGOs have lost credibility in keeping up their sacrosanct humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. This has been aggravated by the PRTs use of so-called quick impact projects aimed at producing quick results for the benefit of the local population but arousing great suspicion amongst the very same Afghan locals. For them these projects mask the hidden political agenda of NATO-forces and cooperating NGOs are just as suspect of being political tools of the occupying forces (Frerks 2006, 57).

**Conclusion**

The post-1991 situation in the world has increased the level of attention for humanitarian crises and the moral obligation to act on behalf of the civilised world in order to alleviate human suffering. Due to an increase of human suffering in fragile and failed states and a willingness among the public at large, IGOs and NGOs to engage in humanitarian action, humanitarianism has turned into a multi-billion industry with a ‘sexy profile’ for those delivering it. Although as of old, an area for civilians (because of the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity and independence) the military, especially so NATO, have grabbed the opportunity to adapt to the post-Cold War circumstances and have entered the humanitarian field. As a result, military and civilian parties have increasingly met in humanitarian action and have sought a *modus vivendi* of cooperation and coordination. Thus, civil-military relations have become a hotly debated issue in the field of humanitarianism. This chapter has assessed the compatibility of the military and humanitarian-civilian
interpretation of their relationship against the background of parties’ mandates and ‘inner beings’ in the present day complex crises around the world.

Both the military as well as NGOs have come up with definitions and descriptions of what in their view civil-military relations in the field of humanitarianism are. The military have reasoned from existing (historical) concepts in which the military mission primacy has been difficult to conceal. Although cooperation and coordination with civilian parties in the post-1991 complex emergencies is heralded (NATO speaks of a comprehensive approach to crises) NATO’s guidelines and actual behaviour in Afghanistan through ISAF and the so-called PRTs are indicative that civil-military relations in humanitarian action are an instrument to facilitate the military (political) goals imposed by the respective governments of NATO members.

The NGO community also has come forward with documents delineating its position towards the military in the field of humanitarianism. In fact, the NGOs are as split as the military on the acceptance of the new reality on the ground. On the one hand, giving the significant rise in danger during humanitarian relief operations, the NGOs have properly valued the military assets in terms of creating a secure and stable environment in which humanitarian assistance can be offered. On the other hand, by clinging on to the ‘old’ humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, any alignment with the military (fundamentally being a political actor) is in principle impossible. For one, the NGOs are equated with the military by the recipients of aid. Secondly, participation of the military in humanitarian action more often than not has turned out to be so-called quick impact projects. In these projects not so much needs-based aid has been given, but more the winning of hearts and minds of the local Afghans has been priority number one, a grave infringement of humanitarian principles.

Both the military and the NGOs have tried to adapt to the new reality in complex humanitarian emergencies after 1991. If only because they bump into one another much more frequently in humanitarian space than before 1991. Through conceptualisations they have made an effort to adjust to the new circumstances of a comprehensive approach to humanitarian crises. However, both parties have formulated their conceptualisations rigidly close to their core beings, making their earlier principles dominant over the amalgamation of the other party’s inner characteristics and motivations. Afghanistan is an example in kind. Both the military and the civilian humanitarian organisations have accepted increased encounters in humanitarian space, but they emit fundamental annoyance of having to work together somehow.

References


http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc
Part 3 – Security Policies & Actions
Chapter 10. NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning Mechanism and Crisis Management Theory

Marjan Malešić

The end of the Cold War and the enlargement of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) profoundly altered the constellations of European politics and security (Bebler 2010). A greater emphasis was placed on the capacity to address non-military cross-border threats that were capable of triggering complex socio-political crises. New security challenges such as those presented by natural and technological disasters, severe socio-economic problems, mass migration, epidemics, environmental issues, threats arising from information and communication technology, terrorism and organised crime, demanded new coping strategies. Subsequently, urgent calls were made to establish comprehensive and consistent approaches to threat-detection, prevention, preparation, response and recovery (Brändström and Malešić 2004, 11). In response to these new circumstances, NATO, whose future at that time appeared uncertain and open to question, began to broaden its security concept to cover many of the above mentioned threats, and to find new roles for the military in dealing with them. Additionally, NATO started to revive some of its programmes and activities which had previously been regarded as less important during the Cold War period.

During the Cold War, NATO was almost exclusively regarded as a military alliance and as a political organisation. During the last two decades however, NATO has significantly developed its third, so-called social dimension. NATO’s social dimension encompasses science programme activities, an environmental programme, and civil emergency planning. They all originated more than half a century ago, but, as suggested above, the importance of these programmes has increased profoundly recently. The 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept envisaged a broad approach to security which shifted the emphasis from military to political means and introduced cooperation with non-NATO countries which had formerly been regarded as foes. The document recognised that “security and stability have political, economic, social and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension” (NATO Handbook 2010).

NATO’s scientific cooperation programme was enhanced to encourage collaboration in civil science between NATO-country scientists and scientists from partner countries in NATO’s Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). This programme of scientific collaboration takes four distinct but interconnected forms: Science Fellowships for young researchers; Cooperative Science and
Technology, designed to initiate cooperation and develop long-term networks between scientists from NATO and partner countries; Research Infrastructure Support for NATO member countries to organise research and to create basic research infrastructure in partner countries; and the Science for Peace initiative, aimed at strengthening applied research and development projects in the fields of industry and the environment (NATO Handbook 2010). About 10,000 scientists from NATO and its partner countries participate in the NATO Science Programme each year.

NATO’s environmental programme was launched with the establishment of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) which was created to provide a forum for the sharing “of knowledge and experiences on social, health and environmental matters both in the civilian and military sectors among NATO and EAPC Partner countries” (NATO Handbook 2010). In recent years, the programme has focused on reducing the environmental impacts of military activities, conducting regional studies, preventing conflicts arising from a scarcity of resources, addressing emerging environmental and social risks that could cause economic, social and political instability, as well as addressing non-traditional threats to security. Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the most important task of the CCMS has been to identify potential threats to society arising from issues of food security, scarcity of resources, social bases of terrorism, environmental crime, and media and communication.

This chapter will focus specifically on the development and the current state of affairs of civil emergency planning, evaluated through the lens of crisis management theory. The theory was developed within the Crisis Management Europe Research Programme and over the last decade has formed the basis for empirical research on crisis management in more than 20 countries and in more than 100 crisis cases (Brändström and Malešić 2004).

Civil Emergency Planning
The primary aim of NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) is “to coordinate national planning activities to ensure the most effective use of civil resources in collective support of Alliance strategic objectives” (NATO Handbook 2010). Civil emergency planning remains the responsibility of the national governments involved in the programme, and civilian assets remain under their control. NATO, however, plays a strategic role in harmonising and coordinating joint capabilities to ensure that jointly developed plans and procedures will work and that the necessary assets are available as and when required. CEP addresses the fundamental security concerns of the Alliance, namely, supporting military defence and crisis response operations, supporting national authorities during civil emergencies, and ensuring civilian populations are protected. In the words of the NATO Handbook, CEP is intended for use in “war, crises and disasters”
CEP covers several areas of civil activity, such as inland surface transport, ocean shipping, civil aviation, food and agriculture, industrial production and supply, post and telecommunications, medical matters and civil protection.

Civil emergency planning activities in NATO were originally launched in 1951 to develop a collective strategy for the efficient use of Alliance civilian assets to support its military operations. Consequently, the development of CEP was primarily shaped by the development of NATO’s military strategies. For instance, the massive response strategy employed CEP in preparation for total war to ensure the survival of people, institutions and the economy. The flexible response strategy required CEP to serve as an additional tool to dissuade a potential adversary from launching an attack against the Alliance. CEP also performed necessary crisis management functions. After the Cold War ended, however, a changing strategic outlook envisaged a significantly different role for CEP: to support peace operations, humanitarian interventions and crisis management. In addition, CEP activities were no longer predominantly limited to NATO members, but instead, CEP cooperated extensively with Central and Eastern European partner countries.

Civil Emergency Planning today has two main concerns: firstly, the employment of civil resources in support of Alliance strategy; and secondly, the protection of civilian populations. Specific areas of activity include: planning and coordination to improve civil preparedness in the case of (terrorist) attack or disaster; civil transportation to military deployments and sustainment; medical planning to support civil preparedness for Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) incidents and civil medical support to the military; civil communications planning; and examining CBR threats to the food chain (NISS 2010). The fight against terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) represents a comparatively new field of engagement for the Alliance. The Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism was adopted at NATO’s Prague summit in 2002. Within the broader framework, the Alliance’s activities for CEP in the fight against terrorism and WMD follow three complementary activities: reinforcing national capabilities to improve the preparedness of NATO members and partners; providing a framework for a coordinated response; and employing NATO military assets to prevent terrorist attacks and the proliferation of WMD. Therefore, on the operational side, the CEP’s mandate has been extended to responding to a terrorist attack, however, its structures have not yet been called upon in this capacity (NATO 2010).

The organisational structure of CEP consists of several bodies. The Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) coordinates the work of eight planning boards responsible for transport, supply, communications and the protection of civilian populations. The SCEPC is an advisory body to the North Atlantic Council, the highest decision-making authority within NATO. All SCEPC decisions are adopted by consensus. The Civil Emergency Planning Directorate
(CEPD) is responsible for administrative support. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU) are crucial elements of this structure. Important elements of the CEP organisational structure are the Rapid Reaction Team which evaluates civil needs in a disaster and provides timely expertise, and the Advisory Support Team which provides expert advice to nations in assessing and developing their preparedness, as well as response and recovery capabilities (Bretschneider 2009, 9-10).

Civil Protection
The primary area of CEP activity today is arguably the protection of civilian populations in various crises, especially in the case of natural disasters. The protection of civilian populations has been at the heart of NATO’s mandate since its inception, therefore the development of its capacities to assist and protect populations in cases of natural disasters would seem a logical step. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme enables the Alliance to cooperate with its partners within Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in preparation and response measures to disasters. The establishment of the EADRCC and EADRU in 1998 was a major step forward for the EACP countries in their common endeavour to provide assistance to affected populations in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Palmieri noted that the decisive moment in the development of the EADRCC can be “traced back to 1992, predating the Partnership for Peace itself, when the late NATO Secretary General, Manfred Wörner, had the foresight to host an innovative conference on international disaster relief” (1998, 24), where representatives of more than forty countries and several international organisations discussed the availability of military assets to tackle civil disasters, and the feasibility of new forms of international cooperation in this field. In addition to the practical aims of enhanced cooperation in civil crisis management, a broader political dimension can also be observed, as this area would seem to be “the most conductive environment for dialogue, cooperation and confidence-building between former foes” (Palmieri 1998, 24). The expectation that some defence resources could “be freed up for civil purposes” anticipated a so-called peace dividend.

The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre has described itself as a “focal point for coordinating disaster relief efforts among NATO member and partner countries” (EADRCC 2010). Its main function is to coordinate the response of NATO and partner countries to natural and man-made disasters within the Euro-Atlantic area. The centre also functions as an information-sharing tool of disaster assistance for NATO and its partner countries. Disaster management operations are performed in close cooperation with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-
OCHA), which retains the primary role in the coordination of international disaster relief operations. Therefore, the EADRCC is designed as a regional coordination mechanism, supporting and complementing the UN in its efforts, rather than competing with it. The EAPC’s coordinating role is crucial in this matter: based upon the information provided by the EADRCC, the members and partner countries decide whether to provide assistance, and if so, what level of assistance to provide.

The EADRCC’s tasks are to inform NATO’s Secretary General of any disasters in EAPC countries, to coordinate a disaster response in the EAPC area if the afflicted country requires it, to function as a medium for information sharing on disaster relief within the EAPC, and to develop the concept of the Euro Atlantic Disaster Response Unit. The latter is a non-standing, ad hoc unit, a mixture of civilian and military elements. Its structure and strength depend upon the nature and scope of the disaster in question, and as a general rule such a unit functions within the EAPC area. Joint training and exercises are organised for the elements of the unit in order to achieve interoperability. The EADRU can be deployed to the major disaster site at the request of the stricken EAPC country, although the EAPC members who contribute various elements to the unit decide upon their deployment. The cooperation between the civilian and military structures of the various countries forms a solid basis to develop the synergies necessary to provide an effective disaster response. Military assets, such as NATO’s AWACS, the NRF and the Multinational CBRN Battalion have also been engaged in some of NATO’s most recent operations in the field of civil emergencies. Two recent operations deserve special mention: NATO’s intervention in response to Hurricane Katrina in the United States in August 2005, and NATO’s assistance to Pakistan following the earthquake in Kashmir in October 2005. In both cases, NATO’s response to a natural disaster combined the traditional intervention of the EADRCC with a military component, through the use of the NRF in particular (NATO 2010).

Palmieri saw the EADRCC as a new concept which “puts to practical use NATO’s cooperation mechanisms and long experience in civil emergency planning” (1998, 24). According to Palmieri, the Euro-Atlantic disaster response capabilities enhance the disaster response ability of the international community as a whole due to the fact that the countries in the area possess the greatest response capabilities. Although the recipients of the assistance are primarily affected countries, the mechanism indirectly helps UN-OCHA, the leading international agency in the field. The author thinks that the EADRCC “institutionalises a third link between NATO and the United Nations, adding to the two existing working links in the political and security areas” (Palmieri 1998, 24). The EADRCC brings a wealth of experience to the field of civil emergency planning, including a network of civil experts, standardised and interoperable plans, procedures, services and equipment, civil-military cooperation, communications and so forth. It is important to stress however, that the concept
is developed in such a way that individual countries retain the decision-making process, whilst concurrently providing NATO and the EAPC with an identity as the public face of civil emergencies.

The EADRCC performs several tasks that are coordinated with UN-OCHA. The EADRCC prepares the plans and procedures for providing assistance, taking into account national threat assessments, bilateral and multilateral agreements and the capacities of individual countries to provide assistance; it also prepares and updates the list of civilian and military forces and the means that the countries offer in support of international disaster relief; when the disaster occurs, the EADRCC contributes to the prompt organisation and functioning of the EADRU; it also plans and carries out the joint training of civil protection personnel.

Taking into account the limited resources, the only way to increase the effectiveness of disaster response at an international level is by speeding up the process through which the provision of assistance is implemented in order to avoid a duplication of efforts and a waste of resources. To support UN endeavours in the field, the NATO mechanism should not conflict with the UN arrangements and ought to provide added value to the United Nations efforts (Palmieri 1998, 25). The UN itself also calls for the International Relief Community to coordinate investments in disaster response capacities, improve coordination and mobilisation procedures, improve communication within regional relief coordination networks, define specific projects to systematically improve relief processes, and work collectively to mobilise resources to meet the challenge. In other words, the PfP civil emergency planning and UN-OCHA mechanisms work in unison.

The EAPC policy on enhanced practical cooperation in the field of international disaster relief is based upon several key principles: the affected country is responsible for disaster management; the UN retains the main coordination role in providing international assistance to the affected country; the EADRCC should not perform the same tasks as the UN and duplicate them, but should complement them; the EADRCC should perform the coordination role in the EAPC area; national governments alone should decide what level of assistance to offer the affected country; and last but not least, the countries providing the assistance should cover the costs of the operation. It is important to stress that, through the EADRCC, NATO operates according to the general principle of subsidiarity: the countries themselves are responsible for developing their own disaster management capabilities, whereas the international mechanisms are available to support their efforts when the scope and intensity of the disaster exceed their national capacities.

Since its inception in 1998, the functional aspect of the EADRCC during disasters has been impressive (EADRCC 2010). The Centre has guided consequence management efforts in almost fifty emergencies, most often fighting floods and forest fires, and dealing with the aftermath of earthquakes,
although it has also dealt with other crises. The following examples illustrate the variety and the geographical scope of the crises that the EADRCC has dealt with, as well as the role it has played in each case: the floods in Ukraine in 1998, 2001 and 2008 (collecting and sharing information, coordinating several forms of assistance, providing water pumps, mobile electric generators, medical equipment, rescue vehicles, food, blankets, clothes); the refugee crisis in Kosovo in 1998-99 (cooperating with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, acting as a focal humanitarian information point for EAPC countries, establishing air lifts to provide humanitarian assistance); the earthquakes in Turkey in 1999 (cooperating with the Turkish crisis centre, the UN-OCHA, EAPC countries and NATO delegations, providing search and rescue teams and the necessary equipment); the forest fires in Portugal in 2003 (coordinating the provision of helicopters and planes from EAPC countries involved in fire fighting activities); hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005 (providing food, medical and logistical supplies, organising air-lifts, establishing on-site coordination); the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005 (organising 168 NATO flights providing 3,500 tones of relief supplies, providing engineers and medical units from the NATO Response Force); the massive explosions at an ammunition storage site in Albania in 2008 (providing experts in Explosive Ordnance Disposal, medical equipment, de-mining equipment, financial support etc.); the H1N1 pandemic flu in Bulgaria in 2009 (providing vaccinations); the political crisis in the Kyrgyz Republic in June 2010 (the EADRCC received a request to provide medicines and medical equipment for use in emergencies -this mission is still ongoing at the time of writing).

Theoretical Aspects of Crisis Management
Researchers agree that the phenomenon of modern crises is changing both in terms of quantity and quality (Malešič 2009, 80-82). They believe that, in the future, more crises can be expected (a quantum jump), and that these crises will be characterised by endemicity (i.e. the crises will constitute a logical opposition to the increasingly complex systems, which, due to technological, financial or political factors, will fail to meet the high security standards and expectations), and by complexity (crises will consist of several combinations of crisis events and of the causal relations triggering them, meaning that a crisis permanently reproduces itself in different forms) (Rosenthal and others, 2001). In other words, crises are a result of several causes, interacting over a given time span and producing a risk with destructive potential (Boin and others, 2005). Porfiriev (2001) believes that future crises will be characterised by a growing heterogeneity, complexity and insecurity regarding the causes, conditions and the directions of crisis development. In contrast, Quarantelli and Dror are more cautious in their conclusions. Quarantelli (2001) notes that modern crises already exert tangible negative effects on people's lives, and that
this will not change in the future. Dror (2001) believes that, as unexpected and dangerous events, crises are ontologically present in the historical process; from an epistemological perspective, they are an integral part of the human mind. Consequently, Dror warns against the introduction of an entirely ‘new’ or ‘modern’ concept of crisis.

These disagreements notwithstanding, scholars concur that future crises will differ at least in part from those we have known and those we are currently preparing for. Future crises will become an inherent characteristic of society. Nevertheless, their consequences will be fairly conventional; we will continue to define them in terms of victims, damage, risk, urgency, uncertainty, stress and decision-making dilemmas.

Inductive reasoning leads us to predict certain driving forces or critical trends which will influence the occurrence and the development of future crises, understood “as situations, in which basic social values, norms and structures are at risk, where the time for decision-making is limited, and which entail uncertainty, stress and frequently also the element of surprise.” (Malešič 2004, 12). Decisive factors include transnationality, technological development, the influence of the mass media, and the declining role of public authority (Rosenthal and others, 2001). Most future crises will certainly be limited to national or even local social systems. However, large-scale crises will have international consequences. This can be illustrated by three recent major crises: the Chernobyl nuclear disaster; the terrorist attacks in the United States; and the tsunami that struck Southeast Asia and part of the East African coast. Lagadec (2001) states that global development is subject to considerable change in the fields of technology, knowledge, strategic management etc., and this results in chains of crises in which the dynamics are no longer regarded as an exclusively local-global process, but as an increasingly global-local process. This means that, in future, it will not only be a question of how local crises expand into national, regional, and even global crises, but also the ever more salient question of how global processes occurring in different fields influence the emergence of a crisis at a local level. A process supporting this assumption is the current financial and economic crisis that is spreading into local environments where there are no home-grown reasons for financial and economic problems to exist.

The changing dimensions of modern crises have direct implications for crisis management, which can be defined “as the formulation of procedures, agreements and decisions which affect the course of a crisis, including the organisation, preparation, measures and distribution of resources needed to control it” (Malešič 2004, 14). The range of preventative and intervention strategies has not been adapted to the character of present and future crises, which are, and will continue to be, primarily characterised by a complex and intricate structure. The conventional forms of coordination cannot be used to organise the work of the increasing number of different organisations and
individuals who participate in crisis management, since the role of the state in recent decades appears to be in decline, especially in Western countries (Rosenthal and others 2001). Moreover, faced with the greater politicisation of modern crises, crisis managers are required to satisfy tougher demands and to address new ways of thinking. Numerous scholars agree that the available tools for dealing with crises are themselves also facing a crisis (Beck 2008). Both routine decision-making processes and the political process need to be thoroughly upgraded. Building an integrated crisis management calls for a broader approach to and a reflection on the policies and the competencies of the various authorities.

Researchers of crises and crisis management have developed a methodological tool to explore the topic. One of the important features of this tool is the development of analytical themes which should be taken into account when exploring crises and crisis management (Brändström and Malešič 2004, 15-18), i.e.: crisis preparedness, prevention and mitigation (the extent to which crisis managers and their organisations are prepared to respond to extraordinary events); leadership (the leadership styles and variations as understood and displayed by key actors in the crisis); decision units (how and where decisions are made in the complex institutional systems that are typically engaged in managing a crisis); problem perception and framing (the subjective and socially constructed aspects of crisis management); value conflict (the potential tension and conflict among the various values at stake in a crisis situation); political and bureaucratic cooperation and conflict (the patterns of convergence and divergence, parochialism and solidarity among actors and stakeholders in a crisis); crisis communication and credibility (the relationship between the information available, their timely and appropriate procession, and the perception of the crisis and the actions that are taken to solve it); transnationalisation and internationalisation (the tendency of crises to spill over national boundaries in an increasingly politically, economically, socially and ecologically interdependent world); temporal effects (by its very definition as a crisis, there is a time limit on responding); and learning (the ability of crisis management structures and individuals to learn from their experiences and to embed lessons learned into future crisis management behaviour).

**Conclusion: Practice and Theory**

As stated in the introduction, the conclusion will address some crucial theoretical aspects of crises and crisis management with regard to NATO’s arrangements for Civil Emergency Planning. As we have seen, NATO documents refer to “war, crises and disaster”. Theoretical definitions of crises imply that wars and disasters are also crises. However, NATO also identifies a broad range of potential new threats to modern society, among them the question of food security, the scarcity of resources, social bases of terrorism,
environmental crime, media and communication. Empirical data from recent CEP interventions confirms these new trends: they range from natural and man-made disasters to terrorist attacks and contagious diseases. Each of these cases could be referred to as a “crisis”. It is important for CEP structures to recognise the complexity of a crisis, especially in terms of its social perception, dynamics, technological aspects, transnationality and interconnectedness.

Let us briefly revisit NATO’s efforts in civil emergency planning from the perspective of the crucial crisis management analytical themes. Crisis prevention, preparedness and mitigation are covered in CEP through threat assessment using the same methodology by member and partner countries, practising joint training programmes, exercises, and planning. CEP provides support to national planning and it is important here to stress the empirical fact, that whilst a plan in the form of a document may not be useful in a crisis, planning as a process is. The fact that crisis management actors are involved in the planning process has shown to be pivotal for their successful response. Disaster exercises are designed to practise procedures, provide training for local and international actors, build up interoperability skills and capabilities and “harness the experience and lessons learned for future operations” (EADRCC 2010).

The internationalisation of crisis response is written into the CEP programme itself: it involves NATO member countries, partner countries, and at the operational level even non-NATO and non-partner countries. It also involves the UN, the EU, the Council of Europe, other international organisations and NGOs. The decision-making process is in general based upon the will of those countries contributing the resources to the mission: they decide which the civilian and military elements are to be involved in the crisis response; they decide which mechanism will be used to offer assistance to the affected country; the affected country makes the decision to ask for assistance; the CEP elements are added to the national disaster relief units of the stricken country and operate under their coordination. It is encouraging that the EADRCC has managed to overcome strict civilian-military divisions in operative terms: the EADRU consists of civilian and military elements and additional military units are engaged to support civilian crisis management. Communication in crisis is coordinated through the EADRCC as an information-sharing tool, however it is often the case that affected countries appear to be unable to provide information on the assistance required, hence NATO’s experts must visit the area to define the needs. Coordination is provided by various countries within the EAPC area and between CEP structures and the UN-OCHA, while special attention is given to cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. Coordination with the affected country is crucial for the success of the crisis response. The EADRCC is designed as a regional coordination mechanism. CEP documents emphasise that any duplication, competition and conflict among international crisis management actors should
be avoided. Cooperation between the civil and military structures involved in the crisis response should also be free of competition and conflict.

It is evident from an examination of CEP documents and structures that coordination with UN-OCHA is well tailored. Closer cooperation with the EU, however, is crucial, due to the EU's strong civilian instruments. As NATO's Parliamentary Assembly document states: “In the areas where EU and NATO initiatives overlap, such as programmes and mechanisms for disaster prevention and preparedness, coordination and a clear division of labour between both organisations would be highly desirable to avoid duplication. In the current context, NATO has proved better suited for large operations, including in far-away places, whereas the EU could provide a useful framework for intra-EU operations. Moreover, the European project of ‘civil protection modules’ could allow for the development of reinforced cooperation between a limited number of interested countries. Such types of cooperation already exist among several European countries” (NATO 2010). Cooperation between NATO and the EU could be also improved through joint threat assessments, joint meetings of decision-making bodies, joint financing of science and technology programmes, training programmes and exercises.

Although some NATO officials are of the opinion that “civil protection” is not a core task for the Alliance, the author believes that the entire social dimension of NATO, including civil protection, is pivotal for the image of NATO, its legitimacy and consequently for its continued development. In the future, however, it would be advisable to integrate even more the three social dimensions. A number of Science for Peace projects within the Security through Science Programme have already been developed in the field of CEP. These projects typically bring together scientists and end-users from research laboratories, industry, and universities to work on applied R&D projects. One group of projects aims at increasing knowledge of natural disasters and reducing their impact. Scientific and environmental programmes also have many common features. And last but not least, environmental threats and risks should be the joint concern of the environmental programme and civil emergency planning.

Therefore, there is considerable room for improvement within the civil emergency planning itself, above all in the areas of prevention, preparedness and timely interventions, both through integration of the CEP with NATO’s science and environmental programmes, and through the improved harmonisation and coordination of crisis response efforts, particularly with EU.

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Territories under disputed rule are parts of a state that are not under control of the ruling governments. Every tenth state in the world falls into this category, from Indonesia in East Asia, Azerbaijan in Central Asia, Georgia in the Caucasus region, Cyprus in Europe to Colombia in Latin America. In most of these cases so called ‘frozen conflicts’ exist. According to Nodia (2004) ‘frozen conflicts’ are areas in which ethno-political conflict over secession has led to the establishment of a de facto state clone government that is recognized by neither the international community nor by the rump state from which the secession occurred. As the violence has largely abated, Nodia argues, the conflict has become ‘frozen’. This adjective is controversial: not only in itself – because it suggests an absence of political activity, whereas in most cases the opposite is true (Weir 2008) – but also because secession is not necessarily what the respective community is aspiring to achieve. De facto states, however, are different, because they build on a complex interplay of endogenous and exogenous factors. They are different because a set of interactions between the rump state and the local authorities, and between the different ethnic groups, which are not completely segregated, may exist regardless of the ongoing conflict.

A good example is provided by a divided city in Northern Ireland. Two thirds of the inhabitants call it Derry, while one third insists on the younger name of Londonderry. Some people even call it ‘stroke city’, as the name of the city is sometimes written Derry-stroke-Londonderry. Northern Ireland has become a peculiar entity – not a de facto state yet – although some Unionists might even have a preference for this as the second best solution to the contemporary status. Despite the gradual progress that has been made since the Good Friday Agreement, both the Nationalists and Unionists have retained their discordant political preferences. John Hume, the Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1998, said at a conference which took place in 2009 in that city and which I attended, that the prerequisite for transformation in Northern Ireland has not been a common political will on the part of the political stakeholders for resolving the national conflict, but mutual respect for difference. He added that if respect for the existing difference does exist, institutions and mechanisms have to be created...
that respect the differences too. He pointed to a creative European Union, which has allocated a regional fund jointly to the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, while the money has been sent directly to the local authorities in Northern Ireland. I refer to this surprisingly impressive EU flexibility because it encourages to apply similar creativity to other cases where people live with and under disputed rule.

Of course, it may legitimately be argued that each case is different and that any effort to find a catch-all approach on the international level entails the risk of immediately getting stuck in fruitless debates over legalistic interpretations. But there is another message which gives reason for cautious hope. Most of the rump state/de facto state constellations are characterized by the inability or reluctance of the stakeholders to alter the status quo. Ironically, most of the almost twenty rump state/de facto state constellations in the world, of which seventeen have a clear ethno-political background, are relatively stable with regard to internal security and the given state of power-sharing. More interestingly, two thirds of these conflicts root back to times long before the Cold War ended. Hence, they are not a product of the communist implosion. If a long stalemate lies behind, and an ongoing stalemate in terms of the existing political status can be predicted, addressing the daily fate of the people living under this status is legitimate, at least from the perspective of humanity.

Analytically – but also from a policy perspective – the interplay of external and internal actors in intrastate conflicts, especially if these have an ethno-political dimension, is complex. Rogers Brubaker (1996) proposed a triadic nexus approach to explain the interplay between national minorities, nationalising (host) states and international homelands. But these analytical tools (developed for explaining transformation and nationalist conflicts in Eastern Europe) are debatable because they start from the premise of a distinction between ‘western civic’ and ‘eastern nationalizing’ states. Taras Kuzio (2002), for example, argues that all states possess an ethno-cultural dimension, rendering futile any difference between civic or ethnic states. More comprehensive approaches suffer from another deficit of Western prescriptive perspectives: it uses the additional dimension of international organizations as a pretext for projecting normative expectations onto the actors within the states, and their neighbouring proxies.

External intervention remains a sensitive issue though. For rump state actors it is sensitive because they often fear that external support may either tip the balance of power in favour of the actors not under their control, or even encourage these actors to push further for secession. The local or territorial rulers, on the other hand, do not necessarily hope for external assistance, even from a kin state or other supporter states. They might fear that they will become dominated by external actors and policy agendas which are not theirs. Besides, from their perspective an external intervention could also end up being used by rump state actors as a welcome legitimacy for choosing hard power against
them in order to protect sovereignty. International actors, states in particular, are afraid of lending unintended support to secession through providing resources to the local authorities. But sometimes, however, the same state actors are even interested in preserving the status quo for their own strategic reasons, as happened with Russia in the cases of Transnistria, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The economic sector might also not be interested in letting political actors intervene, for they are concerned about the profits gained from the existing partition.

And the locals? Who does seriously care about them? The slogan of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) – according to the equally named report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001) – or ‘responsibility to prevent’ as the Quaker’s League FNCL (2004) in the US has rephrased it, seems often to end where the sovereignty of rump states is at stake. The core message of R2P was the predominance of humanity and human rights over interests and state sovereignty. But the reality is different. R2P interventions are rare, and if they occur, the interveners usually have own interests in the case. Fighting poverty, or more basically: achieving the Millennium Development Goals, is not top-ranked on their agendas. The question is what the international community can and should do in terms of good service and in compliance with the Millennium Development Goals for people who are living in underdeveloped territories that are not under the control of central governments – without being confronted with a debate over the legal and political status and without putting the life and security of the ordinary people in these territories at risk? To start with I would like to call the ‘three dilemmas’ of a pervasive phenomenon:

1. the dilemma of isolation;
2. the dilemma of territory, and
3. the dilemma of responsibility.

The Dilemma of Isolation
A close interrelation exists between territories that are administered like states, but whose rule is not recognized internationally, and fragility. In a nutshell, we are facing a very specific and often neglected type of fragility. From an outside perspective, states with divided rule in the territories under their jurisdiction are, according to international law, usually considered fragile – especially because of a lacking or at least endangered monopoly of force, and because of a protracted dispute about the legitimacy of rule and about territory. This does not mean that the administrative structures of the territories in question are not functional or are not functioning. On the contrary, as we have learned from cases such as Lebanon, but temporarily also from the OPT in Palestine, territorial governance structures may compensate well for existing deficits of central state administration. Local structures may function even comparably
better than the malfunctioning administration of a weak, and often also corrupt central state. Ironically, sometimes the people in territories under local administration seem to be better off than they would apparently be if they were under the administration of a failed state with ethno-politically dominant rule. But the sense of fragility that is implied by divided rule may become a cause for both internal and external isolation of the ruling groupings and the ordinary people in these local territories.

The internal isolation originates from the legally contested legitimacy of the rule. The central governments try to weaken what they consider a challenge to their power. On the other hand, as we can see in cases like Cyprus or Nagorno Karabakh, the balance of power distribution is often relatively stable, i.e., the central governments or the kin state rulers do not dare to risk restarting an open conflict, and nor do the local rulers. As said before, assistance and even military backing by external actors may help to freeze an existing standoff.

What makes such cases comparable, however, is that the direct access for external actors to bring aid directly to the people in territories under disputed rule is extremely difficult and risky, both for the deliverers and for the recipients. Most studies on the interrelation between fragility and development in the last decade have either ignored or underestimated this dilemma. This applies to the prominent World Bank (1999) and OECD/DAC (2001) commissioned studies on war and economy, and on development and security, but interestingly also to others, such as the most recent Human Security Report.

The point for discussion is – against the background of a foreseeable ongoing status quo of divided rule in many cases – what kind of assistance can be provided to the local people without changing the status quo (in the sense of just good services). To put it more precisely and positively: how can external assistance improve the chances for peaceful conflict transformation in both the local and the overall territory of a divided state?

The Dilemma of Territory
While not territorial conflicts by definition, most of the relevant cases under investigation are also cases where disputes over territory matter. Territory is an important principle of organizing social interaction, or as Sack (1986) has said: an element of social coordination and combination of area, power, and rule. As Goertz and Diehl have pointed out, territory has both immanent and relational importance. Immanently, territory provides the basis of resources and the starting point for self-determination.

In terms of relational importance, territory matters as a geopolitical alternative in comparison to a different territory within the same state. The political focus on territory may at first glance imply the idea of competing state-building, or even secession, but the primary interest of the actors in most cases is rather, according to Holsti (2004), the legitimacy of rule and self-
determination. With Kratochwil (1986) we can therefore assume that territory for these actors has, in the first instance, a functional importance. It provides a framework for the control, use, and distribution of resources for their own community and constituency.

It can be concluded that the territorial conflict is only a secondary consequence of the primary political conflict. That is why the territorial conflict cannot be resolved as long as the causes for the political conflict are not eliminated. On the other hand, the rump state actors may be afraid that any recognition, i.e., also implicit recognition, of the divided territorial rule will undermine their authority, increase the fragility of the state, and, moreover, may even strengthen the moral conviction and political strength of local rulers. But for the local rulers, giving up control over their territory would inevitably disrupt the organic coherence of social interaction. Therefore to them this would be tantamount to political surrender.

Territorial cohesion which is motivated by functional reasons and which seeks to protect the integrity of a determined community, implies at the same time almost inevitably that the governing actors risk increasing segregation and isolation from the people in other parts of the country. Segregation, moreover, may make territorial integrity dysfunctional because difficulties emerge for the isolated part to get access to vital resources beyond the bordering lines, which then puts additional strains on the local living conditions.

The points for discussion here relate to how to access the territory and how to assist the local people without unwillingly contributing to further segregation or even secession?

The Dilemma of Responsibility
The Western declaratory development policies undisputedly refer to many, extremely positively connotated, aims, such as: the strengthening of human security; the protection of human rights; peaceful conflict resolution; the reduction of poverty; the mitigation of climate change risks; sustained economic development; a just social order, etcetera. These general aims reflect what the eight Millennium Development Goals are also all about: to improve the capacity, ownership and ability of developing societies to deal constructively and peacefully with the challenges of social, economic and environmental transformation.

During the last decade development policy has for many states become a recognized instrument also for crisis prevention and conflict management. Already in the early 1990s a common understanding had emerged globally that Development and Human Security policies (UNDP 1994) should first address people rather than states.

The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD fuelled this debate with the Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation and a
great deal of subsequent studies gave substance to an intensive debate on this shift in policy focus. But all papers about the nexus of development and security either address the restoration of legitimate central rule or the protection of oppressed people against dictatorship and autocratic rule. The case of state-like actors whose legitimacy may not come from written law but from the people whose support they enjoy and who they are a part of, has not been dealt with adequately in these studies. Certainly, it cannot be ignored that states primarily deal with other states.

But as described above, the world of states has changed, as have the attitudes of states vis-à-vis state actors who ignore fundamental principles of human and minority rights. Rwanda and especially Srebrenica stand for a moral turn in the community of States towards concepts such as the R2P, which some legal experts already consider to be an ‘emerging norm’ (Schorlemer 2007). At the same time, however, intervening in states for humanitarian reasons with non-military means (such as aid) has been criticized time and again for potentially conflicting with the aims of counter-insurgency policies.

Empirically it can be proven that especially in multi-ethnic countries with a longstanding history of wars over resources, poor governance coincides with signs of ethno-political rule and ethnic oppression. But the international community has for a long time been reluctant to open this Pandora’s box for conflict resolution, not only because of the collective memories of the potentially mobilizing role of ethnicity in many past wars, but also because many states feel constrained by their own ethno-political agendas. Some fear that they will be affected by spill-over effects.

Whereas the responsibility to protect is not a fixed legal entity and is disputed as such, especially among the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council, it has helped to establish legitimacy for collective missions of humanitarian intervention, such as those in Kosovo, East Timor and Darfur. But why should a humanitarian intervention be considered primarily in military terms? The record of military intervention is, roughly speaking, not very impressive, nor is the ratio of investments and outcomes. $4.5 bn were spent on the ongoing military intervention, $1.6 bn were spent on the Chapter VII mission to Somalia, $450 mn on Rwanda. The military personnel sent to only the three aforementioned countries amounted to 50,000. Other cases may teach different lessons: Northern Ireland, South Tyrol, Gagauzia, Macedonia – to mention a few.

Against this background, the search for alternative options for ‘intervention’ seems to be overdue. Humanitarian assistance and development aid could be easily understood as an optional form of proactive and early intervention, thus matching the two other, often forgotten, but in the Report equally stressed,

17 See, i.a., Welsh and Mendelson Forman (1998); Ball (1998); World Bank (1999); Uvin (1999); Chalmers (2000).
aspects of the threefold ‘Responsibility Concept’: in addition to the responsibility to protect, the responsibility to prevent, and the responsibility to rebuild.

The core idea of the UN Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali 1992), that rapid growth and poverty reduction can contain and eliminate conflicts, does comply with that concept. When development succeeds, countries become safer and less prone to violent conflict. As Balls and Cunliffe (2007) have pointed out, rebuilt economies create prosperity and so aid progress towards a viable political agreement in the given country. Or more precisely: the illiteracy of populations, fragility of educational systems and longstanding inequities can have a structural impact on the ability to cooperate in conflict, for example on the attempts at empowering people, communicating very basic information, or impeding the rational conflict transformation approaches.

Most recent cases of ‘humanitarian intervention’ have hardly shown an impressive and, more important, sustained outcome. What has become visible though, is that rump states may not have the best concepts at hand if they are more of a problem of than a solution to the challenge. In case of a corrupt regime rather instead of, the international community faces the challenge of primarily protecting the people who suffer under that regime or the sovereignty of the state. If the disputed territory, however, is ruled by clientele groupings who care more about their welfare than about that of the people, the international community would also have to take care of the oppressed people first, before addressing the political status quo of the country.

De facto states are a phenomenon of states in transition. It is not the fault of the people if they have to live and to survive in divided parts of their home country. But the way how the international community accepts or does not accept the responsibility of support will have a great deal of influence on the future of the country, whether or not there will be one or more states, dictatorship rule or participatory governance. Fighting poverty is a matter of global humanity and responsibility. States may look different, responsibility does not.

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These days, it is common for NATO and Western governments to stress the need for defence, diplomacy and development policy to go hand in hand. The idea is that they need shared goals, common guidelines and coordination in action. No one is saying that soldiers, diplomats and development workers must stand shoulder to shoulder in all their endeavours, but there is wide agreement that they need close coordination in several important fields. One of these is preventing and fighting terrorism. Another is helping other countries to improve their military, police and justice establishments, making them more effective and accountable. The jargon for this is Security Sector Reform (SSR).

In this article, I will look at the common doctrine for SSR developed by the Western donor countries in the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC). I will argue that some of the sound and sensible principles of Western SSR policy are hard to reconcile in the real world. There are paradoxes in the policy and practice of SSR support that limit its effectiveness and transparency. I will suggest ways to overcome these paradoxes. These comments will have a bearing not only on SSR policy in the narrow sense of the word. They will also apply to efforts by NATO member states to foster the development of democratic defence institutions in the Partnership for Peace (PfP).

The idea of a comprehensive approach to defence, diplomacy and development is not entirely new. It has long been common to regard military and defence policy as a tool of foreign policy, and war as a continuation of politics by other means. However, it is only in the last few decades that Western countries have begun officially using the term ‘security policy’, which encompasses defence and diplomacy, and goes beyond both. It implies an approach to security that is not limited to national security or regime security, but also takes other dimensions of security into account. There is a strong and widespread desire among policy-makers to adopt a comprehensive approach to security. Many believe that the fundamental goal of security policy must be human security, meaning freedom from want and freedom from fear for each individual citizen: children, women and men.

The other main novelty of the ‘Three Ds’ (defence, diplomacy and development) lies in the perceived nexus between security and development.

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18 This article is partly based on a text published in Spanish in Revista Española de Desarrollo y Cooperación.
Security and development, we are told by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Union, depend on each other. Security provides an enabling environment for development, and development improves the capacity of the state and society to provide human security. It also contributes to human security by reducing poverty, ill health, marginalisation and injustice (OECD DAC, 2001). As Willy Brandt used to say: “development policy is peace policy”.

If they are to tackle these related challenges in a comprehensive and consistent fashion, governments must carefully coordinate the efforts of all relevant state agencies. The OECD calls this the ‘Whole of Government’ approach, while the British prefer to speak of ‘joined up’ government. In Germany, government and civil society strive for greater ‘coherence’ in ‘civil crisis prevention’. This means coordinating all government-led efforts to prevent violent conflict and promote international peace and security by non-violent means. Contrary to what one might expect, the armed forces, development agencies and non-governmental organisations play important roles in the German policy of civil crisis prevention. The Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development runs a programme similar to the US Peace Corps, called the Civil Peace Service (Bundesregierung, 2004).

It seems churlish to resist these notions. How can one reasonably object to governments taking a wider view of security? Who would seriously maintain today that security is the exclusive job of diplomats, soldiers and police officers? Could anyone be against closer and better cooperation between the people working on security and those working on development? The holistic approach to security and development is appealing. However, it has its problems, some of which we will discuss below.

What is New about SSR?
There is nothing new about governments transforming their military, police and judicial establishments, and receiving aid from other countries for that purpose. Since 1945, hardly a year has passed without security establishments undergoing fundamental changes in several parts of the world. The causes or triggers include the gaining or loss of independence, changes in political regime, changing military postures, state-building, democratisation and the aftermath of violent conflict. All these are likely to lead to changes in a country’s defence and security policies and therefore in the state bodies that carry out or oversee these policies. In 2010, we are witnessing fundamental changes in the security sectors of Afghanistan, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Timor-Leste, Kosovo and several countries formerly under communist rule.
The establishment of security forces in West Germany during the 1950s is an interesting historical example of security sector reform or security sector development. At the time, German rearmament was a highly emotive issue, both at home and in the countries that only a few years earlier had been under German occupation. Rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany was made acceptable by tight integration into NATO, restrictions on the weapons the FRG was allowed to field, rigorous oversight by the parliament in Bonn and a new democratic ethic that sharply distinguished the Bundeswehr from its predecessors. Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, is often said to have described the purpose of the alliance, established in 1949, as “keeping the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down”. It is uncertain that he ever spoke these words, but the quotation has nonetheless become a famous adage. The nineteenth-century Prussian notion of the army as ‘school of the nation’ - a concept ascribed to Lieutenant-General Hermann von Boyen, a contemporary of Clausewitz, who as the Prussian minister of war first introduced conscription in 1814 - was discarded. From now on, soldiers were to be considered ‘citizens in uniform’.

The conditions under which West Germany established military forces were partly imposed by the Allied powers. NATO needed German forces to defend the Central Front, but there was a general agreement that Germany should not re-emerge as an independent military power. The government of the FRG, based in the provincial town of Bonn, did not resist the constraints imposed by the Allies. On the contrary, it embraced them and incorporated them into the new German state that it was building: a democracy with a modern and liberal constitution, a powerful parliament and an army whose only official purpose was to contribute to NATO defence. In the following, we will see that the establishment of the Bundeswehr followed the principal guidelines of SSR doctrine avant la lettre.

What, then, is new about Security Sector Reform, as currently advocated and supported by the OECD, the European Union and their member states?

A Developmental Approach

Western SSR doctrine takes a developmental approach to security. It is worth noting that when the donor governments decided to develop a common strategy for supporting SSR overseas, they did this at the OECD in Paris. The OECD comprises 30 leading industrialised democratic countries. Its work mostly consists of studying and monitoring the economic, social and environmental activities of its member states and making recommendation on growth and

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19 Its members include nineteen members of the EU, as well as Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Mexico, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA. The European Commission takes part in the work of the OECD. The OECD does not include China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Taiwan or any African countries.
development. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD is an important body for consultation and coordination amongst donor governments regarding development aid. The OECD is neither a global nor a security-oriented organisation. Rather it is a club of rich and democratic countries (Mexico is a bit of the exception here) who are also the main providers of development aid. The Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation (CPDC) of OECD DAC produced a ‘reference document’ on SSR that was endorsed by the members of the organisation in 2004 (OECD DAC, 2005).

The donor doctrine on SSR developed at OECD DAC is developmental in the sense that it aims to “promote peace and security as fundamental pillars of development and poverty reduction” (OECD DAC, 2005: 12). Besides, it places heavy emphasis on notions that are held dear by the development community, such as local ownership and sustainability, but were until recently quite unfamiliar to the people who make and carry out security policy.

**A Broad Concept of Security**

Another new characteristic of the donors’ approach to SSR is that it defines security very widely. It calls SSR “a key component of the wider human security agenda, developed with leadership from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).” The concept of human security, elaborated in UNDP’s Human Development Report of 1994, has two principal features. First, it focuses on the safety of each individual child, woman and man. Second, it comprises every conceivable aspect of safety, from physical security, via economic and social security to environmental security. Quite rightly, OECD DAC points out that this goes beyond the scope of Security System Reform (OECD DAC, 2005: 11). However, OECD DAC itself defines security very broadly, as “an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment that is not detrimental to their health and well-being” (OECD DAC, 2001: 38).

The omnibus definitions of security and development favoured by organisations like UNDP and OECD DAC are problematic from an analytical and conceptual point of view. They are an open invitation to circularity, question-begging and other forms of muddled thinking. If, like OECD DAC, we assume at the outset that security and development are Siamese twins, then we cannot go on to argue they are connected at the hip. This is meaningless, like saying that husbands and wives are related by marriage. The other conceptual problem is that when a term is bloated to the point that it encompasses everything, it ends up meaning nothing. For analytical discussions of security
and development, we need true definitions, that is to say clear demarcations of meaning.

Of course, if security is an all-encompassing condition, it cannot be the exclusive responsibility of state security agencies. This is why OECD DAC prefers the term Security System Reform to Security Sector Reform. The security system ranges from the security forces to the state organs managing them, the official bodies that oversee them, the judicial and penitentiary system, up to and including civil-society and media organisations that monitor the security sector of the state.

**Building Capacity and Integrity**
The next distinctive feature of SSR doctrine according to OECD DAC is the *dual purpose of SSR*. Obviously, it should improve the delivery of security and justice services by enhancing the professional *capacity* of the security sector. Like the United Nations, OECD DAC stresses the need to ensure freedom from fear (OECD DAC, 2007: 21). However, OECD DAC argues more forcefully than the United Nations that the security sector must also be transparent, accountable and respectful of the rule of law. Therefore SSR must help to improve the *integrity* of the security sector and the quality of its governance. Indeed, OECD DAC attaches such importance to governance that the word was attached to the title of its 2005 reference document on SSR. Here the message is bold and clear: Improving capacity and building integrity goes together; you cannot pick and choose. If an international support programme only serves to make a country’s security sector more powerful or effective, but fails to remedy a lack of transparency and accountability, then, according to the Western donors’ doctrine, it is not SSR. We cannot say this with equal assurance about the UN’s SSR policy.

The OECD’s heavy emphasis on accountability is all the more important because in practice, the *de facto* objective of international security assistance tends to be to improve operational capacity. Generally speaking, the governments of the host countries are much more interested in making their security forces stronger than in making them more accountable. The priorities of the donors are not always the same. They may have sound reasons to fear that making the host country’s security forces more powerful without improving control and oversight will result in greater insecurity for the population. When the authorities of a host country and their overseas sponsors disagree on the priorities for an SSR programme, this is not merely a political problem between them. It is also a clash between two hallowed principles of Western SSR doctrine: on the hand the need for a balance between building capacity and building integrity, and on the other hand the need for local ownership.

There is no simple solution for these problems. However, in a true partnership, an attempt will be made to accommodate the wishes and concerns
of both sides. Ideally, this would yield a compromise that both fits local needs and is in line with OECD DAC’s guiding principles for SSR support.

It would be unfair to disqualify the OECD doctrine for being a donors’ doctrine. The donors deserve praise for having stated their priorities in SSR support clearly and frankly, and for admitting that these do not necessarily apply to countries receiving SSR assistance. However, we must realise that this limitation makes the quest for local ownership all the more important. If as a result of donor pressure, SSR results in enhanced security for the population, then it is a good thing for donors to exercise pressure. However, in practice, it remains to be established whether programmes labelled SSR really follow these principles, and whether they succeed in achieving the desired outcomes.

Local Ownership and Sustainability

The next novelty in the Western SSR doctrine is its insistence on local ownership and sustainability. The restructuring and reforming of the security system is the responsibility of the country concerned. The process must be driven and led, indeed ‘owned’, by the government and society of the country in question. “Donors don’t do SSR, they support SSR”, says the OECD DAC Handbook on SSR of 2007. Its authors do admit that local ownership is a hard requirement to meet, because the country in question often lacks the capacity to design and run such a programme, even with foreign advisors. Another common complication is that beneficiaries and donors may fundamentally disagree about the goals of reform. The government that is to receive the aid may be only interested in improving the professional capacity of the police through operational training and re-equipment, whereas in the opinion of the donor governments (who are themselves answerable to their parliaments and voters) the main goal of SSR support should be to enhance the accountability and integrity of the police. The proposed solution to such problems is to make increased local ownership a goal of SSR assistance programmes, and to build political support for their ambitious objectives.

Local ownership is important for its own sake. Without it, an SSR programme is unlikely to fit local needs and conditions and operate in a way that is culturally, economically and politically appropriate for the country concerned. There is, however, a longer-term consideration that is equally important. If an SSR programme does not fit the country well, if local stakeholders do not support it whole-heartedly, and if it continues to require massive external assistance, it will not be sustainable. Any gains it achieves are likely to be short-lived. The country may then revert to a situation hardly better, or even worse, than the conditions that the SSR assistance programme sought to improve. Therefore this insistence on local ownership and sustainability is a valuable contribution of the development community to the making and execution of security policy.
Unfortunately, the quest for local ownership is complicated by a paradox that is difficult to avoid or overcome. The providers of SSR aid expect, encourage and exhort the recipients to take the programme into their own hands. But a programme that is locally driven and managed will reflect local goals, concerns, sensitivities and ways of working. To be more precise, it will reflect what powerful local stakeholders want. It will not be fully in line with the priorities of the donors. Indeed, it may not meet conditions that the donors have set for SSR support.

Here is an example from the real world. In 2008 a country recovering from a civil war agreed on a security sector development programme with a Western donor state. At the insistence of the donor, the plan, with an appended list of activities to be undertaken, was drawn up by the government of the host country. So it came as no surprise that the document is specific and detailed when it comes to the supply of money, trucks, computers and operational training for the military and the police, but short and vague as regards improving oversight. For the most part, such subjects are tucked away in a final section called ‘cross-cutting subjects’. The activities concerned were supposed to have been tackled in the first two years of the programme, but this period has passed, and to my knowledge nothing has been achieved.

This leads me to think that there may be an inverse relationship between the local ownership of SSR programmes and the importance they attach to improved accountability. The stronger the former is, the weaker the latter is likely to be. Governments seeking foreign aid for their security sector usually want to enhance their power, not curtail it. The solution to this problem may be found in reflecting carefully on the role and responsibility of various stakeholders in SSR programmes.

When donors support a Security Sector Reform programme, they become stakeholders. Foreign stakeholders, to be sure, but stakeholders. The success of the programme becomes important to them. They want to make sure it will make a good contribution to their security policy, their foreign policy and their development policy. They want to demonstrate this success to their parliaments, their media and their voters. They should be frank and resolute about their interests when negotiating an SSR support programme. At the general level, OECD DAC has clearly laid out what donors expect to achieve by supporting SSR programmes and what the requirements for success are. Individual donors engaging in a specific support effort for SSR should be equally clear and insistent about the conditions under which they can help. This will set limits to local ownership, but it is necessary nonetheless.

Now let us consider local stakeholders. To its credit, OECD DAC avoids speaking of ‘national ownership’, perhaps because this term (favoured by the UN) suggests government ownership. OECD DAC stresses the important and essential contribution of civil society to the improvement and oversight of the security sector. Often, the priorities of civil society with regard to the security
sector are different from those of the government. For instance, civil society may be more concerned about the violation of human rights and civil liberties by the security forces, and more eager to put in place institutions and mechanisms that will watch over the security forces and hold them to account. If such civil society groups are officially included as partners in an SSR programme, this will provide foreign donors with legitimate local partners with an equal interest in accountability.

The fourth and last guiding principle for SSR in the OECD DAC approach is sustainability, which to some extent is a function of local ownership. This is probably the least researched and least understood aspect of SSR and SSR assistance. Development studies have identified some of the requirements for sustainability in other fields, and we now need to do the same for SSR.

Having reviewed the four guiding principles of SSR, we can now see that the birth story of the Bundeswehr illustrates their relevance. Some 55 years ago, the FRG was able to acquire modern armed forces with the acquiescence and the help of its allies because its military build-up went hand in hand with the development of democratic institutions and a culture of accountability. In this particular case, the complete integration of the Bundeswehr into the North Atlantic alliance was also an essential requirement. Notwithstanding external constraints and assistance, the process was owned and driven by the West German government and adequately supported by West German society. Had it been dictated by the senior NATO powers (the occupation forces, France, UK and USA) it would probably have been less well adapted to local needs and conditions, and its results would therefore have been less durable. In the event, the Bundeswehr has proved successful and sustainable. Rather than serving as a war-fighting force, it provides military support to a security policy rooted mainly in diplomacy and development.

**Whole of Government Approaches**

The last distinctive feature of SSR policy is the call of interagency and multidisciplinary cooperation. When donors support SSR in developing and post-conflict countries, they are committed to carefully coordinating the policies and activities of the government agencies and non-governmental organisations involved. This coordinated mode of operation is called a ‘Whole of Government’, ‘joined up’ or ‘coherent’ approach.

There are many difficulties associated with the Whole of Government approach. It is easy to prescribe, but hard to put in practice. Experience shows how fiercely and tenaciously government agencies resist working closely together. Their operational goals, their institutional interests, their cultures and their methods are often quite different. The solution commonly proposed for such problems is training. Indeed, good and sustained training programmes can help to combat prejudice, myopia and ignorance. But even if such obstacles can
be eliminated, there may be rational and valid reasons to avoid close cooperation between diverse agencies and organisations.

For instance, people from various organisations cannot work together fruitfully unless their policy-makers have provided them with clear and specific objectives and guidelines for joint action. In practice, these are often lacking. It is not unusual to find inconsistencies and even contradictions between the goals and activities of various organisations supposedly serving the same strategic purpose. Sometimes, close interagency cooperation may be counterproductive or even dangerous. Several of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan require close civil-military cooperation between ISAF forces and development workers. But as desirable as this in some ways, a close association with foreign soldiers may jeopardise the public image, the effectiveness and even the safety of NGO workers. Now let us assume, for the sake of discussion, that all the diplomats, soldiers, police officers and NGO people working on behalf a donor country to support SSR support have synchronised their watches and are all on the same page. How will the stakeholders of the host country respond to this concerted approach?

By the same logic that calls for the coordination of the donors’ efforts, the policies and activities of the host country should also be in unison. In practice, they are not. The countries engaging in SSR at home have no doctrine like the OECD DAC approach. The relevant United Nations policy document does say that “successful reform of the security sector needs political commitment, consensus and coordination among national actors” (UN SG, 2008:11), but that is a statement of fact, not a prescription. Developing and post-conflict countries are not committed to Whole of Government approaches. Even if they wanted to adopt such an approach, they would find this more difficult than the donor countries.

Besides, the government of a country engaged in SSR may not necessarily be happy to see donor countries tightly coordinating their efforts, especially if they are doing this on an international level. This limits the opportunities of the aid recipients to play donor countries off against another and exploit the differences between, for instance, ministries of overseas cooperation and ministries of defence. By the same token, it makes the donors more effective and influential. For instance, the better the EU member states, the European Commission and the Council of the EU coordinate their separate and joint efforts to support SSR in developing and post-conflict states, the more they will be able to make a difference. If better coordination on the donors’ side makes host countries follow suit, in order to respond more effectively to the united front presented by donor agencies, that would probably be a good outcome all around.
Promoting Democracy

In 1995, Peter Volten established the Centre for European Security Studies (www.cess.org) a think tank that many associate with the Netherlands government and the University of Groningen. In fact, it is independent from both. With Peter Volten as its director, CESS has initiated and run programmes to promote democratic governance in the security sector of countries that were once allied with or part of the Soviet Union. During the Netherlands presidency of the EU in 2004, Volten also launched a similar programme in Turkey. Shortly afterwards, I joined CESS as its executive director. In the last fifteen years, we have run programmes to promote transparency and accountability in the defence and security establishments of young democracies. Countless CESS seminars, workshops, training courses and research projects have stimulated thinking and debate on democratic security policy, and helped local stakeholders to begin putting it into practice.

Bearing in mind the questions raised above, it is relevant to ask whether an organisation based in Western Europe and working with donor money can make a useful and durable contribution to democratic reform. Are its programmes not ‘donor-driven’? If host country governments are really interested in what these programmes have to offer, why do they not more often pay for such projects? And if they are not really interested, what is the point of these projects?

In trying to answer these questions, it is useful to distinguish between two stages in the political development of a transition country, before and after the revolution. ‘Revolution’ is taken here to mean the moment at which the government fully commits itself to the pursuit of democracy. Before the revolution, there will be considerable ambivalence in government circles of the host countries regarding activities to promote democratic governance in sensitive areas like the military, the police and the intelligence agencies. Under these conditions, host country governments will rarely seek foreign aid for such activities, though it may acquiesce in them, perhaps to please the West. CESS programmes launched under such conditions will necessarily be donor-driven, but not entirely. Our programmes are designed and implemented in close cooperation with local NGOs and think tanks in the host country. Unlike their governments, these NGOs are committed to democratic change. They ensure that the programmes are suited to local needs and conditions and will improve the chances for civil society to advocate democratic reform in their country. This is an important element of local ownership. Advocacy, debate and capacity-building can help make it attractive, or indeed unavoidable, for governments to engage in serious democratic reform. This is how CESS programmes can help pave the way.

After the revolution, conditions become more favourable. The host country may still need foreign money and expertise to push through reforms, but its political commitment to democratic change will be strong and clear. The
programmes proposed by CESS and its local partners are likely be regarded as instrumental to achieving the government’s goals. The scope for local NGOs to organise such activities will improve. Local ownership will expand and improve, despite the continued importance of donor aid.

So I do believe that CESS programmes make a useful contribution to democratic security policy in transition countries, even when these programmes are largely driven by donor money and donor priorities. In fact, one can argue that we are most useful before the revolution, despite the low level of local ownership.

CESS began working in Moldova in 2003, under a communist government, when political conditions were difficult and donor interest was much lower than today. The Netherlands and other donor countries enabled us to work with government and civil society. With the Institute for Public Policy and other local partners, we established the first project ever to support Moldova’s parliament in its task of overseeing the security sector. In 2009, everything moved towards change. Parliamentary elections brought a coalition of non-communist parties into power in Chişinău, and this government has clearly committed itself to democratic change. Foreign aid abounds. Naturally, CESS is continuing its work in Moldova, with increased and improved opportunities. However, I sometimes think that before the revolution we were making a bigger difference.

References
Chapter 13. NATO Interventions in the Balkans. History, Perceptions and Analogical Reasoning

*Sipke de Hoop*

“Statesmen frequently turn to historic analogies for guidance when confronted with novel foreign policy problems … they usually pick inappropriate analogies and as a result make bad policies.” (Khong: 1992, 9)

**Western Interests and Balkan Notions**

The internationally renowned Albanian writer Ismail Kadare once stated that the Balkans have always been incapable of solving their own problems and therefore always need external intermediaries. From a historical perspective one could even argue that West European powers contributed to the Balkans as a powder keg in the nineteenth century and the first half of twentieth century. These powers had their own agendas when intervening in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire and continued a policy of self-interest after the Balkan states became independent. In most cases Western powers did not contribute to stability and security and maintained quasi-colonial relations with the young Balkan states (Glenny 1999).

The creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the First World War, renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1927, illustrates the influence of Western powers in the past. Yugoslavia was formed because the Western powers needed a large country as a counterweight against future new German territorial ambitions. Yugoslavia also served as a buffer against the communist Soviet Union that just arose in the East.

Yugoslavia was an artificial construction where peoples with different political, economic, cultural and religious backgrounds had to deal with each other. A central or a decentralised state was a constant factor in their political discussions, leading at certain moments to national movements in Croatia and Kosovo striving for autonomy or even independence. These wishes were counterweighted by the Serbs who were in favour of a centralised state. In the Second World War as well as in the 1990s these differences culminated in civil war, and Yugoslavia became the stage for ethnic cleansing. In the Western world journalists and even some politicians were inclined to analyse the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s in a historical pattern of ethnic hatred, with disregard for other factors like the leadership vacuum, economic crises and the absence of liberal political traditions or changing international circumstances (Ramet 2005, 70). The Yugoslav peoples themselves also referred to old
empires, historical animosities and past events to explain their behaviour and to back up their territorial contemporary claims.

Winston Churchill once said that the Balkans have more history than Europe can deal with. Almost fifty years later that statement still seemed accurate. Both the Europeans and the Americans had difficulties understanding what was really going on in the Balkan region. There was a general lack of knowledge and the Western powers had different views on the nature of the conflict. Was this a civil war were all parties were guilty or was it a Serb war of aggression? Was it a war for self-determination, a failed transformation process or an explosion of ethnic hatred? When the war in Bosnia was prolonged, the Western partners were not able to reach consensus on the strategy.

The purpose of this chapter is to show the linkages between the decision-making process whether to intervene or not and the role of history and historical arguments in this process, by making use of the theory of analogical reasoning. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the (mis)use of history by policy-makers by comparing contemporary events with past events.

From EU to NATO
The Europeans took the lead when the problems in Yugoslavia started. The European Community (EC, in 1993 the EU) wanted to design an independent foreign policy and regarded Yugoslavia as a test-case. The chairman of the EC claimed in 1991 “this is the hour of Europe” (Poos, 1991), but the Europeans could not prevent the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The self-interest of the Europeans was stronger than their capability for conflict resolution. The best illustration of this is the installation of the Badinter Commission that had to draw up a list of criteria for recognition when the disintegration went further. The two main conditions for recognition that the Commission agreed upon on were control over their own territory for the new states and provisions for minority rights in their constitutions. Under these criteria Macedonia should be recognized, but Croatia could not meet them since the Serbs occupied parts of Croatian territory and there were, in contrast with Macedonia, no solid regulations on minority rights. However, the opposite happened. The Germans were strongly in favour of recognition of Croatia, and Greece blocked the recognition of Macedonia. Because of the ambitions for a common foreign policy the Europeans closed ranks. Their policy again contributed to instability in the region and was neither credible nor effective.

During the first phase of the war in Bosnia the Europeans and later the United Nations came up with several peace plans that all failed. A European diplomat sighed once that perhaps one should build a wall to surround the Balkans and wait until the warring parties are done fighting. The Europeans were divided and indecisive, but they could not afford to stay at the sidelines. The main reason was of course that the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the
backyard of Europe could lead to instability in Western Europe as well. Western values and human rights were at stake and an intervention seemed a humanitarian and moral obligation when more and more reports on ethnic cleansing became known.

The policy of the US government in the early 1990s towards any kind of intervention in Yugoslavia can be characterised as reserved. All their attention was directed to the first Gulf War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Concerning the Balkans, American politicians and diplomats asked why the United States should fight “Europe’s yesterday’s wars”. In their opinion Europeans should solve their own problems. However, in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999 the USA eventually became the decisive force. The US-led NATO Operation Deliberate Force bombed the Bosnian Serbs in 1995 to the negotiation table, and in 1999 history repeated itself when Operation Allied Forces was launched against the Serbs to enforce them to accept the Rambouillet Accord.

Of course there were differences between the two: the first operation was already successful after two weeks and was based on UN Security Council resolutions; the second operation lasted 77 days and was undertaken without a mandate from the Security Council. What Bosnia and Kosovo had in common was that the Europeans could not act decisively without the USA and that in both cases it took quite a while before the Americans entered the stage. One of the reasons is that they perceived the war in former Yugoslavia as an ethnic, religious, tribal war.

George Kennan, a well-known American historian and influential diplomat wrote in 1993 in a report on the Balkan wars: “the Nationalism on the Balkans drew on deeper traits of character inherited, presumably, from a distant tribal past … and so it remains today.” (Kennan 1993, 11). Robert Kaplan also favoured the notion of ancient Balkan hatreds. According to him, the region is so non-European, a region where people are deeply immersed in their bloody history: “a time-capsule world: a world upon which people raged, spilled blood …” (Kaplan 1993, xxi). Ivo Banac, another American historian and Yugoslavia-specialist concluded in 1994 that “Western aloofness and indifference to the area itself and to any action or involvement” came from the perception that the Balkans differed too much from Western civilization as a consequence of century long dominance by the Turks (Banac 1993, 181). Richard Holbrooke, the famous American peace-maker for Bosnia, concluded in his book To End a War that “misreading of Balkan history” was one of the reasons for Western failure in Yugoslavia: the idea that ancient hatreds made it impossible for anyone outside the region to try to prevent the conflict. According to Holbrooke (1999, 21), US president Clinton and also Lawrence Eagleburger, the American ambassador in Yugoslavia and later Minister of Foreign Affairs, were influenced by these notions in Balkan literature.
Analogical Reasoning

The theory of analogical reasoning, or Khong Theory, states that humans look for guidance to the past (Khong, 1992). This is not a deliberate process, based on any bias or conscious choice. People just rely on some 'sort of simplifying mechanism' to cope and to process massive amounts of information. These mechanisms are analogies and lessons learned from historical events (Khong 1992; Houghton 1996, 524). It seems that analogies are “selected from more recent events rather than more similar events” and the available evidence “strongly supports the notion that decision-makers use analogies poorly” (Khong 1992, 36). According to Khong (1992, 7), within the category of international policy makers US officials are “particularly predisposed to analogizing”. There is plenty of evidence that US foreign policy has been dictated by “warnings from history” (Hehir 2006, 73). Since the NATO interventions only took place because of the American leadership, this chapter will analyse the statements and ideas of US officials.

The findings suggest that especially in the USA the hesitation or reluctance to develop an active policy concerning the Yugoslav disintegration in the early 1990s had to do with analogical reasoning. The decision to become actively involved for the sake of the Kosovar Albanians in 1998-1999 also had to do with the so called 'lessons from the past'. In the case of Bosnia four analogies can be identified: The Viet-Malia analogy; the ethnic hatred analogy; the Balkan war analogy; and the Holocaust analogy. The first two did not encourage an active stance, but they were gradually replaced by the other two. In the case of Kosovo there were four analogies that encouraged an interventionist approach: the Bosnia analogy; the Munich analogy; the Dayton analogy; and the Operation Deliberate Force analogy. The Viet-Malia analogy, moreover, was also still influential. This analogy did not prevent a US-led intervention, but heavily influenced the chosen military approach.

Bosnia and analogies

The Viet-Malia analogy is based on the Vietnam syndrome, which is a dominant theme in US foreign policy, and the US experiences in Somalia in 1992. An influential factor in Washington was the fear that intervention in the Balkans could result in either a new Vietnam or a disaster akin to the intervention in Somalia (where eighteen US rangers were killed and the US pulled back its troops). The use of American ground troops in far away countries is not a popular theme. There was another complication: Americans do not care about foreign affairs. Presidential historian Michael Beschloss revealed that “from the beginning of 1993, President Clinton was very affected by this view”.(Redd 2005, 137) Therefore Clinton was not eager to risk new military action and was not inclined to push heavily for the use of force. The degree of public support for such actions was limited and there were no direct national interests at stake. Ivo Daalder, in the mid 1990s a White House specialist on Bosnia and currently the
US ambassador to NATO, stated that the Clinton Administration believed that Somalia demonstrated conclusively that you cannot have any casualties (Redd 2005, 138).

The other analogy that in first instance deterred the Americans to undertake action was the *ethnic hatred analogy*: the suggestion that contemporary events in the Balkans were analogous to eruptions of ostensibly endemic ethnic hatred throughout Balkan history. In the first paragraph it was already made clear that this notion also influenced Clinton.

These two analogies were replaced by two others when the incapability of Europe and the UN to address the problems in the Balkans became more and more visible and pictures of concentration camps and ethnic cleansing led to more pressure from public opinion and media in the US. The *Holocaust analogy* – we should never again allow ethnic cleansing in Europe – became popular. The US pleaded from 1994 for a lift and strike policy and airstrikes by NATO to halt the Serbs. The Europeans were against it because both would lead to escalation on the ground where they had stationed their military forces as UN-troops. In 1994 and 1995 it became painfully clear that the UN could not prevent that the Safe Areas came under attack. The media compared the international policy with the appeasement politics in the 1930s towards Hitler, and the credibility of the international community was at stake. In 1995, after the fall of Srebrenica and continued shelling of other Safe Areas, NATO, backed by the UN, launched an attack, leading to the defeat of the Serbs and finally to the Dayton peace accord.

The general tendency of the US and the EU to take a more active stance was also justified by the *Balkan war analogy*. The West has to prevent the Yugoslav conflict from engulfing the wider region or leading to global escalation. In this context the assassination of archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 by a Bosnian Serb (leading to the First Word War) was cited as a justification for intervention. In reality there was not much risk for such a regional escalation. Already in 1992 the UN stationed peacekeeping units in Macedonia to deter the Serbs, but Belgrade had no intention to become involved in another war, especially since there was no large Serb minority to support as was the case in Croatia and Bosnia. In Kosovo, the Albanian majority (90%) was heavily suppressed by the Serbs. They chose a non-violent strategy and hoped for pressure from the international community. The Albanians had resisted incorporation in Yugoslavia in 1913, 1918, 1945 and in the 1970s they protested with success against their subordinate status; they received autonomy in 1974. Their autonomy was revoked by president Slobodan Milosevic in 1990 and since that time they strove for independence.

*Kosovo, motives and analogies*

After the peace accord of Dayton was enforced on the Serbs in 1995 the Albanians were very disappointed that there were no arrangements made for
their future. Young Albanians turned to armed resistance and the situation escalated. The Kosovo Liberation Front (KLA) attacked Serb police stations and the Serbs retaliated. After a major KLA offensive in February 1998, a Serb counteroffensive in June drove the KLA back, burning rebellious villages and displacing more than 200,000 persons.

NATO ambassadors issued the threat of bombing to Milosevic in the summer of 1998, but in spite of an agreement for a ceasefire and a withdrawal of Serb troops (the Belgrade Accord, October 1998) fighting continued. Unarmed UN observers could only stand by, watch and write reports about the ongoing escalation. In January 1999 the massacre of 45 Albanian civilians in Racak (Kosovo) demonstrated to the public opinion the lack of political will of the West to carry out their June 1998 threat. Indeed, as Susan Woodward (2001, 333) stated, “disagreements among NATO states over the most effective military action (only air operations or also ground operations) and over the legal basis for intervention caused delay”. Daalder en O'Hanlon (2002, 164) concluded in this context that NATO Secretary General Javier Solana “kept insisting on the importance of getting NATO involved ... not only in the air but also on the ground”. The United States refused to consider a deployment of ground troops, whereas the European allies were sceptical about a bombing strategy.

In Kosovo, history seemed to repeat itself: new ethnic cleansing while the West was issuing powerless warnings. Although the Albanians interpreted these messages differently, their expectation that escalation would lead to intervention were probably based on the earlier intervention in Bosnia. Alan Kuperman (2008, 69) even supposed that the Albanians switched from pacifism to rebellion and pursued a strategy of provoking Serb retaliation against citizens because they believed they could provoke humanitarian intervention. Another encouragement, according to Kuperman, was the Western habit to devote extra resources to the Balkans whenever violence escalated. The message of Dayton that only with violence one can achieve goals and draw international attention, was not only believed by the disappointed Albanians in Kosovo, but according to Kuperman (2008, 70), also encouraged by Western officials.

Kuperman's implicit human intervention analogy is from a different perspective also mentioned by Woodward. She argues that the Western intervention in Kosovo, that was launched on 24 March 1999, was the logical outcome of a long process that started during the 1990s in response to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and cases compared to it, such as Somalia and Rwanda (Woodward 2001, 331-333).

Before the NATO operation started, the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians were ordered by the Americans to Rambouillet to reach a settlement. The Americans had already designed a peace plan with far-reaching autonomy for the Albanians. The agreement provided democratic government, peace and security implemented and supervised by NATO. After a three-year transitional
period, the mechanisms for a final settlement for Kosovo should be determined, including the possibility for a referendum on this matter. These conditions were not acceptable to Milosevic and after the final rejection in March, NATO started its intervention by air-assault.

Before I turn to the analogies which played an important role, I first briefly analyse the motives for intervention. President Clinton addressed the nation on the night of the first airstrikes with the following words: “we act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war; to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before with catastrophic results … let a fire burn here in this area and the flames will spread” (Clinton 1999).

The first reason mentioned was to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. This had to be achieved by strategic and precision bombing on military targets (initially in Serbia) to reduce the capability of Serb forces to continue their violence. There was of course, as Michael Mccgwire (2003, 1-3) rightfully addressed, “a contradiction between the stated military objective of degrading Serbia’s military capability (a slow process) and the immediate political objective of halting the forced expulsions and associated killings in Kosovo”. The airstrikes did not prevent a crisis from becoming a catastrophe. On the contrary, the bombing led to an escalation strategy of the Serbs on the ground which could not be prevented without the use of ground forces.

The second reason was the fear that an escalation in Kosovo would lead to regional escalation, drawing in countries like Albania, Turkey and Greece and destabilizing the fragile inter-ethnic relations in the Balkans. However, this was exactly what happened after the interventions. The ethnic cleansing politics in Kosovo caused huge flows of refugees in the region and the impact of the Kosovar Albanian influx in Macedonia had an impact on the radicalisation of the Albanians in this country.

The third reason had to do with the growing pressure to get Kosovo sorted out before NATO’s 50th anniversary summit. The summit was intended as a powerful affirmation of NATO’s continuing relevance in the post-Cold War world and the credibility of NATO was at stake after almost a year of threats to use force against Serbia. In this respect we should not underestimate the pressure of the media to act on behalf of the victims of violence. A last reason is the will not to repeat the mistakes of Bosnia and Rwanda. In this sense the intervention of NATO was not only a response to the violence in Kosovo, but also to the failure by Western powers and international organisations to protect civilians in Bosnia in 1992-1995 and in Rwanda in 1994.

Apart from the humanitarian reasons, security interests and credibility concerns, there was according to MccGwire (2003) “a certain willingness to war among political leaders from NATO”, reflecting the opinion that Milosevic was “the root cause of the Balkan tragedy”. This idea was coupled with a “sense of revulsion and guilt” over Srebrenica, where 8,000 Bosnian Muslims were
murdered in 1995. McCwire (2003, 13) further argues that because of this willingness and because there was not much room for negotiation there is a "widespread impression that Rambouillet was set up to fail". Aidan Hehir (2006) and Sébastien Barthe & Charles-Philippe David (2007), who researched the role of analogies in decision-making, nuanced this view. In the words of Hehir (2006, 71): "The use of analogies steered the negotiations down a course that made it impossible to reach an agreement."

The key foreign policy players in the Clinton Administration were veterans of the policy debates that culminated in the US-led NATO intervention in Bosnia. Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, became "the single driving force" behind a coercive diplomacy policy. President Clinton was preoccupied with the Lewinski Affaire and his defence against prosecution. One of his advisors later said that he "could hardly remember Kosovo in political discussions. It was all impeachment, impeachment, impeachment, there was nothing else" (Redd 2005, 141). After the Racak massacre, Albright pushed forward the Rambouillet peace plan with elements that were not acceptable to the Serbs.

In the decision-making process there are four new analogies that had a major impact. First of all the Bosnia analogy and the Munich analogy. Albright advocated the use of force from the beginning. Already in March 1998 when the problems in Kosovo began to resurface, she wrote: "we are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia" (Redd 2005, 142). She believed that Milosevic wanted regional domination, and the experience of Bosnia learned that only force could stop him. Negotiations, compromises and the quest for diplomatic solutions were akin to the failed policy of appeasement used at Munich in 1938 to contain Hitler. Albright had fled Czechoslovakia following the German invasion. She advocated a hard stance to foreign threats and admitted that in her approach to Milosevic her "mindset is Munich", and that "most of her generation's mindset is Vietnam" (Albright 2003, 27). Albright compared the Serb politics to the Nazi genocide of the Jews. Milosevic rejection to sign the Rambouillet accord was in her eyes "genuinely evil", and her analysis was that he "only will listen to force". This vision is of course debatable. Looking at Dayton one could also conclude that Milosevic could be reasoned with and that he was susceptible to external pressure and economic inducements.

In the Dayton analogy Milosevic was a man who would in the end see sense and broker a peace deal if offered enough incentives and threatened with enough intent. According to this analogy he would not risk NATO airstrikes and back down. Holbrooke, who played a key role in the negotiations both with Dayton in 1995 and in 1999 supported a robust uncompromising approach, because he believed Milosevic would give in: "it's obvious that Milosevic only responds to force or the absolute credible threat of the use of force" (Hehir 2006, 75). Hehir concluded that key policy makers believed that Milosevic's commitment to Kosovo "was as malleable as his support for the Bosnian Serbs
proved to be at Dayton”. They never understood the historical and emotional importance of Kosovo for the Serbs. Kosovo was, unlike Bosnia, a recognized province of the Former Yugoslavia and was regarded as the cradle of Serbian civilization. The political success of Milosevic has been built on the Serbian love for Kosovo and giving in at Rambouillet would have been political suicide.

The Operation Deliberate Force analogy, the last analogy that was used in favour of an intervention, referred again to Bosnia. If no agreement could be reached, then the Serbs would back down after a brief military campaign similar to the two week airstrike campaign in Bosnia. What has been neglected in this analysis is that in 1995 the air campaign was carefully coordinated with the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, who attacked the Bosnian Serbs at the same time with their ground forces. The concept of troops on the ground was in 1999 excluded because the Joint Chiefs of Staff resisted the concept of sending US troops into Kosovo as part of a multinational invasion force. Their fears were directly linked to the still widespread Viet-Malia analogy (Barthe and David 2007, 90-91). Another omission in the analysis and the comparison with the 1995 operations was the supposed target of the airstrikes. In 1995 the Bosnian Serbs, who were dependent on external support from Belgrade, were the target, in 1999 the well-trained and well-equipped Serb army had to be defeated. The stakes were also much higher. Belgrade did not give in because they were fiercely against the deployment of NATO troops in their sovereign country.

The Serbs themselves also had an analogy. The Yugoslav army believed that the bombing would not last long, because they saw the situation as being like Operation Desert Fox in Iraq in 1998 when the USA and Great Britain carried out a four-day bombing campaign, without getting new commitments from Hussein and with the alliance consensus withering away very soon (Barthe and David 2007, 78). Military advisers told Milosevic to hold out against what they assumed would be a similarly short campaign, but they underestimated that credibility forced NATO to go all the way. The refugee flows, the media attention and the public aversion towards the unfolding events in Kosovo made early suspension of the campaign politically impossible.

The paradox in the Kosovo case is that ethnic cleansing and the massive refugee problem in the region were a direct consequence of the NATO airstrikes. The coercive diplomacy, without the use of ground troops, prolonged the war, aggravated the humanitarian situation, threatened the security in the region and as a consequence damaged the credibility of NATO. Barthe and David (2007) conclude that “the reliance on the images of Bosnia prevented the Clinton administration from seriously discussing the ground option”. This option was at last seriously considered in May 1999 when the air campaign proved to be ineffective. Only when the Western threat of a ground invasion became highly credible, Milosevic was prepared to negotiate.

To be aware of history and the role it plays in international conflicts should be the lesson of this case study about NATO’s interventions in the Balkans.
David Houghton (2001, 222), who studied the role of analogical reasoning in many US foreign policy situations, concluded on this topic: “Inevitable we will almost always be misled by analogy; nevertheless we are compelled to use history and experience as our guide.”

References

158

Ine Megens

The Lisbon meeting in February 1952 stands out as one of the most important moments in the early history of the alliance. Based on the recommendations of the Temporary Council Committee measures were taken to improve the build-up of balanced collective forces. A huge increase in defence forces was accepted for planning purposes. It called for the creation by the end of 1954 of a total of 42 ready divisions and 48 reserve divisions to be mobilized within thirty days. At the same time the Council decided to organize a yearly review of the military requirements of the alliance and the political and economic capabilities of the member states. Reconciliation of the defence requirements with the politico-economic capabilities lied at the heart of the process. In the 1950s and early 1960s the Annual Review (AR) was one of the most important tasks of the alliance and certainly of the International Secretariat. As Lord Ismay stated in his book about the first five years of NATO “the two words ‘Annual Review’ are probably heard more frequently in the offices of NATO Headquarters than any other combination of words in the English language” (Ismay 1955, 89).

The AR process involved a continuous and intense dialogue between the central bodies of the alliance and the member states. The procedure was kept into being until 1966 when it was followed by the Defence Planning Review, which underlies the planning cycle of the alliance until today. This chapter will present an analysis of the Annual Review 1952 and 1953 and come up with some preliminary conclusions on the role of the various actors involved in the process with references to discussions in later years.

Annual Review 1952 and 1953

In Lisbon it had been decided to change the organizational arrangement of the North Atlantic Treaty and create a permanent body of national representatives to the organization, the Council Deputies. An International Secretariat headed by a secretary-general was also established and he and his staff moved to a new headquarters in Paris. Staff work had to be planned to cover the requirements of Annual Review. Military experts, specialists in equipment planning, statistical clerks and experts from defence ministries with experience in budget and finance matters were hired. Material and technical facilities had to be arranged too.

To conduct the AR the Council established a special committee comprising members of the International Secretariat, representatives of the fourteen
member states and a member of the liaison office of the Standing Group in Paris. The Annual Review Committee was chaired by Henry Vredenburgh, Deputy Secretary General at the International Secretariat. The AR committee was charged with a threefold task in the process. Firstly, a continuous review of reconciliation was needed including political, economic and other obstacles in the way of achieving firm goals. They also needed to take care of the carry forward of the programme. Last but not least the committee needed to discuss the long-term implication of the military build-up and its maintenance.\textsuperscript{20}

The AR Committee met for the first time on 9 May 1952 and discussed the principles underlying the AR further. It had been agreed that there should be “comprehensive Annual Reviews of the requirements for building and maintaining adequate defensive strength on a realistic foundation of politico-economic capabilities” (Ismay 1955, 89). Immediately a discussion emerged on how to conduct the review. Should the force goals accepted at Lisbon in February of that same year serve as a starting-point or was there a need for a revised assessment, as the Canadian and Belgian representative argued. During one of the first meetings of the AR Committee the US Representative, L.T. Merchant, stated that the ultimate purpose in his opinion was the achievement of maximum combat-ready balanced collective NATO forces. Other representatives, notably the French member of the committee, emphasized the need to discuss an equitable distribution of the defence burden.\textsuperscript{21} The British representative Eric Roll pleaded for a different approach and wanted to take the national defence programmes as a starting point (Roll 1985, 86-90). The committee also learned from the Standing Group Liaison Officer, rear admiral R. Dick, the Standing Group did not intend to scrutinize the military programmes of the member states as this was a responsibility of the Council.\textsuperscript{22}

In May the Standing Group formulated new force goals beyond 1954 and noted that based on new intelligence estimates an increase to 98 divisions for 1955 was a military prerequisite. They considered the agreed forces goals not sufficient in the light of the trends in Soviet policy and overall security threat to the alliance. The situation was even more urgent because German contingents to the allied defence effort had not been agreed upon because ratification of the European Defence Community was still pending. In a meeting of the Council Deputies US ambassador Draper expressed his serious reservations on the feasibility to achieve the force goals proposed by the military authorities. Preliminary American analyses revealed a gap between the forces proposed by

\textsuperscript{20} Record meeting Annual Review Committee (ARC), 9 May 1952, AC/19-R/1. NATO Archives Brussels, Annual Review Committee AC/019. See also Council memorandum on committees, CM(52)15, 31 May 1952.

\textsuperscript{21} Record meeting ARC, 16 June 1952, AC/19-R/3(revised)4. NATO Archives.

\textsuperscript{22} Record meeting ARC, 16 June 1952, AC/19-R/3 (Revised); Statement by SG Liaison Officer read out at the meeting ARC 16 June 1952. Annex to AC/19-R/3 (Revised). NATO Archives.
the Standing Group and the prospective resources available to meet them. In particular the costs for major materiel equipment could not be met by the defence budgets. He argued it was therefore of utmost importance during the AR to analyze the most effective way to reduce this gap. “The balance between the size of the forces and the levels of equipment must be explicitly dealt with, as must also the problem of estimating the continuing maintenance and replacement requirements and providing for them both production-wise and financially.”

The aim should be to arrive at a firm force plan for 1953, a provisional goal for 1954 and a planning goal for 1955, which were in the range of feasibility.

This would become the starting point for the Annual Review procedure. A questionnaire was submitted to the member states on 9 July and consisted of two parts. In part A countries were asked to give an overview of the military efforts. All information had to be presented in tables completed with an explanatory note. Detailed information was requested concerning the military forces available and provisional planning figures for forces planned to be available for NATO at a later date. Supplementary tables called for information on military requirements, the availability of equipment and infrastructure. Part B demanded information on the economic situation of the country and an outline of the definition and classification of defence expenditures.

The member countries had difficulties to come up with the information requested and the country replies to the questionnaire, which should have been presented by 31 August, were not received till 15 November. The procedure was postponed and had be revised several times during the process. The delay was partly due to inexperience and inadequate facilities. The receipt and distribution of the material for instance required over a million pages to be run off, assembled and distributed, as each country reply comprised at least 300 pages. And only in November it was decided to establish technical teams within the International Staff to study the country submissions. Apart from the military considerations team, there were four separate teams dealing with defence expenditure, equipment, infrastructure and economic capabilities.

The Annual Review disclosed other political, economical and military problems too, both within the countries and among the member states. The British pleaded in favour of a reduction in armament as nuclear weapons would reduce requirements for conventional weapons. The US had difficulty to come up with information as the American government had initiated a review process that would ultimately result in lower ground and air force goals than the Lisbon

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23 Statement ambassador Draper to the Permanent Council, 25 June 1952, C-M(52)44. NATO Archives.
goals or the Standing Group goals (Condit 1988, 382-383). The French were tenacious and adamant when they insisted during the meetings on timely and adequate information about American force strengths and military expenditures. The Dutch minister of Defence, Cornelis Staf, in a report to the ministerial council in The Hague told his colleagues that the French sabotaged the process.\textsuperscript{26} When the Americans were pushed to the wall, the outgoing Truman administration did not have enough perseverance to enforce decisions and had to leave final decisions to the new Eisenhower administration.

In November the reports of the technical teams were ready whereupon two weeks of intense discussions followed in which all country reports were discussed by the AR committee, two or three at a time. All in all there were eight meetings. At every meeting national delegations comprising four representatives from the countries under discussion were present as well as representatives of the national delegations to NATO and the staff members of the technical teams. There was a great interest from the national delegations to NATO for this process of collective scrutiny of national defence efforts. A year later the procedure would be elaborated. Each delegation now studied the replies of a number of countries and attended the interviews arranged with the countries for which they had responsibility.\textsuperscript{27} Although not every delegation attended every examination, they had the right to be present.

Due to the delays the first report on the Annual Review 1952 was presented as an interim report. The Annual Review Committee would continue its work and submit a final report in the Spring.\textsuperscript{28} The interim report had three parts The first part was a progress report on the developments in 1952, the prospects for 1953 and of problems that needed to be solved. The second part of the report were team reports and technical studies, while the third part were the country studies. The special studies comprised reports on military technical issues such as the standard of readiness, major equipment deficiencies, operational reserves but also studies of a more general character like the study of the spare part problems. An analysis of the plans for 1953 revealed that these plans appeared to be within the economic capabilities of the countries, but additional funding was required for improvements in defence such as improvement in the standards of readiness, formation of operational reserves for 30 days, logistical support and infrastructure. The report demanded guidance on a number of issues both in regard to possible increases in resources available for defence and regarding possible changes in planned effort.

\textsuperscript{26} Minutes Cabinet meeting 24 November 1952. National Archives The Hague (NA), Notulen Ministerraad 1952.
\textsuperscript{27} List of countries for which delegations will be more particularly responsible during the 1953 Annual Review, 23 July 1953, AC/19-D/74(Revised). NATO Archives.
\textsuperscript{28} First report on the Annual Review, 12 December 1952, C-M(52)130. NATO Archives.
At the North Atlantic Council meeting on 18 December the ministers accepted the report and adopted agreed decisions. Prudently the document insisted on measures to maintain and if possible to increase resources devoted to defence. The recommendation on the necessary adjustments in force plans, however, was cast in clear language. “Where resources are inadequate to meet in full the military desirable force plans, emphasis should be given to the effectiveness of the forces rather than to numerical increases in units inadequately supported.” This is indicative for the value assigned to the advice of military authorities. It was also a conclusion that would set the stage for further discussions in the years to come.

Early January 1953 the AR committee discussed the programme of future work to finalize the work of the Annual Review 1952 and tried to elicit more information from SHAPE for the standards of readiness for land forces. The committee emphasized full participation of military authorities was essential for the work of the committee. So when the Standing Group proposed to submit the reports and recommendation only to the country concerned the Belgian representative, R. Ockrent, emphasized the multilateral approach of the Annual Review. “Some departure from the strict multilateral approach had to be accepted, because of the time factor. But he felt that the very limited distribution of information proposed by the Standing Group would tend to rob the Annual Review of all real value.” In the end it was decided to discuss the recommendations of the military authorities and their recommended firm goals for 1953 in the committee and include them verbatim in the final report on the Annual Review 1952. According to the military authorities deficiencies for air forces were most seriously, in particular for interceptor fighter and all-weather fighter aircraft. Armed forces were hampered by inadequate training and an insufficient number of regular personnel as well as shortages of equipment.

The resolution on the AR 1952 adopted by the North Atlantic Council in April 1953 noted with satisfaction that many recommendations of the military authorities had been accepted by countries and urged governments to take all steps necessary to attain the firm force goals for 1953. Simultaneously the Council considered the agreed force goals not adequate and required a

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29 Agreed decisions on the first report on the Annual Review taken by the Council at its 41st meeting 18 December 1952, C-M(52)145. NATO Archives.
30 Agreed decisions on the first report of the Annual Review, 18 December 1952, C-M(52)145. NATO Archives.
31 Records meetings ARC, 7 January, 12 January and 21 January (AR/19-R33 i/m R-35). NATO Archives.
32 Record meeting ARC, 27 January 1953, AC/19-R/36. NATO Archives.
33 Record meeting ARC, 30 March 1952, AC/19-R/42; Summary of force goals, 9 April 1953, DSR/3 (second revise); Second Report of the Annual Review, Part I, Summary of force goals, 15 April 1952, C-M(53)35. NATO Archives.
34 Resolutions on the 1952 Annual Review adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 24 April 1952, C-M(53)47(Final); Summary Record of meeting North Atlantic Council, 24 April 1952, C-R(53)23. NATO Archives.
progressive build-up of the size and effectiveness of NATO defence forces. It was followed by a long list of considerations, recommendations and requests to the national governments on a variety of issues such as the importance of the European Defence Community, improving combat readiness of forces, financial and economic factors, standardisation and defence production.

The Annual Review Procedure
A second resolution adopted by the North Atlantic Council in April 1953 gave guidance for the AR 1953 and called for a simplified procedure. The request would be repeated in the years to come. All the same, the procedure would become even more complicated in the following years mostly because there was no previous international experience in this field and sometimes because of simultaneous requests of higher authorities. In regard to the AR 1953 for instance the Council demanded special consideration for the annual recurring costs and, in addition to the goals for the next three years, also asked for guidance for 1957 as needed for long-range planning of equipment.\(^35\)

A working group on procedure had been created a couple of months earlier under the chairmanship of J.K. Horsefield of the Finance and Economic division of the International Secretariat.\(^36\) Discussions on the questionnaire in greater detail and the timetable for the Annual Review would become the core business of this working group. The group discussed and agreed on technical details such as the timeframe for the calculations and how to measure the status of military units, or defence expenditures for that matter. Some countries used a calendar fiscal year, others operated on a different fiscal year. Defence expenditures for instance were not measured in the same way by all countries. To give but one example: some member states included costs for military pensions, others did not. How to present the tables regarding planned forces and information of military production capabilities was also brought up for discussion. A recurrent issue was how to simplify the procedure and in particular to diminish the large amount of figures and huge number of detailed information on military equipment. The Dutch representative expressed doubt whether “the mountains of papers now submitted are within the powers of the International Staff properly to digest” and noted that was certainly beyond the powers of the national representatives”.\(^37\) Over time a procedure developed in which four phases can be distinguished.

\(^{35}\) Resolution on plans for the 1953 Annual Review, 24 April 1952, C-M(53)48(Final). NATO Archives.


The initial step in the procedure was to send a questionnaire to all the member countries. The questionnaire itself was drafted by the subcommittee. Over the years it would change slightly, but generally speaking the document asked the countries to submit information on their defence effort as well as on their financial and economic capabilities. Apart from the military information the questionnaire asked for economic basic data and financial aspects of the defence programme. The second stage took place in the capitals of the member states where several branches of the government had to cooperate and coordinate to provide information to NATO. Special military teams of the allied headquarters paid visits to all member states and gave planning guidance. When countries had completed and submitted their replies the third and most important phase began. The national reports were carefully studied by allied civil and military authorities. The latter formulated detailed recommendations for improvement from the military point of view. The International Staff studied the equipment tables as well as economic and financial figures submitted by the countries. A draft report on every country including recommendations was then presented and discussed with the national delegation. After these examining sessions the Annual Review Committee prepared a report for the Council and a draft-statement of defence. The AR reports contain two parts, a general one and an analysis of the situation in every member state. The report also maintained recommendations to every member state. During the fourth and final stage of the process the report was discussed in the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council and a resolution on defence adopted. Although the procedure developed and changed over time, the basic outline remained the same over the years.

This analysis of AR 1952 serves as the basis for some preliminary conclusions on the role of allied civil and military authorities involved. The manner in which harmonization was brought about will also be evaluated.

Comments and Advice from Military Authorities on National Plans
The force goals for 1954 as accepted in Lisbon 1952 came under discussion while the ink was still wet. As already indicated above the Standing Group formulated new force goals in May 1952. The military authorities of NATO also started to work on a revision of the strategic guidance which would result in the adoption of MC 14/1 in December 1952. In this document too the Military Committee maintained that conventional forces available fell short of requirements and argued the alliance should use “all types of weapons” for the initial air offensive. If weapons of mass destruction should become available in greater numbers the re-evaluation of requirements might be necessary (Pedlow 1998). Within the Annual Review procedure the military authorities had to take the political guidance by the North Atlantic Council as their starting point and had to
work within the limits of the political and economic framework as agreed upon by the member countries. Both the Standing Group and the Supreme Commanders issued comments and recommendations for improvement to individual countries. In the Fall of 1952 the military commanders paid visits to the member countries to discuss their contribution to allied defence. Thereupon the United Kingdom suggested to include these visits in the procedure. The visits had a dual purpose of giving the supreme commanders additional information and providing them with a basis on which to make recommendations. The proposal was accepted and SHAPE started to send so-called 'visiting teams' to the member countries to discuss the annual submissions. The highest military authorities in the alliance, the Standing Group on the other hand tried to keep their distance. Vice-admiral R.M. Dick, Standing Group Liaison Officer at the International Secretariat, emphasised the visiting teams were the sole responsibility of Supreme Commanders and raised objections against all attempts of the Annual Review Committee to tie the Standing Group into the process.

This is a clear indication of the diverging roles the two military bodies would come to play in the Annual Review process. It can be partly explained by differences in competences. The Standing Group was responsible to provide military advice to the political leaders and considered itself responsible only to the North Atlantic Council. In 1952 they focused on the development of a new strategic guidance and got deeply involved in a discussion on how to incorporate nuclear weapons into NATO strategy. The Annual Review was not their first priority and definitely not their main concern. Disagreements over the military structure of the alliance prevented that international military advice could be developed for the alliance. The SG was composed of military representatives of the US, the UK and France. The SG was superior to the allied commanders and could issue guidance and direction to them. Formally the Standing Group was subordinate to the Military Committee, which had a representative of each member state, and during the greater part of the 1950s this was the cause of great problems of coordination. Rivalries among the members of the SG itself added to these problems. Gradually therefore Supreme Allied Commander Europe became the main focal point for military planning. According to Douglas Bland apart from the responsibilities and the personal prestige of SACEUR, the immediacy of the allied headquarters to Europe's military problems are the main reasons for this (Bland 1991, 148). The Annual Review illustrates the latter point. Officials at SHAPE got deeply involved in the AR procedure and got intimate knowledge about the national planning processes and the problems member states had to deal with in the

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38 Memorandum by the UK delegations re. NATO Annual Review 1954, Questionnaire and timetable for the 1954 annual review. Comments by delegations, 28 October 1953, AC/39-D/40; Record meeting ARP, 10 November 1953, AC/39-R/16. NATO Archives.
39 Record meeting ARC, 22 February 1954, AR/19-R/88. NATO Archives.
build-up of their forces. Their mission statement and practical approach to solve problems served them well in the end.

**The Role of the International Secretariat**

When the first AR started NATO’s International Secretariat (IS) was still in the making and had to work with an inexperienced staff. Recruitment for the Economics and Finance Division for instance was not yet completed and some experts were loaned to the International Secretariat (Jordan 1967, 213). The other two major divisions, the Political Affairs Division as well as the Production and Logistics Division also got involved. The IS had to conduct the day-to-day coordination of the process and under the chairmanship of Lord Coleridge, Deputy Executive Secretary, a steering committee coordinated the activities of the various divisions and working groups. This steering committee had only limited responsibilities as the Annual Review Committee itself was responsible for supervision. Proposals to limit the number of representatives in the committee or to create an executive agency met with opposition. The member countries wanted equal access to all information and operate on an equal footing.

During the 1950s the role of the International Secretariat gradually increased because the review process developed into a routine procedure which required the gathering and analysing of detailed information not only on defence expenditures, but about economic and financial data as well. The comprehensive, time-consuming and routine nature of the collection of data contributed to a growing responsibility of the International Secretariat. The *Report on the 1954 Annual Review* claimed that the recommendations in the country reports, although discussed in the AR Committee, were the responsibility of the International Staff. This was a deviation of the procedure as agreed earlier and was probably caused by the delay in the submission of country replies. Apparently no one objected, on the contrary a few months later the procedure for this section was adapted and now became common practice for this stage of the procedure. Thereafter drawing conclusions and recommendations of the country chapters remained the responsibility of the IS. It was also agreed the IS would prepare a short general chapter on the main military problems and other points of general significance to the defence effort of NATO. As the delegations did not designate a chairman from their

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40 The experts probably came from the Office for European Economic Cooperation.
42 ARC, Procedure and timetable for the 1954 Annual Review, 18 February 1954, AC/19-D/97 (Final). NATO Archives.
43 Record meetings ARC 28 January, 2, 3, 10 and 15 February, AC/19-R120 through R/124; Draft report to the Council on procedure for the 1955 Annual Review, 11 February 1955, AC/19-D/133 (Revised). NATO Archives.
midst the newly appointed Assistant Secretary-General for Economics and Finance, Fernand-Didier Gregh, was appointed to that position.\textsuperscript{44} In his study of the administration of the alliance Robert S. Jordan noticed a trend to make more use of senior officers of the IS as chairman of Council Committees and regarded it as a result in experience in working together and of an increase of confidence between national delegations and the International Staff (Jordan 1967, 290). The examination of the AR procedure demonstrates that it was both the nature of the process and the way the procedure was carried out by the officials that contributed to a growth in confidence in the International Secretariat. The Annual Review process thus contributed to the trust in the organization and helped to establish the IS as the centre in the organizational structure of NATO.

**A Truly Multilateral Procedure?**
During the first year the national delegations showed great interest in the examining sessions. Allied consultation on war planning in times of peace was an innovation in international relations and the main element why the procedure qualifies as a truly multilateral one. The multilateral character of the process was cherished by many individuals that were involved and some of the smaller member states. In particular the Belgian representative R. Ockrent often brought it up for discussion in the meetings of the Annual Review Committee. In February 1954 he tried, together with his Italian colleague R. Ducci, to increase the multilateral character of the procedure by incorporating the military representatives of the countries, but their proposal was rejected.\textsuperscript{45} Internal Dutch memo’s in 1954 also point out the unique and productive character of the exercise. It was a procedure which would offer an appropriate format to develop a sound collaboration with Germany too, the memo added.\textsuperscript{46} In his memoirs the Dutch Deputy Secretary of Defence Calmeyer who chaired the Dutch delegation a few years later claims it was one of the most valuable elements in NATO and adds: “It was the most difficult exam I ever took, far more difficult than any debate in Parliament. The committee basically knew their business and had comparable data of other countries. In terms of financial and economic potential the committee was better informed about our capabilities than I was” (Calmeyer 1997, 511, 618).

The AR process thus served to gain a clear understanding of the national contributions to the alliance. It does not automatically follow that ‘harmonization’

\textsuperscript{44} Record meeting ARC 22 September 1954. NATO Archives.
\textsuperscript{45} Record meeting ARC, 22 February 1954, AR/19-R/88. For references to the multilateral character of the AR see also Record meeting ARC, 27 January 1953, AC/19-R/36. NATO Archives.
or ‘reconciliation’ of national defence plans with the changes considered desirable by NATO was brought about. On the contrary, negotiation was at the centre of the AR process because defence requirements needed to be reconciled with the political and economic capabilities of the member countries and NATO as a whole. The aim was to develop target figures for the build-up of military forces which were accepted by the national authorities. Differences of emphasis were noticeable from the beginning however.

As the negotiating procedure offered numerous opportunities to influence the process many of the parties involved had their own additional purposes for the AR. One of the issues that complicated the process was the American military assistance programme. The United States used the outcome of the AR process as a guidance for planning purposes in their own aid programme. National governments in Europe tried to elicit firm commitments from the US, promises to speed up the deliveries of military equipment the Americans or guarantees that spare parts would be included in the end item programmes. Only NATO-assigned units were eligible for military assistance and extending the national commitment to NATO increased the prospect for American support.

I have analysed elsewhere how the Dutch minister of Defence Staf played this gamble in two directions to get additional American military equipment (Megens 1994,138-147). In the Dutch cabinet he made a parade of the promise of American support to convince other ministers to furnish an additional army division to the alliance. The Dutch military included corps support troops for this division too, but diplomatic representatives considered this to be contrary to the defence plan as accepted to the Dutch cabinet. The 7 December division was no more than a stripped division with Indonesian veterans. Difficulties within the delegation notwithstanding the Dutch succeeded to use the discrepancies to their advantage during the examining sessions at the end of 1953. When SHAPE accepted the unit as a NATO commitment and the division was included in the Annual Review minister Staf also obtained US approval of the plan as a basis for aid programming.

Disagreements within national delegations were not uncommon. Both civil and military national authorities tried to use the international process to influence decision-making at the national level. In his memoirs Calmeyer writes he had to defend the Dutch defence policy in front of the Annual Review committee even if he often agreed with the critics and used their points of criticism in the Dutch cabinet (Calmeyer 1997, 619). “It resembled a chess game with merely horse jumps” another Dutch participant observed (Evers 1997, 46). National military authorities used the process to underline the importance of certain units, specific equipment or other demands.

For NATO’s military authorities the AR also offered the opportunity to investigate specific issues that warranted more attention in their opinion like air defence. Without any exception NATO officials and country representatives who were closely involved in the Annual Review process describe the long
discussions and tough negotiations about national contributions to allied defence. Lord Ismay was perhaps the most outspoken when he labelled it “the long drawn agony of the Annual torture”. When he quoted these words in his memoirs Henry van Vredenburch, chairman of the Annual Review Committee, added that Ismay thus wisely kept his distance. Vredenburch too labeled the AR as “a very time-consuming exercise giving little satisfaction, useful and necessary it might be ...” (Vredenburch 1985, 469).

It is as yet too early to come up with conclusions on the impact of the Annual Review as no scholarly literature is available and only scattered references can be found elsewhere. In his analysis of the first five years of NATO Lord Ismay maintains it was “an efficient means for collecting precise information, sifting it, drawing conclusions from it and then acting” (Ismay, 1955). Dutch ambassador and later Secretary General to NATO, Dirk Stikker, argues the AR was “always an incentive to greater efforts” (Stikker 1966, 259).

In an unpublished memorandum professor Geoffrey Goodwin who studied the Annual Review process of 1958 stated by way of conclusion: “the impact of the Annual Review (later, biennial) on government attitudes and policies is very difficult to measure, and will naturally vary from country to country, but on some issues, or on some occasions, a country may be open to suggestions while remaining adamant on others.” However, “it can help to focus minds on the collective needs of the Alliance, and, in the process, not only to smooth off the rough edges of national policies but also to induce a frame of mind not rooted exclusively in a narrowly conceived national interests” (Taylor 1978, 202-204; Taylor 1990, 35).

The Annual Review was a complicated bureaucratic process which needs to be examined in greater detail by historians as well as IR scholars because it provides an excellent opportunity to study the internal performance of the alliance. The process may also put another light on the way national and international decision making were tied together as it was part of a game that was played simultaneously at numerous chessboards. Studying the AR applying concepts such as multilateral-level governance we will get a better understanding of the internal dynamics of the alliance.

References


Part 4 – NATO’s Retirement?
More than twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall the intensity of the debate on European security leads many to believe that the continent’s stability is in jeopardy. Numerous strategy papers on European security refer to historically unprecedented challenges and threats, such as terrorism, failed states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks and energy security. Apart from this daunting security environment, strategists point to shifting geopolitical balances: with the emergence of new sovereign powers we are heading towards a messier, multi-polar world that will no longer be primarily dealt with by the current multilateral mechanisms that were inspired by the West. All this uncertainty generates uneasy debates among Europe’s security establishments. Late 2010, NATO produced a new strategy while the alliance is bitterly divided over Russia and its ISAF mission in Afghanistan is not going well. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is bogged down in institutional turf wars over its external policy, while the currency crisis is calling the entire European project into question. The OSCE, the only truly pan-European security forum, is having a hard time explaining its relevance and Russia has tabled a new draft European Security Treaty, because it considers itself a strategic outcast. So much for the euphoria that erupted after the end of the Cold War about Europe’s prospects.

However, is it really all that bad? Or is there something virtual about considering Europe as a danger zone. Maybe we need to take a fresh look at European security. We may get one by zooming in on one of the remedies invariably suggested for improving our security: better NATO-EU cooperation. At the same time, we should evaluate Europe’s overall security situation and NATO’s current position as the most important vehicle for transatlantic relations. Finally, we should examine the question whether it is imperative that Europe further develops a common foreign and security policy to become a significant international player and, if so, how to translate this assignment into a new partnership with the US.

**Tearing Down the Brussels Wall**

Most observers find it nearly impossible to explain why two Brussels-based organizations, with their overlapping memberships, find it so difficult to get their act together. This act ideally consists of combining the two organizations’ unique qualities into a comprehensive approach to crisis management. This
concept has become fashionable in the framework of the international community's presence in Afghanistan and amounts to fusing military, development assistance and diplomatic instruments into a single, aggregate policy. Actually, a comprehensive approach is about everything that the USA did not apply in Iraq. In the case of NATO and the EU, this would mean linking the former's hard power tools to the latter's soft power tools, preferably under the aegis of the United Nations. Some observers even consider bringing these two primary Western institutions together as a strategic fix to re-establish the West's dominance in the world (Drozdiak 2010).

Cyprus

The most cited and conspicuous reason for the lack of cooperation is the political stalemate surrounding Cyprus. In short: ever since Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, NATO member Turkey has been blocking Cypriot cooperation with the alliance, while Cyprus prevents Turkey's access to institutions such as the budding European Defence Agency. Thus, the NATO-EU debate is confined to the realm of the so-called ‘Berlin plus arrangements’, the mechanism hammered out in 2003 that provides for EU-led operations making use of NATO assets and capabilities. Cyprus, which for obvious reasons does not have a security agreement with NATO, is excluded from these arrangements. In practice, therefore, the main topic that NATO and the EU can discuss safely together is Bosnia-Herzegovina, the only theatre where Berlin plus – an already ‘un-comprehensive’ concept since it rules situations that do involve the EU but do not involve NATO – is applicable.

Of course, this political issue is a major obstacle to improving NATO-EU ties – and a stark reminder of the sound advice that institutions shall never import trouble, the way the EU did when admitting Cyprus without the island’s partition being settled. But if by some magic this stalemate would all of a sudden be lifted, do we really believe NATO and the EU would together live happily ever after? Maybe the Cypriot question serves as a useful pretext behind which more structural problems are lurking. Apart from their different scopes, NATO and the EU have their own, distinctive characteristics. The former is a US-led and highly political military alliance, while the latter is more of a regulatory body under alternating lead-coalitions, aspiring towards a more political external role. Next to this, NATO’s consensus principle works differently from the EU’s unanimity rule that governs its external policies. Is it plausible that these heterogeneous entities would manage to agree on some kind of complementary division of labour? Probably not.

Different Animals

Both organizations are engaged in complex transition processes with uncertain outcomes. NATO is supposed to be transforming from a classical self-defence organization into a more general security organization able to project power far
beyond its treaty area. But the intake of former Warsaw Pact countries and Soviet republics necessitates reassurance measures against perceived threats emanating from Russia, while ISAF, NATO’s most ambitious out-of-area mission to date, is straining the alliance’s cohesion. Its new strategy is a politically correct, but half-baked compromise between collective defence and collective security.

Hopes for NATO-EU rapprochement ran high when in 2009 France finally rejoined NATO’s military structures. But the flipside of this deal was a stronger commitment to the EU’s common security and defence policy: a deal that mainly concerns London, since Anglo-French cooperation will be crucial in fulfilling this ambition which ultimately will have to cause friction with the alliance. In 2009, too, the EU adopted its long awaited Lisbon Treaty that would pave the way for more concerted policies. But ever since, the Union has been struggling how to make the treaty’s complex provisions work in practice, while the financial crisis of 2007-2010 has consumed most of the EU leaders’ attention, raising even more fundamental questions about Europe than its external dimension. To sum up: the current environment seems particularly hostile for these two altogether different organizations, both in the process of (re)formulating their goals and ambitions, to strike a deal that would position the one vis-à-vis the other. In this context, the fact that no fewer than 21 countries are members of both NATO and the EU distorts the picture and appears to be a liability rather than an asset, given these governments’ talent for institutional schizophrenia and separate chains of instruction within their bureaucracies.

How Bad is Suboptimal NATO-EU Cooperation?

Does a lack of NATO-EU cooperation spell the end of the Western world? No, it does not. The era of Western pre-eminence on the global stage, which has lasted for almost three centuries, is anyhow coming to an end. Estimates indicate that by 2025 Asia’s economic output will be on a par with the OECD countries’ output, while by that time the United States and Europe together will account for only nine percent of the world’s population (Notre Europe 2010). The relative decline of the West and the ‘rise of the Rest’ will be dominant features in the coming decades. This course of events should not be dramatized: ‘our’ decline will not be absolute and only a very gradual process, while ‘they’ will encounter many problems of their own, whereas this ‘Rest’ hardly constitutes a like-minded caucus. But having NATO and the EU act hand in glove will not change this trend. Besides, despite institutional obstacles, NATO-EU cooperation is not all that bad. Wherever the organizations meet in theatre, whether in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan or off the Somali coast, practical arrangements work out fairly well. Furthermore, a comprehensive approach to crisis management makes sense but does not exclusively hinge on NATO-EU cooperation. And given the precarious state of the ISAF operation,
the main driver of this approach, it is not a foregone conclusion that this mission provides the format for future engagements.

So, basically, let NATO and the EU do what they are doing right now: work together in a bottom-up way as well as they can. With an eye to both organizations’ ultimate incongruity, it may be wiser not to waste time trying to merge their respective policies but rather to manage them by making use of the possibilities for cooperation that present themselves. Since NATO-EU synergy is not going to save the world, or Europe for that matter, we should be able to live with a less-than-perfect level of interaction.

Europe is Not Under Siege
Another reason why this state of inter-organizational affairs should not keep us awake at night is that security-wise Europe is not under threat, at least not to the extent that many gloomy forecasts tell us. When in 2003, two years after 9/11 and nine months after the US-led invasion of Iraq, the EU for the first time formulated a security strategy, it came up with a bold first sentence: Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. This statement seems to capture the state of the Union surprisingly well. Admittedly, this highly readable and concise document, which is still in force today, also invokes the prospect of greater threats than we have known, but the elaborations under the headings terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime suggest that these are very serious issues rather than existential threats to Europe’s security. Instead of being defensive, the EU strategy breathes a fair amount of self-confidence and idealism, viewing itself as “inevitably a global player [which] should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and a better world” (EU Security Strategy 2003).

Still, the myriad of security organizations dealing with Europe; the often vitriolic debate about European security, especially when it features Russia; the ‘frozen conflicts’ imbroglios; the number of sub-strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and the controversies related to missile defence systems: all this suggests a security situation that needs urgent attention. But are we not, to a certain extent, chasing phantoms? It seems we have grown so accustomed to regarding Europe as a battlefield, both as an arena for internal European strife and as a bone of contention for outside powers, that we find it difficult to assess our environment as it is. When it comes to the above-mentioned new threats and challenges, some of which are actually not so new, none of these require primarily military answers, while all of them are transnational in nature and therefore do require international cooperation.

The Russian Federation
In some European capitals, Russia looms large as a remaining physical threat, but this has more to do with the past than with the present. For some reason,
we tend to make Russia bigger than it is. It is a nuclear giant but apart from being diplomatically isolated it only has one third of the EU’s population, spends about one-tenth of what EU countries spend on defence and its economy adds up to one-fifteenth of that of the EU. Even if the EU is not capable of wielding these levers effectively, it puts Russia’s might somewhat into perspective. Russia is managing the current financial and economic crisis relatively well, but its exclusive dependence on oil and gas revenues, which mainly come from Europe, will sustain its vulnerability to global market trends. And in order to upgrade its inefficiently run economy, including its energy industry, Russia will need Western technology, know-how and capital. Economic entanglement in a globalizing world does not always prevent warfare — it certainly did not manage to do so in 1914 — but under current circumstances it seems to bring an appetite for stability. Apart from a host of other domestic problems, Moscow will have to deal with its restive Northern Caucasus in a more structural way, in order to secure the Federation’s integrity. The way Russia is defending its interests in neighbouring countries is hardly sophisticated, to say the least, but the fact that this ‘near abroad’ represents a zone of interest, and an outlet for its resources, should not come as a surprise. Like it or not, power status implies some degree of regional dominance. How else is NATO’s enlargement policy or the EU’s Eastern Partnership to be interpreted but as efforts to extend a zone of interest to our neighbourhood? Even Russia’s 2008 military expedition against Georgia, which by the way highlighted serious shortcomings in its armed forces, was a post-imperial reflex provoked by Tbilisi’s reckless behaviour, rather than a prelude to a series of neo-imperial campaigns. That is why Moscow got away with it fairly easily.

Most likely, all the professed nervousness about European security is not entirely justified. Certainly, tomorrow’s world is fraught with risks and dangers, many of which are as yet unknown, but it does not appear that these warrant the kind of security debate we still have in Europe. We are prosperous, secure and free but we prefer to base our views on past experiences. In this regard, let us take a look at NATO and examine to what extent the alliance’s endurance is instrumental in perpetuating our thinking and keeping us from turning the page.

**NATO as an Optical Illusion**

At the venerable age of sixty-plus, NATO is very much alive and kicking. Over the last decades its agenda has broadened significantly and the alliance is operationally more active than ever before. Its membership has grown to 28 and there are still a number of aspirant countries in its waiting rooms. For most European countries, NATO remains the cornerstone of their security policies. Since it was established in 1949, NATO’s original purpose has been twofold: to deter the Soviet Union and to allow for European integration. Since at least twenty years, almost half of the entire Cold War period, the Soviet threat has
gone and European integration has resulted in a Union that claims global prominence on its own. In this respect, NATO has been a resounding success.

The sudden demise of the Soviet bloc caught the world by surprise, so no wonder at the time the alliance did not contemplate disbanding itself. And given its continuation, it would have been politically impossible to reject newly independent countries' wishes for accession. And yes, it took NATO to intervene in the Yugoslav civil war, be it belatedly in Bosnia and controversially in Kosovo. But it is obvious that the original gist has been taken out of the alliance, and judging by the arduous strategy debate it has not been replaced by a successor gist. In essence, NATO has been and is changing from a single-minded military alliance into a multi-purpose platform enabling countries to cultivate their bilateral ties with the USA. That is why it will prove impossible to erect a European pillar within NATO, as some commentators suggest should be done. Why else would recently acceded member states, apparently not trustful of NATO’s consensus machinery in Article 5 situations, be lobbying so actively with the US for additional security guarantees? And would most allies send their units into Afghanistan because they feel their national security is at stake in the Hindu Kush or because they want to curry favour with Washington? When in February 2010 the Dutch coalition government fell over the extension of its Uruzgan mission, the first question raised was whether this implied that the Netherlands would be kicked out of the economic G20 forum.

Of course, it makes sense for countries to ally themselves with the world’s foremost power, and only for that reason NATO will continue to exist for some time to come. But increasingly, the de facto EU-US-NATO triangle is becoming untenable. On the one hand, sustaining US-led NATO as Europe’s primary security forum at the end of the day runs counter to EU ambitions in the field of foreign and security policy. On the other hand it ties Europe to a more global US security agenda that, deep down, it does not subscribe to and that it is certainly not willing to shoulder financially. Finally, as long as Europe remains a function of US security policy, this will put a curb on its ability to forge comprehensive partnerships with third parties.

Revamping the Transatlantic Relationship
The transatlantic relationship, North America’s partnership with Europe, is still the world’s most vital economic, strategic and political bond, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The question is, however, whether NATO should remain its ultimate embodiment, or whether this relationship should be remoulded and based on a broad and new strategic EU-US partnership, including provisions on security and defence such as a mutual assistance clause. Such a recalibrated partnership would leave room for differences in approach and be more informal in nature, while not necessarily always involving all 27 EU members, but still important when crises erupt. We have seen
examples of this kind of cooperation on Iran, with the EU3 teaming up with the US, and the Middle East, where the EU sits next to the USA, the UN and Russia in the Quartet: both cases that do not allow for direct NATO involvement.

**Good Old NATO**

Critics will maintain that we cannot do without NATO’s unique capabilities, in terms of joint planning and interoperability. No other organization but NATO can conduct an operation like ISAF, the argument runs. But in many respects ISAF is a revealing operation. What we really see in Afghanistan is an able and willing coalition that runs the demanding southern and eastern regional commands, and a host of other countries doing something else in the more benign provinces. Out of ISAF’s 46 contributors, non-NATO member Australia seamlessly joins combat operations in the South, while NATO member Germany is carrying out its national stabilization operation in the north, steered by the Bundestag rather than by NATO. None of these countries would be able to sustain their operations without US enablers. So it is rather the US, and not necessarily NATO, which is pivotal within ISAF.

Trading NATO for the EU-USA does not mean doing away with the *acquis atlantique*, but it would mean doing away with a top-heavy alliance that served its purpose well but increasingly stirs unease in Europe, while becoming less relevant to Washington – even if the newest US National Security Strategy routinely speaks of NATO as the *pre-eminence security alliance in the world today*. NATO, or Europe, is nowhere as central in US security thinking as many Europeans like to believe. When 9/11 occurred, invoking the alliance’s Article 5 only came as an afterthought. Paradoxically, this trend may be reinforced under a less traditionally inclined president Obama, no matter how enthusiastically his inauguration was celebrated in Europe. Moreover, building a new relationship with the USA which is more balanced than it is now would likely stimulate Europe to further boost its post-Second World War integration process.

**Third Parties**

Last but not least, a new transatlantic partnership more firmly based on both participants’ autonomy would enable the EU, but also the USA, to review their relations with third parties. Take, for example, Russia. Among other reasons, the EU-Russia relationship, important because of the density of trade, investment and energy links but marred by endless negotiations on a new strategic agreement, is held back because of Moscow’s frustration that it cannot discuss security with the EU, which tends to refer to NATO instead. As long as Europe labels NATO as its primary security organization, Moscow is likely to regard the EU’s neighbourhood policies as affiliated with the alliance’s enlargement agenda, given the expressed synergies between these two ‘Euro-Atlantic organizations’. More broadly speaking, the outside world will look at Europe as a more serious interlocutor as it depends less on US security.
guarantees. Sticking to the Russia example, the US, lacking the economic dimension in its relationship with Moscow, is perfectly capable of concluding deals on strategic issues, such as the recent START agreement on nuclear arsenals. But many, not all, of the bilateral irritants concern Europe and are NATO related. It is probably no coincidence that Russian compliance with START has been made dependent on missile defence developments in Europe.

**Long Term and Big Ifs**

Without any doubt, a process away from NATO and towards an EU-US framework, including reserved seats for NATO’s non-EU members, would be a long-term affair, more likely to be driven by crises than to evolve in a linear fashion. But no matter what, we will have to start preparing ourselves for a changing environment, not so much from a European believer’s point of view but simply from a realist angle. It looks like fixed alliances have had their day and will give way to more informal partnerships. Right now, there is not a single operation that NATO conducts on its own, and it is highly unlikely the alliance ever will. And the EU is trying to develop its ‘permanent structured cooperation’, meant to create core groups of member states sharing higher security and defence ambitions.

It goes without saying that such developments depend on major ifs. The most fundamental question in this regard would be whether the European project, which does not have a given end state, will proceed. In other words: will Europeans trust each other, or themselves for that matter, to the degree that they will carry on accomplishing this essentially political project, current predicaments notwithstanding? Or does Europe still need the USA as an institutionalized security provider to keep it from lapsing back into bad European habits?

These questions defy simple answers. But global trends seem to lead Europe towards more integration rather than less. Were Europe to fail in mustering the vision and will to seize this opportunity, then at least its much debated *finalité politique* will be known and will oblige us to settle for a more modest outcome of the European project. Maybe Europe will survive as a glorified economic union protected by the USA through NATO. But alliances are not made for eternity, and the chances are that at some point the USA, due to conflicting interests and competing distractions, may earmark more worthy destinations for its security investments and troop deployments than Europe. So the EU had better prepare itself to rise to the occasion. There is no convincing reason to assume that in the 21st century Europe can do without more traditional instruments of power to protect its interests in the world. If someone else will not provide these, Europe will have to do so itself.

In order to get there, it is imperative that Europe starts thinking and acting more politically. Sometimes it does, for instance during the summer of 2008
when on behalf of the EU French president Sarkozy jumped in to broker a ceasefire agreement between Russia and Georgia. The EU should then overcome its internal divide between those who do conceive of the EU principally as a political idea, and those who consider the Union first and foremost as a technocratic device, with strict rules that must be obeyed at all times. If the latter school of thought prevails, it will keep the EU from doing what is politically sensible, such as inviting Turkey to join the Union. Apart from the fact that it concerns an economically vibrant energy hub with a young population, taking this moderate Muslim country on board will reap huge benefits from a security point of view, for instance in dealing with the Middle East. The EU, although largely being framed in an idealistic manner, should then start engaging more in power politics as well. If one wants to leave a mark on the global stage, human rights strategies will not suffice, certainly not when national interests will be more brazenly pursued by others. A reconfiguration of Europe’s security ties with the USA might just provide the impetus needed for a reality check of Europe's strategic outlook.

A managed realignment of transatlantic forces would of course be an enormous tour de force, for which there seem to be few, if any, historical precedents – a reconfiguration of US-Japanese ties may be a case in point. Taking into account Europe’s inclination for introversion and a lack of bold visions, (e.g., Project Europe 2030, 2010) such a process may very well have to be kick-started by the USA. Once this happens, it may provide the blessing in disguise allowing old Europe to come of age in the new world.

References
Chapter 16. NATO in 2029: Retired or Rejuvenated?

Nienke de Deugd

The fall of the Berlin Wall, the revolutions that took place in many of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union all clearly signalled the end of the period of the Cold War. At the same time, the epochal events that took place on the European continent in the late 1980s and early 1990s marked the dawn of an era in which several new challenges, for example with regard to the role and membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), presented themselves.

There were many who believed that NATO lost its raison d’être when the threat of the communist bloc disappeared and the Warsaw Pact seized to exist. With the Soviet empire, or ‘evil empire’ as it was characterized by former US president Ronald Reagan, gone, was it not also time for the Alliance to dissolve itself? NATO tried to address this concern by developing new strategic concepts and becoming involved in out-of-area operations – such as the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. But these missions could not silence those who questioned the enduring relevance of the Alliance to a changing world.

As discussions about the role of NATO were raging, so was the debate about its membership. When the Iron Curtain was removed, many of the former Soviet satellite states and even some of the former Soviet republics expressed their desire to join the Alliance. To the countries from Central and Eastern Europe, NATO had lost none of its attraction. On the contrary: it represented the best guarantee against renewed Russian attempts to expand its sphere of influence. Eastward expansion, however, did not prove to be the definitive answer to the issue of membership. The differences between old member states and new ones – in terms of military capabilities, structure and organization – were considerable, several countries were wait-listed for membership and the Russian Federation was increasingly unhappy about the presence of NATO in what it believed to be its own ‘near abroad’.

When taking matters pertaining to the membership of NATO into consideration and combining them with concerns about its role, questions about the future of the Alliance arise. What will NATO look like in 2029, when it is supposed to celebrate its 80th birthday? Will there have been further rounds of enlargement by granting membership to countries from the Western Balkans and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or will the process of eastward expansion have been halted and perhaps even been reversed? Has the Alliance managed to silence those who question its continued significance to the post-Cold War world by becoming ever more active in peace-keeping,
peace-building and peace-enforcing operations or will the process of finding new tasks have come to a full-stop and maybe even been overturned?

In the underlying contribution, questions regarding the future of NATO are addressed by building scenarios. In a scenario-building exercise, the trends that are considered to be of special significance in shaping the development of the subject-at-hand in the years to come are brought together in a single framework, thereby painting a picture of what the future may look like. When building different scenarios by making use of different trends, different options present themselves; an exercise that allows for the development of a perspective that is broader in scope than the one that would follow from simply envisioning current trends to continue indefinitely. In short, a scenario-building exercise is helpful in creating awareness not of that what is likely to happen, but of that what is possible.

In the scenarios that can be built with regard to the future of the Alliance, two trends are of importance: NATO’s role in a changing world and its membership. For the purpose of this chapter, these two trends will be used to build two different scenarios. In the first scenario, entitled ‘Retirement’, NATO in 2029 is still struggling to reinvent its raison d’être, to deal with Russia’s quest for influence in Central and Eastern Europe and to close the debate on possible new waves of enlargement. By contrast, in the second scenario, entitled ‘Rejuvenation’, NATO in 2029 is without a doubt the world’s most important security organization, with a clear sense of purpose and an unprecedented appeal to prospective member states.

Scenario 1: Retirement

With hindsight, 2010 turned out to be the beginning of the end for NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. The rising numbers of casualties among ISAF’s troops, the growing influence of the Taliban in virtually all Afghan provinces and the mounting criticism of president Hamid Karzai and his ineffective government were all signs that the Alliance’s out-of-area operation was anything but successful. The grim picture that had been painted at the start of NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan by those Russian generals who had witnessed the Soviet Union’s retreat from the country in 1989 was quickly turning into reality.

The remarks that general Stanley McChrystal made in the July 2010 issue of Rolling Stone magazine – while uncalled for and grounds for his immediate dismissal as commander of the Allied forces – reflected the unease that many within NATO came to feel about the future of ISAF (Hastings 2010). As it turned out to be impossible to fulfil the mission’s objectives, it was also difficult to justify the loss of lives and convince the public in the participating countries of the necessity of fighting a war that had no direct bearing on their own societies.

From 2011 onwards, talks about the withdrawal of the Alliance from Afghanistan intensified and efforts to increase both the quality and quantity of
the Afghan security forces were strengthened. Dismantling ISAF, however, turned out to be a very difficult and costly affair. With the authority of the central government in Kabul in question and corruption running rampant, the country’s police force and military apparatus could not be counted upon to keep the Taliban at bay and so preserve the achievements of NATO in terms of improvements to Afghanistan’s infrastructure, health care and educational system.

In the midst of the complicated process of devising a viable exit-strategy the American people in 2016 elected Sarah Palin to succeed Barack Obama as president of the United States. A fierce Republican and weary of foreign adventures the new president was quick to call for the complete extraction of all American troops from Afghanistan. By the summer of 2017 her campaign promise became a reality when the presence of the United States in Afghanistan came to a sudden and complete end. With the main Allied force no longer in play, ISAF also came to a quick and immediate end. Without the support of their biggest and most influential member state, the other NATO countries rapidly lost whatever justification they still had for participating in this out-of-area operation.

The unilateral decision from the part of the United States to retreat from Afghanistan and thus end NATO’s involvement in the region plunged the Alliance in the greatest crises it had ever witnessed. With ISAF – the longest, largest and costliest mission that the Alliance had ever undertaken – ending in disarray, there was little enthusiasm to embark upon new peace-keeping, peace-building and peace-enforcing operations. What is more, with Palin in the White House, the possibilities for American participation – crucial to the successful completion of each and every task – were limited at best.

In turn, the difficulties that NATO encountered in deciding upon which, if any, missions to embark resulted in renewed discussions about its raison d’être. After the end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the threat of the communist bloc had already given cause to much debate about this issue, but it was hoped that a solution could be found in the adoption of novel strategic concepts. However, when NATO proved incapable of fulfilling the new roles assigned to it, the relevance of the Alliance was called into question yet again.

And there were other problems that still had to be resolved. A prime example of this was NATO’s relationship with the Russian Federation. Under president Vladimir Putin (2000-2008), president Dmitri Medvedev (2008-2016) and once again Putin (2016-2024), Russia manifested itself as a great power; a great power moreover that desired to expand its sphere of influence and so regain control over its ‘near abroad’. The repeated wars with Georgia over Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, the Russian involvement in the Central-Asian republics and the attempts to influence the internal affairs of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine to its own advantage were all signs of Russia’s renewed confidence.
The NATO-Russia Council, although designed to act as “a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action”, proved unable to adequately address the aforementioned concerns (NATO, 2010). It only demonstrated the internal divisions that had come to plague the Alliance – divisions between those that favoured a pro-Russia policy and those that opposed such a strategy – and highlighted the existing problems concerning relations with third countries. For years, NATO had been talking about allowing countries from the Western Balkans to join. And there had even been talk of granting Ukraine and Georgia access to the Membership Action Plan. Yet, beset as it was with other problems, the Alliance did not make good on the promises that it had made. In fact, NATO’s hesitant attitude towards its eastern neighbours was perceived by the Russian Federation as a sign of weakness and as an implicit endorsement of its own policy of slowly but surely regaining the influence that it had lost.

The ongoing discussions about the role and membership of the Alliance were compounded by the steadily solidifying isolationist policies from the part of the United States. After two terms in office Palin was succeeded by Jeb Bush, who carried on several of his predecessor’s policies; especially in the field of foreign affairs and security. To many European countries, even those who had always been staunchly Atlanticist such as the United Kingdom and the new member states that had joined the European Union in 2004, 2007 and 2018, this was a clear signal that they had to take the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) seriously. And while the improvement of the ESDP was by no means an easy task, from 2025 onwards it became increasingly clear that the ESDP was overtaking NATO as the world’s most important security organization. The relevance of the EU to the security of the European continent and – due to the ESDP’s strong external showing – also to that of other regions was growing just as NATO’s significance was waning.

At first hesitantly, but soon more openly, people began talking about ending NATO’s suffering. As an organization that had proved itself utterly incapable of dealing with the many challenges that the post-Cold War world presented, its continued existence was called into question more and more frequently. And so it was that in London, on 4 April 2029, the Treaty on the Dissolution of NATO was signed and the Alliance was sent into retirement.

**Scenario 2: Rejuvenation**

The year 2010 turned out to be a turning point for NATO in Afghanistan. Initially it seemed as though 2010 would become a veritable *annus horribilis*: the rising numbers of casualties among ISAF’s troops, the growing influence of the Taliban in virtually all Afghan provinces and the mounting criticism of president Hamid Karzai and his ineffective government gave rise to doubts about the successful outcome of this out-of-area operation. The situation seemed to worsen even
further when *Rolling Stone* magazine profiled general Stanley McChrystal in its July 2010 issue under the heading “Stanley McChrystal, Obama’s top commander in Afghanistan, has seized control of the war by never taking his eye off the real enemy: The wimps in the White House” (Hastings 2010).

However, when McChrystal was replaced by general David Petraeus the situation began to change. Instead of urging the NATO member states to send more and more troops to Afghanistan, Petraeus focused on cooperation with the Afghan security forces. Strengthening the country’s policy force and military apparatus through various training missions became a key priority for ISAF. Also, initiatives such as the *jirga* – a traditional Afghan form of cooperation – were set up to encourage tribal chiefs to work together with moderate members of the Taliban to achieve peace and stability on the local and regional level. What is more, ISAF’s new commander focused heavily on building relations between the international donor community and the Afghan people. Only if the achievements of the previous years – in terms of improvements to the country’s infrastructure, health care and educational system – could be sustained would Afghanistan have a viable future.

By gradually shifting the responsibility for the security and prosperity of the country away from NATO and its allies, Petraeus managed to make ISAF a success. In addition, he created the much-needed room to develop a well-timed and well-executed exit-strategy. With the lessons that he had learned in Iraq firmly in mind, Petraeus was careful to not disentangle NATO from Afghanistan too quickly or abruptly. Still, president Barack Obama was able to fulfil the promise that he made during his re-election campaign and bring the American troops home by the end of his second term-in-office.

The successful completion of ISAF – NATO’s longest, largest and costliest mission ever – gave the Alliance the confidence that it needed to pursue other out-of-area adventures. In the early years of the post-Cold War period NATO was hesitant to take on new roles and become engaged in peace-keeping, peace-building and peace-enforcing operations, but in the newest version of the strategic concept (which was adopted in 2016) the pursuit of ‘ISAF-like’ missions was designated as the Alliance’s number one priority. NATO, it seemed, had reinvented its *raison d’être*.

In the following years NATO did indeed undertake several new out-of-area operations. Especially noteworthy are the peace-enforcing operations in Sudan and Congo, where NATO managed to finally put a stop to the endemic violence that had been plaguing the area for years, and the peace-building operations in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, where ethnic tensions had been crippling the entire Central-Asian region. In its dealings with the former Soviet republics, NATO established close ties of cooperation with the Russian Federation. Initially Russia was weary of involvement from its one-time Cold War adversary in what it still considered to be its own sphere of influence, but when president Vladimir Putin, who succeeded Dmitri Medvedev in 2016, realized that stability in
Central-Asia was needed to secure Russia’s unhindered access to gas and oil, relations between the two sides intensified and ameliorated.

The deepening of relations between NATO and the Russian Federation was influenced by other factors as well. President Obama and his Russian counterpart Medvedev had already decided to ‘reset’ their relations in 2009, a pledge that they later renewed in 2010. From that moment onwards, the two sides began cooperating on a host of issues, including that of Iran’s nuclear program, joint adventures in space and mutual disarmament. Presidents Putin and Hilary Clinton who was elected as President of the United States in 2016, took this process one step further by giving new impetus to the NATO-Russia Council. The NATO-Russia Council was established to act as “a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action”. In the early years of its existence, it focused mainly on consultation post facto, but later on joint decision and joint action became increasingly important. The aforementioned peace-building operations in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan testify to this.

With the relationship between Russia on the one hand and the United States and its NATO allies on the other hand steadily improving, the Alliance was presented with the opportunity to resolve yet another long-standing problem: enlargement. When the Soviet empire collapsed, the countries from Central and Eastern Europe lost no time in declaring their desire to ‘return to Europe’ and gain membership of NATO. For several countries in the region this desire became a reality, but by the beginning of the 21st century there were still many countries in the Western Balkans and the CIS that were waiting to be admitted.

When Vaira Fike-Vreiberga from Latvia succeeded Anders Fogh Rasmussen to become the first Secretary-General from a country that had previously belonged to the ‘other’ side of the Iron Curtain, enlargement regained a prominent position on NATO’s agenda. With Russian opposition to eastward expansion muted by the positive experience of cooperation in Central-Asia, the Alliance invited many countries from South-eastern and Eastern Europe to join. Here, what was helpful was the fact that the aspiring member states had used the long waiting-period to bring their military organizations both in quantitative and qualitative terms, in line with those of the older member states. And what made enlargement even more palatable was the fact that Ukraine and Georgia were contented to be part of NATO’s New Neighbourhood Initiative – the Alliance’s version of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership that granted far-reaching cooperation without actual membership.

With the issue of membership of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe out of the way, the ties with the Russian Federation on a higher level than ever before and the Alliance able and willing to take on out-of-area operations, NATO had managed to resolve the problems that it encountered when the Cold War came to a sudden end. The Alliance had proven itself
capable of dealing with the many challenges that the post-Cold War world presented. Its continued existence was no longer called into question. And so it was that in London, on April 4th 2029, a rejuvenated NATO celebrated its 80th birthday.

**NATO in 2029: Retired or Rejuvenated?**

When building different scenarios with regard to the future of NATO, there are two trends that are of importance: NATO’s role in a changing world and its membership. When bringing these elements together in a single framework, various pictures of what the Alliance may look like in 2029 emerge. For the purpose of the underlying chapter, two of these pictures have been sketched in more detail. In the first scenario, entitled ‘Retirement’, NATO is finding it difficult to reinvent its *raison d’être*, to deal with Russia’s quest for influence in the countries from Central and Eastern Europe and to close the debate on yet other waves of enlargement. By contrast, in the second scenario, entitled ‘Rejuvenation’, the Alliance is without a doubt the world’s most important security organization, with a clear sense of purpose and an unprecedented appeal to prospective member states.

Admittedly, both scenarios seem rather far-fetched. It is difficult to imagine a world where NATO has lost all relevance and has simply ceased to exist. It is equally difficult to envision an Alliance that happily agrees to more member states and to more out-of-area operations. It seems so much easier to envision a future that is similar to the present. However, if the history of NATO has taught us anything, it is that unexpected events will happen: the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union being cases in point. Throughout the more than 60 years of its existence, the Alliance has seen its share of unexpected twists and turns.

This is where the two scenarios come into play. From one extreme to the other, both scenarios paint a picture in which NATO is an actor that, for better or worse, shapes its own destiny and that provides answers to new and unforeseen questions. Of course, this is not to say that the events depicted in both scenarios are *likely* to happen, but it is to say that they are *possible*. When thinking about the future, one is well-advised to develop a perspective that is broader in scope than the view that one would derive from simply envisioning current trends to continue indefinitely; and that is exactly what a scenario-building exercise is all about.

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Curriculum Vitae Peter M.E. Volten

Education


Free University of Amsterdam, M.A. in Political Science, 1974.

Posts Held

January 1994-present  Professor of International Relations and International Organization at the University of Groningen and Director of the Centre for European Security Studies

July 1992-Autumn 1993  Senior Vice President IEWS and Director of the Netherlands IEWS Center.

June 1989-July 1992  Director of Research, Institute for EastWest Security Studies (IEWS)

1984-July 1989  Professor of the History of War, University of Utrecht

1987-July 1989  Director of Studies and Strategic Planning, Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands

1985-1987  Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute of International Relations; on leave from the Ministry of Defence

1977-1985  Senior Staff Member, Directorate of General Policy Affairs, Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands

1975-1977  Visiting Scholar, Stanford University, research on Soviet security and defence policy

Personal

Married to Karin Deen. They have four children: Sander, Anne-Marie, Sonja and Robert.
Publications

Articles


**Book Chapters**


Books - monographies - editorial books


GREENWOOD PAPERS


23. Peter M.E. Volten, Perceptions and Misperceptions in the EU and Turkey: Stumbling Blocks on the Road to Accession, October 2009, €19 (incl. postage).


Special Issues

Ivanka Nedeva and Joost Herman (eds), Minorities and Foreign Policy, November 1998, €14 (incl. postage).

Herman W. Hoen, and others, Governance Structures in Central and Eastern Europe, September 2000, €14 (incl. postage).