Contributions of Track Two to Peacemaking:
Assessing the Contingency Model

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Abstract

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Interactive Conflict Resolution in the form of problem-solving workshops has been at the center of the relationship between Track One and Track Two Diplomacy for the past four decades. A contingency model of third party intervention provides one framework for articulating the potential complementarity of unofficial and official processes toward the resolution of international conflict. This paper provides a comparative analysis of five cases of successful unofficial interventions in ethnopolitical conflicts at the elite or influential level that made important contributions to the overall peace process. While the analysis provides some support for the validity and utility of the contingency model, the variations in the patterns of intervention also indicate that strict applications of the model are not tenable.
Introduction

The theory and practice of third party intervention in international conflict continues to develop in constructive and impressive directions (Fisher 2001; Kriesberg 2001; Bercovitch 2002). As the scope and nature of both official and unofficial interventions continue to expand, scholars work to identify and document the various forms, and to conceptualize about the relationship among these variants and aspects of conflict, with a view to increasing applicability and effectiveness (Crocker, Hampson et al. 1999; Kelman and Fisher 2003). While research on traditional forms of mediation continues to move forward, there is also growing acknowledgement that unofficial interventions, such as problem-solving workshops and dialogue sessions, also have their place in the overall scheme of third party work. For example, Crocker et al (1999) in their groundbreaking work on multi-party mediation, identify and describe “social-psychological approaches” alongside the more established “structuralist paradigm of mediation.” These approaches are said to be directed more toward processes of interaction that change attitudes and perceptions, and allow parties to explore options and develop solutions outside of the charged arena of formal negotiations. In contrast, the structuralist paradigm is based in an objective, cost-benefit analysis and uses persuasion, inducements and disincentives to lead parties toward a negotiated settlement. These distinctions bear some similarity to those offered in an earlier contrast between traditional mediation and the unofficial method of third party consultation (Fisher and Keashley 1988). In essence, mediation involves the use of reasoning, persuasion, the suggestion of alternatives and at times the application of leverage in order to facilitate a negotiated settlement on the substantive issues in the conflict. By contrast, third party consultation focuses on the perceptual, attitudinal and relationship aspects of the conflict, with a view to facilitating mutual analysis and joint problem solving that will engender a settlement within the context of an improved relationship. While the acknowledgement of newer and more innovative forms of third party intervention in the mediation literature is encouraging, it should not blur the distinctions among various methods which operate with different assumptions, values, roles and objectives.

Many of the newer, unofficial methods of third party intervention are captured under the rubric of “Interactive Conflict Resolution” defined in the first instance as “small-group problem-solving discussions between unofficial representatives of parties engaged in destructive conflict, facilitated by an impartial third party of social-scientist practitioners (Fisher 1993). This focused form of Interactive Conflict Resolution is most strongly associated with the problem-solving workshop pioneered by John Burton, Herbert Kelman and others, and shows many similarities with related methods, such as sustained dialogue developed by Harold Saunders and his colleagues and the psychodynamic approach associated with Vamik Volkan and other psychoanalytic practitioners. In addition, a variety of interactive methods in dialogue, training and cooperation have also grown up, leading to a broader definition of Interactive Conflict Resolution as “facilitated face-to-face activities in communication, training, education, or consultation that promote collaborative conflict analysis and problem solving among parties engaged in protracted conflict in a manner that addresses basic human needs and promotes the building of peace, justice, and equality (Fisher 1997). Over the past forty years, the focused form of ICR working mainly at the elite level has demonstrated its applicability and utility in addressing destructive and apparently intractable conflicts
between identity groups and states (Fisher 2005). At the same time, activities coming under the broader definition have experienced a virtual explosion in the provision of conflict resolution services, particularly at the grassroots and mid-level of societies engaged in protracted conflicts (e.g., European Centre for Conflict Prevention 1999).

The design of the problem-solving workshop involves bringing together influential yet unofficial representatives of the parties for informal discussions to open up communication, facilitate a joint analysis of sources and dynamics of the conflict, and create directions and options for its resolution that are fed into official policy making and/or negotiations. The workshops offer a noncommittal, low-risk forum for the exchange of perspectives, a mutual diagnosis of the conflict, and the creation of innovative options worthy of consideration in the official domain. Hence, the potential for transfer of various effects from unofficial or track two diplomacy to official or track one interactions has long been identified with the methodology. Burton saw the method as focusing on the underlying causes of the conflict and the relationship between the parties, and proposed that such interactions should occur prior to negotiations to provide analyses and options that would then directly lead to the negotiation of administrative arrangements for resolving the conflict (Burton 1969). (Kelman 1972) was the first to seriously discuss the challenge of transfer, and distinguished the individual changes that participants experienced as a result of the workshop from the influence of these changes on the policy making process through the subsequent behavior of the participants. He proposed that the ideal participants are those who are in a position to evaluate and influence policy, although their role is not to formulate or implement it, as such individuals would be more committed to existing policy and less likely to change their minds. Kelm and his colleague Stephen Cohen were also the first to identify the multiple points at which problem-solving workshops could make contributions to the negotiation process, indicating that useful inputs could occur prior to negotiations to test the feasibility of talks, and during the negotiations to work on particularly thorny issues and on long range issues to be addressed once settlement is reached (Kelman and Cohen 1976). The potential range of contributions now claimed by the method is summarized by (Fisher In Press a):

As a prenegotiation method, the problem-solving workshop can examine barriers to negotiation, help to create the conditions for negotiation, and develop joint actions that support entering into negotiations. As a paranegotiation intervention, problem-solving workshops can diagnose obstacles that arise in negotiations, analyze particularly difficult issues, and shed light on topics that are a focus of future negotiations. As a postnegotiation supplement, workshops can help parties develop cooperative attitudes and create plans for the implementation of agreements, and can engender reconciliation between enemies so that resolution is ultimately achieved (p. 14).

The proponents of problem-solving workshops thus make a strong case for the complementarity of these unofficial interventions with formal peace processes, particularly negotiations. While the track-two work is not seen as a substitute for official interactions, it is regarded as supplemental, and in cases of intractable identity conflict,
may in fact be essential to resolution. Most of the emphasis in complementarity has been placed on the prenegotiation phase and to some degree in the earlier stages of negotiation, where it is deemed that unofficial interventions can make important if not necessary contributions. Along with Kelman (1992) and others, (Fisher 1989) has provided an explicit rationale for why problem-solving workshops can help prepare the way for negotiations. The individual changes that participants typically experience in workshops include more accurate and differentiated perceptions and attitudes, particularly toward the other party, more open and accurate communication, increased trust, and a cooperative orientation, all of which prepare the way for a changed relationship. The critical element, however, is a perceptual shift in the parties’ thinking that now provides for the possibility that negotiations are in fact possible and may bear fruit. Such a reorientation also provides a basis for sustaining negotiations through difficult times once they are underway. The considerable challenge in the transfer process is for participants with changed attitudes and orientations to convince decision makers that a perceptual shift and a move to cooperative, bilateral behavior are both realistic and profitable in terms of addressing the costs of the conflict. For this to happen, a continuing series of workshops with many of the same high level influential is likely necessary in order to support the related shift in group norms supporting cooperative moves that needs to take place in decision making circles.

The potential complementarity of different methods was a driving force in the creation of the contingency model of third party intervention by Fisher and Keashly, which attempts to link types of intervention to the stages of conflict escalation (Fisher and Keashly 1990; Fisher and Keashly 1991). The rationale underlying the model is that conflict is a mix of objective and subjective elements, with the latter gaining in importance as conflict escalates, and that both aspects must be dealt with for de-escalation and resolution to occur. It is further posited that different interventions are differentially equipped to deal with subjective and objective elements, and forms of interventions can therefore be matched to levels of escalation where they can play the most useful lead role in addressing the conflict and starting the de-escalation process. Other interventions would then follow in sequence to move the conflict to resolution.

A four stage model of conflict escalation was created by drawing on previous work in the field to identify four stages which demonstrate changes in the nature of communication and interaction between the parties, the parties’ perceptions of the other and of the relationship, the predominant issues, the perceived potential outcomes, and the method of management deemed appropriate (see figure 1). Briefly, as conflict escalates communication moves from direct discussion and debate to interpreting deeds rather than words, to threats and ultimately direct attacks, i.e., violence. In terms of perceptions, accurate images are replaced with increasingly pejorative stereotypes, and the relationship moves from one of respect and trust to one of disrespect, mistrust and ultimately hopelessness. The emphasis on issues shifts from substantive interests to concerns regarding the relationship, to basic human needs, and ultimately to existential concerns about group survival. Concurrently, the perceived possible outcomes move from joint gain to compromises through win-lose payoffs to lose-lose consequences. Accordingly, the parties adopt increasingly adversarial and destructive strategies, shifting from joint decision making and negotiation through defensive competition to unilateral, coercive behaviors designed to inflict damage on the other.
The development of the taxonomy of third party interventions for use in the contingency model was approached by Fisher and Keashly (1990) by drawing on literature at both the domestic and international levels, neither of which demonstrated much consistency in the use of terminology. The problem-solving workshop and related methods were captured under the label of third party consultation, which generally represents work following the focused definition of Interactive Conflict Resolution. Third party methods were distinguished by their overall purpose, the attention given to objective versus subjective factors in conflict, and by the degree of control exercised by the third party over both the process and the outcomes of the interaction. These considerations produced a six item taxonomy, which has been concisely described and slightly revised by Fisher (2001):

**Conciliation** in which a trusted third party provides an informal communication link between the antagonists for the purposes of identifying the issues, lowering tension and encouraging direct interaction, usually negotiation.

**Consultation** in which the third party works to facilitate creative problem solving through communication and analysis using human relations skills and social-scientific understanding of conflict etiology and dynamics.

**Pure Mediation** in which the third party attempts to facilitate a negotiated settlement on substantive issues through the use of reasoning, persuasion, the control of information and the suggestion of alternatives.

**Power Mediation** which includes pure mediation but goes beyond to include the use of leverage or coercion by the mediator in the form of promised rewards or threatened punishments, and may involve the third party as a monitor and guarantor of the agreement.

**Arbitration** wherein the third party provides a binding judgement arrived at by considering the merits of the opposing positions and imposing a settlement deemed to be fair and just.

**Peacekeeping** in which the third party provides military personnel to monitor a ceasefire or an agreement between antagonists and may engage in humanitarian activities to restore normalcy in concert with civilian personnel who may also assist in political decision making processes such as elections (p. 11).

The idea of matching third party interventions to levels of conflict escalation had previously been expressed in the organizational conflict management literature, particularly in the work of (Glasl 1982). The contingency model built on this thinking by proposing that the most appropriate lead intervention be matched to the stage of conflict escalation, and then be followed by further interventions to de-escalate the conflict and ultimately move it to resolution (see figure 2). Ideally, this would involve not only the sequencing of different types of interventions, but coordination among the third party actors in order to maximize the complementarity of their interventions (Fisher In Press b). Of particular interest in the model are the potential points of complementarity between mediation and third party consultation, the first of which occurs at the second stage of polarization. In this instance, the conflict has begun to exhibit a breakdown in
communication, perceptions and images have become distorted and simplified, relationship issues of trust and respect are moving to the fore, and the parties are having difficulty dealing with their substantive issues through negotiation. As a lead intervention, consultation or problem-solving workshops can be used to ameliorate the subjective difficulties, thereby allowing the parties to re-enter negotiations. Alternatively, it might be necessary for consultation to be followed by a mediation intervention of the pure variety in order to address the substantive issues, which may still be beyond the reach of the parties given the escalation that occurred. Thus, consultation in this instance can serve a useful pre-mediation function, in line with the rationale for prenegotiation effectiveness (Fisher and Keashly, 1991).

A second point of complementarity occurs in the third stage of segregation, where it is proposed that a powerful form of third party intervention in the form of arbitration or power mediation is required to arrest the escalation process. If a settlement on some or all of the substantive issues can be attained through the use of leverage (or a ruling of arbitration which is woefully absent at the international level), then some breathing room to work on subjective factors is created. Consultation in the form of problem-solving workshops, along with other forms of track two diplomacy to positively influence public opinion, would be helpful in addressing the perceptual and relationship issues between the parties. Further consultation and mediation efforts would also be necessary to address additional substantive issues and/or the many difficulties in implementation that must be overcome for resolution to occur. The second point of complementarity can also occur at the fourth stage of destruction, where violent and destructive behavior first needs to be controlled through peacekeeping, typically initiated by a mediated ceasefire agreement between the parties. Here, consultation can follow peacekeeping directly, or might also follow arbitration or power mediation in a fashion similar to that of stage three. In either case, consultation is now directed toward deeper conflict analysis in addition to relationship improvement, in order to unearth the underlying fears and frustrated basic needs which are driving the conflict toward intractability. In most protracted ethnopolitical conflicts it is likely that this analysis will reveal the importance of development aid as a third party intervention to deal with structural inequities and address issues of equality and distributive justice. Thus, the contingency model proposes an essential role for informal, problem-solving methods alongside established forms of diplomacy in order to fully address the complexity of violent ethnopolitical conflict.

The purpose of the present paper is to examine a number of cases in which track-two interventions in the form of problem-solving workshops or related methods are generally agreed to have made important contributions to peacemaking. The cases are drawn from a larger analysis of such contributions, and represent violent ethnopolitical conflicts of both an intrastate and interstate nature (Fisher 2005). Following a brief description of the conflict and the official peacemaking efforts, the transfer effects from track two to track one are identified according to a model of transfer developed by (Fisher 1997). Each case is then analyzed to identify the point of complementarity between consultation and mediation or negotiation within the context of the contingency model. Through a comparative case analysis, common themes are identified and the validity of the contingency model is evaluated.

**Cases of Complementarity**

**Problem-Solving Workshops on the Indonesia-Malaysia Conflict**
The first known application of the problem-solving approach to international conflict involves the pioneering work of John Burton and his colleagues in addressing the post-colonial confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia in the mid-sixties (Mitchell 2005). Using his previous diplomatic connections, Burton was able to bring together mid-level representatives of the parties, which also included Singapore, with a third-party panel of academics who worked to engage the participants in seminar-style discussions of the conflict. Over a number of sessions, misperceptions were corrected, motives and costs were reassessed, and policy options were developed which essentially formed the framework of an agreement. Along with political and other realities on the ground, the intervention is regarded as making an important contribution to the peace agreement in 1966.

The conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia arose primarily over disputed territories in the wake of British decolonization in the area, fuelled somewhat by ideological differences related to Indonesia’s neutrality in the Cold War and its resentment of Western imperialism. A proposal to create a Malaysian federation in 1961, which would include not only Singapore but also Sarawak and Sabah, was strongly resisted by Indonesia which had its own ambitions to the latter territories as part of its federation. Armed rebellion in the disputed territories in 1962 was supported by Indonesia, but was put down by Malaysia with British assistance, although incursions across the border continued with Indonesian support. Indonesia mounted an intense political campaign to stop the formation of the Malaysian federation, but a UN mission ascertained that previous referenda in the territories had expressed a desire to join the federation and it was officially declared in September of 1963. Indonesia denounced the declaration and proceeded with economic sanctions against Malaysia and the seizure of Malaysian property in Indonesia. The border incursions intensified with the increasing involvement of Indonesian “volunteers.” British troops in the border areas were reinforced, and in early 1964 Malaysia announced a general mobilization of all men in their twenties. Indonesia responded with a nation-wide mobilization of its own, and in late 1964, mounted an airborne and seaborne invasion of Malaysian territory. The dispute was taken to the United Nations, but a resolution against the use of force was vetoed by the Soviet Union and in early 1965 Indonesia withdrew from the UN over the granting of membership to Malaysia. Hostilities continued through 1965, and it was clear that the conflict was moving into a period of stalemate and potential intractability.

During the period of escalation, a number of official intervention efforts ended in failure (Mitchell, 2005). The government of the Philippines engaged in mediation in 1963 and 1964, holding a series of meetings in Manila followed by one in Tokyo, but all to no avail. The United States in the person of then Attorney General Robert Kennedy undertook mediation in early 1964 and achieved a temporary ceasefire on the border hostilities, but unfortunately a wider agreement was not forthcoming and hostilities resumed. The government of Thailand was successful in arranging another ceasefire in 1964 along with a later withdrawal of Indonesian forces from northern Borneo, but was not able to address the conflict in its entirety. Japan also played a small role in arranging a high level meeting in 1963, but was unable to bring together a similar meeting in 1965. The then British Prime Minister Harold Wilson was also not able to bring the parties together for a proposed mediation in London in autumn of 1965, and it appeared that the conflict had become immune to traditional diplomatic methods of management.
In the face of stalemate and track-one failure, John Burton took the bold step of requesting approval from Harold Wilson for the holding of quiet, informal discussions and letters of invitation were sent to the three heads of government (including Singapore which had broken away from the Malaysian federation) to nominate representatives. Positive responses resulted in the holding of a five day session in December of 1965, followed by five shorter sessions throughout the spring and early summer of 1966. The third party panel was composed mainly of academics, but included members with expertise in small group dynamics as well as some regional experts. The approach of the panel was to facilitate a “social science analysis” of the conflict, to allow free discussion by the participants, and to move from analysis to the creation of options that might address the conflict. During this process, misperceptions were challenged, motivations and fears were probed, the costs and benefits of the conflict were assessed, and “what if” ideas were floated for reactions. The utility of the process was affirmed when the parties decided to continue the meetings early in the New Year, during which time the locus of power in Indonesia also began to shift away from those favoring continued confrontation to those looking for a way out. The series of brief, typically one day sessions between January and June of 1966 saw the introduction of British and Australian representatives into the meetings in order to elaborate on intentions that were of interest to the participants, and an increasingly prenegotiation cast to the intervention, in that points of agreement were identified. The fifth meeting in mid-March roughly coincided with the transfer of power in Indonesia from President Sukarno to General Suharto, which led to the resumption of official talks culminating in a peace agreement in May. The workshop convened for one last time in early June, and most of the panel and participants agreed that the sessions had made a contribution to the achievement of peace.

In terms of the transfer of positive effects from track two to track one in this case, my recent analysis indicates that the targets of transfer were the leaderships of the conflicting parties, which is congruent with Burton’s theory of practice (Fisher 2005). The mechanisms of transfer were personal communications from the representatives of the parties through various intermediaries to the leaders and one assumes their policy advisors. With respect to transfer effects, the categories of analysis distinguished cognitive changes (e.g., realizations or improved attitudes), creative ideas or cognitive products (e.g., directions, options, recommendations), substantive products (e.g., joint statements of principles, written proposals), relationship changes (e.g., increased empathy, trust and cooperation), and structural connections (e.g., participants becoming negotiators). In the Indonesia-Malaysia case, both cognitive changes and products appear to be in evidence, and a substantive product in terms of a framework for an agreement was created, although participants kept only personal notes on this and there was no joint document produced. The transfer effects are less clear on relationship changes and structural connections, but it appears that none of the participants went on to be involved in the formal negotiations. Thus, this is not a case of multiple transfer effects, but the contribution of the mutual conflict analysis and the understandings reached in the workshops, including some points of agreement, appears to have had a positive effect on official peacemaking.

Interactive Problem Solving in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The longstanding work of Herbert Kelman and his colleagues over the past thirty some years stands as one of the most continuous and well crafted unofficial third party
interventions in a major ethnopolitical conflict (Kelman 2005a). Using his model of interactive problem solving, initially based on the pioneering work of John Burton, Kelman has organized and facilitated approximately sixty workshops with Israeli and Palestinian participants of increasingly greater influence in the politics and public opinion of their respective societies. For the purposes of the present analysis, the focus is on a continuing workshop with largely the same participants that ran from November of 1990 to August 1993 (Rouhana and Kelman 1994), and was followed by a continuing working group designed to deal with particularly thorny issues that must be managed in the final status negotiations (Kelman 1995).

The roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict go back for more than a century to the birth of political Zionism and the growing Jewish presence in Palestine, which was perceived as a threat by the Arab population (Kelman 2005a). Intergroup violence began in the 1920s and was accelerated by the failed United Nations partition plan and the establishment of Israel in 1948, leading to the first war between Israel and its Arab neighbors, which resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees. Subsequent wars in 1956, 1967, and 1973 established Israeli dominance, with the 1967 war resulting in the acquisition of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in addition to the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. This war also brought about the Palestinianization of the Arab-Israeli conflict, rendering it back into a conflict between two peoples over the same land (Kelman 1988). The peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979 did not deal with the Palestinian question, and that issue became mostly the struggle of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which in the 1980s shifted its focus to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories. The first intifada or uprising in the West Bank and Gaza in the late 1980s along with the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991 convinced the parties and other actors that negotiations might be fruitful, and the Madrid and later Washington talks began under the auspices of the United States and Russia. The talks included a number of tables between Israel and her Arab neighbors, and there was also an Israeli-Palestinian table at which the PLO was formally excluded but clearly was the power behind the scenes. These talks resulted in little progress over two years, and it remained for a semi-official, back channel initiative led by Norway to produce the breakthrough of the Oslo agreement, which included mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, and articulated a set of principles for the transition to self-rule for the Palestinians.

The initiation of the first intifada signaled a more urgent phase in the conflict, and in response, Kelman, Nadim Rouhana and their colleagues organized for the first time a continuing workshop with highly influential Israelis and Palestinians for a series of five meetings from 1990 to 1993 (Rouhana and Kelman 1994; Kelman 2005a). Previous workshops had brought together influential from many roles that could have influence on both public opinion and policy making: journalists, political activists or leaders, academics, directors of think tanks, political advisors, former diplomats, parliamentarians, and so on. The high level of the influential invited for the continuing workshop is shown by the fact that when the official Madrid talks began, four of the six initial Palestinian participants became key members of the Palestinian negotiating team, and when Labor came to power in Israel in 1992, several of the Israeli participants were appointed to ambassadorial and cabinet positions. The focus of the continuing workshop was adapted to changes on the ground and in the official peace process, as shown by the
replacement of some participants when official talks began and by the shift from analyzing obstacles to starting negotiations to dealing with difficulties confronting the peace process.

Kelman (1995; 2005) maintains that his third party intervention, with an emphasis on the continuing workshop, evidences three primary ways of making a contribution to the evolution of the peace process that laid the foundation for the Oslo accord, which many take as a significant and now squandered milestone in the potential resolution of the conflict. First, the development of cadres on both sides of individuals experienced in respectful and analytical communication enabled their movement into official roles in the discussions and negotiations that led to the Oslo breakthrough. Second, the information sharing and formulation of new ideas on the analysis and resolution of the conflict yielded important substantive inputs into the political discourse and into negotiations. Third, the workshops, along with similar interventions, fostered a political atmosphere that was conducive to negotiations and to a new relationship between the parties, including a sense of mutual reassurance and the realization of the possibility that there is a way out of the conflict.

The analysis of transfer effects in this case (Fisher 2005), indicates that Kelman’s work involved multiple targets of transfer (political leaders, negotiators, governmental-bureaucratic constituencies, public-political constituencies) and multiple mechanisms of transfer (personal contacts, briefings, writings, speeches, interviews), and yielded transfer effects in most coding categories, including cognitive changes in the view of the conflict and the other party, cognitive products such as new directions or options, relationship changes among participants that evidenced some influence on the wider relationship, and structural connections wherein numerous participants moved into highly influential roles in the peace process, particularly official and semi-official negotiations. At the same time, the analysis identified the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as relatively low in receptivity to intervention, given its highly intractable nature, contentious goals of segregation rather than integration, and a double minority situation which compensates for the power asymmetry between the principal parties. It is therefore not surprising that the conflict has slid back into mutual and protracted destructiveness.

Sustained Dialogue in the Tajikistan Conflict

One of the most impressive unofficial interventions in internal conflict is represented by the long term engagement of Harold Saunders and his colleagues in the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan, which experienced a bloody civil war in 1992-93 followed by continuing unrest (Saunders 1999). Drawing on their experience gained in the Dartmouth Conference, particularly the Regional Conflicts Task Force, Saunders and his American and Russian co-facilitators organized a series of interactive sessions following a carefully constructed model of sustained dialogue. The sessions brought together high level influential from the government and opposition sides of the conflict, and made numerous contributions to the formal negotiation process, reconciliation among the antagonists, and the building of a civil society in the country (Saunders 2005a).

Following its declaration of independence in 1991, Tajikistan descended into a destructive internal conflict composed of fractures among different ethnicities and nationalities, clan-based and regional groups, and a mix of ideologies from communist, to democratic to militant Islam (Saunders, 2005). Although clan-based regionalism was the primary focus of group identity, the conflict essentially became a struggle for power
which coalesced around supporters of the former communist regime and a collection of fragmented opposition groups. Fraudulent elections in late 1991 brought a communist-dominated government to power, which used harsh measures to counter the growing unrest. Opposition forces were able to enter into a coalition government in May of 1992 and gained control in September of 1992, but were unable to assert their authority in all regions of the country. Following the failure of attempted coalition governments, the country slid into civil war, with the supporters of the former communist order gaining the upper hand, in part with the assistance of Russian forces. As armed conflict engulfed the country, there were significant casualties (estimates vary from 25,000 to 200,000) and massive displacements of hundreds of thousands of refugees.

Saunders and his colleagues initiated their dialogue intervention in March of 1993 during the height of the civil war. The official UN sponsored peace negotiations got underway in April of 1994 and were able to reinforce a ceasefire which had partly been implemented by Russian troops in October of 1993 in the role of peacekeepers. A comprehensive peace agreement was signed in 1997, with a new constitution in 1994, and legitimate elections and a series of agreements being stepping stones along the way. The 1997 accord also established a National Reconciliation Commission to oversee implementation of the agreement over a transition period. For its part, the unofficial dialogue continues to this day, having held about four meetings a year over its lifetime.

The Inter-Tajik Dialogue followed the approach developed over many meetings of the Regional Conflicts Task Force, in particular, a five-stage model of sustained dialogue developed by Saunders and his Russian colleagues. (Saunders 2001) sees the dialogue approach as a public peace process within a multilevel peace process that also includes the official track, the quasi-official process and civil society. The dialogue process focuses on the human causes of the conflict and the relationship between the parties. In the first stage, influential members of the parties decide to engage, typically with the facilitation of an impartial or balanced third party, to focus on the issues that divide them. The participants map the relationship in the second stage by talking analytically rather than polemically, and move in the third stage to probe the dynamics of the relationship in terms of each side’s hopes and fears. In stage four, the participants experience the relationship by thinking together and building scenarios about how change might come about in elements of the relationship, and in the final stage, they take practical action steps to implement the scenarios.

The first stage of the model was implemented by Russian members of the Task Force visiting Tajikistan to enlist participants, establish the ground rules for the dialogue, and gain tacit approval from the government. In March of 1993, the first meeting in Moscow brought together second and third level members of governmental and opposition organizations to explore the possibility of an ongoing dialogue, and by mid 2003, the dialogue had met over 35 times, with the number of participants growing to an average of 15-17 and involving a good proportion of continuing members over time (Saunders, 2005). In the first year, the group met six times and moved from hostile alienation between the participants to producing a joint memorandum on a negotiation process. When negotiations began, three participants were members of the two negotiating teams, and when the peace agreement was signed in 1997, five members of the dialogue served on the Commission on National Reconciliation. From March of 2000 to the present, dialogue members have been instrumental in creating a non-governmental
organization designed to replicate the dialogue in regional locations, hold public forums on national issues, create economic development committees in towns than experienced conflict, and hold workshops for developing curricula in peacebuilding. Along the way, the dialogue has produced a continuing series of memoranda, based on their joint analyses and scenarios, which have been fed into the official processes.

In terms of transfer, Saunders and his colleagues were very clear that the dialogue was intended to complement rather than duplicate or second-guess the official deliberations, and that even though the dialogue dealt with some of the same issues as negotiations, its job was to provide analyses and options to be considered rather than to negotiate outcomes. Along that line, dialogue participants wrote approximately 25 joint memoranda that were taken into the negotiations and the commission’s deliberations, in which some also participated. Other participants constantly briefed government and opposition leaders on the work of the dialogue, and appeared on television and in print to present ideas from the sessions. After each meeting, Saunders wrote an analytical memo to capture the main points, and these were shared with UN headquarters and the mediation team as well as the US State Department (Saunders, 2005). My own analysis of the transfer process in this case (Fisher, 2005), indicates a clear rationale for transfer on the part of Saunders and his colleagues, multiple targets for transfer (leaders, negotiators, governmental-bureaucratic, and public-political constituencies), and a number of mechanisms of transfer, as identified above. In terms of transfer effects, the intervention coded positive in every category, particularly in substantive products, given the numerous joint memoranda, and in structural connections, given the swinging doors for participants between the dialogue, the negotiations and the reconciliation commission. Thus, the dialogue’s intention to make complementary contributions to the official peace process has been amply demonstrated, and also attested to by actors in the official track, including the lead UN official and a member of the mediation team (Saunders, 2005).

Track Two Conflict Resolution in the Moldova-Transdniestria Conflict

This case involves a series of problem-solving workshops, initially in the Burtonian style, organized with high level officials and influencers from the country of Moldova in Eastern Europe and the breakaway region of Transdniestria (Williams 1999). The workshops were facilitated by a team of mainly academic scholar-practitioners associated with the Centre for Conflict Analysis at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK, and the Foundation for International Security, based in London. The intervention moved through three stages of interaction with the goal of directly influencing negotiations between the two parties, and resulted in a number of process and substantive contributions to the official deliberations (Williams 2005a).

Moldova is one of several Soviet republics that experienced internal conflict with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Lying roughly between Romania and the Ukraine, the region had been part of Tsarist Russia, and came under Romanian control between the two World Wars, only to be annexed to the Soviet Union in 1940 along with a strip of land (Transdniestria) on the left bank of the Dniester river that had historically been under Ukrainian control (Williams 2005a). When the current state of Moldova declared independence in 1991, the left bank followed suit and declared the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (TMR), thus initiating a conflict over political sovereignty. Police forces from Moldova entered the left bank to restore Moldovan control, but were met with local resistance and the intervention of Soviet, now Russian, forces stationed in the
area. This brief but intense civil war, with approximately 1,000 casualties and 100,000 displaced persons, was terminated with an uneasy ceasefire in 1992, sustained by Russian and Ukrainian peacekeeping forces. The conflict between the two entities is as much ideological and economic as it is ethnic: Moldova (with approximately two thirds Romanian speakers) is orientated toward Western Europe, whereas The TMR (with a greater Slavic presence of almost 50% Russian and Ukrainian) wants to maintain its Soviet style institutions and connections with Russia. The TMR, with most of the industrial capacity of the former Moldova republic, has also developed economic interests, some illicit, that support its capacity and motivation to operate independently.

Track-one mediation began in 1993 under the auspices of the Conference (now Organization) for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and continues to the present, with the assistance of personal representatives of the Presidents of Russian and the Ukraine. The head of mission at the ambassadorial level of the OSCE plays the lead role in the negotiations, and has also been the main point of contact for track-one players with track-two initiatives. The primary focus of the negotiations has been on constitutional and economic issues between the two entities, within a context of some degree of political relationship short of independence for the TMR.

The unofficial track of problem-solving workshops was initiated when Williams visited Moldova and Transdnestria in 1993 with a colleague from Northern Ireland who was involved in community development work in the region. Invitations were forthcoming from the leaderships of both sides to engage influencers and officials in unofficial capacity in an intervention consisting of problem-solving workshops. Three such workshops were held in the ensuing three years at the University of Canterbury, which brought together about six participants from each side who were advisors to the leaderships, negotiators in the OSCE talks, parliamentarians and other high level officials. The discussions focused on a continuing analysis of the conflict, with particular attention to the question of the political status of Transdnistria, although issues of language, economics, education and currency were also discussed (Williams, 2005). This lead series of workshops was useful in developing a shared understanding of the conflict, and developing directions and options toward its resolution. The third workshop held in 1996 is of particular interest from a coordination point of view, because the official mediation team was invited as observers, by Williams’ colleague who was well versed in community development but less so in problem solving conflict resolution. The effect was that the analytical process and the trust that had been built in the first two workshops were compromised, as the session turned into something of a negotiation at a number of points. However, in general the workshop process was generating broad thinking on how the conflict might be approached in track one, and the question was how to further develop creative problem solving, especially on the constitutional issue. To move in this direction, Williams and his colleagues designed four further hybrid workshops that brought together many of the same participants in analytical and creative discussion supplemented by input from various constitutional experts with experience in different cases. This comparative focus in the discussions allowed the workshops to move toward the creation of a constitutional framework under the rubric of a “common state” that was articulated in a document acceptable to the participants from both sides. Also in this phase, coordination between track one and track two moved to collaboration, with the OSCE ambassador taking an active part in the problem-solving sessions as a member of
the third party facilitation team. This clearly supported the transfer process, with the common state document being identified in a 1997 joint memorandum signed in Moscow, which unfortunately was not subsequently ratified by both parties. A larger, more conventional problem-solving conference was held in 2000 in Kiev, with both official and unofficial participants and interveners. This session produced a constitutional document, based on the concept of the common state, which Williams (2005) clearly sees as a result of the fusion of track-one and track-two processes.

In terms of transfer effects, Williams (2005) maintains that track two took over when track one was faltering in the early stage of negotiations, and was able to create and provide input into track one so that more precise thinking and action could then be taken. He also indicates that both official policy and public opinion in both parties has been informed by the fruits of the problem-solving workshops. The common state document approved at Kiev has now been superseded by a proposed federal constitutional document, crafted by the mediators, which includes a number of the elements of the earlier document. My own analysis of transfer effects supports these contentions, and identified cognitive changes (improved attitudes), substantive products (the common state document), and structural connections (the participation of negotiators) as strong elements of transfer (Fisher, 2005).

The Contribution of Track Two to the Peru-Ecuador Peace Process

A hybrid intervention of interactive conflict resolution known as the Innovative Problem Solving Workshop has been developed at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, and has been applied to a number of destructive ethnic-political conflicts. The workshop design is a fusion of conflict resolution training, conflict analysis and problem solving, and involves influential participants from the two sides in a variety of activities with the overall goal of contributing to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The case described here engaged members of the Center working with local co-facilitators to apply the methodology to the longstanding border dispute between Peru and Ecuador, which escalated into armed conflict again in 1995. A series of four workshops ran alongside the official talks and made contributions to both the negotiations and public opinion supportive of rapprochement.

The border conflict between Peru and Ecuador can be traced to the emergence of the countries from colonial rule by Spain to independence in 1824, at which time there was no clear demarcation to follow (Kaufman and Sosnowski 2005). The dispute continued through the 1800s, fueled by political maneuvers to sustain an external enemy, an inability to resolve the conflict by the parties, and a failed attempt at arbitration by the King of Spain, who refused to make a ruling in 1910 in fear of sparking hostilities. Further efforts also failed and in 1941, a major conflagration saw Peru emerge as victorious and the signing of an international treaty in 1942, the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, intended to define the norms for a solution, with the United States, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina as guarantors. Lack of movement toward a resolution and the deep feelings of rivalry and animosity over the issue prepared the way for further armed hostilities in 1981 and 1991 with Peru having the upper hand. In early 1995 a brief but major conflagration ensued with sustained fighting in the contested border area in which Ecuador prevailed. This outbreak of hostilities was followed by a renewed effort on the part of the guarantor powers to achieve a settlement. Ecuador having overcome the loss of face due to

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previous defeats was persuaded to accept the validity of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol and a military mission was established to separate and demobilize forces and verify agreements. A ceasefire declaration called for the beginning of negotiations and identified the major impasses, and a later agreement allowed the guarantors to offer suggestions if necessary to facilitate settlement. This active mediation role started at the time of the 1995 hostilities, continued through 1996 with high-level meetings, and in late 1997, the guarantors proposed separate commissions to deal with each of the major issues. A comprehensive peace agreement was signed in October of 1998.

The track-two intervention, led by Edy Kaufman, Saul Sosnowski and their Peruvian and Ecuadorian colleagues, consisted of four innovative problem solving workshops over a three year period, which brought together many of the same influencers from the two societies who shared some element of common identity (e.g., profession, religion, ethnicity). The workshops began with a trust building phase, moved to a training phase providing concepts and skills, engaged the participants in searching for common ground on the issues, and finished with a reentry phase wherein participants developed commitment to jointly created action plans. The first workshop was held at the University of Maryland in August of 1997 before the separate commissions had started, and among its many activities developed a shared vision of Peru-Ecuador relations and analyzed the positions and arguments of both countries in the conflict. The major theme revolved around how civil society could make contributions to support the peace process, and five working groups to foster this were formed, the last one specifically looking at possible contributions to track-one diplomatic efforts. The participants formed a joint action group, later named Grupo Maryland, and paid well-publicized visits to the Peruvian and Ecuadorian embassies in Washington to present proposals and encourage movement on the peace process. The second workshop, which occurred in March of 1998, several months before the signing of the peace agreement, included community and religious leaders from the border area, and reviewed the many activities that had been carried out in the interim to support the peace process. Among other agenda items, the workshop focused on ideas and proposals to address critical problems in the border zone, and these were communicated to officials from the two countries. At the request of the two governments, the third workshop in August 1999 included official representatives acting in personal capacity, and continued the process of developing ideas on implementation of difficult items, given that the peace agreement had now been signed. Concrete steps were developed in a number of areas (e.g., media, civic activities, culture) to support the peace process and these were again reported to government officials. The final workshop in August of 2000, approximately two years after the agreement, concentrated on consolidating the peace, largely by bolstering the border region’s economic development through joint ventures and institutions. The group also proposed a dozen themes for building a culture of peace within and between the two societies.

Kaufman and Sosnowski (2005) conclude that the workshop initiative saw many of its ideas incorporated into the negotiations, and that it assisted civil society in supporting the peace process between the two countries. My own analysis of transfer (Fisher, 2005) indicates that this intervention attempted to target all of the important recipients of transfer (negotiators, leaders, etc.) and used multiple mechanisms in doing so (reports, personal contact, writings). Its objectives shifted from supporting
negotiations in various ways to assisting in the implementation of the peace agreement. Thus, there was a high degree of complementarity as shown by multiple transfer effects from cognitive changes (e.g., realizations about historical distortions), to substantive products (e.g., a proposal for a cross-border park), to structural connections (four participants became members of the negotiating teams and three of these returned to the workshops once the peace agreement was achieved).

Comparative Case Analysis Based on the Contingency Model

In order to probe the validity of the contingency model, each case of ICR intervention was assessed as best as could be determined from the descriptions in Fisher (2005) augmented by other sources. The variables of interest in the analysis included the stage of escalation and the existence and nature of official peacemaking interventions. Attention was also given to the point at which the track two interventions took place and their timing and duration in relation to track-one activities. Finally, the nature and magnitude of transfer effects was identified in order to assess the form and extent of the contribution to peacemaking.

In the Indonesia-Malaysia case, a high level of escalation had been reached in the conflict, including ongoing hostilities which are indicative of stage four (destruction). It appears that the parties were engaging in little direct communication, and were using international forums to make their cases in attempts to unilaterally achieve their objectives. In terms of perceptions, relationship and issues, it is not clear that stage four had been reached, but there was propaganda in play to support the mobilizations on both sides. It is also not clear that the conflict had reached a lose-lose outcome in terms of overall destruction, or that the relationship was seen as hopeless. Thus, the conflict is judged to be at a level between stage three and four, and given the armed attacks and counterattacks, was certainly in need of peacekeeping. Unfortunately, a number of attempts at a ceasefire had failed, although the conflict appeared to have moved into a stable level of reciprocal hostility. In terms of broader official interventions, none of the mediation efforts had borne fruit, and the door was thus opened for Burton’s unofficial overture. The ICR intervention thus occurred at a point in failure of official efforts and continued during a period of change in Indonesia’s attitude up to the point of settlement. The transfer effects in this case appear to be significant, but unfortunately a hard copy was not produced that could be tracked to the official negotiations and the peace accord. Nonetheless, a number of the third-party panel members indicated that ideas produced in the unofficial sessions found their way into the text of the agreement.

In relation to the contingency model, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had moved into a new phase of destructiveness with the initiation of the first intifada in December of 1987 and the repressive response of the Israeli government. The increasing Palestinianization of the Arab-Israeli conflict was now expressed in ongoing direct hostilities, supported by increasingly negative images and sense of relationship. The existential nature of the conflict where both sides fear for their continued existence is consonant with the mutually destructive tactics and the acceptance of lose-lose outcomes. Thus, on all indicators the conflict was at stage four when Kelman and his colleagues planned and initiated their continuing workshop. The official power intervention by the United States and Russia started approximately a year after Kelman’s workshops, but had gained little traction up to the declaration of the Oslo accord in late 1993. Thus, the continuing workshop did not follow a peacekeeping or mediation intervention, but may
have helped pave the way for both Madrid and Oslo. The subsequent working group can be seen as a response to the Oslo accord in that the participants agreed to work on difficult final status issues to be considered in future negotiations. The transfer effects of Kelman’s intervention are deemed to be significant, and most likely contributed to the Oslo breakthrough in the number of ways that he has outlined. However, the sequencing of interventions and their complementarity does not follow the order or the paths outlined in the contingency model, but rather demonstrates an ongoing responsiveness of track two to the needs of track one.

The Tajikistan conflict would appear to be at stage four (destruction) at the time of the unofficial intervention, particularly in the direct and reciprocal attacks of violence. Assessment on the other indicators of escalation is less clear, but with the massive expulsion of refugees, it is likely that concerns about survival were in play, as was a management strategy of destruction, aligned with a winner-take-all attitude. The interesting observation is that the consultation intervention preceded a ceasefire and the imposition of peacekeeping by approximately a year, and it should be noted that there were also further outbreaks of violence. The dialogue intervention certainly engaged the participants in a mutual analysis of the conflict, although Saunders does not identify social science knowledge as something that the third party brings to the discussions, even though he and his colleagues generally possess such understandings of conflict. Hence, the intervention can be seen as a stage four intervention in conflict analysis, which also worked to improve the relationship between the government and opposition forces. In line with the contingency model, the Inter-Tajik Dialogue paved the way for mediation by the UN, which involved a combination of pure and power mediation given that benefits would flow from the international community in the wake of an agreement. The dialogue can also be seen as continuing the intervention sequence as the conflict was de-escalating, by making further contributions to improving the relationship (the reconciliation commission) in the wake of a mediated peace agreement. Thus, a number of points of complementarity are represented in this work, which is not surprising given that the track-two intervention started prior to and continued beyond the track-one intervention.

In the Moldova-Transdniestria case, the sequencing of interventions specified in the contingency model seems to play out quite well. The conflict reached the stage of destruction through the brief civil war, and the negative images of “Romanians” versus “Slavs” say something about the negative perceptions that had been built up since the declarations of independence. The TMR was of course concerned about its survival as a political entity, but generally the issues in conflict would be seen more at stage three in the frustration of basic needs than stage four. The primary issues and process of negotiations would now seem to indicate an orientation of defensive competition, rather than lose-lose destructiveness that might have existed at the time of the civil war. Thus, overall the conflict appeared to escalate briefly to stage four, and the initial intervention sequence flows from a ceasefire and peacekeeping, to mediation with muscle to control hostility, to consultation involving conflict analysis, with subsequent transfer effects back into continuing mediation. The power mediation element is again evident in the positive inducements, or the punishment of their withdrawal, that the OSCE and other mediators are able to offer in the wake of a peaceful settlement. For Moldova, entry into the European family is attractive, while for the TMR, the benefits of a stable political and
economic situation, given adequate autonomy, would also be attractive. Hence, the consultation intervention was able to improve relations and offer inputs into ongoing negotiations, particularly on the central constitutional issue. Although the conflict has thereby been de-escalated and a nonviolent state of ongoing contention exists, a comprehensive agreement has been elusive. My analysis proposes that this intractability is due in part to the contentious goal of separation, or at least significant autonomy, pursued by the TMR, as well as the involvement of Russia and the Ukraine, which in essence creates a double minority situation (Fisher, 2005).

The Peru-Ecuador conflict appeared to be approximately at stage four at the time of both official and unofficial intervention. The border war in 1995 was short but intense and constituted both a national cause and a national trauma for both societies. In terms of perceptions and relationships, the armed conflict reinforced hostile misperceptions and images that had been developing for almost two hundred years. Whether national survival was perceived as being threatened (stage four) is debatable, but it is clear that basic needs were threatened on both sides (stage three), and that both parties were willing to incur significant losses in order to sustain their adversarial efforts (stage four). In line with the contingency model, this stage-four escalation is linked to the first intervention being a combination of a ceasefire and peacekeeping, followed by power mediation to control hostility and gain breathing space for further peacemaking. The consultation effort followed the initial mediation discussions and aided in de-escalating the conflict, both through contributions to negotiations and to civil society in support of the peace process. With a mix of pure and power mediation culminating in successful agreement, consultation continued its work by providing opportunities and actions for improving the relationship between the parties at both the elite and public levels. Thus, the sequencing and combination of track-one and track-two interventions follow the contingency model rather well in this case.

In terms of the comparative case analysis, it is first important to note that all of the five cases can be considered as ethnopolitical conflicts, defined by (Gurr 2000) as “conflicts in which claims are made by a national or minority group against the state or against other political actors (p. 65).” The important essence of ethnopolitical conflict is that grievances or issues are defined in relation to national or ethnic identity such that powerful social-psychological forces at the individual and group level are engaged in the etiology, escalation and maintenance of the conflict. Such conflicts may be intrastate or interstate and are of concern at the international level when their prosecution is regarded as a threat to peace and security as noted in the United Nations Charter. It is the subjective aspects of such conflicts that have both been the target of and provided the rationale for interventions following the methodologies of interactive conflict resolution.

In terms of stage of escalation, a major dimension of the contingency model, all of the cases were deemed to be at or very close to stage four of destruction. All involved armed hostilities at a significant level, thus gaining the attention of outside actors, both official and unofficial. In relation to the contingency model at stage four, three cases evidenced a peacekeeping intervention with a concurrent ceasefire (Tajikistan, Moldova-Transdniestria and Peru-Ecuador), while two were characterized by an ongoing state of relatively stable hostility at the time of unofficial intervention (Indonesia-Malaysia, Israeli-Palestinian). In terms of lead interventions, two cases saw peacekeeping followed by power mediation as called for in the model (Moldova-Transdniestria, Peru-Ecuador),
while in one case a ceasefire and peacekeeping was preceded by a consultation intervention (Tajikistan). In the two other cases, the high level of stable hostility was the opportunity for a consultation intervention in the context of failed or non-existent mediation (Indonesia-Malaysia, Israeli-Palestinian). This is also congruent with the model at stage four, although the lack of peacekeeping as the lead intervention must be noted. The fact that unofficial intervention could occur without a ceasefire may indicate one of its flexible advantages over official mediation, which typically works to achieve a cessation of hostilities between the parties before considering the substantive issues in the dispute.

In three of the cases, interactive conflict resolution served a prenegotiation function (Indonesia-Malaysia, Israeli-Palestinian, Tajikistan), while in two remaining cases the unofficial interventions made paranegotiation contributions. However, in the Moldova-Transdniestria case, formal talks were stalled at the time the workshops started and these sessions are credited in part with getting the parties back to the table, i.e., a form of prenegotiation contribution. The nature and timing of official interventions also varies across the five cases—in fact in the Indonesian-Malaysian conflict, mediation was essentially absent during the period of de-escalation as the parties managed to reach a settlement through bilateral interactions, in part by drawing on the London workshops. In the other four cases, official mediation appears to be a mix of power and pure mediation, noting that the definition of the former always involves the latter. This is congruent with the contingency model in that an intense conflict that has escalated to stage four is likely to require an ongoing mix of pure and power mediation, in contrast to a stage two conflict, which can be settled by pure mediation. In the one case of unsuccessful power mediation (the Madrid and Washington talks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), the power intervention of the U.S. gave way to a semi-official, back-channel, pure mediation effort by Norway that broke the logjam and resulted in the mutual recognition and assurances of the Oslo accord. In the Tajikistan, Moldova-Transdniestria and Peru-Ecuador cases, the pure mediation functions (communication, formulation) were vigorously pursued, while the power function of manipulation through leverage was operationalized in the mild form of promised rewards following settlement. The pattern in all four of these cases is that the unofficial interventions helped de-escalate the conflicts from stage four down to stage two, where primarily pure mediation could work more effectively on settling the issues and interests in dispute.

Conclusion

The contingency model, as any theoretical construction, is an idealized representation of a complex reality, and its simplicity is thereby acknowledged. At the same time, it may capture some of the essence of the relationships between highly escalated conflict and the interventions required to address it. It may also identify some of the important interplay necessary between track-one and track-two methods in order to deal effectively with all aspects of intractable conflicts.

In concert with the contingency model, all of the unofficial interventions in the five cases occurred at the second point of complementarity in stage four, but two occurred in the absence of a successful peacekeeping or power mediation effort (Indonesia-Malaysia, Israeli-Palestinian). These stage-four interventions were geared to deal with the subjective, human elements of the conflict, which official interventions generally ignore or work around, and provided the parties with an opportunity for mutual
conflict analysis and relationship improvement. The outcomes lead to the conclusion that track-two interventions can serve useful prenegotiation purposes (in three cases), but that paranegotiation contributions are also significant (initially in two and eventually in five cases). In all cases, the analysis of transfer effects indicates that the unofficial interventions helped to de-escalate the conflicts down to the stage-two level (at least in the minds of political elites) where mediation of a primarily pure form could assist the parties in working toward settlement. The lack of a universal path and common connections in all the cases is a testament to the complexity of ethnopolitical conflicts and the interventions that must be mounted to deal with them. It also may in part be attributable to the fact that there appears to be very little direct coordination between track-one and track-two interventions (Fisher, In Press b). In any event, the present analysis leads to the conclusion that the contingency model is at best an approximation of reality, rather than a strict and complete representation of it.
Figure 1. Stages of Conflict Escalation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Dimensions of the Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communication/Interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Discussion/debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Less direct/deeds, not words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Little direct/threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Nonexistent/direct attacks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. A Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention

Intervention Sequence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Step 2</th>
<th>Step 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Conciliation (assist communication)</td>
<td>Negotiation (settle interests)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polarization</td>
<td>Consultation (improve relationship)</td>
<td>Pure Mediation (settle interests)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>Consultation (improve relationship)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power Mediation (control hostility)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction</td>
<td>Peacekeeping (control violence)</td>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>Consultation (conflict analysis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Power Mediation (control hostility)</td>
<td>Development Aid (reduce inequity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References


