Security, Political Terrorism and Militant Islam in Southeast Asia

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These edited papers were originally delivered on 24 July 2003 at the Forum on “Regional Strategic and Political Developments”
About the Speaker

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SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Introduction

More than a decade after the demise of the cold war, the world has undergone through a period of momentous strategic change. The relative calm of the cold war era has been replaced with numerous conflicts and wars. Although some conflicts have been resolved many more have emerged, mainly in the form of ethnic violence, territorial disputes and the proliferation of weapon of mass destruction.

And latest to join the list is the scourge of terrorism which has commanded a global effort and attention. All these developments have had significant impact on the long term strategic outlook of Southeast Asian region.

Southeast Asia, due to its strategic and economic importance has always attracted the interest of the super powers and regional players. It is unlikely that this is going to change in the future. In the past we have been able to prevent major conflicts from occurring mainly by having an effective mechanism of conflicts resolution in the form of ASEAN and the maturity of bilateral relations amongst nations of the region.

We also have had other security instruments in collaboration with the superpowers either bilaterally or through multilateral arrangements which had contributed towards the deterrence of conflicts.

However, the stable security environment of the region in the future is not a matter of assurance. Recent developments within and beyond the region will definitely pose some challenges to the security of Southeast Asia. But what is more challenging is the management of these threats as they are becoming more complex, complicated, multifaceted and entwined.
Against this backdrop I will share with you the Malaysian perspective of the critical issues that may shape the future security environment of the region. While doing so I may also advocate my personal views on how these issues will be developed, managed and the process of resolution.

**Internal Conflicts**

Let me start with the internal conflicts within ASEAN. Almost all ASEAN countries are plagued with internal problems in the form of communist armed struggle, separatist rebellions, ethnic rivalry and religious extremism. Indonesia is conducting a massive military offensive in Aceh to put down the Free Aceh Movement’s ambition of an independence state. Independence movement is also taking shape in the Papua region. Elsewhere in that country ethnic and religious discords have not been totally suppressed and would continue to be a thorn to the country’s stability. In the Philippines the threat from the Communist National People Army and the separatists movement in the south have not shown any indication for early recession despite efforts by the government to suppress them militarily.

Thailand is no exception with the separatist movements in the southern part of the country is still not extinguished. Meanwhile in Myanmar, even if the junta hands over the country to democratic opposition there will be no guarantee of stability in a volatile environment of ethnic rivalry. Even small ASEAN nation Laos is having its own internal armed rebellion. And despite an extended period of harmony in the multiracial Malaysia, the country is still seeking a national integration formula.

Many security experts argue that these internal problems within the individual ASEAN nations, not the external threat, pose the higher risks to region security. To a certain degree and from the economic and social points of views this has credential. Continued internal problems will deplete the nations’ resources that could instead be used for national development.

The unstable environment will also deter foreign investment. Not to mention the spillover effect of the conflicts to neighbouring countries in the form of refugee and sanctuary issues which could strain bilateral relations.

Each country has their own way to resolve their internal conflicts ranging from military operation to negotiation — foreign or domestic initiative, or combination of
all. External pressure has also been exerted on some countries especially those with human rights related issues.

The ASEAN way of not interfering with the internal affairs of member states has been questioned by critics. The question whether ASEAN needs to intervene collectively is a subject of an interesting debate. Malaysia upholds the non-interference concept which has served the region well in the past. But at the same time we are also very glad from the recent moves by certain countries to be transparent about their internal problems. In the ASEAN ministerial meeting in Cambodia recently, Myanmar and Indonesia did the unprecedented by briefing the meeting about the situation in Yangon and Aceh respectively.

I would also like to inform this forum that there have been some talks that Malaysia will be asked to lead a team of observers to monitor the anticipated ceasefire in South Philippines. If there is an official request, we are considering it favourably, in the spirit of ASEAN cooperation. Let us hope that this mission will be successful if it materialises as it would be a cornerstone for the future ASEAN constructive engagement.

Intra ASEAN disputes
Internal problems aside ASEAN is also beset with bilateral disputes amongst its members. Malaysia for instance has territorial issues to be resolved with Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Brunei and the Philippines. There were also skirmishes along the border of Myanmar and Thailand. Thailand relationship with Cambodia at times could be tensed for some xenophobic reasons.

Besides territorial disputes Malaysia and Singapore still have not shown any progress towards settlement of many outstanding bilateral issues that have strained relations between the two countries from time to time.

The way out of these bilateral disputes is tricky and complex as they are flavoured with national interests and issues of sovereignty. What have kept the disputes from becoming open conflicts is the mechanisms of confidence building measures achieved through ASEAN, ARF and bilateral arrangements. But these mechanisms have neither the mandate nor the capacity to tackle the problems head on.
Some disputes have therefore been referred for arbitration to international institutions like the ICJ in the case of Sipadan and Ligitan and Pulau Batu Putih. Joint development of the disputed areas is another strategy that can be exploited for dispute management.

As for Malaysia we will not “run away” from resolving all outstanding issues with our neighbours and that we will be committed and take a firm stand in settling the problem. Like any nation we will defend our right and integrity. We want to maintain good relation with all our neighbours. Therefore, we must ensure that relations are good and resolve all problems.

Spratly Islands dispute
Competing and overlapping claims over territories and resources in the South China Sea is a matter of serious security concern to the region. Amongst the claimants, China is the only major power and it reinforced the latent fears in ASEAN of Chinese hegemonism in Southeast Asia. China military posture in the area is bound to prove worrisome to the other claimants as the disputes have resulted in two bloody armed clashes between China and Vietnam in the last two decades.

China has shown no hurry to resolve the dispute but it has demonstrated willingness to negotiate with the other claimants over the issue.

The practical difficulty of demarcating the sea boundaries, the poor prospect of fruitful bilateral talks and the clear obstacles to holding multilateral negotiations all suggest that a negotiated settlement is still far away, and that the potential for armed conflict cannot be overruled. Under these circumstances, the best approach in managing the Spratlys issue is to continue with the engagement.

Joint development and a code of conduct must rigorously be pursued as part of the strategy. Regional security forum and bilateral arrangements provide ready platforms to advance the engagement processes.

Global and regional crises
Beyond the Spratlys, the security environment in Southeast Asia will be affected by the various unresolved security issues surrounding the region. The security situation in the Korean peninsular has remained tense. South Korea continues its military build
up, especially in the procurement of sophisticated conventional weapons while North Korea on the other hand seeks to compensate for its conventional military deficiency with the development of missile and nuclear capabilities.

Dispute over national reunification between Beijing and Taipei has been the major cause of successive bouts across the Taiwan Strait. Taipei has consistently insisted that Beijing does not have the right to represent Taiwan and that Taiwan and mainland China are under separate rules and thus should have equal right of participation in the world community. On the other hand Beijing “one China” policy refers to Taiwan as an inalienable part of the PRC.

The security development in South Asia region is also of great concern to Southeast Asia. For more than half a century relations between India and Pakistan has been in a state of hostility. Since May 1998, the two countries have also been locked in a nuclear arms race. Pakistan considers nuclear capability as essential to offset India conventional military superiority. Military leaders of both sides have threatened nuclear war against each other. Although there are signs of improving relations with the recent reintroduction of the bus service between Lahore and Delhi, the possibility of a nuclear exchange cannot be ruled out.

Meanwhile the expansion of Japan’s military power could cast a heavy shadow over the Asia-Pacific strategic landscape. In the long run Japan’s rearmament could bring the country into direct confrontation with the other major power. The main catalyst of Japan’s arms expansion is the new US-Japan security and defence cooperation guidelines which could pave the way for the revision of Japan’s peace constitution. It would prepare the ground for US-Japan active political and military intervention in regional affairs. This could turn tensions in the Korean Peninsular, Taiwan Straits and the Spratlys into open armed conflicts.

From ASEAN standpoint the major drawback of this alliance is that the operating principles run counter to the approach of the ARF where the principal rule is peace and stability through integration.

**Economic issues**

On the economic front, ASEAN has not fully recovered from the economic crisis of 1997 which has affected some countries security outlook. For some, the recovery is at
a very slow pace despite prescriptions by the IMF. Notwithstanding the economic crisis, ASEAN states are sensitive to China’s economic rise, its admission to the WTO and its push for Sino-ASEAN free trade area.

On one hand there is concern that China will wean foreign capital from the region but on the other hand ASEAN states feel the urgency of expanding access to the China market.

Japan’s response to Sino ASEAN free trade area also merits attention. To neutralize China’s competitive pressures and its dominant role in regional integration, Japan has stepped up consultation with ASEAN on the proposed framework of Japan-ASEAN free trade area. Meanwhile, the industrial and financial circles in the United States are pressing Washington to conclude as early as possible free trade agreements with the ASEAN states in a move to safeguard their interests in ASEAN region and to curb the expansion of Chinese economic power in the region.

It thus can be foreseen that the Asia Pacific shall henceforth witness an intense competition for influence with far reaching strategic significance between the US, China, Japan and ASEAN. But our interest in the formation of free trade area in the region should focus on the scenario that is likely to emerge ultimately. The US is now seeking the southward expansion of NAFTA and China is also planning to transform the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (with Russia and the Central Asian states) into a free trade area.

By then the entire Asia Pacific would enter into an era of competition and balancing between a Pan-American and a Pan-Asian free trade area.

**Terrorism**

Since September 11, economic and trade issues pale in comparison to a new emerging threat of terrorism. In Southeast Asia, since the attack on the twin towers, terrorism has become the most immediate threat. Malaysia has consistently condemned all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal acts and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations, in particular those which threaten international peace and security.

We are willing to work closely with the international community to strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism. We are also committed to
enhancing cooperation among law enforcement agencies internationally and are in the process of acceding to all UN conventions and protocols on countering the scourge of terrorism. At the regional level we have actively been cooperating with our neighbours in the area of information exchange on terrorist activities and their networking.

We have arrested members of the Jemaah Islamiah and the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM). We have also been actively involved in the various forum and seminars initiated by regional institutions and NGOs. And we have recently established a Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCCT) to reflect Malaysia’s firm commitment and determination in fighting terrorism.

The Malaysian position is that terrorism should not be identified with any race or religion and in particular, Islam. Terrorism has indeed no colour or face. Islam and Muslims have continued to be wrongly identified with terrorism and terrorists. This is perhaps the unfortunate consequence of highlighting terrorist activities carried out by Muslims in the name of jihad. But Islam is a religion of peace and is against the killing of innocent people.

Malaysia believes the way to tackle terrorism more effectively is through understanding the root causes. Let us not forget “the other war”. This is the war to win the heart and minds of the people, so as to reduce support for acts of terrorism.

**Military build up**

Prior to the economic crisis of 1997, the subject of arms race in the Southeast Asian region was prominently debated. During that period Southeast Asia was the only region in the world where the defence budget was expanding. However this was not a new phenomena as it had been on going since the individual countries took up the responsibility for national defence, following the departure of the colonial powers. It was also prompted in response to the various internal and external security threats as well as to the changing security environment of the region.

The fall of Vietnam, the US military withdrawal from the region after the end of the cold war, perceived threat from Asian regional powers and intra-ASEAN security issues were the other contributing factors of arms procurement. The
enactment of the UNCLOS (UN Convention on Law of the Sea) further accelerated the weapon programs for those states that were affected with the overlapping claims of the sea area.

Malaysian takes a pragmatic view of the perceived military build up in the region. We believe nations have every right to preserve the sovereignty and integrity of its territories and to safeguard their national interests. Nations have their own perspectives on security threats and they armed themselves accordingly. In fact, in relations to the superpower or regional power military capability the combined military hardware of the ASEAN states dwarf in comparison. Although we may argue that some member countries have been equipping themselves beyond the defence deterrence need, it is subjective. Some may look at it from the point of expanding the market base for their military industries.

Others may view the requirements differently vis-à-vis their long term grand strategy in the continuously changing regional and global strategic scenario.

The advocates of the regional arm race notion may be pleased by the effect of the economic crisis of 1997 which has reduced the funds available for arm procurement. The crisis has forced countries to either postpone or shelve their plans to buy military hardwares. To offset the effect, some countries renew and form strategic alliance and military cooperation with the major powers to meet their security needs.

Some even have been rewarded for their support of the superpower’s efforts in the war against terrorism. Military development from the Malaysian perspectives is part of our overall security and defence management strategy where preventive approach is prominent. We have the confidence in the preventive diplomacy accomplished through bilateral and multilateral fora and will continue to give our full support to the ASEAN and ARF security agenda.

At the same time we will continue with the development of military capability within the framework of the concept of deterrence.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the future security landscape of the region is dependent on the development of the various issues we have just discussed. As the world is changing at
a rapid pace towards globalization and the changing of the world order, the resolution of these issues is becoming more complex and less predictable. We acknowledge that ASEAN as a mechanism of peace lacks political punch to be the only major institution in regional conflict resolution.

Southeast Asia is still subjected to the power play of the major powers who have their own respective strategic interests in the region. But ASEAN should continue with current efforts to ensure that security issues do not develop into a dangerous situation.

As a whole, Southeast Asia can look forward to a relatively stable security environment in the near future on the basis of the growing trend of international and regional cooperation. The internal conflicts within ASEAN states are not anticipated to be a major concern while the intra ASEAN issues will be managed in the spirit of ASEAN goodwill and through bilateral and regional mechanisms.

ASEAN’s leaders have reaffirmed that co-operative peace and shared prosperity should be the region’s basic goals. Towards these goals ASEAN shall remain a driving force in building a more predictable and constructive pattern of relationships among nations in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN will also move towards greater economic integration, emphasising sustainable and equitable growth. ASEAN will nourish a caring and cohesive Southeast Asian community, whose strength lies in fostering a common regional identity and a shared vision of the future.
About the Speaker

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POLITICAL TERRORISM AND MILITANT ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Introduction
I have grown increasingly concerned about the public discourse on global terrorism by international terrorist specialists, regional security specialists and area studies/country specialists. In my view international terrorist experts have succeeded in colonizing the discourse and analysis of political terrorism in Southeast Asia. This has resulted in the adoption of a homogenizing framework by regional security specialists. Area studies/country specialists have been put on the defensive. This is so for two main reasons. Firstly, some country specialists went into denial in the wake of the Bali bombings. They were highly skeptical if not dismissive of claims that organized international terrorism had arrived on Southeast Asia’s doorstep. They were in good company. The Thai and Malaysian Prime Ministers as well as senior Indonesian officials also dismissed such claims.

Secondly, area studies/country specialists are on the defensive because the mainstream international media generally does not want detailed complicating arguments to get in the way of the main story — the global war on terrorism. Area studies and country specialists too were in good company. For example, when Malaysian security officials identified Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) as a local terrorist group with international connections, opposition politician Lim Kit Sang argued that KMM was a figment of the government’s imagination. Malaysian authorities have preferred to identify their home grown terrorists as members of KMM rather than Jemaah Islamiyah.

International terrorism experts generally argue that contact with Al Qaeda by regional terrorist leaders and their organizations results in co-optation and/or subordination of the latter. This conclusion is inevitably derived from a lengthy
analysis of the personal links between Al Qaeda operatives and the leaders of regional terrorist groups. In some cases elaborate organizational charts or wiring diagrams are drawn up to illustrate this pattern of subordination to Al Qaeda’s leadership and command.\(^5\) In one amusing case a terrorist expert’s wiring diagram was described as being like a ‘plate of spaghetti’.\(^6\) The homogenizing framework developed by international terrorism experts portrays Osama bin Laden as a kind of chief executive officer presiding over a global terrorist organization composed of Al Qaeda ‘franchises’ or Al Qaeda ‘associates’.

International terrorist experts tend to see Al Qaeda behind nearly every act of terrorism in Southeast Asia. This assertion is then repeated from one terrorist expert to another, until it has become the prism through which regional security specialists have viewed political terrorism in Southeast Asia. Let me give you one example from personal experience. On 5th March this year, the day after a bomb exploded outside the airport terminal at Davao in the Philippines, I participated in a lengthy pre-recorded interview with an Australian television station. I was asked to provide my assessment of who was responsible.\(^7\) I indicated that it was probably too early to be definitive but that there were three likely suspects — the New People’s Army, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayaaf Group (ASG). In my opinion, I felt the Davao incident was likely the result of local factors carried out by domestic groups. As the bomb went off outside the Davao airport terminal and no Americans or American interests were targeted, I felt it unlikely that the bombing was directly related to the involvement of US military forces in counter-terrorism exercises in the southern Philippines. That night when the television program went to air my analysis was cut basically to just one sentence: ‘I think, overwhelmingly, the evidence is it’s domestic’.

I was immediately followed on the program by an international terrorism expert who opined, ‘There are only two groups that have the intention and the capability to conduct such bombings — they are the Abu Sayaaaf group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. And both these groups are linked to Jemaah Islamiah, the regional terrorist network that perpetrated the Bali bombing, and also, both these groups are linked to Al Qaeda which is a global terrorist [network]’. According to the
interviewer, ‘That makes it more likely international terror networks were at play in the bombing’.

To give credit to the television producers they did mention in their script a point I had made in my pre-recorded interview: ‘Islamic extremists have fought for a separate state in the southern Philippines for more than a quarter of a century’. A month after the Davao airport incident, a further bombing outrage occurred in Davao, and in a separate incident unidentified gunmen sprayed automatic weapons fire at a local mosque. Philippine police initially blamed the Davao bombings on a secret MILF urban terrorist cell operating in tandem with five alleged Indonesian terrorists. But to date only two individuals have been arrested. They do not appear to have any affiliation with the MILF and their motivations remain unclear.

The MILF, for its part, strenuously denied responsibility for the Davao bombings. At the time of the March Davao bombings press reports indicated that if the MILF were involved it would be a violation of a reported truce agreement the MILF had reached with the mayor of the city. After the second spate of bombings in April there was further speculation that the outrage had been designed to derail peace talks between the Arroyo government and the MILF.

The jury is still be out on this particular incident but I remain unconvinced that the JI or Al Qaeda were involved. This story seems to me to illustrate the homogenizing framework applied by international terrorism experts. Raising the ASG’s and MILF’s reported ‘links’ to JI and Al Qaeda serves to divert attention from the probability that long-standing local issues and grievances may have been involved.

In sum, the homogenizing framework attempts to fit square terrorist pegs into round holes. This distorts differences among Southeast Asia’s terrorist groups, especially with respect to their motivations, ideology and objectives. It also fails to take into account ‘agency’ — that local actors may initiate action and even leverage their association with outside bodies — such as Al Qaeda or JI — for their own ends.

The remainder of this paper is divided into four parts: (1) defining terrorism and militant Islam; (2) political terrorism in Southeast Asia; (3) militant Islam in Southeast Asia; and (4) a discussion of Current Trends.
Defining Political Terrorism and Militant Islam

There is no internationally agreed definition of terrorism. The League of Nations attempted to do so in a draft convention in 1937 and failed. The United Nations General Assembly has had a resolution defining terrorism on its books since 1999 but has not yet reached consensus. At present the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee is considering a draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism that would include a definition of terrorism if adopted.

Surprisingly, the United States government, the leader in the global war on terrorism, does not have a single comprehensive definition of terrorism. While it is true that a legal definition of terrorism may be found in the US Code of Federal Regulations, it is also true that the State Department, Defense Department and FBI all use their own separate definitions. President George Bush added yet another definition when he issued an Executive Order on terrorist financing in the wake of 9-11.

Finally, to round off this point, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) has been unable to reach agreement on a definition of terrorism as well. At the OIC summit held in Kuala Lumpur in April 2002, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir proposed that any deliberate attack on civilians, including those by Palestinian suicide bombers, should be classified as acts of terror. Delegates disagreed and in the final OIC Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Terrorism they declared inter alia:

- We reject any attempt to link Islam and Muslims to terrorism as terrorism has no association with any religion, civilization or nationality;
- We unequivocally condemn acts of international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including state terrorism, irrespective of motives, perpetrators and victims as terrorism poses a serious threat to international peace and security and is a grave violation of human rights;
- We reiterate the principled position under international law and the Charter of the United Nations of the legitimacy of resistance to foreign aggression and the struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation for national liberation and self-determination. In this context, we underline the urgency for an internationally agreed definition of terrorism, which differentiates such legitimate struggles from acts of terrorism [emphasis added];
The OIC declaration may be summed up with the expression that ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter’. The OIC quickly threw this hot potato to the United Nations for consideration.

I lay this conundrum on the table and offer the following methodology for sidestepping this vexed question. For purposes of my analysis I will define terrorism in terms of those individuals and groups that have been proscribed by the United Nations and by the US Government. The United Nations maintains a ‘consolidated list of individuals and entities belonging to or associated with the Taliban and Al Qaida organization as established and maintained by the 1267 Committee’. This list presently includes some 98 entities and several hundred individuals. It should be noted that the UN list is not a comprehensive list of terrorists or terrorist organizations found across the globe.

Under United States law the Secretary of State has the authority to designate a terrorist group into one of three categories: Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), Other Terrorist Organization and organizations included on the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL). These categories are not mutually exclusive.

The United Nations and the US State Department have identified a total of seven terrorist organizations. Three organizations are considered terrorist groups by both: Al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah. The other four groups are considered terrorist organizations by the US Department of State: Alex Boncayo Brigade, Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army; Cambodian Freedom Fighters; and Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia.

Surprisingly, a number of Southeast Asia’s prominent politically active groups that have been associated with armed violence are not included on either the UN or US lists. These include: Moro Islamic Liberation Front; Pattani United Liberation Organization; Aceh Freedom Movement; and the Mujahidin Council of Indonesia and its affiliates, Laskar Jihad and Laskar Jundullah. Nor are a number of regional armed insurgent and separatist groups, active in Myanmar and Laos, listed as terrorist organizations.

The question of what constitutes ‘militant Islam’ is equally vexed. In the security literature that discusses terrorism and Islam in Southeast Asia a number of descriptors are routinely if not uncritically used: fundamentalist, deviationist, radical,
militant and extremist. For purposes of this paper I draw a distinction between religious views (which may be fundamentalist, deviationist or radical) and public actions (which may be peaceful, intimidating, or violent). I consider a militant group to be one that has leadership and organization and which pursues its program and objectives in public through means that are designed to physically or psychologically intimidate their opponents. Physical intimidation may at times result in aggressive action leading to violence. I would also like to draw a distinction between militant Islam and ‘Islamism’. Islamism refers to the ideology of those groups in Southeast Asia that advocate overturning the secular order with the aim of establishing an Islamic state.

**Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia**

As I begin my discussion of political terrorism in Southeast Asia I am mindful of the OIC’s rejection of ‘any attempt to link Islam and Muslims to terrorism as terrorism has no association with any religion, civilization or nationality’. To make this point it should be noted that three of Southeast Asia’s listed terrorist groups have no association with Islam. These groups are:

- **Alex Boncayao Brigade (OTG)** is an urban terrorist group that broke away from the Communist Party of the Philippines in the mid-1980s. In March 1997 it formed an alliance with Revolutionary Proletarian Army. It is reportedly responsible for over one hundred murders including US military personnel. Little has been heard of the ABB since March 2000 when it attacked the Department of Energy and the offices of Shell Oil in protest against rising oil prices.

- **New People’s Army (FTO/TEL)** is the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines that was formed in 1969. It is a Maoist revolutionary groups that seeks to overthrow the Philippines’ government through armed force. The NPA also targets US officials, civilian and military, working in the Philippines. According to Filipino military sources that I have spoken to, the NPA is the greatest internal security threat and not the MILF.

- **Cambodian Freedom Fighters (OTC)** is/was a US-based anti-communist organization that mounted armed attacks against government buildings in Phnom Penh in November 1998. Most members of the assault team were apprehended and tried by Cambodian courts in early 2002.

Now let me turn to the four other organizations that featured on the UN and US State Department lists.
Al Qaeda. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 sparked a movement throughout the Islamic world in support of the Afghan resistance movement or mujahedin, including a drive to attract recruits for military combat. Between 1982 and 1992 an estimated 35,000 Muslims from thirty-five countries answered the call. Of this number about 1,000 Southeast Asians enlisted with the Mujahidin. The Philippines sent the largest number, estimated at 700, of whom 360 actually completed basic training and only half that number actually engaged in combat. The first batch of Filipino volunteers was sent in January 1980. The remainder of Southeast Asia’s jihadis came from Indonesia and Malaysia. Thus it was during the anti-Soviet period, before Al Qaeda was formed, that Southeast Asia’s militant Muslims acquired religious indoctrination, military training, and combat experience. During this time Southeast Asians forged personal relationships with leading Arab Islamists including Osama bin Laden and others who would establish Al Qaeda. Prominent among the Southeast Asians were Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani the founder of the Abu Sayaaaf Group, Salamat Hashim, leader of a breakaway faction of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) who founded the MILF in 1984, and Abdullah Sungkar the first spiritual leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah.

Al Qaeda was founded at the initiative of Osama bin Laden in 1989. Al Qaeda had its roots in the Arab Service Bureau an organization that played a prominent role in recruiting Muslim militants from the Arab community in the Middle East. In February 1989 the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and the Mujahidin took control. The following year attention turned to the Persian Gulf in the aftermath of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the build up of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. It was not until 1994, however, that the Taliban emerged as a military force and began their drive to power. They seized control of Kabul in September 1996 and established their regime. During most of this period, from 1991 until May 1996, Osama bin Laden was headquartered in Sudan.

International terrorism experts invariably assert that Al Qaeda’s first contacts with Southeast Asia date to 1988 when Muhammed Jamal Khalifa visited the Philippines as a representative of several Islamic charities. This was a year before al Qaeda was founded and a decade before Osama bin Laden launched his war against the United States. Khalifa’s charities were primarily concerned with providing aid to
oppressed Muslims around the world. Khalifa’s charities donated money for the construction of orphanages, hospitals and mosques in the southern Philippines. Khalifa returned in October 1991 and began to expand his network of charitable and commercial interests including contacts with the Abu Sayaf Group. In 1992, Khalifa was joined by two Al Qaeda associates, Ramzi Ahmad Yousef and Wali Khan Amin Shah and ties with the ASG were intensified. For example, Abdurajak Janjalani accompanied Yousef on a tour of the Philippines from late 1991 until May 1992. The following year Yousef reportedly provided training in bomb making techniques to twenty ASG personnel at a camp on Basilan island.

In 1994 Yousef, Wali Khan Amin Shah and Abdul Hakim Murad began planning for a series of high-profile terrorist actions that took the code name Operation Bojinka. This was a self-contained operation that did not involve the ASG. In December 1994 Yousef planted a bomb on a Philippines Airlines plane to test the feasibility of his master plan. In January 1995 a mishap resulted in the exposure of the terrorist cell and the eventual arrest of the three main plotters. During the second half of the 1990s Filipinos began to replace Arabs in the running of Islamic charities and non-government organizations that had been set up with funds donated primarily from Saudi Arabia.

The period from 1991-95 represents Al Qaeda first attempt to lodge itself in Southeast Asia. The results of this encounter were mixed. Al Qaeda’s main accomplishments were to assist in the training and development of the Abu Sayaf Group (see below for further discussion) and the establishment of ties with the MILF. On the negative side, Al Qaeda had been exposed, three of its key operatives were arrested, and a number of local sympathizers were forced into hiding. As a consequence of this set back, Al Qaeda shifted its operations to Malaysia where it set up a number of commercial enterprises. Malaysia also proved useful as a convenient, if temporary, planning venue for all of the major Al Qaeda terrorist operations directed against the United States up to and including the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11th September 2001.

Coincidently, in May 1996, Osama bin Laden returned to Afghanistan and assisted the Taliban forces in their armed struggle with the Northern Alliance. Bin Laden set up a network of 40 paramilitary and terrorist training camps. According to
Zachary Abuza, bin Laden’s major priority was to create ‘an international network and a business empire’ to fund operations designed to overthrow conservative Islamic governments and drive the United States out of the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{20} In February 1998 bin Laden announced the formation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders. Southeast Asia ‘became secondary to Al Qaeda’.\textsuperscript{21} Nonetheless, throughout the period 1996-2001, Southeast Asian militants continued to be recruited by their organizations and sent to Afghanistan for training. Figures extrapolated from CIA estimates suggest that the potential number of Indonesians who may have joined the Taliban during the Afghan civil war at between 210-450 (low estimate) to 450-600 (high estimate).\textsuperscript{22}

The U.S.-led attack on the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in the final quarter of 2001, combined with the death or capture of key operatives through counter-terrorism operations, greatly degraded and disrupted Al Qaeda’s command and control structures. Al Qaeda members were forced to seek refuge in remote areas of eastern Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s North West Frontier. Other Al Qaeda members dispersed overseas, including Yemen, Chechnya, Iran and Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{23} It is my contention that since late 2001 the initiative for political terrorism in Southeast Asia has mainly rested in the hands of indigenous organizations. I would now like to test this proposition with reference to the Abu Sayaff Group, Jemaah Islamiyah and Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia.

**Abu Sayaff Group.** During the Afghan War, as noted above, several hundred Filipinos went to Pakistan and Afghanistan to join the Mujahidin. Among them was Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, a charismatic religious teacher. Janjalani met Osama bin Laden and befriended Abdur Rab Rasul Sayaaf, a religious scholar, and Ramzi Yousef. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan Janjalani sought support for the Moro struggle in the southern Philippines. The Abu Sayaff Group was founded in 1991 when it broke away from the MNLF. As noted above, Janjalani formed a partnership with Ramzi Yousef. Yousef provided instruction in bomb making, while Al Qaeda provided funding and weapons. Between 1991 and 1997 the ASG conducted 67 terrorist attacks across the Philippines. The ASG targeted foreign missionaries and a Catholic bishop but at least half of all its attacks were indiscriminate. The ASG also engaged in kidnapping and massacres. As a result of
ASG’s growing notoriety it attracted the support of a number of criminal gangs active in the Sulu archipelago.

The ASG was kept out of the loop during the planning stages of Operation Bojinka. According to Abuza, ‘Yousef really did not trust the ASG or think it capable enough to carry our serious terrorist acts’. The character of the ASG changed with the death of its leader Janjalani in December 1998. In April 2000 the ASG kidnapped foreign tourists from a resort on the Malaysian island of Sipadan and the following year kidnapped a number of foreign tourists in Palawan.

The ASG only gives occasional lip service to its pretension of establishing an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. The unity of the ASG has degenerated into a number of semi-autonomous factions whose stock in trade consists of bombings, assassinations, extortion and kidnapping for ransom. Ransom and extortion are sure signs that the ASG is not receiving significant covert external funding. In the aftermath of 9-11, the United States joined forces with the Philippines and routed the ASG infrastructure on Basilan. The ASG still lives on, however, with bases on Sulu and Tawi-Tawi islands as well as a foothold on the Zamboanga peninsula. The ASG still retains the capacity of conducting terrorist attacks.

Jemaah Islamiyah. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has no official founding date. It emerged gradually in the mid- to late-1980s primarily as a radical community of Moslem scholars and students that identified with the Salafi-Wahabbi school of Islamic thought. In the 1990s members of JI became more proactive in seeking out contacts in Afghanistan and across the Southeast Asian region. JI’s organizational development reached its high point in 1999-2000 as a result primarily of Southeast Asian initiative set against the backdrop of personal connections between regional leaders and Al Qaeda officials in Afghanistan. The JI network in Malaysia built upon and expanded the business and commercial foundations established in the early 1990s. JI is unique in that it also developed a full-blown administrative structure on the Malaysian peninsula as well as regionally. JI also sponsored the establishment of a number of Islamic schools. The aim of JI was to create an archipelagic Islamic state (Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara) composed of Malaysia, Indonesia and Mindanao (and
incorporating Singapore and Brunei). An estimated 1,000 JI members from Southeast Asia were sent to terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.

Ordinary JI members who were recruited in Malaysia and Singapore took their direction from senior veterans of the Afghanistan war. In 1999, for example, on instructions from Hambali they created operational cells and later became involved in a major plot involving a series of high-profile terrorist attacks against selected western diplomatic missions in Singapore, US military personnel in transit on shore leave, western warships in the Straits of Malacca, Changi airport and Singaporean defence facilities.

The Indonesian component of JI has a distinct history that sets it apart from its counterparts in Malaysia and Singapore. JI in Indonesia has its roots in the Darul Islam movement that emerged in the 1940s in the struggle against Dutch colonialism and which continued its struggle for an Islamic state in the 1950s and early 1960s. The Darul Islam movement was crushed but its spirit has lived on.

The core of JI in Indonesia is centered around the ‘Ngruki school network’ in Solo, Central Java run by radical Islamic clerics, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Sungkar was a veteran of the Afghan war. In the 1970s and 1980s Sungkar and Ba’asyir promoted *jemaah islamiyah* in the sense of an ‘Islamic community’. In this regard JI was more an aspiration or state of mind rather than a de facto organization.

JI in Indonesia became involved in a Machiavellian plan hatched by Ali Moertopo and military intelligence designed to smoke out Islamic extremists. Sungkar and Ba’asyir became its victims and in 1985 they fled to Malaysia. There they re-established themselves and ran another religious school with a radical Islamic curriculum. This school attracted several of the Ngruki alumni as well as supporters in Malaysia and Singapore. After the fall of Suharto in 1998, Sungkar and Ba’asyir returned to Central Java and their school at Ngruki. When Sungkar died in 1999 Ba’asyir became the so-called spiritual head of JI.

In 2000 Ba’asyir became a leading figure in the Mujahidin Council of Indonesia (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or MMI), an umbrella organization that grouped many militant Islamic groups. The MMI’s main concern was to have the *shariah* comprehensively implemented in Indonesia, preferably through the creation
of an Islamic state. The MMI gave aid and support to the Muslim victims of ethnic and sectarian violence in the Mulukus and Sulawesi. Several of the MMI constituents developed their own independent relationships with JI Malaysia and the MILF.

Although there is overwhelming evidence for the existence of the JI in Indonesia, its spiritual head, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir has repeatedly denied its existence claiming it is the figment of foreign intelligence agencies. Even members of the group that carried out the Bali bombings also deny the existence of JI. Whatever the case, it is clear that the main perpetrators of the Kuta beach bombings in October 2002 were members of a close-knit family group with close ties to the Ngruki school network. Under the leadership and guidance of Hambali they planned and executed this terrorist outrage. According to one of Australia’s leading counter-terrorism experts, ‘[t]here is, as far as I’m aware, no evidence of al-Qaeda involvement [in the Bali bombings]’. An indication of this is that prior to the Bali bombings, key members of the JI cell that launched the operation had to resort to robbing banks in order to secure funds to finance their future operations. This led the to the arrest of additional Bali suspects in June this year.

On peninsula Malaysia the situation was quite different. There members of JI Malaysia-JI Singapore created a hierarchical structure. In 1988-89, for example, a Singaporean religious teacher, Ibrahim Maidin, first made contact with Ba’asyir. In 1993 Maidin went to Afghanistan and undertook a short course in military training. On his return he facilitated the travel of other Singaporeans to Afghanistan. JI Singapore was probably founded about this time.

JI Malaysia was established around 1994-95 by Hambali and Abu Jibril acting on instructions from Sungkar and Ba’asyir. Hambali and Jibril concentrated their recruitment efforts among Indonesian migrants and university lecturers and students at the Universiti Tecknologi Malaysia. They also sought out promising recruits from among students at Islamic schools. One school in Johor Baru stood out in particular. Ali Ghufron (Muklas), the school’s master, and Imam Samudra, a student, were both involved in the Bali bombings. Young militants were then sent to religious schools in Pakistan for ideological indoctrination. An estimated 50 Malaysians and Singaporeans were sent to Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. Others were dispatched to MILF camps in Mindanao.
Under Hambali’s leadership, a five-member Regional Advisory Council or syurah was established to oversee JI cells in four countries: Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. JI Malaysia grew in size to perhaps 200 members.

In 1999 JI attempted to forge a regional coalition of like-minded groups under the name of Rabitatul Mujahidin. Representatives from JI, MILF and militant groups from Aceh, Sulawesi, and Myanmar reportedly attended the first meeting. Rabitatul Mujahidin met three times in Malaysia between 1999 and late 2000. During this period, acting under instructions issued by Hambali, JI groups in Malaysia and Singapore were converted into operational cells. JI members continued to be sent to Afghanistan and Mindanao for training. In August 2000, JI members possibly acting in coordination with MILF elements attempted to kill the Philippines Ambassador to Indonesia in a car bomb attack. At the end of the year JI terrorists conducted a series of bombings of Christian churches in Indonesia as well as a bomb attack on the Manila LRT.

Terrorist activities by the JI network on peninsula Malaysia came to an abrupt end in December 1991 when Malaysian police and Singapore’s Internal Security Department (ISD) separately carried out arrests of a number of JI suspects who were charged with planning terrorist attacks.32 In August 2002 the ISD arrested another 21 suspects of whom 19 were identified as members of JI. As a result of these roundups it is believed that most members of JI Singapore have fled abroad. There have been no further reported JI activities in Singapore since then.

**Kampulan Mujihaddin/Militan Malaysia.** The KMM was reportedly founded in 1995 by an Afghan war veteran, Zainon Ismail. Total membership may have reached a high of 70 to 80 persons including a small core who underwent military training in Afghanistan. Leadership of the KMM passed to Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz in 1999. The KMM advocates the violent overthrow of the Malaysian government and the creation of an archipelagic Islamic state. KMM members have been implicated in a number of violent crimes allegedly including the murder of a Kedah politician in November 2000. In addition, KMM members are thought to have taken part in sectarian fighting in Ambon. Malaysian police broke the back of KMM in August 2001 when nearly 60 members were arrested. Earlier, in June, Malaysian police apprehended Abu Jabril.
Militant Islam in Southeast Asia

The question of the relationship between political terrorism and militant Islam in Southeast Asia essentially involves a consideration of the potential for politically active groups in Indonesia and the Philippines to turn to terrorism to advance their objectives. There are two related considerations: (1) whether any militant group, alone or in combination, has the potential to come to power in a Southeast Asian state; and (2) whether regional militant Islamic groups can come together and achieve a critical mass sufficient to advance the goal of creating an archipelagic Islamic state.33

While these are serious concerns, the available evidence suggests they can be dismissed as highly unlikely.34 The MILF has been struggling for nearly two decades to create an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines without notable success. It exercises control over no more than ten percent of Mindanao. There indications that it is not a completely unified organization under the command and control of its national leadership. This is hardly surprising in an organization with an estimated 12,000 combatants.

Historically, the MILF has had important but nonetheless transient contacts with Al Qaeda and JI. These contacts must be seen as instrumental to the MILF and its domestic objectives in the Philippines. The MILF cannot be considered a franchise or associate of the Al Qaeda despite its external linkages. The MILF recently has negotiated a ceasefire agreement with the government of the Philippines and if this holds the MILF may engage in protracted negotiations over a political settlement. It is this posture that has kept the MILF off the list of proscribed terrorist organizations by the UN or the US.

The prospects for militant Islamic groups in Indonesia turning to political violence to advance their objectives successfully also appears doubtful. There is great diversity in Indonesian Islam. The largest and most influential Islamic organizations, whether traditional or modernist, are moderate in outlook. Few Muslims support the conversion of Indonesia into an Islamic state as the results of the 1999 national election indicated. The forthcoming elections in 2004 will once again test this proposition. It is likely that Islamic political parties will play a decisive role in the composition of the next national government. But Islamic political parties by
themselves will not be able to form the next government. The balance of power will still lie with secular nationalists such as the PDI-P or GOLKAR.

Indonesia has successfully weathered the firestorms of sectarian violence that broke out in the wake of the President Suharto’s resignation and the collapse of his New Order regime. Internal sectarian violence was serious but it was not a universal phenomena across the archipelago. For the most part sectarian fires have been doused through ceasefire agreements and efforts towards reconciliation in the Mulukus and Sulawesi. Key paramilitary groups such as Laskar Jihad, Laskar Jundullah and the Islamic Defenders Front have stood down — at least for the moment. The main exception is in the province of Aceh where Gerekan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), is involved in armed separatism. GAM earlier turned down approaches for support from Al Qaeda. GAM is unlikely to succeed given that it is isolated internationally. But heavy-handed tactics by the Indonesian military will stoke continued resentment against rule by Jakarta.

In the wake of the Bali bombings Indonesia has been abruptly shaken out of denial. The Indonesian police have made commendable strides in rounding up JI terrorists and breaking up their infrastructure. According to Indonesian police Inspector General Made Mangku Pastika JI is finding it more difficult to recruit due to the arrest of its top operatives, increased police surveillance and growing public perception that Ba’asyir has abandoned his followers.35 There are some indications that the Bali outrage has aroused moderate Muslim leaders and organizations to condemn such actions as un-Islamic. Much remains to be done, however, to root out terrorist groups as the recent spate of bombings indicates. It will be several years or more before the threat of political terrorism fully recedes in Indonesia. Much will depend on economic recovery and Indonesia’s uncertain transition to democracy.

Indonesia no longer stands alone. In the wake of 9-11 and the global war on terrorism much of the region’s terrorist infrastructure has been disrupted, particularly in Malaysia and Singapore. Southeast Asia states, regional associations and international institutions are all making concerted efforts to further cooperate in counter-terrorism.
Current Trends

According to the US State Department’s *Patterns of Global Terrorism — 2002*, the number of terrorist attacks worldwide dropped by some 30% from 2001 to 2002. The methodology of how these figures are gathered and interpreted is contentious among international terrorism experts. Nonetheless, they are an indication that progress is being made in the global war on terrorism. The global war on terrorism must be seen as a multidimensional effort that is proceeding simultaneously on five fronts: diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, financial and military.

The US-led coalition war against the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda in the last quarter of 2001 resulted in the elimination of Al Qaeda’s centralized command structure and forced the top leadership to regroup to areas where directing operations is more difficult. There can be no question that Al Qaeda has taken significant leadership hits. US sources estimate that 65% of known senior Al Qaeda leaders, operational managers and key facilitators have been either captured or killed since September 2001.36 Or put in another form, more than half of Osama bin Laden’s inner circle of 180 members have been put out of action.37 Included in this number are Mohammed Atef, military director, and his replacement, Abu Zubaydah, who was captured after only one month in job; Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, chief of operations; Abu Zudeida, planning director; and three chief lieutenants Yasir al-Jaziri, Ramzi Binalshibh and Waleed bin Attash. During the same period more than 3,000 rank-and-file suspects have been captured in ninety countries.

As a result of heightened intelligence cooperation around the globe, including border security, and information gained from the interrogation of Al Qaeda members, a number of Al Qaeda’s operations have been successfully interdicted. In April 2003, Ambassador Coffer Black, the State Department’s Coordinator for Counter terrorism offered this assessment ‘[Al Qaeda’s] operational capabilities are severely limited and they are unable to effectively mount attacks on high-value targets’.

The United States has succeeded in freezing US$134 million in suspect Al Qaeda funds in the United States. An additional US$20 million has been frozen worldwide.

Set against these positive achievements is the sobering fact that an estimated 70,000 persons have passed through Al Qaeda training camps or fought with the Arab...
jahidis in Afghanistan. These Afghan veterans are dispersed around the world in the Middle East, North Africa, Chechnya, and Southeast Asia.

There is still a great deal of sympathy for Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda around the globe. Al Qaeda retains the ability to replace its losses by recruitment but it is more difficult for Islamic terrorists to operate outside their traditional recruitment areas. Allied to this point is the fact that the causes of Islamic militancy remain — the Palestine-Israeli conflict, and the protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Most alarming is the assessment that Al Qaeda’s financial network is not only still intact but that Al Qaeda and its affiliates have developed new techniques to obtain, use and disburse funds and logistical resources. Al Qaeda still has access to funds from a number of Islamic charities and deep pocket donors. It has also reverted in some areas to raising funds from the illicit trade in drugs or through such self-funding activities as credit card fraud, petty crime and the remittances system.

Finally, there is evidence on the global scene that a new breed of post-Afghanistan activists is making its appearance. For example, the terrorist attacks in Casablanca earlier this year were carried out by terrorists who had not trained in Afghanistan. These have been dubbed ‘3G’ — short for third generation terrorist. In sum, Al Qaeda is not a spent force, and although its members have been dispersed Al Qaeda operatives are able to make common cause with local Islamic terrorists in more than forty countries.

What is the situation in Southeast Asia? Al Qaeda regional network has been broken up and disrupted as a consequence of the global war on terrorism. JI cells have been eliminated in Singapore and Malaysia. Several long planned operations have been disrupted as a result of police action in Malaysia and Singapore. The round up of terrorist suspects in Indonesia after Bali has also degraded JI’s operational capabilities in that country. Approximately 130 suspected JI members in Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Indonesia have been arrested or detained.

Despite this generally upbeat assessment, the threat of political terrorism remains. New terrorist cells have been discovered recently in Thailand and Cambodia. The US government estimates that 500 JI members are still active throughout the region who retain the motivation and capacity to continue their
terrorist activities. In May 2003, for example, a high-level meeting of JI operatives was reportedly held in Central Java to plan a new wave of terrorist activities.\(^{38}\)

In the near-term future political terrorism in Southeast Asia will be conducted by already existing indigenous terrorist groups. Southeast Asia's political terrorist groups will operate under their own direction in pursuit of their own aims and objectives and largely on the basis of their own resources. The Abu Sayaaaf Group is a prime example. Counter terrorism action by Malaysia and Singapore has knocked the wind out of the sails of the regional JI network dedicated to establishing an archipelagic Islamic state. JI members in Indonesia can be expected to turn inward in the absence of external sources of support. They have the capacity to mount terrorist outrages but not the ability to seriously challenge the stability of the Indonesian state.

In these new strategic circumstances it is highly unlikely that militant Islamic groups in Indonesia will turn to political terrorism to advance their cause. Their main focus will be on the forthcoming 2004 national elections. This could well be a tumultuous period of history but it will not be a period in which political terrorism and militant Islam combine and triumph.

NOTES


3. Reuters (Bangkok), July 8, 2002.


7. Tim Lester, ‘Claims Philippines blast may be linked to Al Qaeda arrests’, ABC ‘7:30 Report’, March 5, 2003. A transcript may be found at: [http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2003/s799136.htm](http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2003/s799136.htm).

8. The draft convention defined terrorism as ‘all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a groups of persons or the general public’.

9. US Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism as: ‘the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85)’.

10. US Department of State defines terrorism as: ‘premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience’.

11. US Department of Defense defines terrorism as: ‘The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological’.

12. The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as: ‘the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives’.

13. According to the Executive Order on Financing Terrorism (September 24, 2001), terrorism ‘(i) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure; and (ii) appears to be intended — (a) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; — (b) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or — (c) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking’.

14. Michael Chandler, a UN specialist on international terrorism, has compiled an additional list of 104 terrorist individuals and entities from public sources that are not included on the UN consolidated list; see: CNN, United Nations, December 18, 2002.


16. Claims by Al Chaidar, a Darul Islam activist, that approximately 15,000 Indonesian returned from Afghanistan after fighting with the Mujahidin against Soviet forces must be dismissed as wildly over exaggerated. See: The Straits Times, September 27, 2001.

18. Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law.
19. Abdul Hakim Murad was arrested almost immediately in the Philippines. Ramzi Yousef was apprehended in February 1995 in Islamabad and deported to the United States. Wali Khan Amin Shaw, who was arrested, escaped, and re-arrested was deported to the U.S. in December 1995.
21. Ibid.
22. Chris Wilson, Indonesia and Transnational Terrorism, Parliament of Australia, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Current Issues Brief no. 6, October 11, 2001, 4.
25. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism — 2002, Appendix B.
31. CNN, Jakarta, July 8, 2003
32. Abu Jabril was apprehended in June 2001 by Malaysian police.
TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA


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