African Capacity-Building for Peace Operations: UN Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS

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with
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This report is based on extensive research and interviews conducted in Africa, the United Kingdom and at the United Nations in 2004. It aims to provide better understanding of the evolving African peacekeeping capacity and recent efforts to support its growth. I hope that this work illuminates some timely issues for a broader audience and brings helpful attention to African organizations and those focused on improving peace operations worldwide. I am grateful to the many dedicated and thoughtful individuals who shared their insights, experiences, concerns, and hopes so generously and candidly. To the extent that this report achieves its goals, that success is due to their willingness to assist this project.

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Tori Holt
The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC
Abbreviations

ACCORD   African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AMIB      African Union Mission in Burundi
ASF       African Standby Force
AU        African Union
CMD       Conflict Management Division, AU
COMESA    Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States
DDR       Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DES-PADS  Office of the Deputy Executive Secretariat for Political Affairs, Defense and Security, ECOWAS
DPA       Department of Political Affairs, UN
DPKO      Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN
DRC       Democratic Republic of Congo
DSC       Defense and Security Commission, ECOWAS
EAC       East African Community
EASBRIG   East African Standby Brigade
ECAS      Economic Community of Central African States
ECOFORCE  ECOWAS Peacekeeping Force in Côte d’Ivoire
ECOMICI   ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
ECOMIL    ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG    ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS    Economic Community of West African States
IGAD      Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMTF      Integrated Mission Task Force
ISDSC     Inter-state Defense and Security Committee, SADC
ISS       Institute for Security Studies
MONUC     United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo
MPMC      Mission Planning and Management Cell, ECOWAS
MSC       Mediation and Security Council, ECOWAS
NEPAD     New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO       Non-Governmental Organization
NMIMG     Neutral Military Observer Group, ECOWAS
NUPI      Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
OAU       Organization of African Unity
OCHA      United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OLMEE     OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea
OMC       Observation and Monitoring Center
OMIB      OAU Mission in Burundi
OMIC      OAU Mission in Comoros
ONUB      United Nations Mission in Burundi
OPDSC     Organ on Defense, Politics and Security Cooperation, SADC
OSAA      Office of the Special Advisor on Africa
PBPU      Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, DPKO
PSC       Peace and Security Council, AU
PSD       Peace and Security Directorate, AU
RDL       Rapid Deployment Level
REC       Regional Economic Community
RPTC      Regional Peacekeeping Training Center, SADC
SADC      Southern African Development Community
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>South African Development Coordination Conference</td>
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<td>SDS</td>
<td>Strategic Deployment Stocks</td>
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<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Standby High Readiness Brigade</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
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<td>UMA</td>
<td>Arab-Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNLB</td>
<td>United Nations Logistics Base</td>
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<td>UNLO/AU</td>
<td>United Nations Liaison Office with the African Union</td>
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<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNOWA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for West Africa</td>
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<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Standby Arrangements System</td>
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<td>WANEP</td>
<td>West African Network for Peacebuilding</td>
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— EXECUTIVE SUMMARY —

Peacekeeping in Africa has grown dramatically over the last five years, with the continent hosting more peacekeepers than any other region. In early 2005, the United Nations led seven peace operations there, in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Western Sahara, with an eighth planned for Sudan. With increased demand for peace operations worldwide, including large and complex missions led by multinational coalitions, attention has focused on the ability of the United Nations and African organizations to respond to crises and to manage peacekeeping operations effectively.

Fueled by ambitious leadership and prompted by multiple conflicts, the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are developing more capacity to tackle regional peace and security questions. The AU and ECOWAS successfully deployed troops and led recent operations in Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, Liberia and Sudan. Donor governments are offering support bilaterally, through regional venues, and via the Group of 8 (G8), to leverage African national, subregional and continent-wide capacities for such efforts.

Ten years after the Rwandan genocide, the horrific crisis in Sudan further heightens international attention on questions of intervention and peace operations. Which African groups have the will and mechanisms to plan, deploy, manage, and sustain peace operations? What is the United Nations’ relationship with the AU and ECOWAS? What are their capacities for peace operations and how do they – or can they – work together with the United Nations? This study examines these questions.

This Report

First, this report considers the goals and architecture of the African Union and ECOWAS for leading peace operations. The African Union and ECOWAS have adopted formal mechanisms with wide-ranging peace and security responsibilities, unparalleled in Asia, South America or the Middle East. Both the AU and ECOWAS are developing standby force concepts, increasing their headquarters capacity, and working with member states and donor countries to increase their ability to organize, deploy and manage peace operations. Even as they take on increased leadership of peacekeeping operations, however, African organizations and nations can be misunderstood as having more advanced

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1 In January 2005 the UN reported about 65,000 peacekeepers deployed worldwide, with 49,169 in Africa. Another 10,000 troops are proposed for the new UN operation in the Sudan. Peacekeepers include troops, military observers and civilian police. These numbers do not include civilian staff in the field or at UN headquarters.
2 The G8 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
capacity for such missions than they actually possess. Both organizations have small and new headquarters staff of a few dozen professionals, limited funding, and rudimentary planning and management capacities to support peace operations. Ambitious plans for coordinating peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions are still in the early stages of being operationalized.

Second, this study considers how the recommendations to improve UN peace operations capacity in the “Brahimi Report,” the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in August 2000, could apply to the AU and ECOWAS. In many areas, the UN effort to support peacekeeping operations is instructive for these organizations. As UN missions have grown in numbers, size and complexity since 1999, the UN has scrambled to fill its own shortages in available, well-trained military and civilian personnel, funding, ready equipment and logistics. The structure of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and its continuing efforts for reforms, however, are not well-known within African organizations or used to guide their development. The UN experience with developing its own capacity could inform the AU and ECOWAS in meeting similar challenges; UN reform efforts parallel areas needing development within both organizations.

The AU and ECOWAS would benefit from clearer mandates, concepts of operations, leadership qualifications and doctrine for their missions, as well as from identifying requirements for civilian police and other personnel. They face fundamental gaps in their planning and management capacity to lead peace operations; staff are taxed by the requirements of their (often multiple) responsibilities. The AU and ECOWAS have successfully deployed troops in peace operations, often quickly, but they are not yet self-sustaining and require outside logistical support. The AU and ECOWAS are reliant on external sources to finance much of their headquarters and operations, since they lack sufficient funding from their member states.

Numerous opportunities for collaboration with the United Nations exist, ranging from adopting their mission planning systems to increasing participation in the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), a database of national capacities; from funding to identification of mission leadership; and from development of pre-deployment training to better coordination of logistical requirements, including potential use of the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, to support African-led missions.

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Third, this report considers the UN headquarters role in working with regional and subregional organizations such as the African Union and ECOWAS to leverage capacity for peace operations. To improve its relationship with African organizations, the United Nations has held high-level meetings on regional cooperation, identified it as a priority, and launched initiatives to look at collaboration with African efforts. Africa is dominating the UN’s peace operations agenda, as its annual budget approaches $5 billion and 75 percent of UN peacekeepers are deployed in Africa. Yet collaboration with other organizations is not natural for the United Nations, which is designed and funded to focus on UN operations rather than those led by other multinational groups – even when such missions are authorized or welcomed by the Security Council.

On an ad hoc basis, the UN headquarters has provided some support to African-led operations, such as matching countries that can provide airlift with countries offering to deploy troops or providing UN staff to assist with mission planning. In the case of Sudan, the UN Secretariat provided unusually strong mission planning support to the AU for its operation in Darfur in 2004 after the Security Council approved that role via a UN special political mission, not its traditional role. But more regular and robust UN assistance with planning and management, effective deployments, organizational capacity development or funding for regionally-based missions are all areas where collaboration is in the beginning stages. The UN lacks a strategic vision for providing such support, as well as a means of offering it consistently and clear member state backing for this approach.

Fourth, this study looks at development of a more complementary relationship between the UN and African organizations, recognizes the role of bilateral actors, considers key areas for future collaboration, and suggests priorities for regional and subregional capacities. African multinational organizations have reshaped themselves, setting out to organize more operational responses to post-conflict situations. The AU has an ambitious agenda, deploying two peace operations since 2003 and considering additional missions. ECOWAS has retooled itself, sent out multiple peacekeeping forces, and moved forward to develop a subregional standby force for future missions. Both organizations are working to build more capable headquarters staff and peacekeeping forces in concert with their member states, the international community, and the United Nations.

The United Nations is also shifting toward a clearer vision of collaboration with and support to non-UN-led operations. The Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in December 2004 offered a fresh approach, urging improvement of the UN relationship with regional groups to be “more proactive.” The Panel suggested collaborations ranging from information exchanges to co-training of civilian and military personnel to the use of NATO to help train and equip regional
The Panel urged specific attention to the African Union framework, a 10-year effort to support African regional and subregional capacities, and the UN provision of material and financial support, such as use of UN stocks and potentially funding, to African-led operations.

In general, ECOWAS and the AU have difficulty responding to outside offers of assistance, and often partner countries are unsure how to approach these organizations. Bilateral donors could also improve the impact of their support for African capacity-leveraging. Competing bilateral efforts to train and equip African forces can lack coordination, duplicate one another, and blur where real gaps exist (or do not) in capacity. A headquarters database and tracking system to handle incoming offers of financial, material and personnel support could be useful for partner countries, NGOs and the United Nations.

**Recommendations**

Since this study was proposed in 2002, the United Nations has greatly expanded one major operation (DRC) and taken on four more peacekeeping missions (Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi and Sudan) in Africa. This intense focus on African operations, and parallel development of regional actors, highlights the need for increased attention to and analysis of these topics. With new donor support to increase African capacity, however, the African organizations, the UN and donors need a joint strategy to address what is needed.

Genuine political energy and support in numerous quarters, especially evident in Africa and the West, can move ideas to real operational capacity. African organizations deserve serious support as they take on leadership of such missions, as does the United Nations for its major role in leading peace operations. The challenge is to leverage the existing political energy into a clear plan that sets priorities and harmonizes the work and resources of varied actors and member states.

Just in the past year, 2004, there has been noteworthy progress in UN collaboration with regional and subregional groups in Africa for peace operations. The heartbreaking crises in many African countries, especially the DRC and Sudan, have led to new efforts and sharper thinking about means to strengthen peacekeeping within Africa, and the role of the United Nations and other actors in supporting that effort. Many recommendations toward his goal are made within this study, with a few central themes.

**Numerous areas are ripe for better collaboration between the UN and African groups, with support of member states.** The UN could work with the AU and ECOWAS on developing their

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headquarters capacity, with a focus on mission planning and support. They could also work on the coordinated use of logistics sites (such as Brindisi and African depots); development of the African Standby Force capacities; organizing staff exchanges between headquarters; supporting hand-offs between African-led and UN-led operations; sharing lessons learned and planning expertise; improving use of early warning and analytical information in Africa; harmonizing training and doctrinal materials; and consideration of funding.

The United Nations should create an operational mechanism for working with regional and subregional organizations on peace operations and their capacity-building. UN member states should agree to use Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to trigger real support to regionally- and subregionally-led peace operations authorized by the Security Council. By identifying in advance the areas of potential support, the UN could use Council citation of Chapter VIII to “turn on” headquarters resources to such operations. On a case-by-case basis, the Council could also direct the use of assessed funding through the United Nations to support these missions.

To identify these areas of potential support, the United Nations should conduct a full assessment of how it could work more effectively with African organizations in the early planning and start-up phase of an operation; during the initial deployment and as forces ramp up; and, when appropriate, during hand-offs of leadership from regionally-led to UN-led peace operations. This review should include consideration of how the United Nations could also assist with longer-term headquarters development at the AU and ECOWAS; identify areas of joint capacity development operationally (e.g., logistics, communications, and transportation); link with African standby forces; and help develop more peacebuilding capacities for African missions. This review should also identify areas where the UN’s capacity for peace operations is enhanced by African capacity developments, such as increasing the ability of the United Nations to organize effective peace operations and smoother hand-offs from regional leadership, to access trained pools of peacekeepers (military and civilian police), and to have regional capacities listed within UN databases (e.g., on-call lists of personnel; UNSAS). United Nations efforts to support longer-term capacity-building could be funded through a trust fund managed by the UN Secretariat with voluntary contributions, as is currently done for work on preventive action.

These and other collaborative measures are explored in this report, with a view that many of them would be beneficial and worthy of support.
In the last five years, peacekeeping in Africa has grown dramatically, with the continent hosting more operations and peacekeepers than any other region. Of 16 peace operations led by the United Nations (UN) in early 2005, seven were in Africa: Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Ethiopia/Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and the Western Sahara. These African missions accounted for about 75 percent of all UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide. At the same time, demand for peace operations has expanded globally, with greater numbers of large, complex, and multidimensional missions running simultaneously. This demand has focused attention on the United Nations and African multinational organizations. Are they prepared to respond effectively to crises and to manage peace operations?

This question is timely and important for several reasons. African-led forces have deployed to hot spots across the continent, often arriving quickly after a crisis and effectively helping provide security to a region. Fueled by ambitious leadership and prompted by multiple conflicts, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and other African subregional organizations are developing more ability to tackle regional peace and security questions. These organizations are focused on anticipating major conflicts, planning and managing missions of all kinds, and supporting deployments of peacekeepers. In turn, donor governments are offering support bilaterally, through regional venues, and via the Group of 8 (G8), to leverage African national, subregional and continent-wide capacities for such efforts. And abundant political will – the key component needed for political and structural change in institutions – is helping drive this effort in Africa and internationally.

Ten years after the Rwandan genocide, the mass killings in Sudan further heighten international attention on questions of intervention and peace operations. Which groups have the political will and constitutional mechanisms to act? Which multinational organizations can plan, deploy, manage, and sustain peace operations in Africa? Where should resources go, and how can they best reinforce existing capacities? As seen in Iraq and many UN peace operations, longer-term peacebuilding and rule of law
efforts should be developed in concert with peacekeeping. What is the United Nations’ relationship with African groups?

**African Leadership and Peace Operations**

Outside of Europe, only African countries have pushed to establish their own multinational organizations capable of organizing, managing and deploying troops for peace operations. The African Union and ECOWAS have adopted formal mechanisms with wide-ranging peace and security responsibilities, unparalleled in Asia, South America or the Middle East. Within Africa, leaders offer many reasons for this focus. Some view peace operations as the equivalent of putting out a fire in a neighbor’s house – a moral instinct and a practical understanding that, if left unchecked, the flames could spread throughout the neighborhood.\(^5\) Other African leaders cite a responsibility to prevent future genocides on the continent, a call echoed by “no more Rwandas,” or cast it as “a matter of survival” for Africa.\(^6\)

The African Union operationalized its Peace and Security Council in 2003, as outlined by its Protocol adopted in 2002.\(^7\) Soon after, the African Union launched its first peacekeeping operation in Burundi. The AU deployed its second operation, a ceasefire monitoring force in Darfur, in June 2004. The ambitious AU agenda also includes development of subregional brigades to comprise its proposed African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010. In West Africa, ECOWAS developed a broader peace and security mechanism in 1999, reflecting its increasing use of forces in the region. More recently ECOWAS launched peace operations to intervene in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia. ECOWAS has also adopted a standby force concept, with designs for a regional task force under consideration.

In other subregions, African organizations that traditionally focus on development and economic agendas have moved to address peace and security issues, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). SADC involvement in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo has been controversial and subject to dispute by its members. IGAD has engaged in mediating efforts in Somalia and Sudan, with the potential for offering peacekeepers.

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\(^5\) Discussion with Ambassador Raph Uweche, ECOWAS Special Representative in Côte d’Ivoire, Stimson Center roundtable, Washington, DC, January 2004.


\(^7\) *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the Africa Union* adopted in Durban, South Africa, 9 July 2002.
Many recent African peace operations have been hybrids, where African organizations have played a lead role in advance of – and then in concert with – the United Nations and individual nations. In Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS intervened in late 2002, with subsequent support from the French, laying the groundwork for the UN to take leadership of a peacekeeping operation there in 2003. In Liberia, ECOWAS deployed troops in the summer of 2003 with US assistance. The mission then transitioned to UN leadership in October 2003. In Burundi, the AU led a peacekeeping force primarily from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique in 2003, which the UN took over in June 2004. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the European Union (EU) authorized a French-led force to the north-eastern DRC in June 2003 to secure the town of Bunia in the Ituri region for three months, giving the UN time to organize a more robust and expanded force to replace it that fall. In Sudan, the African Union has led an observer force in Darfur, as the United Nations planned for a broader peace operation in the southern past of the country.

With all this movement, however, African organizations and nations can be misunderstood as having more advanced capacity for peace operations than they actually possess. African troops may be available, but they are not yet self-sustaining and often lack logistical support. Depending on the kind of peace operation, from truce-monitoring missions to more robust peace enforcement, they require added headquarters support, logistics capability and general mission support, sufficient and skilled military and civilian personnel, funding, a clear concept of operations and links to a peacebuilding plan.

Regional and subregional organizations face the same challenges as the United Nations, plus additional ones. To help meet these challenges, outside partners have offered support for leveraging African development of organizational and national capacities for peace operations. The United States, Great Britain and France have run modest, bilateral military training programs focused on selected countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Many other governments have direct programs in Africa, including Canada, Japan, Norway, Germany and Belgium that focus on aspects of peace operations capacity-building. The G8 announced an ambitious “Africa Action Plan” in 2002 pledging funding and logistical support for African-led peace and security organizations and the proposed African Standby Force. The United Kingdom created a Commission on Africa forecasting its focus as chair of the 2005 G8 Summit.

With new donor support to increase African capacity, however, the African organizations, the UN and donors need a joint strategy to address what is needed. This is challenging, especially at a time when immediate crises may postpone longer-term planning and as resources are applied to urgent

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8 Ethiopian peacekeepers in Burundi also lacked sufficient food or medical supplies. Author interview, June 2004.
requirements. What is a useful, analytical way of looking at how leveraging African capacity is developing and where should future support be best applied?

**A Framework for Capacity: The Brahimi Report**

Lessons can be learned from the United Nations. Aware of its shortcomings in peace operations during the 1990s, the UN took a hard look at its own capacity to lead peace operations. After tough reports on UN failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan created an expert panel to ask hard questions about how the organization could do better. Led by UN Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi and subsequently referred to as the “Brahimi Report,” the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* issued strong recommendations in August 2000. It urged improvements in strategy and doctrine, planning and management of operations, and rapid and effective deployment. The Report pushed for UN member states to advance reforms, make UN headquarters more capable, and improve their contributions to peace operations.

Since 2000, the UN and its members have accomplished a great deal. The United Nations strengthened its headquarters planning and management capacity, improved its ability to support more rapid and effective deployments and better integrated the peacebuilding and peacekeeping components of operations.9

Yet modern UN peace operations are more ambitious and complex today than at any other time since the end of the Cold War. The United Nations faces challenges and finite resources for its peace operations. As UN missions have grown in numbers, size and complexity since 1999, the UN has scrambled to fill shortages in available, well-trained military and civilian personnel, funding, ready equipment and logistics. Today’s peace operations are more multidimensional, and likely to operate with robust rules of engagement.10 Costs are also reaching new heights, with annual UN peacekeeping spending headed toward $5 billion. The bulk of those funds support efforts associated with African peacekeeping.

These operations benefit from the numerous reforms pressed forward since the Brahimi Report, such as improved logistics capacity and clearer matching of Security Council mandates with missions and troop contributors. The UN still has major gaps in its capacities and in its ability to meet the demand for

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10 Chapter VI of the UN Charter refers to the organization’s role in the pacific settlement of disputes that threaten international peace and security, the authority for most UN peacekeeping missions before 1990. Chapter VII is cited for operations with more robust mandates and where peacekeepers may use force beyond self-defense, the majority of UN-led operations approved since 1999.
peacekeepers with skill and credibility. The United Nations is also looking at a better relationship with regional and subregional organizations and how they can play a useful role initiating and supporting peace operations.

One natural question is how the UN’s own effort to evaluate and reform its conduct of peacekeeping can be applied to frame a discussion of support for peacekeeping in Africa. The Brahimi Report’s recommendations offer important areas to consider for regional operations and for evaluating organizational capacity. The Brahimi framework also provides the potential for mutual support. As regional and subregional capacity for peace operations progresses in Africa, how are these efforts consistent with UN efforts since the Brahimi Report? How is UN collaboration with regional organizations supporting capacity-building for peace operations broadly?

**Collaboration with the United Nations**

The United Nations is expected to be a natural source of collaboration with regional and subregional organizations. And African institutions are an obvious venue from which to lead peace operations, especially as the UN faces a dramatic increase in its own mission requirements. The UN has held high-level meetings on regional cooperation, identified it as a priority, and launched several initiatives to focus on collaboration with African efforts.

Yet actual collaboration with such organizations, especially in providing material, planning and funding support, is not natural for the United Nations. Fundamentally, the UN is not designed to support peace operations led or run by other multinational organizations. The Brahimi Report offered a mere paragraph on this topic, succinctly urging more cooperation with regional organizations. The Panel suggested that cooperation on peacebuilding activities such as electoral support was a good fit, but cautioned that many war-torn regions were unlikely to have their own robust peace operations capacities. It therefore recognized that training, equipment, logistics and resources would be needed for regional and subregional organizations to participate in UN-led missions or to conduct their own operations.11 Despite this practical list, the United Nations has neither a strategic vision for providing such support nor a clear means of doing so on a regular basis. Indeed, the very offices of the UN Secretariat that are charged with UN peace operations appear the most constricted in using their resources to support African regional and subregional organizations. The UN needs to clarify its vision for collaboration with and support to non-UN-led operations on a practical level.

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**This Report**

Since this study was proposed in late 2002, the United Nations has greatly expanded one major operation (DRC) and taken on four more peacekeeping missions (Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi and Sudan) in Africa. This intense focus on African operations, and parallel development of regional actors, highlights the need for increased analysis of these topics.

The presumption of this project was that the Brahimi Report’s recommendations could apply to African organizations, help identify areas of strength and weakness, highlight gaps, and offer a focus for the United Nations and nations to fill those gaps. A few dilemmas were realized, however:

- African ambitions are high and they have deployed peacekeepers to new operations, but the proposed architecture of the AU and ECOWAS far exceeds their current support structures for peace operations;
- Analyzing African capacity through the lens of the Brahimi Report cannot presume that specific capacities within ECOWAS and AU headquarters, or within other African subregional organizations, already parallel the UN structure;
- Despite enthusiasm within the international community to work more closely with African groups, the UN is *not designed* to directly support development of regional and subregional organizational capacity, their mission deployments, or field activities. The UN lacks a formal mechanism and strategic vision for providing either staff or material assistance on a regular basis; and
- There is a lack of consensus on how to build improved international capacity for peace operations, and thus, a competition for resources without common priorities. African organizations are learning how to develop their own plans and respond to offers of outside support. Donor nations often provide bilateral assistance to individual nations, rather than through or to regional and subregional organizations. UN mechanisms of outreach to regional organizations are still in their infancy.

As efforts to increase international capacity for peace operations expand, where should support be directed: to the United Nations, or to regional and subregional organizations? Further, how can efforts be harmonized with UN capacity-building and reform efforts, and how can UN hands be untied so they can work better with regional groups prior to assuming their operations? One need is clear – the United Nations should have a better mechanism for working with regional and subregional organizations.

This study is the result of research and interviews conducted in 2004 with individuals working within the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS, and from interviews of experts and practitioners in
The interviews asked how the measures laid out in the Brahimi Report related to current efforts by African institutions to organize peace operations and how the UN collaborates with these regional groups in their efforts. While important political insights were offered, this paper does not concentrate on the political issues involved. The report is divided into four chapters:

- **Chapter 1, Architecture of African Organizations: The AU and ECOWAS**, looks at the proposed structures of African multinational organizations for peace operations, especially at ECOWAS and the African Union.

- **Chapter 2, The Brahimi Report and African Capacity**, considers the reforms pushed forward for UN peace operations capacity by the Brahimi Report and how such reforms compare to the capacities of the African Union and ECOWAS.


- **Chapter 4. Looking Forward: UN-African Complementarity**, examines how these concurrent efforts to increase peace operations capacity are potentially compatible, competitive, or divergent, and offers recommendations for the UN and African multinational organizations to work together better.

This report aims to offer a picture of current efforts to support peace operations capacity. The goal is to help identify gaps between the important ambitions of African multinational organizations and the structures available to support those ambitions in peace operations; to give a primarily Western audience a better understanding of why those gaps exist; and to relate some of the capacity-building efforts at the United Nations to those in Africa. This report aims to offer insight into how the UN does – and does not – provide support to African regional and subregional organizations. Most of all, the purpose here is to provide a practical perspective and useful recommendations for policymakers to help improve work within and between multinational organizations, partner nations, and peacekeepers in carrying out more successful peace operations.

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12 A list of interviews is cited in the Annex.
Among African organizations, the African Union and ECOWAS are at the forefront of leading peace operations in Africa. They are unique in their peace and security mechanisms and the architecture proposed for their activities in this area. Subregional organizations such as SADC, IGAD, and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community have some ambitions to conduct peace operations. Like many other subregional groups, such as the Economic Community of Central African States, the East African Community, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States and the Arab-Maghreb Union, they are more active in offering conflict management, mediation and diplomatic efforts.

This chapter looks at AU and ECOWAS structures and the on-going implementation of their new mechanisms. In reviewing institutional structures, the focus is on their headquarters capacity, and its implications for peacekeeping interventions and coordination with other actors. This chapter provides a basis for understanding how their ambitions match their existing tools for peace operations, and where the key gaps exist. Better understanding of these gaps can help guide better collaboration among African organizations, the United Nations and partner countries.

The African Union

The African Union came to life in July 2002. With 53 founding members (all African countries joined except Morocco) and a wide-ranging agenda, the AU replaced the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and reflects a fundamental shift in thinking for African leadership. Based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the current AU is structured and better designed to respond to conflicts on the continent than its predecessor. The OAU, which emphasized the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, lacked both the statutory authority and capacity to intervene in matters related to peace and security. The AU, which embraces international cooperation and recognizes the primacy of the UN Charter in peace and security, has also adopted a wider field of engagement options, from mediation to using force to intervene in specific circumstances. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act specifies:
The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity… the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.\textsuperscript{13}

**Main Bodies: The Peace and Security Council and the AU Commission**

Two bodies are primarily responsible for the AU peace and security agenda today, the *Peace and Security Council* (PSC) and the *AU Commission*. The PSC is designed as the main decision-making body, much like the UN Security Council. The day-to-day work on peace and security issues is conducted by the AU Commission, a role that parallels that of the UN Secretariat.

In July 2002, the AU adopted the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*, which details the PSC mission and operational structure. The AU Constitutive Act was signed in July 2000, but the PSC framework took several years of consultation among member states. The Peace and Security Council was established by AU member states in late 2003 as the standing decision-making organ “for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts,” with a goal of “timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.”\textsuperscript{14} The Protocol sets the role of the PSC within the context of the primary role of the United Nations and the UN’s own recognition of regional arrangements in this arena:

Mindful of the provision of the Charter of the United Nations, conferring on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as the provision of the Charter on the role of regional arrangements or agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security, and the need to forge closer cooperation and partnership between the UN, other international organizations and the African Union, in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa…\textsuperscript{15}

Several entities are designated to support the PSC: the *Commission*; an *African Standby Force* (including a *Military Staff Committee*); a *Panel of the Wise*; a *Continental Early Warning System*; and a *Special Fund*. The PSC Protocol identifies the components for developing an AU capacity for peace support operations, mostly within the context of the African Standby Force, as well as signals an ambition to conduct peacebuilding efforts.

\textsuperscript{13} *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, Article 4.
\textsuperscript{15} *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*. 
Of the bodies proposed to support the PSC, the AU Commission is the most developed. Established before the Peace and Security Council, the Commission created the Peace and Security Directorate prior to PSC ratification in 2003. The Directorate is the institutional body for supporting AU goals to promote peace and respond to crisis in the region. It has three main divisions: the Peace and Security Council Secretariat; the Peace Support Operations Division; and the Conflict Management Division (see Diagram 1). Within the Peace Support Operations Division are two sections, the Operations and Support Unit and the ASF and Military Staff Committee Unit. The Conflict Management Division includes an Early Warning Unit and a Conflict Management, Resolution, and Post-Conflict Unit. These sections are designed to develop policy options and support actions to prevent, manage, and help resolve inter-state and intra-state conflict.


The African Standby Force concept, approved in 2003, is a priority for the PSC as the primary means of future AU peace operations. Based on standby multidisciplinary contingents, the ASF is envisioned with civilian and military components stationed in their home countries and ready for call-up and deployment. The ASF peace and security responsibilities are broad, with the force expected to serve multiple, diverse purposes, including monitoring and observation missions, preventive deployments, peacebuilding efforts and post-conflict missions, and peace support operations and interventions.

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16 Author interviews, African Union, June 2004. The ASF is outlined in Article 13 of the PSC Protocol.
The ASF will be directed by the Peace and Security Council, in coordination with the UN and other regional and international institutions. (The UN has actively participated in the process of developing the ASF concept, which is considered further in Chapter 3.) Meeting the ASF goals depends on member states establishing standby contingents for participation in peace operations under AU guidelines and leadership. Each of the five African subregions is expected to organize an operational standby brigade, with the more advanced subregions having a rapid deployment capacity and planning elements embedded within the AU Commission headquarters. Six scenarios are identified for action under the initial ASF framework:17

1) Provision of advice to a political mission  
2) Observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission  
3) Stand-alone AU observer mission  
4) AU peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions  
5) AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission with low-level spoilers  
6) AU intervention (e.g., to intervene against genocide)

The AU has proposed ambitious deployment timelines for these scenarios. For scenarios one through four, peace operations should be deployed within 30 days. For scenario five, when it involves a military deployment, deployments should be complete in 90 days. Fastest of all, scenario six of an AU intervention is expected to deploy within 14 days.

The ASF is being designed in two phases. The first phase, originally to be completed in 2005, aims to give the AU capacity to offer advice to political missions and manage the strategic requirements of co-deployment. The second phase is scheduled for completion in 2010 and builds on AU capacity to manage observer missions. By then, each subregion is expected to develop regional standby brigades through their multinational organizations, giving the AU additional support in deploying and managing complex peace support operations throughout the continent.18

The African subregional organizations are viewed as the first point of contact for a crisis on the continent, with the AU providing a continental perspective in consultation with the United Nations. For each ASF mission, the Chairperson of the Commission would appoint a Special Representative and a Force Commander (much like the UN structure for leadership of operations.) The Military Staff

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18 For a complete discussion of the ASF framework, see previously cited Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee.
Committee, which has yet to be established, will support the PSC and the ASF missions. The ASF borrows from the design of the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which emphasizes the importance of headquarters capacity. The AU expects to develop a headquarters component with a robust planning cell and strategic planning unit to coordinate development of the five regional brigades. The planning elements within AU headquarters (and each of the subregional groups, known as Regional Economic Communities, or RECs) would include staff focused on training, doctrine and management.

Ideally, the structure of the five regional brigades would support a continental system, which could also feed into UN planning and organization. The ASF concept also outlines the need for training guidelines for both civilian and military personnel contingents at the operational and tactical levels, and envisions training to be in accordance with UN practices and standards. Non-military aspects of the ASF include a standby capacity for civilian police, as well as civilian experts in areas such as human rights, governance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

**AU Progress and Challenges**

There are major challenges facing the young African Union, especially in developing an AU headquarters capacity and meeting its own timeline for the African Standby Force. The scope of the ASF concept is very ambitious, especially its goal of five interoperable regional brigades by 2010. The AU needs to establish a common mission statement, operating guidelines, and training standards to guide participating countries and subregional organizations.

Within the AU Commission’s Peace and Security Directorate, insufficient staff and funding have hampered personnel tasked with supporting current missions and forward-looking projects such as the African Standby Force. Lack of coordination between the AU and the subregional organizations on capacity-building has also impacted development of the ASF modalities. In fact, only a handful of the 53 AU member states had defense attaches assigned to Addis Ababa in 2004, making it difficult to create a standing committee at Headquarters.

Without guidance to the subregions, the AU concept suffers from unclear responsibilities and capabilities for the proposed brigades. Of the five subregions, only ECOWAS has a clearly viable multinational

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19 The Military Staff Committee is to consist of senior military officers of the Members of the Peace and Security Council.
organization from which to organize and manage brigades or standby forces. Further, some countries belong to more than one group. For purposes of the ASF they must either choose or be assigned to a subregional association. Multiple allegiances influence their relationship with these groups, as well as with the African Union.

Even where there is a strong organization such as ECOWAS, communication and collaboration with the African Union is not assured. ECOWAS, with multiple peace operations under its belt, has its own aspirations for leading a subregional force, outside the scope of the African Standby Force. Such competition reflects the fact that the relationship between ECOWAS and the AU is not institutionalized. While the dialogue is evolving between the organizations, patchy communications affect their collaboration.

Funding from outside donors is an explicit requirement of current and proposed AU capacity. The AU must secure a method of financing its operations, development of the ASF and its headquarters capacity. Where the former OAU had four organs, the AU now contains 17 and has a much larger budget. The ASF proposal calls for financing of $600 million: $200 million from its member states, $200 million from outside partner countries, and $200 million from the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The Peace and Security Directorate budget, in contrast, was budget at a mere $500,000 in 2004, with most of its activities funded through extra-budgetary resources from donors. Still, the PSD is the only department within the African Union that has a certain percentage of the AU budget earmarked for its activities.

As described in more depth in the later chapters, numerous capacity challenges limit the African Union. The AU also relies on external support to lead peace operations and cannot sustain them on its own. Both AU deployments of forces have relied heavily on bilateral donations from a variety of countries. Even so, the Burundi mission anticipated an eventual handoff from the AU to the UN, providing a stop-gap force deployed with outside financial, logistical, and planning support. Though South Africa was able to deploy immediately to the Burundi mission, Mozambique and Ethiopia were aided by financial and training support from the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively.

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22 With respect to the proposed African Standby Force, IGAD will coordinate the design and development of the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) with cooperation from the 13 members that make up the East Africa Region.
24 In 2004, six percent of the total budget was earmarked for the PSD; the department would like to increase the percentage to ten.
25 Support came from the US and Europe, as well as logistical support from South Africa, among other contributors.
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS)

ECOWAS is the most experienced African multinational organization in conducting peace operations. Founded in 1975 to promote economic integration, ECOWAS has increasingly taken on a role in peace and security issues in West Africa. With its 15 member states, ECOWAS has demonstrated a willingness to put boots on the ground, deploying forces to Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1998) and Guinea Bissau (1998), Côte d’Ivoire (2002) and Liberia (2003).26

The early ECOWAS operations of the 1990s met with mixed reviews, praised for their efforts to provide security and protection, but criticized for their lacking skills and most distressingly, committing human rights abuses. ECOWAS today recognizes that its “peace-keeping activities have in the main been considered commendable,” although they had a “few shortcomings.”27 After the 1990 deployment of troops to Liberia as the ECOWAS Observation and Monitoring Group, or ECOMOG, the ECOWAS Treaty was revised in 1993 to include new peace and security objectives.28 To further identify how and when to intervene in the region, ECOWAS members decided to establish a mechanism for its security-related actions.

In October 1999, ECOWAS adopted its current framework for peace operations, the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. The Protocol outlines a conflict management role for ECOWAS in preventive diplomacy, human rights, early warning, cross-border crime, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance, including to:

Promote close cooperation between member states in the areas of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping; constitute and deploy a civilian and military force to maintain or restore peace within the subregion.29

ECOWAS also defined more clearly its grounds for intervention, establishing that it would respond to humanitarian disasters, threats to peace and security for the subregion, and disorder occurring after threats to a democratically-elected government.

The main organs supporting its peace and security responsibilities are the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) and the Executive Secretariat. The MSC is composed of the foreign ministers or Heads

26 ECOWAS includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
28 Today ECOWAS uses the term ECOMOG to designate the military instrument of ECOWAS.
of State from ECOWAS member states. Similar to the AU Peace and Security Council, the MSC is authorized to make ECOWAS decisions on peace and security matters, and will:

Decide and implement all policies for conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping and security; authorize all forms of military intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of political and military mission; approve mandates and terms of reference for such missions.30

The MSC has several supporting committees: the Defense and Security Commission (DSC), the Council of Elders and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The DSC is designated to backstop peacekeeping operations that are conducted by ECOMOG, while the Council of Elders is designed to serve as a standing group of experts and leaders who serve two year terms and are available to act as regional mediators and negotiators.31 As senior leaders within the ECOWAS community, members of the Council of Elders are to be available for dispatch at the request of the Mediation and Security Council to lead responses to regional crises. Additionally, the ECOWAS early warning system is overseen by its Secretariat and intended to work in conjunction with the MSC and its three supporting elements. The ECOWAS objectives for developing the MSC, Defense and Security Department, Early Warning System and proposed subregional standby force parallel both the stated goals of the African Union and the goals of the UN and international community in Africa.

The ECOWAS Secretariat

While ECOWAS deployments have accelerated its recognition as a leader in the region and internationally in peace operations, the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria has just begun to truly develop a headquarters capacity for planning and managing peace operations.32 Within the Secretariat offices, the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defense and Security (DESPADS) has the lead for peace and security (see Diagram 2).33 It has four departments: Political Affairs, Humanitarian Assistance, Defense and Security, and Observation and Monitoring Center. These offices are the operational arms of the Protocol.

30 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Article 10. The AU Summit needs to approve any peace operation involving a military component.
31 Protocol, Articles 17, 19, 20, 21.
32 For more discussion, see Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Institute for Security Studies, 2000, page 78.
33 “The Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defense and Security shall initiate and undertake all activities relating to the implementation of the Mechanism,” (Article 16), Protocol.
As recently as 2000, DES-PADS had just one full-time official, the Deputy Secretary, who shouldered the work with support from the legal department. Today each of the four departments in DES-PADS has a director, all of which are new positions in the last few years.

The Humanitarian Affairs Department was set up in 2003. By mid-2004, the department consisted of the Director and one staff person.\(^{34}\) The department acts as a liaison with NGOs and UN agencies, such as the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), but does not have an operational budget.\(^{35}\) The department is still developing a real track record and addressing issues identified for its work such as famine, flood and refugees. ECOMOG units are supposed to include a humanitarian officer who liaises with NGOs in the field.\(^{36}\) The Political Affairs Department is also underdeveloped, with just the Director and one staff position filled as of the middle of 2004. The Defense and Security Department

\(^{34}\) Author interview, ECOWAS, June 2004.
\(^{35}\) Author interview, ECOWAS, June 2004.
\(^{36}\) Author interview, ECOWAS, June 2004.
is the most fully staffed and experienced of the departments. Even with a skeleton planning staff, it has supported deployment of peace operations to Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, gaining greater operational experience than other departments. ECOWAS is developing its Mission Planning and Management Cell (MPMC) to help fill the Secretariat’s planning capacity gap.

Yet the headquarters and logistics capability at ECOWAS still need substantial development despite improvements. During the Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire crises, ECOWAS had few military officers in its headquarters in Abuja. In 2004, the officers that staffed these missions within DES-PADS were seconded Nigerian military officers, not permanent ECOWAS staff. At least two of the officers were scheduled to depart ECOWAS and the MPMC in 2004, before replacements were identified by ECOWAS. A Canadian initiative usefully aimed to recruit officers from ECOWAS member states to staff up and work in the MPMC. Staffing support could dramatically increase ECOWAS capacity in many needed areas such as managing missions; helping develop doctrine, planning systems, standard operating procedures, and force generation; and in establishing the standby units and conducting lessons learned studies.

The fourth department, the Observation and Monitoring Center (OMC), focuses on creation of an early warning system in West Africa. OMC is designed with bureaus in four regional zones, each with a director, accountant and support staff. Each office is to report on signs of conflict as well as disasters; on economic, political and military issues; and about small arms and child trafficking. Each bureau chief needs to develop a network of government and non-governmental contacts to track events in the zones. The EU has helped recruit bureau heads, but formalized networks for the bureaus to use remain under development.

The Observation and Monitoring Center staff is working with an NGO, the West African Network for Peace (WANEP), to build these early warning networks. WANEP has conducted training seminars on conflict indicators and warning signs, and a WANEP liaison officer works within ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja. The zonal bureaus are to write and send weekly reports by email or over the telephone. OMC personnel in DES-PADS had few current reports that were available weekly or which were compiled in a standardized template for the reports. In addition, WANEP field staff report to their

37 Author interviews, ECOWAS, June 2004.
38 Canada had earmarked $4.5 million for added staff for the mission planning cell and funding for a small arms unit, scholarship fund for training, and the ECOWAS Peace Fund. Author interview, ECOWAS, June 2004.
39 Author interview, ECOWAS, June 2004.
40 Author interviews, ECOWAS, June 2004.
liaison officer at ECOWAS, rather than report through the ECOWAS zonal bureaus. Discussions were beginning about creating a formal link between the early warning efforts at ECOWAS and the United Nations or the African Union. ECOWAS has considered funding a staff exchange with the United Nations to enhance ECOWAS’ early warning capabilities and to liaise with the UN on early warning issues.

**Task Force/ECOMOG**

In 2004, ECOWAS announced its decision to create a rapidly deployable standby capacity through ECOMOG. The Protocol identified ECOMOG as its military component, to be based on a standby arrangement involving the use of national contingents. Contingents are expected to be earmarked, trained and equipped in advance of deployment and prepared for such deployment on short notice.

In June 2004, the Defense and Security Commission approved the concept of a 6,500-strong force with three parts. An ECOWAS task force would have 1,500 rapidly deployable troops, followed by a brigade of 3,500 troops for more prolonged missions, and 1,500 troops in reserve. The initial 1,500 troops would be deployable within 30 days, with the remaining 5,000 troops deployable within and self-sustaining for 90 days. The Defense and Security Commission outlined other standby elements, including the operational requirements and procedures of the force, and an evaluation of equipment and logistics capabilities of member states. In general, ECOWAS has used a military approach to conflicts, not yet developing a parallel capacity for humanitarian or peacebuilding responses.

ECOWAS was also asked to examine the infrastructure needed for logistics depots in the subregion, specifically in Mali and Sierra Leone. Additional resources in West Africa include three designated training centers for peacekeeping operations in West Africa. The National War College in Nigeria is aimed at the strategic level, a training center in Mali operates at the tactical level, and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana is focused on the operational level.

**Financing and the Peace Fund**

ECOWAS is severely limited in its ability to fund its deployments and to sustain its headquarters staff. The Protocol provision for funding from member states (Article 36) remained unimplemented until 2003.

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41 Author interview, ECOWAS, June 2004. WANEP has a director in 12 of the 15 ECOWAS countries with three to four staff. Not all country offices are focused on early warning; WANEP also works on other Mano River issues.
42 Author interview, ECOWAS, June 2004.
44 *Nigeria: Defense Chiefs Give Green Light to Rapid Reaction Force*, UN OCHA, IRIN news, 21 June 2004. The sustainment or reserve units would be earmarked or identified in advance.
when the ECOWAS summit again encouraged member states to pay their share into the Peace Fund.\textsuperscript{45} Member state compliance has been slow, and the Peace Fund remains on the agenda of most member state meetings in an effort to solidify support for the financing. An operations manual for the Peace Fund was crafted by an ECOWAS consultant with the help of the African Development Bank.\textsuperscript{46} ECOWAS can use the Peace Fund to harmonize and standardize its funding process while providing partners, donors and member states more transparent information about ECOWAS financing.

**Other Subregional Groups**

Other subregional organizations, such as SADC, have yet to materialize as viable or politically coherent managers of peace operations in their neighborhoods or continentally. The SADC\textit{ Protocol}, which requires nine ratifications, has yet to become operational. Despite its shortcomings, SADC remains the likely southern Africa regional contribution to the ASF regional brigade system, and its member states have met to discuss formation of a brigade by the end of 2005.\textsuperscript{47} The SADC\textit{ Protocol} proposes an early warning system similar to those proposed by ECOWAS and the AU, but most of the objectives contained within its Protocol are not realistic. SADC also faces significant funding and capacity restraints; there is no SADC fund where members or donors can contribute to operations.\textsuperscript{48} SADC also has the same problem as the other regional organizations in regards to training and doctrine.

Since forming in 1986, IGAD has moved from its focus on drought and trade to include regional cooperation on issues like border security and conflict mitigation. By 1996, IGAD had created an organizational arm for conflict prevention, dispute resolution and humanitarian affairs. While too underdeveloped for organizing full scale peace operations, IGAD has played a role in conflict resolution in Somalia and the Sudan and with the former OAU to facilitate peace talks in the region.

Moving from proposed architecture to a real operational capacity is difficult and challenging for multinational organizations, as UN member states know. The lessons of the UN efforts to develop better headquarters support and coherent member state capabilities are instructive for looking at the development of African organizations and lessons for their efforts. The Brahimi Report offers one lens through which to frame expert thinking about the requirements for successful management of multinational peace operations and avenues for cooperation among African efforts, outside partners, and the United Nations.

\textsuperscript{45} Author interview, ECOWAS, June 2004.
\textsuperscript{46} Author interview, ECOWAS, June 2004.
To meet their ambitions to play a leadership role in African peace operations – whether with observation and monitoring missions, or with peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations – the AU and ECOWAS must develop baseline capacities beyond what they have today. The short list of requirements includes logistics, management, financing, personnel, leadership and training. These categories parallel the areas in which the United Nations has worked to improve its ability to organize and manage peace operations.

While the AU and ECOWAS plan to expand their capacity for peace operations, they are not trying to equal the United Nations in scale or global responsibilities. The UN has the political leverage and organizational reach to run multiple efforts simultaneously, providing support to its peace operations with related relief, development, peacebuilding and political initiatives. No African group has this breadth, of course, though African nations offer many resources. Whereas the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) employs roughly 600 staff at its headquarters, both the AU and ECOWAS are lucky to count two to three dozen full-time professionals serving in their entire DPKO-equivalent headquarters.

This chapter uses one of the UN’s own landmark reports on peacekeeping reforms, that of the influential Panel on UN Peace Operations of August 2000, known as the “Brahimi Report,” as a tool to consider how the capacities necessary for UN operations apply to the African Union and ECOWAS and whether they are along the same lines. No public equivalent of the Brahimi Report has analyzed and sorted out how the UN and African organizations are developing alongside each other in this area, though far more expert studies than this have looked at AU and ECOWAS capacities. By using the recommendations of the Brahimi Report and its record of implementation, this section offers one lens for viewing how African capacity compares to UN capacity; how the UN, regional and subregional organizations in

49 In this chapter, the 2000 report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations will be referred to as “the Report,” the “Brahimi Report,” and the “Panel’s findings.”
Africa are expected to work together; and how they could collaborate in developing better tools for conducting peace operations.

There is increasing enthusiasm for African capacity-building for peace operations. UN member states are concerned with African capacity, either as members of the AU and ECOWAS, as partners to African nations and organizations, or as countries interested in operations succeeding in supporting post-conflict stability and peacebuilding efforts in Africa. There is also an expectation that an improved UN capacity for peace operations benefits regional and subregional groups. Lacking, however, is a common means of looking at the key requirements for such operations, and an understanding of how the UN and African groups can best work together as their headquarters try to prepare for peace operations. This is especially important as the demand for peace and stability operations has grown, and with it, the numbers of “hybrid” missions where multiple organizations try to synchronize their field activities. The international community also needs a better rationalization of the various capacity-building efforts to support such missions.

**UN GOALS: The Brahimi Report and Peace Operations Capacities**

Nearly five years ago, UN experiences in Africa played a prominent role in the Brahimi Panel’s considerations. The United Nations led 17 peace operations in Africa during the 1990s. Many of these missions illustrated the central UN challenge in matching Council mandates with the provision of effective forces.\(^{51}\) The Brahimi Panel responded directly to Secretary General Kofi Annan’s call to recognize and address past UN failures, as during the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

The Panel was not just concerned with past events, however. As it worked, the UN was busy keeping up with new peace operations launched by the Security Council, with three in Africa in 1999-2000. These operations included a daunting effort to provide peacekeepers to the war-torn Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1999, where UN forces were trying to facilitate peace in a region wracked by a multinational, multi-party conflict known as “Africa’s first world war.”\(^{52}\) In July 2000, close to 4,000 UN peacekeepers were being deployed to monitor the implementation of a peace agreement after a nasty border war in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Most visceral for the Panel, however, was the immediate crisis in Sierra Leone, where UN forces were not prepared and properly resourced to deal with attacks, kidnappings, and resolute rebel resistance.

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\(^{51}\) UN-led operations are distinct from operations authorized by the UN Security Council but led by a regional or subregional organization, a lead nation or as a multinational force (MNF).

\(^{52}\) Description used, for example, by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright; see “Albright calls for end to ‘Africa’s First World War,’” CNN.com, 24 January 2000.
A Cautionary View

With nearly 80 recommendations, the Brahimi Report offered neither a broad strategy for the UN to develop relationships with regional and subregional organizations, nor specific recommendations about their role in peace operations.\(^{53}\) The Report recognized traditional areas of collaboration in peacebuilding and humanitarian endeavors (activities often outside the realm of the UN Secretariat), but cautioned against over-regionalization of responsibility for peace operations.

The Panel seemed to urge the international community not to adopt a wholesale philosophy of subsidiarity and devolve responsibility for intervention and management of peace operations to those closest to the conflict. Competence in leading peace operations, not proximity to “crisis-prone areas,” was of foremost importance for modern peacekeeping:

The Charter clearly encourages cooperation with regional and subregional organizations to resolve conflict and establish and maintain peace and security. The United Nations is actively and successfully engaged in many such cooperation programmes in the field of conflict prevention, peacemaking, elections and electoral assistance, human rights monitoring and humanitarian work and other peace-building activities in various parts of the world. Where peacekeeping operations are concerned, however, caution seems appropriate, because military resources and capability are unevenly distributed around the world, and troops in the most crisis-prone areas are often less prepared for the demands of modern peacekeeping than is the case elsewhere. Providing training, equipment, logistical support and other resources to regional and subregional organizations could enable peacekeepers from all regions to participate in a United Nations peacekeeping operation or to set up regional peacekeeping operations on the basis of a Security Council resolution.\(^{54}\)

Along with its caution, the Panel encouraged filling well-known operational gaps facing regional and subregional organizations in support of UN-led or UN-authorized peace operations: training, equipment and logistical support. The Panel reiterated the view that regional groups should have UN authorization for peace operations (further discussed in Chapter 3).\(^{55}\)

The Panel’s Recommendations for UN Peace Operations

A few broad principles framed the Brahimi Report and remain salient for UN peace operations today, whether in Africa or elsewhere. First, warfighting is the job of nations and coalitions, not the United Nations. But peacekeepers should be prepared to deal with armed groups or bandits and not get pushed

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\(^{53}\) The Report’s formal recommendations include 55 major measures; another two dozen were within the text of the Report (A/55/305). See also UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/502, 20 October 2000.

\(^{54}\) Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, A/55/305, paragraph 54.

\(^{55}\) The AU and ECOWAS do no recognize UN authorizations as a requirement for their actions.
around during the conduct of their mission. The UN may need to provide troops with more robust rules of engagement (ROE) and specialized support to implement peace after intrastate conflicts. Second, peacekeeping and peacebuilding must be complementary from the beginning. The security provided temporarily by peacekeepers enables peacebuilding to work; peacebuilders help develop the institutions and environment that sustain security and enables peacekeepers to return home. Third, fundamental support is required from member states and within headquarters to underpin peace operations. Their collaboration affects and influences the capacity and success of the organization’s missions. These principles apply to operations led by regional and subregional organizations too.

With its focus on peacekeeping, the Panel identified more specific requirements: clarify UN mandates and match capacity with the mandates’ directives; improve communication among actors in headquarters, the field and member states; support better planning, logistics and mission leadership; deploy more rapidly and effectively with skilled and available military and civilian personnel (including police); and develop rule of law capacities and better links to longer-term peacebuilding efforts. The recommendations were aimed at the UN Secretariat (especially DPKO and the Department of Political Affairs, DPA); the Security Council; the Secretary-General; the General Assembly and its committees; and the troop contributing countries and members states.56

Broadly speaking, three main categories are useful in examining how the Panel’s findings parallel Africa efforts: doctrine and strategy; planning and managing operations; rapid and effective deployment.57 For purposes here, some central Brahimi Report recommendations are highlighted within each area.

**Doctrine and Strategy**

At the United Nations, doctrine and training for forces are viewed as primarily national responsibilities. Both elements affect the ability of troops to meet UN mandates, however, and thus, affect the conduct of forces on the ground and the success of the operation. Limited UN guidelines and pre-deployment training are offered to troop contingents for peace operations through the DPKO Training and Evaluation Service and documents such as *Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*, produced in 2004.

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56 The Brahimi Report launched a wide discussion of its findings and the role of UN missions to support opportunities for peace. See, for example, studies by the International Peace Academy (www.ipacademy.org), The Fund for Peace (www.fundforpeace.org), and the Institute for Security Studies (www.iss.co.za).

57 This outline follows the framework of the Stimson Center report, *The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations*, Durch and Holt et al., 2003.
Some Panel recommendations involved two areas where UN peacekeeping capacity could link with regional groups: **conflict resolution** and **preventive action**. Recommendations for better use of UN fact-finding missions to areas of tension have been adopted, as well as support for DPA-led special political missions, which include Panels of Experts, special envoys and UN peacebuilding missions. **Peacebuilding strategies** were also recommended, an area more difficult for African organizations to parallel. As the Panel urged, a larger UN strategy for peacebuilding has been written, but not yet implemented within the UN system.\(^{58}\) UN peacekeeping mission budgets now include first-year funding for quick impact projects (QIPs), with reports of successful use in Ethiopia/Eritrea and the DRC. Allocating funds within the UN peacekeeping mission budgets for reintegrating forces being demobilized and disarmed (DDR efforts) has also begun, such as with the UN mission budget for Liberia. This funding is not necessarily a precedent assured repeating, however.\(^{59}\) The AU and ECOWAS may look to adopt such approaches to integrate peacebuilding efforts within their peace operations, but do not have structures parallel to the UN in this area.

Vital to peace operations, and thus, any multinational capacities, are **mandates** and **rule of law** capacities, two areas that could greatly benefit African organizations. The Panel’s direction to give UN forces clear, credible and achievable mandates reflected the mismatch between Council mandates and troop capacity in past UN operations. The Report urged the Secretariat to be candid about the requirements for such operations and to tell the Security Council “what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear.”\(^{60}\) Before the Council approved a new mission, the Panel urged that peace agreements meet threshold conditions. They suggested that UN resolutions await identification of troop contributions from member states, and that Council resolutions promote clear unity of effort and command and control. Such a requirement did not fly with the Security Council, but consultations between troop-contributing countries, the Council and the Secretariat have helped all parties better plan and execute operations. The Panel emphasized additional peacebuilding tools, such as incorporating experts in rule of law and human rights in mission planning and within peacekeeping operations, and using on-call lists to identify and deploy available, skilled civilian police and personnel in these areas. These measures have met with some success, but available personnel remain in short supply at headquarters and in the field. AU and ECOWAS recognize

\(^{58}\) Increasing the UN’s peacebuilding capacity is a major topic in *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, the United Nations, December 2004. This report recommends various measures, including a dedicated headquarters staff at the UN for peacebuilding and creation of a new Peacebuilding Commission.

\(^{59}\) The United States, for example, has cautioned against viewing funding for reintegration as useful for inclusion regularly in UN peace operations. Author interviews, US Department of State, 2004 and 2005.

\(^{60}\) *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations*, A/55/305, paragraph 64d.
the role for civilian police in their plans for the ASF and regional forces, but have emphasized military capacity over that of civilians for peace operations.

Further, it was recognized that UN advisors with peacekeeping experience should be made available to peace negotiations. Given the challenges to operations on the ground, the Panel also recommended that the Council and member states recognize that more robust forces and rules of engagement were needed for self-defense and defense of the mission when spoilers and actors challenged peacekeepers on the ground. Stronger mandates for the UN operations in the DRC and Liberia in 2003 reflected the Council’s willingness to meet this challenge, and its approval of new missions in 2004 all had Chapter VII authorization as well. ECOWAS forces have often engaged those who challenge them on the ground. The AU record is still to be seen. Not unlike many UN operations, their missions are both heavily dependent on the troop contingents on the ground and their understanding of the mission.61

In looking at ECOWAS and AU capacities through the lens of the Brahimi Report, the area of strategy and doctrine appears the least developed. Fundamentally, both organizations still need to present a vision from which to derive doctrine and its concepts of operations. ECOWAS is in the process of trying to develop its own strategic vision and rudimentary doctrine for peace operations. In developing its African Standby Force concept, the AU needs to provide a clearer understanding of the role of these forces and identify a common doctrine and strategy to guide the subregional groups in developing their roles. AU and ECOWAS decisions about sending peacekeepers do not appear reliant on the counsel and planning of their Secretariat-equivalent staffs. Headquarters staff have a limited role in advising the Peace and Security Council and the Mediation and Security Council (or even the Heads of State) on the operational requirements for a mission and marrying a concept of operations with personnel and troops. The formal mechanisms of ECOWAS and the AU shed little light on how mandates are developed or matched to headquarters and member state capacity, or about the nature of a mission’s strategy. As ECOWAS and the AU develop their security architecture and establish peace operations mandates, they would benefit from greater transparency in how they reach political decisions to send forces, and how they match operational plans and their member state capacity in designing mandates and missions.

Additional components for a complex operation – police, public information officers, and human rights support – are slowly being identified as needs for their missions but are still in their infancy.

61 ECOMOG forces often came under criticism for using excessive force, rather than too little force, in the 1990s. ECOWAS has not faced such criticism for its more recent operations. The AU mission in Sudan is mandated as an observer mission with a small capacity to protect civilians from imminent threat when in close proximity. The AU forces have received both praise and criticism for their actions in support of defending areas from attacks and for their actions when attacks were on-going in Darfur.
Professional positions in these areas of expertise were not yet integrated within AU and ECOWAS headquarters in 2004, though field support was increasing.\(^{62}\)

**Planning and Managing Operations**

Brilliant folks can make a dysfunctional system work. Average people can make a well-structured system work. We have to aim to enable average folks to do good jobs under trying circumstances by giving them support structures and procedures that help them do their jobs.\(^{63}\)

Having trained and professional staff to anticipate, plan, deploy and manage missions is central to successful peace operations, both at headquarters and in the field. A primary finding of the Brahimi Report was the need to strengthen UN headquarters support for operations with more skilled staff and funding within the UN Secretariat, primarily DPKO. The Panel also pressed for headquarters personnel to include rule of law teams and civilian policing experts; to improve recruitment of civilian personnel; to set up better analysis of best practices and provide greater analytic and strategic assessments; and to use Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) to bring together various sectors of the UN for planning and managing operations at headquarters.

The General Assembly funded 191 new posts for DPKO by 2002. The UN restructured DPKO’s military and police divisions, and created a small two-person Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit. Personnel and headquarters support for civilian police and rule of law teams increased, but left DPKO shorthanded in keeping up with recruiting, deploying and managing roughly 6,000 civilian police in the field. Recruitment of civilian field personnel was somewhat improved with the Galaxy Project, where initial job listings garnered 20,000 applicants per month but soon created an overflow of applicants for every listed job, a huge challenge.\(^{64}\) The UN continues to lack a dedicated unit for integrating analytic and strategic information within UN headquarters, as proposed by the Panel, due to member state opposition. IMTFs have been set up for planning new peace operations. Their results are mixed, however, as they have not overcome traditional stove-piped decision-making within UN offices and agencies.

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\(^{62}\) The AU reportedly included plans for a public affairs position within its mission budget for Darfur. Police are deployed to Darfur, as laid out in AU planning documents, perhaps a reflection of strong collaboration with the UN. \(^{63}\) *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations*, A/55/305, page 50 (citing interview at the United Nations, New York, 19 April 2000).

\(^{64}\) See also, William J. Durch, *Strengthening UN Secretariat Capacity for Civilian Post-Conflict Response*, paper prepared for the Center on International Cooperation, New York University, for conference on Strengthening the UN's Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management, Copenhagen, Denmark, 8-9 June 2004.
For the AU and ECOWAS, the planning and management of peace operations is a fundamental gap in developing their leadership of peace operations. The AU had only two military officers in its Peace and Security Division of its Commission headquarters as it started planning the deployment to Darfur, Sudan in 2004. Likewise, ECOWAS had few headquarters staff in Abuja for planning its ECOMIL and Cote d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) operations. The AU Commission has expanded its staff as it has ramped up its deployment of observers and associated troops for its operation in Darfur. ECOWAS is working on its planning capacity, creating a mission management and planning cell in March 2004 and recruiting additional personnel for the Secretariat.\(^65\) Prior to 2005, coordination between these planning staffs and the DPKO was not formalized. UN expertise had been tapped for specific efforts, such as consulting on the ASF concept and the plans for the Darfur mission, more than for longer-term development of planning cells in Addis Ababa and Abuja. To develop and use rule of law teams, the AU and ECOWAS first need to recognize their importance for peace operations and the role of civilian experts in their field operations. Neither organization had headquarters staff dedicated to these areas in 2004.

IMTFs may not adapt readily to the small AU and ECOWAS staffs, but better communication across their departments would improve decision-making, transparency and coordination. A central source of analytic information would certainly be extremely useful, especially given the challenges facing the early warning systems in both organizations.

**Rapid and Effective Deployment**

Another serious and consistent problem identified by the Brahimi Report was lengthy delays between Security Council action and fielding of forces and personnel, an area where the AU and ECOWAS also have mixed results. The UN lacked even a definition of *rapid and effective deployment*, which hindered planning, recruitment of forces and the management of public expectations. The UN adopted the Panel’s recommended timeline, aiming to deploy a traditional peace operation within 30 days of a Council mandate and a complex peace operation within 90 days. Further, the UN established clearer planning assumptions about anticipated personnel levels and equipment requirements for traditional (e.g., 5,000 peacekeepers) and complex operations (e.g., 10,000 peacekeepers), and moved to organize that capacity more effectively.

The UN has improved organization of its *logistics supply system*, including the available on-hand capacity housed at the UN Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, Italy. The UN created *Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS)*, exceeding the Panel’s recommendation for “mission start-up kits,” housed at

\(^{65}\) Canada is helping fund additional staff positions at ECOWAS. Press Release No. 22, ECOWAS, *Canada signs $4.5 million agreement on peace and security*, 17 March 2004.
UNLB.\textsuperscript{66} Sized to support one complex operation per year, the SDS is to be re-supplied with funding from the budgets of peacekeeping missions which it helps deploy. This mechanism aims to remedy the old and persistent problem of replacing equipment stocks from Brindisi. While these stocks were used successfully for the UN deployment to Liberia in 2003, the pace of operations in 2004 (three new UN-led peace operations) far exceeded the UN’s ability to replace these stocks in time for a new deployment.\textsuperscript{67}

Multinational peace operations depend on the quantity and quality of troops, police, and civilian personnel provided by member states. The UN has reorganized its \textit{Standby Arrangements System}, the voluntary roster of capabilities that lists what member states say they might be willing to provide to a UN operation. The UNSAS is a database tool for planning for new or continuing operations, a system that could benefit African organizations. The revamped UNSAS has clarified its lists of member state capacities, creating a Rapid Deployment Level (RDL) category where participating countries units agree through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the details of potential forces and their ability to deploy rapidly. By late 2004, only two countries were at the RDL level, however, and neither was from Africa. DPKO also badly needed more countries to provide logistical support and other enabling units, gaps that remain today.

In addition to the rapidly available quantities of personnel, the skills and coherence of the potential forces are critical. The Panel urged states to collaborate regionally in training and equipping \textit{brigade-sized forces} that could be listed in UNSAS as ready to deploy coherently and rapidly. The DPKO received little initial support for the brigade-level concept. Members of the European-led SHIRBRIG participate in UNSAS, however, and recent European Union and Africa Union initiatives in this area show promise.

The Panel also noted the importance of \textit{mission guidance} and \textit{leadership}, focusing on the selection of leaders and setting up pre-deployment briefings. The UN largely adopted Panel measures to improve mission leadership through better selection, training, guidance and recruitment. To identify leaders on a less \textit{ad hoc} basis, the UN established key selection qualities, improved its roster of mission candidates recommended by states, and identified UN personnel for senior field positions. UN mission leaders now

\textsuperscript{66} Key items include vehicles, communications and engineering equipment, accommodations and ablution units. UN General Assembly, \textit{The Concept of Strategic Deployment Stocks and its Implementation}, Report of the Secretary-General, A/56/870, 14 March 2002, paragraph 5. This can include forklifts, generators, food storage capacities and other non-military stocks; see Gen. Sten Edholm, presentation, \textit{Challenges of Peace Operations} conference, Abuja, Nigeria, 2 June 2004.

\textsuperscript{67} In 2003, the UN expanded its DRC mission and authorized a new peace operation in Liberia (UNMIL). The start-up phase of UNMIL was made more effective with the use of the strategic deployment stocks and the transfer of equipment from UNAMSIL. The extensive use of SDS for the large UNMIL operation, however, severely depleted the stocks without providing a way to replace them quickly enough for other missions. See, UN DPKO, Best Practices Unit, \textit{Lessons Learned Study on the Start-Up Phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia}, April 2004.
assemble in advance of deployment, and become familiarized with their UN mandates and colleagues before arriving in the field.

**Through a Brahimi Lens: ECOWAS and AU Headquarters Capabilities**

Any organization, regardless of its size and complexity, requires core capacities in its headquarters staff, available logistics and funding, and a clear concept of operations. Officials within the AU and ECOWAS seek to work with the United Nations in developing their capacity, but few African leaders and staff officials have a working knowledge of the Brahimi Report recommendations and the efforts to improve UN headquarters support to peace operations. Stimson found little conscious effort to link subregional and regional capacity-building efforts to those being implemented by the UN in its post-Brahimi work, even where synergies seemed natural, such as for regional brigade training, use of the UNSAS system and to improved fact-finding missions. This section, therefore, considers broad points about AU and ECOWAS capacity, offers observations from Stimson’s visit to their headquarters in 2004, and suggests some key areas of potential synergy with the United Nations.

**African Union**

With its deployments of observers and peacekeepers to Burundi in 2003 and Sudan in 2004, and its ambitions to organize an African Standby Force, the African Union is demonstrating political will, and playing a limited but valuable role.68 This is a significant change from its predecessor. During the 1997 crisis in Sierra Leone, the Organization of African Unity merely called on ECOWAS to report on the situation.69

The AU still needs more in-house ability to plan, manage and run peace operations. The Commission PSD work is focused on early warning and conflict management, peace support operations, and development of the ASF and Military Staff Committee. As the secretariat for the AU Chairperson (akin to the role of UN Secretary-General), the Commission has grown, hiring new personnel and re-interviewing longer-serving officials for their current positions.70 Within the PSD’s Peace Support Operations Division and Conflict Management Division, the two centers for operational planning, staffing and management, there are few staff. In mid-2004, staff levels were close to two dozen. With the deployment to Darfur, additional staff have been added, but numbers reportedly are no more than

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69 Author interview, African Union, June 2004.
70 Author interview, AU, June 2004. The AU Commission has been through a staff shakeup, and some senior staff left the headquarters after being asked to re-interview for their current positions. While the AU staff has increased, and with it, salaries have increased, the AU still struggles to get its member states to provide their assessed funding.
three dozen as of January 2005. Within this section, the AU employs some committed, capable and hard-working officials who face daunting tasks such as developing the ASF concept and managing the AU peace operations. While some of its members states have experienced militaries with headquarters and planning sections, the AU headquarters staff has not functioned together as a planning group nor been given clear guidance on how to operate as one.

In June 2004, two military officers in the PSD were scrambling to help ramp up deployment of the AU’s first contingent of observers to Darfur, Sudan, to monitor the recent ceasefire agreement there.\textsuperscript{71} The logistics required for the deployment were daunting, and the AU had little equipment readily at hand.\textsuperscript{72} Planning for the deployment and the associated political mission seemed to absorb much of the PSD’s time. The one civilian “planner” at the Commission in mid-2004 was “flat out.”\textsuperscript{73} Staff workloads appeared unbalanced; those who were most capable seemed besieged with work. Senior officers were asked to do administrative tasks, such as organizing travel arrangements for AU delegations, while appearing to have little authority to make decisions in their area of responsibility. Little staff time was thus available for longer-term projects, such as developing doctrine and training manuals, mission leadership tools, or concepts of operations beyond the basic documents of the AU.

Competition for highly skilled individuals who can work in this arena is keen within Africa. While its staff and their salaries have increased, the AU still struggles to get assessed funding from its member states. The deterrents for recruiting more military officers as AU staff include the conditions in which they would work, such as cramped quarters, little administrative support, late hours and limited control over one’s day. Nor is the Commission’s pay and prestige competitive with other military jobs. Organizations such as the UN pay better or carry greater amenities. Member states are also reluctant to part with talented military officers.\textsuperscript{74}

Unlike ECOWAS, the AU has resisted having non-African advisors or staff seconded to work in the Commission. Many donor countries have offered, repeatedly, to provide support staff on a gratis basis or asked the AU to let liaisons sit within AU headquarters, without much success. Outside consultants have

\textsuperscript{71} One of the two military staff was characterized as part-time.
\textsuperscript{72} The small AU depot, behind the Commission headquarters in Addis Ababa, included one non-deployed armored personnel carrier, a few jeeps and wheeled vehicles, a single kitchen unit and a communications set, in addition to a small warehouse with supplies such as tents, sleeping bags and other materials, in mid-2004. The depot was built with US support in the 1990s. Supplies and airlift for the contingents going to Burundi and Sudan were funded and provided by outside contributing countries including the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States.
\textsuperscript{73} Author interview, AU, June 2004; quote is from former UN official who has worked with the African Union.
\textsuperscript{74} Author interview, African Union, June 2004.
provided additional support to the AU for planning of the ASF and its mission to Darfur, but on a temporary basis.\textsuperscript{75}

**ECOWAS**

ECOWAS forces have deployed in the thousands to conflict zones in West Africa, often on short notice, as seen when troops arrived in Liberia soon after a decision to deploy in 2003. By fall 2004, the ECOWAS operations in the region had transitioned to UN leadership, with some troops “re-hatted” by the United Nations.\textsuperscript{76}

The contrast is striking between the relatively good ability of forces from ECOWAS member states to deploy quickly and the limited capacity of its headquarters to help plan and support such deployments.\textsuperscript{77}

At a basic level, there are too few professionals to meet the political and operational requirements associated with a headquarters staff at ECOWAS in Abuja, Nigeria. The office has increased from a single professional in 2000 to a still modest two dozen professionals within the DES-PADS Secretariat in mid-2004. They are the personnel tasked with managing the organization’s peace and security work, including an early warning system, conflict management, mediation and peacekeeping operations.

DES-PADS faces substantial hurdles in carrying out its responsibilities. Some staff members are temporary or funded by outside donors, which can lead to difficulties integrating expertise and responsibilities within the office. Seconded military officers are assigned to work on a temporary or short-term basis, for example. Three Nigerian officers, for example, held responsibilities for early warning, the mission in Liberia and the mission in Côte d’Ivoire in 2004. All three were scheduled to leave within the year, however. Such turnover reduces skill-building and institutional memory. DES-PADS also benefited from useful seconded personnel who were integrated to varying degrees, including military advisors from the United Kingdom, France and the United States; a liaison with the UN Development Program; and a civil society liaison to NGOs. Efforts to improve its staffing challenges are also underway. New seconded officers from its member states were being recruited to join the DES-PADS offices in 2004.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{75} Author interviews, AU, UN, US State Department and with individuals who have acted as consultants to the AU.
\textsuperscript{76} Some ECOWAS troops stayed on when the UN took over the operations in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire.
\textsuperscript{77} Much of the actual planning was done by ECOWAS member states within their military departments. Author interviews, ECOWAS and former ECOWAS officials, 2004.
\textsuperscript{78} *ECOWAS to Reinforce Its Mission Planning and Management Cell*, Press Release, ECOWAS, No. 54, 12 July 2004. In June 2004, officials within DES-PADS cited recruitment of about six new staff, supported with funding from the Canadian government.
Many professional staff in ECOWAS work long hours, face administrative obstacles, and have limited guidance or authority to act within their areas of responsibility from ECOWAS leadership. The Stimson team observed a strong camaraderie, a sense of mission and commitment, and staff efforts to collaborate within DES-PADS. This effort was admirable in light of persistent minor and major roadblocks, such as a lack of office supplies including ink for printers and toners for the copying machines. Senior staff shared desks, chairs and computers; everyone answered their own phones as well as the common lines; few had privacy. These were the working conditions within the new Mission Planning and Management Cell, where staff were assigned to plan and manage operations, strengthen the early warning system, develop the ECOWAS task force concept, and liaise with non-governmental networks.

ECOWAS also faced challenges in developing systematic operational and planning analysis for its varied missions. Information gathering was not centralized. Maps of the region were pinned on the walls, demonstrating the large area of ECOWAS operations and interests, but DES-PADS data seemed equivalent to publicly available materials. Maps did not appear linked to regular situation reports, updates on deployment sites or other operational data.

In regards to the early warning system, staff were vague about how it actually worked in relationship to the goals set forth for its operation. When asked for a recent example of an early warning memo, staff provided two reports summarizing news items ranging from one to three months old. It was not clear how these memos supported the work of DES-PADS or their decision-making. The effort required to organize and make effective use of such a system seems burdensome given the quantity of timely data and analysis readily available from outside sources and member states.

Some staff wore two hats: one set of formal duties and another set of assigned tasks and added responsibilities. The Director for Humanitarian Affairs was also acting as the Director for Political Affairs, resulting in his having a combined staff of two people plus an intern. Another DES-PADS professional had official duties to work on the early warning system, but spent the majority of time supporting other projects assigned by senior ECOWAS leadership.

Even when their duties within DES-PADS were clear, most staff were constrained in their ability to make decisions and were discouraged from taking the initiative by their Deputy Executive Secretary. No regular DES-PADS staff meetings assisted in harmonizing staff time and priorities. The management style resulted in a stovepipe that reduced the effectiveness of the staff in an office whose responsibilities far outweighed their ability to meet them.

79 This was true as of mid-2004. Author interviews, ECOWAS, June 2004.
As a result, ECOWAS continues to need additional support to function as a headquarters and planning office, to organize logistics and financial support, and to develop the concepts of operations to meet their peace and security objectives. To meet its own proposed Task Force goals, ECOWAS is likely to remain reliant on international partners’ support for training, equipment and logistics. Another goal could be improving strategic guidance to its troops and leadership, especially when ECOWAS leaders and troops arrive in the field at different times. For example, the Mediation and Security Council approved the ECOMICI mission for Côte d’Ivoire in October 2002, but the force commander for ECOMICI was not approved and deployed until December. The MSC currently nominates mission leadership on a case-by-case basis, but the Secretariat could be allowed to identify mission leaders and force commanders in advance of deployments.

Besides the lack of planning capacity for ECOWAS deployment, the coordination between the handover of a peace operation’s leadership from ECOWAS to the UN during the transition is not regularized. The UN recognizes these gaps, such as during the leadership change for the peace operation in Liberia. ECOWAS expressed the concern that when the UN took over its mission, an ECOWAS Special Representative stayed in the country with a small staff but lacked funding to maintain contact with the UN in the field.

**On the Ground: Brief Consideration of Operations in Burundi and Liberia**

With peacekeeping missions in Burundi and Sudan, confidence in the African Union’s abilities has grown. Though operating in violence-prone countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, earlier OAU missions involved fewer personnel and had notably less ambitious mandates than current AU interventions. The African Union is now playing a unique role in crises where member states, such as Sudan, prefer it to take the lead.

**AU Deployments: Burundi**

After signing of the Arusha Agreement in 2002, the Burundian government requested a peacekeeping force to verify the ceasefire agreement. In April 2003, the AU established its mission for a year, with

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80 Author interview, ECOWAS, June 2004. In the 2003 Liberia deployment, reportedly the force commander met his contingent elements for the first time on the plane to the mission.
81 Author interview, ECOWAS, June 2004.
83 Author interview, ECOWAS, June 2004.
South Africa leading the deployment. While not authorized by the UN Security Council, the mission was set up with the explicit expectation that the AU would hand it off to the United Nations. The objectives of the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) included upholding the ceasefire agreement, supporting DDR, and assisting stability in the country. Its mandated tasks included acting as a liaison between the parties, monitoring and verifying the ceasefire, facilitating humanitarian assistance, providing VIP and mission protection, and coordinating with the UN on the ground. AMIB contained both military and civilian personnel, including 3,335 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique. The operation included a military observer contingent with personnel from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia.

The AU gave South Africa leadership authority and recognized that it would also facilitate the planning and deployment of the forces and issue more detailed directions on the operation. More explicitly, the AU appealed for funding and logistics support from its member states, the UN and the international community, and accepted bilateral support for AMIB’s deployment and sustainment. Donations to the AU trust fund for the mission, and in-kind support for the operation, came from various countries including the US and UK.

Coordination between the African Union and the United Nations helped the mission to move from a regionally-led to a UN-led operation. During the AMIB deployment, the United Nations operated alongside the AU in the Burundi political process and offered resources from its MONUC peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This effort was improvised. As understood from the beginning, the AU could not sustain the mission for long and negotiated with the UN to take over its mission leadership in Burundi (which became the UN’s mission, ONUB) in 2004.

The division of labor between the AU and the UN in Burundi created a new relationship between the organizations. A more formalized and systematic consultation between UN and AU officials, starting in the planning stages, could help prepare both the initial deployments and the later handoff to the United Nations.

87 Aboagye points out that, “At the end of its 14-month mandate, the total budget of AMIB amounted to US$134 million, covering the real costs of troop and equipment deployments, reimbursement for specialized equipment and appropriate depreciation rates and common mission costs for items such as vehicle markings, insignia, and medical health facilities. It also included the budget for the integrated mission headquarters and the military observer element.” *Conflict Trends*, Issue 2 (2004), page 13.
**ECOWAS and the UN: Liberia**

Today’s UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) began with various institutional actors, each with different command structures and goals, operating in an overlapping series of deployments, including the ECOWAS peacekeeping operation ECOMIL; SHIRBRIG; the United Nations; and a US military contingent, of which roughly 200 Marines deployed.

On 2 July 2003, ECOWAS decided to deploy to Liberia, and agreed on 31 July to deploy by August 4. ECOMIL consisted of a each battalion from Ghana, Senegal, Mali and Nigeria. US military forces were also deployed to assist the ECOMIL mission. About 150 marines deployed to Roberts International Airport as a quick reaction force; another 80 marines deployed to Monrovia to do help open the port to humanitarian relief. The US also provided close air support to ECOWAS forces for their seizure of the port and Bushrod Island. After false starts, a peace agreement was reached in August, and a UN advance team was in Liberia on August 20. On September 10, DPKO asked SHIRBRIG to organize the mission headquarters, and by September 24, SHIRBRIG personnel were in Monrovia. The Security Council approved a mandate for UNMIL on 19 September, with an expected state date of October 1, by when the United States would end its mission.

By late October, UNMIL had assembled 5,000 peacekeepers out of an authorized force of 15,000. Major troop contributions came initially from African countries and Bangladesh; force levels grew to nearly 9,000 by late 2003 and included more nations. No major developed country except the Netherlands provided more than a handful of personnel to the UN mission.

Such a sketch demonstrates the complexity of mixing various actors in setting up a peacekeeping operation. ECOMIL faced limitations, including deployment delays, equipment shortages and shortfalls in its “basic quality of life” that eroded its efforts to create a secure environment to support the humanitarian operation, reinforcing the need for outside support from the United States and SHIRBRIG. The United Nations started from scratch in many aspects, failing to be up and running by 1 October 2003. SHIRBRIG reported that it too faced key challenges, such as only having cell phones. Computers were delayed and an intermittent power supply hindered their use. Other challenges faced deployed troops, such as when the United States withdrew equipment support for an African contingent.

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88 Author interview, ECOWAS, June 2004. A battalion is three companies and one support company.
from Guinea-Bissau due to a coup in their home nation. Without the US funding, they were reportedly stranded.92

The equipment that came from the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi was considered excellent, but there were too few people in the mission to help distribute it. Civilian staff lagged in arriving, which kept the focus on the actions of the next 48 hours versus planning for the longer-term components of the mission. Communications and accommodations remained challenged by insecurity.93 The UN did not rehat some of the troops because they were not qualified.

Outside coordination with ECOWAS leadership was good on the practical aspects of the operation, and benefited from ECOWAS’s strong political will and experienced military leadership. Needed, however, were better communications and information systems, coordination between the military and civilians, and development of logistical capacity. Much planning for the ECOMIL mission was originally done with support from outside the ECOWAS headquarters, including military planners from its member states, from the UN and the United States, among others. UNAMSIL provided planning support for ECOMIL in Liberia. The deployment would have been faster if there was a stronger ECOWAS Secretariat. ECOWAS needs, it argued, a permanent multinational brigade team, a planning unit. One SHIRBRIG official later suggested ways to improve capacity for future operations, including development of regional Secretariats, joint factfinding missions, on the job training at SHIRBRIG, and putting UN advisors at the regional planning elements and peacekeeping centers.94

**Common Themes: Identifying Areas of Gaps and Collaboration**

Nigerian Foreign Minister Adenji has argued that the biggest gaps in African capacity are in planning and sustaining regional organizations, which is “understandable… given [the] weakness of states.”95 Outside bilateral support, such as troop training programs and exercises are important, argues Adenji, since “even when troops are deployed they are often ill-equipped for the task,” such as in Sierra Leone and Liberia.96 In some instances, partner countries have organized training support for planning staff. The increased value of an officer trained at another center, however, may inadvertently reduce the chance

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92 Author interview, 2004.
96 Amb. Abeniji, Challenges conference, June 2004. Bilateral peacekeeping training programs include ones offered by the UK (BMATT, the British Military Advisory and Training Team), US (ACOTA, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance) and France (RECAMP, the Reinforcement of African Peace-keeping Capacities). RECAMP has run train and equip programs for African forces since 1997, in liaison with the DPKO.
of that professional returning to a position at the AU or ECOWAS. One officer seconded to the African Union, for example, was set to train alongside SHIRBRIG staff. After the training, he was called home by his government rather than allowed to take up the AU post for which he had just trained.

The AU and ECOWAS have relied on external support to finance their headquarters and operations. They lack sufficient funding from their member states, and gaps between approved budgets and actual revenues make them reliant on non-member states. Unlike UN missions, for which troop contributing countries are reimbursed for providing forces, the AU and ECOWAS have not set up reliable reimbursement systems for their member states, reflecting the financial burden for countries participating in operations outside of the UN system. ECOWAS and AU troop deployments have depended on financing from donor countries for their operations, transport and supplies (e.g., Burundi, Sudan, and Côte d’Ivoire).

AU and ECOWAS management and policy staffs are often consumed by current operations. They lack time to reflect on lessons learned, to develop forward-thinking ideas, or to implement concepts for the organization. When a military officer at the AU is busy with the plans to deploy observers to Darfur (e.g., plane reservations and negotiating time frames) there is little time to work on the ASF concept, AU doctrine or modalities for pre-deployment training.

There are many areas where collaboration could be improved in such operations. Member states can offer more effective, well-trained and self-sustaining brigades to deploy, whether they serve under an ECOWAS, AU or UN flag. Some African leaders desire supply depots or logistics bases in Africa, but logistical support for missions led by ECOWAS and the AU could also come from greater use of the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy. Integration of regional mission leadership (civilian and military commanders) into the UN mission planning process before the handoff could be beneficial, as could additional staff for the AU and ECOWAS planning and management offices. Establishing a better funding mechanism or assessment for regional deployment is also needed. To support longer-term capacity building, the UN could also establish a formal relationship with the AU and subregional groups to aid development of the ASF capacity, including coordination of planning, training and logistics support, and other areas of technical assistance.

Additional UN Challenges

The UN also faces multiple and similar challenges in logistics, deployment timelines, funding, and coordination with other actors in new missions. The UN Standby Arrangements System, for example, is an important tool with limited application for assisting rapid and effective deployments. Nations may not
provide the capacities they list within UNSAS to an operation. Further, UNSAS is organized to support deployments ideally within 30 to 90 days, not within 10 days as urged by the Security Council for the UN mission in Liberia. This demanding timeline reinforces the need for UNSAS-listed units to be fully equipped and self-sustaining, and for more countries to participate at the Rapid Deployment Level. Likewise, the current rate of new UN missions challenges the UN to keep the Strategic Deployment Stocks from depletion. In Liberia generators had to be airlifted into the mission because there were none there, which was delayed because the airport was not open. Central to helping increase effective planning and pre-positioning of logistics support is having sufficient *advance spending authority* available to start UN efforts. UN budgets take time to approve after Council action: the UN approved the peacekeeping budget for the Liberia mission in late December 2003, months after the mission began in October. In short, the DPKO faces consistent gaps in key areas where African organizations also have the most need, such as equipment and logistics.

On the coordination front, troop contributing countries sign up for one UN peace operation, not to operate throughout a region. Regional coordination across missions in West Africa, however, could result in more effective missions and be highly beneficial. Missions should communicate and coordinate with one other, such as in West Africa, where border areas remain a joint concern. The UN needs greater flexibility to use equipment across UN operations in neighboring countries, such as in Burundi and the DRC, and could negotiate MOUs with troop contributing countries to facilitate their activities regionally.

ECOWAS and the AU also lack the ability to leverage *peacebuilding*, an area where the UN is trying to improve its own efforts within peace operations. In places like Liberia, with corruption and a wrecked economy, building rule of law institutions is pivotal to a sustainable peace. Liberians need help establishing their police service, judicial and corrections systems, as well as other rule of law institutions. The United Nations faced delays in recruiting sufficient skilled civilian police and other rule of law experts for UNMIL. Teams of experts with such expertise are hard for the UN to recruit, and not yet an area of focus for ECOWAS and the African Union.

In looking at future ways to improve collaboration, UN Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General Souren Serayderian commented:

> The UN has identified several specific areas in which it could provide support to the AU, subregional organizations and individual African member states. Information sharing,

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training, technical assistance to AU Headquarters and enhanced coordination between the UN and AU are just a few examples. Cooperation in the field of logistics would be mutually beneficial, and could come in several forms, ranging from providing full logistics support to an AU-led peacekeeping mission, to sharing lists of standard equipment, to facilitating technical training in the Brindisi Logistics Base. Cooperation in the areas of civilian police, corrections and rule of law, as well as the exchange of best practices, has the potential to strengthen the continent’s peacekeeping capacity.98

What ability does the United Nations have to work with the AU, ECOWAS and other regional organizations? The next chapter will consider this question in greater depth.

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— CHAPTER 3 —

THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN AFRICA

By all measures, the United Nations focuses substantial time, resources and political energy on issues of African peace and security. UN agencies and programs interact regularly with African leaders and institutions, and throughout the continent UN peacekeepers are trying to help prevent recurrence of violent conflict. Numerous African military and political leaders serve within peace operations and as special envoys and representatives of the United Nations. African contributions to UN operations have also increased substantially in the last 10 years, both in quantity and as an increasing percentage of overall UN forces. African nations provided roughly 13 percent of UN peacekeeping forces in 1994 but increased their contribution to about 35 percent of UN forces deployed in 2004. (See chart in Annex I.)

Direct links between the UN and African organizations are evident. The African Union and ECOWAS recognize the United Nations as a model for developing their peace operations capacities, and cite the UN Charter in their founding documents. They often cast their peacekeeping role as that of a first responder, helping lay the groundwork for a broader UN mission, rather than a substitute for its actions. The United Nations recognizes that regionally-based forces can give the United Nations more time to deploy and reduce response time for deploying peacekeepers, especially if the regional efforts are provided supportive elements. The UN Charter also references regional organizations directly, and UN reports frequently call for greater cooperation with them.

While the leadership of the UN and African regional groups embrace cooperation, their formal collaboration and institutional relations have been thin and slow to formalize. Chapter VIII allows for regional arrangements, but does not require cooperation. At the Secretariat level, UN efforts have

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99 During 2004, nearly every area of Africa with special or personal representatives and envoys of the UN Secretary General included an African leader.
100 Data provided by the UN for those serving in peacekeeping forces in July 1994, July 1999, and July 2004.
101 The AU leadership, however, has opposed the United Nations or others assuming leadership of its mission in Darfur, Sudan, which could suggest a shift in this position.
102 Dialogue within the research and policy community on regional groups has also led to a view that greater cooperation and collaboration between the UN and regional groups is needed, as is support to the African organizations. See discussion of the UN relationship with regional groups in “Collaborating with Regional Organizations,” by Shepard Forman and Andrew Grene, in The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, David Malone, editor (London: Lynne Reinner, 2004).
followed a decade of discussion, but actions have lagged behind the dialogue. These more practical efforts are further hampered by the need for a strategic vision of how the UN can work with regional and subregional efforts. Thus, UN support for African-led peace operations capacity and deployments is offered on an *ad hoc* basis.

At the AU and ECOWAS, the Brahimi Report and its implementation are not familiar frameworks, nor is there strong focus on natural areas of collaboration with the United Nations, such as naming individuals for UN on-call lists of civilian experts, organizing mutual use of the UN’s strategic deployment stocks system and the UN Logistics Base, or linking to UN headquarters for better mission planning and logistics support.¹⁰³ ECOWAS Secretary General Ibn Chambas, however, has cited cooperation with the United Nations as on-going and beneficial, and identified some ECOWAS priorities which mirror Brahimi Report recommendations and UN capacity-building efforts, such as involving troop contributing countries in development of mission mandates and linking ECOWAS standby units with the UN Standby Arrangements System.¹⁰⁴ These links could help build the African Standby Force; the regional standby units could also act as quick and inexpensive stage-setters for the UN to come in later. Another area cited for collaboration is logistical support; ECOWAS leaders have urged establishment of two logistics bases for their use.

In most areas where the AU and ECOWAS aim to develop their own capacity, there is little explanation of how that architecture builds off of or from UN efforts. This view also reflects the general lack of a consistent framework that various donors might apply in trying to leverage capacity within the UN and African organizations, or in offering support to African countries on a bilateral basis.

Even without a clear strategy, the United Nations is beginning new efforts to work more directly with African-led organizations on peace operations, institutional capacity, and other issues related to peace and security. This section looks at the existing formal relationships between the UN, the African Union and ECOWAS in these areas and reviews instances of institutional collaboration for peace operations. From this review, practical areas of collaboration may be identified, and perhaps assist a more systematic relationship between the UN and other multinational organizations.

¹⁰³ During Stimson’s meetings at ECOWAS and AU headquarters, we briefed our findings on the implementation of the Brahimi Report recommendations. Officials within both organizations were interested in the findings, but unfamiliar with the Report or its implementation; some suggested they could use the report to guide their efforts.
¹⁰⁴ Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, presentation, *Challenges of Peace Operations Conference*, Abuja, Nigeria, 3 June 2004. He has argued that ECOWAS troops can handle parties to the conflict more effectively in some situations, bringing a more immediate understanding of the dynamics on the ground, with knowledge of language and cultural issues. Regional and subregional groups can assist UN efforts, bringing political attention to a situation and accelerating action from the international community.
The Formal Relationship: Chapter VIII and Regional Cooperation

Under the UN Charter, nations are not to use force against one another except in self-defense and where the Security Council authorizes actions in response to a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” The Security Council uses the provisions of Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter as grounds for authorizing peace operations. The UN Charter recognizes regional organizations as legitimate actors, even as preceding the UN in taking action, while directing that they seek UN authorization for use of force. Cooperation between the UN and regional organizations is premised on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which addresses regional arrangements for international peace and security. Under Article 52 of Chapter VIII, nothing “precludes” regional arrangements or agencies from dealing with matters related to peace and security, the territory of the Security Council. But the Charter limits their actions to being consistent with UN decision-making. Article 53 states:

The Security Council, shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council…

Further, the Security Council does not always reference Chapter VIII when recognizing or authorizing the actions of regional and subregional organizations to lead peace operations. Four recent African peace operations led by ECOWAS and the African Union demonstrate the Council’s varying approach:

- **Côte d’Ivoire.** In February 2003, the UN welcomed the actions of ECOWAS and previously stationed French forces in response to the violence in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, with reference to Chapter VII and Chapter VIII, and requested that both missions periodically report to the Security Council on their actions.107

- **Liberia.** When ECOWAS sought to intervene in Liberia in 2003, the UN authorized an ECOWAS multinational force under Chapter VII to implement the June 2003 ceasefire agreement and cited Chapter VIII.108

- **Burundi.** When the African Union deployed troops to Burundi in 2003, the UN provided neither authorization under Chapter VII or VIII. In 2004, the Security Council welcomed the contributions of the AU operation, AMIB, but provided no direct authorization for the mission.109

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105 Chapter VI is not cited directly in UN resolutions, but implied if Chapter VII is not cited specifically.
106 See, for example, S/Res/1132 (1997) authorizing ECOWAS involvement in Sierra Leone. Chapter VIII has also been cited by the Council in authorizing multinational forces that were not associated with a regional or subregional group, such as in the US intervention in Somalia in 1992.
107 Resolution 1464, S/Res/1464 (2003), 4 February 2003. This resolution also called for the protection of civilians immediately threatened with physical violence within zones of their operation.
• Darfur, Sudan. Again in 2004, the Council welcomed, rather than authorized, the African Union deployment of observers with a peacekeeping mission to the Darfur region of Sudan.110

In a different kind of case, the Security Council authorized a multinational force under Chapter VII, the Interim Emergency Multinational Force, led by France and authorized by the European Union, to deploy to the eastern DRC to quell violence in the Ituri district in 2003. The Council did not cite Chapter VIII.111

As African organizations develop interest in and greater ability to lead peace operations, tension with the United Nations is natural. The UN is struggling to meet its basic requirements of fielding concurrent, large missions mandated by the Security Council as the expanding role of regional actors provokes the question of priorities in support for their peace operations. Competition may arise over supplies of available forces, logistics, funding and leadership, as well as over what UN authorization of a regional or subregional group’s operation means when there are not established standards – or direct control.112 Tensions may also grow if the United Nations has not acted or is unlikely to authorize action, and regional groups seek to intervene, or when regional groups wish to take a lead but fall short of accomplishing the stated goals. Some of this competition could be played out with funding available from Western nations, for example, which are looking at how to allocate their funding and support between the UN, bilateral training programs, and regional and subregional organizations.113

It is noteworthy that neither the AU nor ECOWAS require their actions to be authorized by the UN Security Council. Both organizations intend to seek UN authorization, but not to be restricted by it. The ECOWAS Protocol recognizes the role of the UN, citing Chapter VII and VIII of the Charter, and affirms that it shall “inform the United Nations of any military intervention undertaken in pursuit of the objectives of this Mechanism.”114 The AU reserves the right to act (with force) without Security Council authorization, but acknowledges its operational dependence on outside partners and resources to meet its peace and security objectives. This expectation is clearly stated in Article 17 of the Protocol:

113 The US Senate, for example, voted to add funding for US direct support to the African Union mission in Sudan in April 2005. That increase was offset by cutting the budget allocated for funding US assessments to UN peacekeeping operations (including the UN mission in Sudan).
Where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Union’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in African, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

This position creates an interesting dynamic: The AU needs both UN and its member states’ financial and expert knowledge, but may not wait for Security Council approval to intervene in the region. Even as it aspires to develop its own capacity, the AU desires to work closely with the UN and its agencies on peace and security in Africa. The African Union has observer status at the United Nations, and houses a small Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York. ECOWAS and other subregional organizations have no equivalent in New York.

Yet UN approval does not generate concrete support, even if Chapter VIII is cited and the mission authorized by the Council. Nor has citation of Chapter VIII evolved to provide a roadmap for the UN in considering collaboration with regional groups, nor does it trigger specific actions by the Secretariat despite deliberations about working better with African organizations. This may be changing, however, as discussion moves toward actions.

**More Than a Decade of Discussion**

UN links with African organizations has evolved since the early 1990s. The Security Council and the General Assembly have held open meetings and made declarations on UN and regional cooperation over the last decade. The 1992 *Agenda for Peace* report by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recognized the need for greater collaboration. In 1994, the General Assembly passed a declaration on enhancing cooperation with “regional arrangements” which focused on peacekeeping activities, in line with Council authorization of regional actions.\(^\text{115}\) Areas identified for possible cooperation included exchange of information and consultations, participation in UN bodies, and personnel and material assistance. More specifically:

Regional arrangements or agencies are encouraged to consider, in their fields of competence, the possibility of establishing and training groups of military and civilian observers, fact-finding missions and contingents of peacekeeping forces, for use as appropriate, in coordination with the United Nations and, when necessary, under the

authority or with authorization of the Security Council, in accordance with the
Charter.\textsuperscript{116}

The United Nations held five high-level meetings between 1994 and 2003, and public Security Council
meeting in 2003 and 2004, on enhanced cooperation with regional organizations.\textsuperscript{117} The Secretary-
General published annual reports on UN cooperation with the OAU nearly every year since 1966. The
Security Council also established the \textit{Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in
Africa}, drawing attention to the importance of engagement with Africa and its multinational
organizations.\textsuperscript{118}

In July 2004, the Security Council hosted an open discussion of coordination in conflict resolution and
the evolving relationship between the UN and the organizations that had led recent peace operations,
such as ECOWAS in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, and the European Union in the DRC.\textsuperscript{119} The AU and
ECOWAS were among the organizations represented at the meeting. British Ambassador Sir Emyr
Jones Parry offered a division of labor between the UN and regional groups:

> Chapter VIII may be the foundation, but regional organizations are not just
subcontractors for maintaining collective security. In the twenty-first century we need to
develop a mutually reinforcing partnership between the United Nations and regional
organizations. We should aim to avoid duplication of effort, allow work to be
undertaken by the organization with comparative advantage, help get regional support
and buy-in for proposed solutions and help mobilize the necessary resources and
capabilities to support regional initiatives and efforts.\textsuperscript{120}

Such remarks reflect the shifting view that better UN collaboration with organizations such as the AU
and ECOWAS is needed. Yet these high-level meetings and public Security Council meetings did not
establish a strategy for implementing these proposals and developing greater collaboration.

**At the UN: Moving to More Practical Collaboration**

The UN Secretariat is designed to support UN-led peace operations in response to Security Council
direction. Security Council authorization does not trigger equivalent Secretariat support for operations

\textsuperscript{116} A/RES/49/57, 9 December 1994.
\textsuperscript{117} Meetings between UN officials and the heads of regional organizations were held in 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001 and
2003 (www.un.org/deps/dpa/prev_dip/fr_uncooperation.html). Topics included cooperation between the UN and
regional organizations, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and challenges to international peace and security. The
public Security Council meetings aimed to share information on best practices and coordinate mutual activities.
\textsuperscript{119} Official record of the Security Council meeting, S/PV/5007, \textit{Security Council, 59th year: 5007th meeting}, New
York, 20 July 2004. Participating states included Romania, Mexico, Chile, Benin, China, Germany, Russian
Federation, Brazil, Algeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, United States, Angola, France and United Kingdom.
\textsuperscript{120} S/PV.5007 (Resumption 1), page 15.
led by other organizations – even if they are authorized explicitly to take action under Chapter VII, recognized under Chapter VIII, and otherwise praised by the Council. At a policy level, UN offices can generally consult and share information with African institutions and leaders, but DPKO and DPA are limited in offering longer-term substantive planning or logistical support to missions led by regional and subregional organizations. These restraints affect UN collaborative efforts with ECOWAS and the AU in development of peace operations capacity.

Institutional cooperation is increasing, however, at various levels.121 First, there is a fresh recognition that collaboration is needed. Second, specific measures are being developed to create better synergies for the UN to work with organizations in Africa. Before the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in March 2003, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno reflected on priorities, including:

> Closer relations between the United Nations, the African Union and subregional organizations, a number of examples of which were contained in the Secretary-General’s report. On the operational level, United Nations’ efforts to enhance African peacekeeping capacity had primarily involved the provision of training and advice to African Member States and subregional organizations, as well as assistance in matching African troop-contributing countries in need of equipment with donor countries.122

Secretary General Annan also issued a consolidated report on cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations in September 2004, which gave examples of an evolving relationship with African organizations, especially the African Union.123

Some in the UN Secretariat bluntly point out the lack of strategic vision within the UN regarding relationships with Africa.124 Even without a vision, numerous collaborative efforts have been established within the UN Secretariat and through liaison offices. The UN is also moving to provide support directly to African organizations and to support bilateral training programs on the continent.

UN headquarters has sought to engage more actively, on a regular basis, with their counterparts at the African Union or ECOWAS on peace and security. On a practical level, UN interaction has increased as African organizations have initiated and led peace operations to stabilize a conflict or provided post-conflict security support, often in consultation with the UN, and consciously acting as the first responder. In New York, the UN Secretariat has designated efforts to address cooperation with African regional

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122 GA/PK/177, 3 March 2003.
organizations within three main departments: the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, and the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA). Both DPKO and DPA have established support programs to the African Union to make cooperation less ad hoc and more institutionalized. Previously, UN staff may not have worked with their UN counterparts in African organizations or within their headquarters in a concerted way.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

With the surge in peace operations and the UN’s growing role in Africa, DPKO organized a support program on African capacity-building in 2004 to increase coordination and to establish a division of labor within the United Nations. DPKO planned to create a working group led by its Africa division that would meet regularly.

Leaders of the working group recognize that the AU and ECOWAS can sometimes deploy peacekeepers into an area more quickly than the UN, which has a more complicated process for establishing new peace operations. Yet they also cite well-known shortcomings of regional and subregional organizations, such as a lack of equipment, logistics, and standards. The UN can provide limited assistance, but DPKO is not authorized to support regionally-led peacekeeping operations with stocks from the UN Logistics Base, where supplies are first used for UN-planned actions. If requested, and approved by the Security Council, these stocks could assist UN-authorized or UN-recognized missions – pending approval of funding for those supplies from the General Assembly. DPKO can play a useful role, however, in matching troop contributing countries with needed supplies from other countries to support deployment. This “facilitation” helps with an immediate deployment, but requires negotiations and does not create longer-term relationships that automatically address the logistics and transportation issues for the next mission.

DPKO is considering the comparative advantage of the AU, ECOWAS and other subregional groups and where they complement UN capacities. DPKO leadership has asked ECOWAS directly for its priorities and met with the AU leadership to talk about their needs. Just identifying these areas with the AU and subregional groups can be a challenge. The AU has also had difficulties responding to offers of

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125 Among the requirements, new operations involve both substantive approval from the Security Council and funding support from the General Assembly budget watchdog, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ).
126 The US, for example, supported the Ethiopian contingent’s deployment to the AU mission in Burundi; South Africa assisted Mozambique’s deployment.
assistance, and has asked for the UN’s help in coordinating bilateral donors, especially in harmonizing training efforts and improving interoperability within their member states. Even connections between headquarters staff seem tenuous. Within the DPKO, some staff suggested that they are available for consultation and assistance. “I’m waiting for my phone to ring,” said one expert on civilian policing.\footnote{Author interview, United Nations, 2004.}

Another challenge is coordinating with those providing bilateral and regional assistance to Africa for peace operations. DPKO’s Training and Evaluation Service (TES) could be a natural link between the UN and member state training assistance, for example, yet they are not provided with regular information from UN member states on their bilateral training programs for military or civilian personnel for peace operations.\footnote{Author interview, UN DPKO, August 2004.} One proposal is for the UN to act as a clearinghouse on data about bilateral training programs, much like the G8 Africa Action Plan proposal for a database of information. DPKO could assist regionals in setting up pre-deployment training for their troop contingents to better understand their mission, mandate and the rules of engagement of an operation.

As noted earlier, the UN has actively participated in developing the AU standby force concept. The UN provided expert consultants to the African Union, including a DPKO official, to help develop its proposal and draft the concept paper for the African Standby Force. DPKO also helped support the African Union deployment to Burundi for its AMIB mission.\footnote{Author interviews, United Nations, AU, Institute for Security Studies, 2004.} UN consultants have advised the Early Warning Unit, and participated in multiple official AU sessions dedicated to the Protocol and ASF.\footnote{DPKO and DPA participated in the African Chiefs of Defense and Ministers of Defense Meetings. In 2002 and 2003, DPKO helped evaluate the Early Warning situation room status.} The ASF concept paper suggests additional areas for UN and AU cooperation, such as adopting an MOU to strengthen AU headquarters capability with a UN expert advisory team. Another recommendation was for a UN peacekeeping specialist to join the UN Liaison Office to the African Union (UNLO/AU), that ASF components be listed within the Standby Arrangements System, and that the AU and UN cooperate on doctrine and training.

The DPKO’s Best Practices Unit is looking at the regional relationship with Africa, conducting lessons learned studies on peace operations involving the UN and African organizations, and commissioning papers on these topics. These studies and related reports are routinely posted on their website.\footnote{See, for example, \textit{African Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: An Assessment of the Continent's Evolving Peace and Security Architecture}, by Funmi Olonisakin, International Policy Institute, King's College London, September 2002 (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/).}
Department of Political Affairs

At the request of the AU leadership, the DPA was asked to help the African Union build its transitional institutions from the former Organization of African Unity. The DPA has focused on helping the AU operationalize its early warning capacity and establish the Peace and Security Council. During 2004, the UN and AU leadership discussed additional AU priorities, such as electoral assistance and support to the Panel of the Wise. This DPA support program is funded through the UN Secretariat budget, with partial funding from the Trust Fund for Preventive Action. DPA hired experts to analyze how the AU can fulfill its operational and strategic goals for various departments; this does not currently include training or hiring of AU personnel.

Special Political Missions. In support of the Security Council, DPA organizes peacebuilding missions to key areas. These missions can also work with regional organizations to support a response to a crisis, such as providing an expert team from UN headquarters to assist with logistics and planning of a regional response. DPA may also meet with local, regional and international actors at UN Headquarters. Special political missions are usually DPA-led peacebuilding efforts that support fact-finding missions or mediators with a small number of observers. In the summer of 2004, the UN sent a headquarters team to Sudan to assess what a peacekeeping operation would require and to consult with the African Union about their deployment to the Darfur region. The UN Secretariat later sought and received Security Council approval of such support as a special political mission. This group was thus authorized and funded as a UN mission, which enabled it to work with the AU Commission on their peace operations requirements as well as to provide an outline for the potential UN peace operation in Sudan.

Liaison Offices. Beyond UN fact-finding and peace-building missions to the region, the DPA also has links to UN offices within Africa. A formal UN mechanism for direct, institutional coordination with a subregional organization for enhancing peace and security began with establishment of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) in 2001. The office is focused on peacebuilding and developing a subregional approach to peace, and working with ECOWAS and its member states. Led by the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, UNOWA aims to connect the UN and its subregional partners regarding “specific mandates of United Nations organizations as well as peacekeeping operations and peace-building support offices.” Based in Dakar, Senegal, however, UNOWA is somewhat limited in its ability to liaise with far away ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria.

133 Author interview, DPA, August 2004.
134 Author interview, DPA, August 2004.
Another mechanism for formal consultation is the UN Liaison Office to the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. UNLO/AU handles peace and security issues in addition to broader UN issues, and can facilitate collaboration with the African Union on its standby force and peacekeeping deployments. This office is not focused on capacity-building, however, although it collaborates with the UN Development Program (UNDP) which does play this role. The UNDP has a formal agreement with the African Union and a relationship with ECOWAS to develop their staff capacity at headquarters for conflict resolution, part of its mandate for capacity-building.

There is a distinction between program support from UN development-oriented offices and those involved in peace operations and military operations. UNDP has more authority for direct support to regional groups than Secretariat offices designed to conduct UN missions, such as the DPKO and DPA, which are not staffed or funded to provide capacity-building support. UNDP staff work in Addis Ababa and with ECOWAS in Abuja on this on-going effort to develop greater headquarters capacity for both organizations.

**Office of the Special Advisor on Africa**

Created in 2003, the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA) leads a task force within UN headquarters to coordinate the operational UN departments and eliminate overlap on work regarding Africa. Led by the Secretary General’s Special Advisor on Africa, Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari, the task force convened in 2004 with UN departments such DPKO, DPA, as well as programs and agencies such as the UNDP, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, and the World Food Program. The Special Advisor’s office is policy-oriented, not operational, and staffed with about a dozen professionals.

No overarching UN guidance provides clear goals to these various UN programs and working groups. With the report of the UN High-level Panel and the Secretary-General’s response, the UN may consider this question more strategically during 2005. If the UN Secretariat is not organized or focused in its efforts, then the effectiveness of its communications and collaboration with regional and subregional organizations will be limited.

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136 There are also MOUs between ECOWAS, UN agencies such as OCHA and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). S/PV.5007 (Resumption 1), 20 July 2004, page 8.

137 During AU summits, there are reportedly more UN delegates than Africans themselves, but they do not meet in advance to coordinate, share agendas, or discuss results following the AU meetings. Interview, OSAA, 2004.
— CHAPTER 4 —

LOOKING FORWARD:
UN-AFRICAN COMPLEMENTARITY

In 2000, the Brahimi Report identified areas where the United Nations and its member states should support regional and subregional organizations’ development of peace operations tools: training, equipment, logistics and other resources. Five years later, that list is still apt. But it needs to expand to include support for closing key capabilities gaps – headquarters management and planning capacity, financing, mission leadership, and available and skilled military and civilian personnel – as well as building links to peacebuilding capacities.

Much has changed to affect this list of requirements. Current worldwide demand for peacekeepers is unprecedented, and African leaders are demonstrating a greater desire to help meet it. The trend toward UN peacekeepers coming primarily from developing, not developed, states has become more pronounced. Even as the number of peacekeepers has grown, the top 20 troop contributing countries are increasingly from Asia and Africa, which provide the majority of peacekeepers. Neither Europe nor the permanent members of the Security Council provide even a thousand of the more than 65,000 UN peacekeepers. At the same time, the cost of UN peacekeeping has ballooned, with bills paid primarily by EU countries, the United States and Japan.

Multinational organizations in Africa have reshaped themselves, setting out to organize more operational responses to post-conflict situations. The newly-created African Union is moving forward with an ambitious agenda, having deployed two peace operations since 2003, and is considering additional missions.138 ECOWAS has also retooled itself, sent out multiple peacekeeping forces, and moved forward with developing a task force for future missions. The AU and ECOWAS are both building more capable headquarters staff and peacekeeping forces, in concert with their member states, the United Nations and the international community.

At the United Nations, views have shifted away from the Brahimi Report’s caution against an over-emphasis on regional and subregional organizations for peace operations. While some fear the United Nations will devolve its responsibility to regional, subregional or multinational forces, others believe that UN collaboration will build a broader peacekeeping architecture, setting up capacities that are

138 The African Union has considered a potential peacekeeping role in Somalia and the DRC, among other areas.
complementary to one another. The African organizations cast their role not as replacing UN actions but as supporting its multidimensional operations by leading immediate, if not long-term, peacekeeping missions. UN member states acknowledge the importance of these regional efforts, especially in Africa, and praise the efforts of the AU and ECOWAS in Sudan and Burundi, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. The Security Council has authorized or welcomed their missions, recognized the need to improve peace operations capacity in Africa, and called for UN initiatives to work together.

Yet beyond this cooperative rhetoric, the United Nations faces hurdles in collaborating effectively with African organizations on more than an ad hoc basis. Fundamentally, the UN needs a device to activate on the very support urged by its own reports to enable regional and subregional groups to lead and manage peace operations successfully. The Secretariat has established its working groups on African security, but they need a strategic vision and political support to set goals and priorities. The UN Security Council could cite Chapter VIII authority more consistently and effectively in regards to missions led by regional and subregional organizations, employing it to trigger real assistance in knowledge and systems (e.g., planning and management), operational capacity (e.g., logistics support, identification of trained units), and funding (e.g., assessed or voluntary contributions). In turn, such collaboration could increase the ability of the United Nations to organize effective peace operations and smoother hand-offs from regional leadership, to access trained pools of peacekeepers (military and civilian police), and to have regional capacities co-listed within UN databases (e.g., UNSAS; on-call lists of personnel). Improved coordination of bilateral support offered by members could also help regional efforts complement, not compete with, UN goals. But these measures are not yet happening – they need to be adopted.

**At the UN: Recognizing the Need for Change**

A fresh approach was offered by the Secretary General’s *High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*. Its December 2004 report addressed the UN relationship with regional groups, and recognized their role “particularly in highly vulnerable parts of the world where no effective security organizations currently exist.”139 Regional groups do not “absolve” the United Nations of responsibility, but preferably they should not conflict with UN efforts. In short, they should work together:

> The ability of the Security Council to become more proactive in preventing and responding to threats will be strengthened by making fuller and more productive use of

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the Chapter VIII provisions of the Charter of the United Nations than has hitherto been the case.\footnote{A More Secure World, Report of the High-level Panel, page 85.}

Such a recommendation fits within the traditional framework of the UN’s approach to regional groups. The High-level Panel restated the need to work within the confines of the Charter, e.g., maintaining the UN’s primacy in authorizing the use of force, but in a more “integrated” manner. The Panel did allow that Council authorization could come after a regional operation began.

But the Panel also gave the United Nations a needed shove toward more systematic and specific means of working with regional institutions, not just when a fire truck is needed. The Panel urged expanded “consultation and cooperation,” perhaps in formal agreements, covering areas such as “meetings of the heads of the organizations, more frequent exchange of information and early warning, co-training of civilian and military personnel, and exchange of personnel within peace operations.” African organizations got direct attention for a sustained effort:

> In the case of African regional and subregional capacities, donor countries should commit to a 10-year process of sustained capacity-building support, within the African Union strategic framework.\footnote{A More Secure World, Report of the High-level Panel, page 86.}

The High-level Panel gave both the UN and regional groups “to do” lists. Regional organizations should list their capacities for peace operations within the UNSAS framework. The United Nations should provide real material and financial support to regional operations. UN member states should make equipment from UN stocks available to support operations by regional groups. On a case-by-case basis, funds within the UN “peacekeeping budget” should also be allowed to finance regional operations authorized by the Security Council. The report suggested that NATO could help train and equip “less well resourced regional organizations and states,” a reference fitting for the African Union, ECOWAS and other African organizations. It also recommended increasing capacity for peacebuilding within the UN system through a new Peacebuilding Commission, with participation from representatives of regional and subregional organizations actively involved in the country in question.

Where the Panel report was striking in the specificity of its recommendations for the UN to work with African and other regional groups. Responsibility for implementation will need to be assigned, however, so that the recommendations are not left in a vague state of post-report homelessness.
Changing a Mind Set or Changing the Rules?

The United Nations is still strengthening its own ability to conduct peace operations. As demand for peacekeeping in Africa has grown, the UN Secretariat has worked to keep up with the Security Council’s direction to provide more than 75,000 peacekeepers to current missions. The UN operations in Africa are especially demanding, often in tough neighborhoods with limited infrastructure. They test the UN’s ability to recruit skilled forces and personnel, and to support effective, integrated, multidimensional operations. Meanwhile, African organizations are trying to develop their own, more rudimentary capacity to deploy, and manage peace operations. Where should resources go?

Within the UN Secretariat, there is an apparent shift in thinking about regional capacity in Africa as more credible and capable, and thus, potentially complementary to UN efforts, as reflected in the High-level Panel report. African-led peacekeeping operations can assist UN efforts if provided with early support in the field and if later hand-offs of responsibility for the mission to the United Nations are sorted out. Whether to UN support should go to other multinational operations is a decision for UN member states, however, and rests on their seeing benefits from the development of the AU and ECOWAS mechanisms.

The United Nations clearly needs a sustainable, formal process to establish working relationships with other multinational organizations and to set priorities for collaboration. Cooperation with African organizations would benefit from a more systematic approach, both in support to the AU and ECOWAS headquarters and for deployments of their peace operations. Existing mechanisms for such collaboration are ad hoc. For example, the UN wanted to send a DPKO team in 2004 to work directly with the African Union on the modalities for the Sudan mission and to plan for a potential UN mission there. This effort was not itself a UN peacekeeping operation, so did not qualify for resources as such. The Security Council authorized an UN special political mission, a category usually reserved for DPA peacebuilding missions, to trigger the authority to use UN funding and enable support by the UN Secretariat. Without a clear mechanism to work with a regional group on a sustained basis (work that exceeds a traditional UN assessment team), future UN efforts to provide staff to work with a regional group will require a new means or similar but unusual use of this mechanism.

142 Hand-offs between the UN and regional and subregional forces have faced difficulties. See Lessons Learned Study on the Start-up Phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, April 2004.
The United Nations and its member states have many options. The Secretariat could coordinate an evaluation of how its systems might be applicable for African organizations, much like the Brahimi Report or as a separate commissioned analysis. Areas of focus should include planning; headquarters development; establishing and handing over peace operations; setting up the regional task forces and African Standby Force capacities; and identifying peacebuilding requirements to accompany peace operations. Funding is another key requirement.

The UN could designate an existing Secretariat trust fund specifically to support these collaborative activities, such as the DPA’s *Trust Fund for Preventive Action* established for fact-finding, consultations, short-term field assignments and “timely dispatch” of personnel to areas of potential conflict for roughly six months, and not more than a year. Such a fund benefits from direct, voluntary contributions and is administered by the Secretary-General. This work could then guide the identification of areas benefiting from more formalized UN support, including use of the assessed peacekeeping budget for supporting regional and subregional operations, as proposed by the High-level Panel.

Secretariat activities can benefit from high-level meetings and consultations, but they should establish practical efforts between the UN and African organizations, thus contributing to the High-level Panel’s recommendation for a sustained effort in Africa for capacity-building over 10 years. Explicit recognition of a UN-African partnership would also facilitate exploration of initiatives such as looking at a coordinated use of logistics sites (such as Brindisi and African depots); co-listing of African ASF capacities in the UN Standby Arrangements System; organizing staff exchanges between headquarters; supporting hand-offs between African-led and UN-led operations; sharing lessons learned and planning expertise; improving use of early warning and analytical information in Africa; harmonizing training and doctrinal materials; and avoiding duplication of efforts. The General Assembly would need to fund liaison positions within the Secretariat for this work, since headquarters personnel within DPA and DPKO are already in short supply and often overworked.

**Synergies with Bilateral Programs: Funding, Planning, and Training**

G8 countries and other bilateral donors could also improve the impact of their support for African capacity-leveraging. Better coordination of bilateral peacekeeping training programs for military and civilians, such as those led by Great Britain, France, the US and Norway, could serve both UN and

144 *Terms of Reference for the Trust Fund for Preventive Action*, 6 May 1997. This trust fund was established with the support of the government of Norway.
145 Even after increases in headquarters positions in 2000-2002, DPKO has only about 600 personnel to manage roughly 80,000-plus military and civilian staff in peace operations in the field in 2004.
African Capacity-Building for Peace Operations: UN Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS

African-led peacekeeping efforts. Where peace operations capacity is enhanced by member states, it benefits the AU and ECOWAS in improved troops and better mission leadership. Some African organizations suggest they could use direct funding for salaries and for staff travel for training sessions.

Norway runs the Training for Peace program, which offers “practical” training for civilians and police within the southern African region in DDR, civil-military relations and rule of law. Courses are run with South African institutions such as the Institute for Security Studies and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes in South Africa. The program results in a database and roster of available trained civilians, which pleases the UN, for one. The program is expanding to West Africa, working with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, and could offer a roster for West Africa and also pre-deployment screenings.

The multinational SHIRBRIG, comprised primarily of European nations, plans and sets up new peace operations, acting as a bridge between UN Security Council authorization and mission deployments. While designed for Chapter VI missions, SHIRBRIG has supported peace operations with a Chapter VII mandate on a case-by-case basis. In Ethiopia-Eritrea, SHIRBRIG deployed its first peacekeeping brigade to help establish the UN mission there in 2000. It has also sought collaboration with African organizations, providing a planning team to support ECOWAS in Côte d’Ivoire and support for establishment of the UN Mission in Liberia. SHIRBRIG has also sent planning staff to Burundi, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. They have invited the African Union and ECOWAS to exercises as well.

Outside partners and donors have helped with development of ECOWAS and AU headquarters. ECOWAS has accepted seconded officers to work in its Secretariat from the United States and Europe, for example. In general, however, ECOWAS and the AU have difficulty responding to offers of outside assistance. Unlike ECOWAS, the African Union staffs its headquarters with only African officers. The AU does not invite representatives from other organizations or seconded personnel from other continents to work in Commission headquarters in Addis Ababa, nor does it accept funding for their staff positions from outside their member states.

146 Competition for national assets such as military bases (including Western countries maintaining bases in Africa) and their being used for subregional, regional and UN-led operations is a subject worthy of review but not covered here.
147 Author interviews, ECOWAS and Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, 2004.
148 Author interviews, Norwegian official with the Training for Peace program, 2004; interviews, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, Accra, Ghana, 2004.
149 SHIRBRIG has 15 countries as members: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Argentina temporarily suspended its membership. Seven nations are observers: Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Jordan, Portugal and Senegal.
In turn, outsiders frequently do not know who to approach at ECOWAS and the AU, which have difficulties with offers of assistance as they lack central offices that can coordinate and identify their unmet requirements and respond to inquiries and offers. The administrative and budgetary offices at the ECOWAS Secretariat and AU Commission are separate from those that work on peace and security issues. Often outside donors approach the leadership of the AU and ECOWAS directly, which may result in offers of support that are not internally consistent with what their staff identifies as needed. Donors may try to arrange for a project with staff, but staff often lack authority to accept such support or coordinate documentation. In mid-2004, the EU announced creation of an “African Peace Facility,” a fund worth €250 million. While heralded widely, officials within the AU and subregional groups had little initial information about how the funds would be received or administered, and there was little initial public clarification.¹⁵⁰

For the AMIB mission, “burdensharing” faced its limits too. Western resources were offered to help the African Union deploy its forces to Burundi. The cost for one year was estimated at $120 million (reportedly half the cost of a comparable UN operation), yet after one year less than $10 million of the $50 million pledged for the mission was received.¹⁵¹ Likewise, bilateral support may be offered to countries that already are providing high levels of peacekeepers. It is striking that Ghana, with only 5,000 total army forces (active), provided 3,000 personnel to UN peace operations in 2004. In contrast, Nigeria has roughly the same number of troops deployed – but from a total army of 62,000.¹⁵²

The AU and ECOWAS need to create a headquarters database and tracking method to handle incoming financial, material and personnel support from partner countries, NGOs and the United Nations. This office would serve as a liaison or one-stop shop for partners wanting to contribute and a way for the organization to track both material and financial resources and report back to partners.

**Following the Brahimi Reforms: A Useful Guide?**

Can Brahimi-related reforms within the United Nations assist regional or subregional organizations to better shoulder peacekeeping tasks? Yes, to a point. Suggesting that African-led organizations adopt all the measures laid out for UN reform could lead them toward an unnecessary effort to duplicate UN

¹⁵⁰ There were competing understandings of the Fund’s potential use and many eager for its use; others were concerned the funds were being drawn from other “new” money or existing accounts already slated for Africa.
¹⁵¹ Numbers presented during discussion with Ambassador Sam Ibok, the African Union, and Eric Berman, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, June 2004.
headquarters. Growth is needed, not replication. In key areas, where African organizations are aimed at organizing and managing deployment of peace operations, there are natural parallels and synergies.

Within the UN, its limited resources are recognized, and tolerated by member states. UN shortages could be exacerbated if the United Nations directed support to regional and subregional efforts solely from current capacity and budgets. Even with increased staff levels in 2000-2001, the ratio of DPKO headquarters staff to deployed peacekeepers is about one to 110.\(^{153}\) DPKO faces a challenge in meeting its own division of labor between operational and analytical roles. Organizing and providing more logistical support would assist regional efforts could tax current over-stretched UN stocks. With the dramatic upsurge in UN-led operations, including complicated (DPA-led, DPKO-supported) peacebuilding missions such as the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Secretariat staff have little spare time to analyze requirements for collaboration with regional and subregional organizations, to develop guidelines for troop contributing countries, and to support new aspects of mandates such as the protection of civilians, DDR programs, gender affairs or integrating humanitarian and development efforts within the peace operation. The UN could accomplish a lot by adding a few well-placed staff positions within the Secretariat for this work, which could make a great deal of difference in UN efforts to improve collaboration with regional groups.

Using the framework of the Brahimi Report can help gauge current African and international initiatives for African peacekeeping, and look for synergies with the United Nations. Within the categories of doctrine and strategy, management of operations, and rapid and effective deployment, there are areas of broad consensus about where improvement is needed, such as financing, headquarters support, logistics and equipment, and skilled, available military and civilian personnel. These areas need progress and African efforts can complement UN efforts. Specific attention is also needed to fill gaps in rule of law and civilian police, peacebuilding, doctrine development, communications, and regional coordination within Africa and with outside donors.

**Doctrine and Strategy**

Regional organizations seeking to develop doctrine for operations may look to the United Nations for support. The UN has increased its doctrine-like guidance, such as the DPKO *Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peace Operations*, and helped establish standardized programs of instruction and training for member states. With the wide variance in member states abilities, willingness to use force,

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\(^{153}\) Ratio reflects current forces levels and headquarters staff in early 2005. See also, *The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations*, Durch, Holt et. al., pages 55, 130 (Table D-1).
and doctrine, DPKO strategic and operational advice could be valuable to African organizations in this area.

Both the Brahimi Report and the High-level Panel recommended increasing peacebuilding capacity within the UN system. This is an area of significant gaps in peacekeeping operations: sufficient and highly skilled civilian police, rule of law teams and other civilian personnel. Integrating rule of law concepts into plans for the African Standby Force and for AU and ECOWAS operations is critical for operations to go beyond providing temporary security to successful longer-term stability. The UN could help develop the concepts of operations and for personnel recruitment, although it too still needs better recruitment systems, skilled personnel, headquarters staff and integration of peacebuilding with UN peace operations. Creation of a Peacebuilding Commission at the United Nations, recommended by the High-level Panel, would include participation of regional and subregional organizations when they were involved in the country in question.154

Efforts to train and equip African militaries can lack a clear sense of who is doing what, if programs are duplicative and whether real gaps are being addressed. There are numerous Western-supported training programs and training centers for peace operations in Africa, but little evidence of a basic “gap analysis” that provides the grounds for such training.155 Such an analysis could consider African capacity goals, understand the state of likely troop contributing countries, and assess the difference between where capacity is and where it is desired to be. Not all countries can absorb more training, or are inclined to accept the offer. This assessment should look at available military and civilian personnel, and help prioritize training goals and programs. The same analysis could address UN or national goals: where is capacity, where should it be, and how do you meet the gap between the two?

Bilateral training programs also implicitly teach doctrine, which may lead to forces operating on conflicting terms. Centers like the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana can play a role in helping sort out AU, ECOWAS and other subregional doctrine and training requirements, and help harmonization. A mechanism is needed to track training programs and new initiatives in Africa by various bilateral, regional and member state actors, especially as the G8 focuses on increasing support to Africa for peace operations and the United States offers to organize $660 million for a new Global Peace Operations Initiative aimed primarily at Africa. DPKO’s Training and Evaluation Service could be a repository for a training database, and the information would assist its work with troop contributing

155 Author interviews, officials in ACOTA, BMATT and RECAMP programs; at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center; at the United Nations, ECOWAS and the African Union, 2004.
countries. Alternatively, the G8 proposal for a clearinghouse is sensible, and G8 members should progress to give a home to the data shared at their meetings.

**Planning and Managing Operations**

The headquarters staff assigned to work on peace and security at the AU and ECOWAS work admirably hard, under difficult conditions, with responsibilities that far outweigh their in-house capacity and small staff. For these organizations to anticipate and plan a mission, support deployment of personnel and forces to the field, and manage operations they need increased expertise, more staff, internal coordination, clearer lines of responsibility, and funding for their programs. This is difficult with a few dozen staff.

More direct coordination between the planning staffs and DPKO could benefit the regional groups with UN expertise and support development of stronger planning cells in Addis Ababa and Abuja. The AU and ECOWAS could benefit from increased training for their civilian leaders and staff as well, whether through staff exchanges with the UN, SHIRBRIG or member states.

In addition to better support from their member states, funding is required to support multinational organizations, to provide for pre-deployment training and transportation of troop contingents, and to sustain peacekeeping forces in the field. Yet neither the AU nor ECOWAS has sufficient funding to provide for all these requirements. Funding through the UN, as recommended by the High-level Panel on a case-by-case basis, would enable the Security Council to have the option to put substance behind Chapter VIII and support operations that meet UN goals.

**Rapid and Effective Deployment**

Effective deployments require many components: skilled and coherent forces, strong management, clarity of mission and leadership, enabling forces and transportation, among other factors. The five regional forces proposed as the basis for the African Standby Force parallel the UN’s need for more coherent brigade-sized contingents deployable for peace operations. These subregional brigades could be a useful component listed within the UN Standby Arrangements System, a database that could be used for UN or regionally-led operations. The UNSAS needs strengthening and improved participation from member states. This is an area where growing capacities of African organizations can benefit the United Nations. The AU and ECOWAS could urge their member states to train together and to participate in regional brigades that are listed in the UNSAS system. Major UN troop contributing countries, including Nigeria and Ghana, as well as Zambia, Tunisia and Benin, participate at Level III of the UNSAS system,
nearly the highest level. African countries with large forces within UN operations, such as Ethiopia, South Africa and Morocco, do not participate at all. Kenya, Senegal, Namibia and Niger are at the basic Level I. More effective use of the UNSAS could help identify where training is needed; give vital data about potential deployment timelines of potential troops; and help match forces with logistical support for missions.

The ability of African countries to create an effective standby capacity is hampered by restraints on national military growth, corruption and political stability. Development organizations and international financial institutions urge African nations to spend less on their militaries and more on other domestic investments. There is also genuine concern within Africa and from partner countries that better-trained, more professional African militaries might also take action against legitimate governments. This possibility needs to be countered by the creation of credible oversight and institutions. Other tensions arise when outside donors offer specific support to regional and subregional groups which does not fit with their concept of priorities, and when these groups do not respond to donors’ requests for specific data or actions.

One requirement echoed by those within Africa for more capacity, especially for the AU and ECOWAS, is especially clear: improving logistics. There is near universal agreement that logistical support is a primary and fundamental challenge for deployment of African-led operations. African institutions severely lack sufficient logistics and equipment stocks to support peacekeepers in-theater, as well as mission-specific items such as communications equipment. Transportation is also fundamental, including airlift or sealift into a mission area, and vehicles for the mission once in the field. In Darfur, for example, the AU observers require helicopters and jeeps for their observation mission, a serious requirement given the challenging geography and expanse of the region. For environments needing more robust forces, such as attack helicopters and armored personnel carriers, equipment may be hard to supply without advance coordination. For example, in Liberia, well-trained troops lacked equipment. The UN can provide vehicles and communications systems, but for more major items, it usually turns to nations to partner with troop contributing countries.156

Both the African Union and ECOWAS outline the development of logistics capabilities, such as depots and bases.157 One option is to use the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi to support stocks for AU and

157 ECOWAS has proposed two depots in West Africa and the AU has proposed at least two, one on each coast. The US has committed to transferring its depot in Freetown, Sierra Leone to ECOWAS.
ECOWAS deployments. The UN has had difficulty keeping Brindisi well-stocked and persuading member states to provide more enabling units, however. Concerns have been raised over standing depots in the subregions because of the difficulty in maintaining, updating, and tracking equipment. The UN could examine ways in which the expertise and equipment at Brindisi can aid the development of depots on the African continent for regionally-led operations, or be a host for equipment identified for African-led operations.

**The UN View**

To make relations more systematic, the UN should consider a few options. First, it should work out direct relations with African organizations and make current initiatives more effective. The UN Secretariat could try to set more strategic goals for its efforts with African regional organizations, and set priorities for the efforts led by DPKO, DPA and the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa. These working groups should have an integrated plan that gains support from the General Assembly and its budget committee over the next five years, and be coordinated to support efforts with African regional organizations, inclusive of UN staff time, funding for needed resources, and likely outcomes from such collaboration. Second, designated points-of-contact within bilateral programs and within African regional organizations are needed to help organize and establish priorities. Third, UN participation in the annual meetings of the African Union could be better organized, such as setting UN priorities relating to peace operations capacity and following up after such meetings to identify where progress was realized.

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158 Brindisi is primarily non-weapons, non-radar equipment needed for deployment not usually with national units. Conversation with Gen. (ret) Tim Ford, former Military Advisor, UN DPKO; author interview, 2004.
— CONCLUSION —

A FINAL THOUGHT

This report has focused on broad areas of potential collaboration between the United Nations and two African organizations, the African Union and ECOWAS, drawing on interviews and discussions with those working in these institutions. The analysis highlights the organizational challenges faced by these groups in trying to field peace operations. Given the pace of operations, the expectation that peacekeeping will remain in demand in Africa, and the desire of member states to support more effective use of the UN and African organizations for these missions, the complementarity of these organizations must be recognized and strengthened.

This report tries to address questions where public data is often scarce. Governments may analyze their own peace operations capacity, but often do not publish it. Good information on the capacities of the African Union, ECOWAS, the United Nations and many government programs focused on peace operations is not readily accessible. Those with expertise in this area will recognize that this report is an effort to provide a better understanding of these organizations, and their operational challenges, to a broader audience interested in Africa, peace operations, and efforts to support peace and security. More work in this field will benefit the understanding of the current challenges and assist public discussion.

African ambitions are high and regionally-led peacekeepers have supported new operations. Such missions are not self-sufficient, however, and both the AU and ECOWAS face major gaps in their proposed architecture for organizing, supporting and deploying such missions. Analyzing African capacity through the lens of the Brahimi Report is useful to gauge key areas of capacity and gaps, as well as areas of potential collaboration. The AU and ECOWAS would benefit from clearer mandates, concepts of operations, leadership qualifications and doctrine, as well as from identifying requirements for civilian police and other personnel. They face fundamental gaps in their planning and management capacity to lead peace operations; staff are taxed by the requirements of their (often multiple) responsibilities. The AU and ECOWAS have successfully deployed troops in peace operations, often quickly, but they are not yet self-sustaining and require outside logistical support. The AU and ECOWAS are reliant on external sources to finance much of their headquarters and operations, since they lack sufficient funding from their member states.
Numerous areas are ripe for better collaboration between the UN and African groups, with support of member states. The UN could work with the AU and ECOWAS on developing their headquarters capacity, with a focus on mission planning and support. They could also work on the coordinated use of logistics sites (such as Brindisi and African depots); co-listing of African ASF capacities in the UN Standby Arrangements System; organizing staff exchanges between headquarters; supporting hand-offs between African-led and UN-led operations; sharing lessons learned and planning expertise; improving use of early warning and analytical information in Africa; harmonizing training and doctrinal materials; and consideration of funding.

Enthusiasm within the international community to work more closely with African groups has grown in the last few years. The UN is not designed, however, to support development of regional and subregional organizational capacity or prepared to assist their deployments on more than an ad hoc basis. The UN lacks a formal mechanism and strategic vision for providing support such as staffing and planning, funding, logistics, or other material assistance on a regular basis. UN mechanisms to work with regional and subregional organizations are still in their infancy.

Just in the past year, 2004, there has been noteworthy progress in UN collaboration with regional and subregional groups in Africa for peace operations, such as in Sudan with the African Union. Within the United Nations, there is an increasing view that better collaboration is needed, as urged by the Secretary General when he recognized the “new multilayered security architecture.” This architecture requires the UN to help address the key areas where African peace operations need support, including doctrine and training standards, equipment and logistical support, funding, and institutional capacity for planning and management. Rather than sit by, the international community can work effectively to help peace operations generally and African leadership specifically.

Secretary General Annan has offered both a broad vision and clear suggestions for such support, putting his organization and member states on notice that he would actively seek UN engagement:

I will, when appropriate, seek a mandate and resources from the United Nations… We should support any initiative that promises to add real peacekeeping capacity where such capacity is needed… The United Nations has significant comparative advantage with its unique capacity to deliver an integrated multidimensional response. As it is recognized that many conflicts are dealt with first at the regional level, the Organization’s package of support should focus on planning and financial and logistical support for African Union start-up operations. This should be done while resisting the impulse towards a complete devolution of peacekeeping in the regions…. While viewing with great
optimism the rapid development of African peacekeeping capacity, I should also note a parallel need in the field of post-conflict peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{159}

While Chapter VIII is cited in UN Security Council resolutions authorizing and recognizing regionally-led operations in Africa, that citation has not led to development of concrete outcomes, such as establishing operational links with regional organizations, providing UN-organized support to operations, or setting standards by which groups should operate. Chapter VIII needs to mean something to all parties, both as a framework that sets standards and as a means of encouraging the international community to work more effectively. Indeed, resources will be wasted if efforts are not better harmonized. Sending more funding and bilateral support to diverse efforts to strengthen peace and security architecture has a limited impact.

The United Nations should create an operational mechanism for working with regional and subregional organizations on peace operations and their capacity-building. UN member states should agree to use Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to trigger real support to regionally- and subregionally-led peace operations authorized by the Security Council. By identifying in advance the areas of potential support, the UN could use Council citation of Chapter VIII to “turn on” headquarters resources to such operations. On a case-by-case basis, the Council could also direct the use of assessed funding through the United Nations to support these missions.

To identify these areas of potential support, the United Nations should conduct a full assessment of how it could work more effectively with African organizations in the early planning and start-up phase of an operation; during the initial deployment and as forces ramp up; and, when appropriate, during hand-offs of leadership from regionally-led to UN-led peace operations. This review should include consideration of how the United Nations could also assist with longer-term headquarters development at the AU and ECOWAS; identify areas of joint capacity development operationally (e.g., logistics, communications, and transportation); link with African standby forces; and help develop more peacebuilding capacities for African missions. This review should also identify areas where the UN’s capacity for peace operations is enhanced by African capacity developments, such as increasing the ability of the United Nations to organize effective peace operations and smoother hand-offs from regional leadership, to access trained pools of peacekeepers (military and civilian police), and to have regional capacities listed within UN databases (e.g., UNSAS; on-call lists of personnel). United Nations efforts to support longer-term capacity-building could be funded through a trust fund managed

by the UN Secretariat with voluntary contributions, as is currently done for work on preventive action. These measures should be undertaken.

There is genuine reason for optimism, as discussions of a multilayered security architecture reveal genuine political energy and support in numerous quarters, especially evident in Africa and in the West. Such political will is the engine that can move ideas to operational capacity, with the right guidance and persistence. Peace operations are difficult undertakings, and African organizations deserve serious attention as they take on leadership of such missions. Increasing ambitions for the United Nations also reflect a level of confidence in its existing operations, but the UN must have sustained political, material and financial backing from its member states to meet their goals and aspirations. The next step is to determine how to leverage the existing political energy into a clear plan that sets priorities and harmonizes the work of so many actors.

Hopefully, the recommendations within this report could be tested and used to encourage concrete collaboration between the United Nations and African-led organizations, giving real meaning and impact to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Such a vision is timely and useful as the international community enters the 21st Century, aspiring for peaceful change despite enduring human conflict.
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(2) 1994 and 1999 data is from 31 December, 2004 data is from 31 August.
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