Research Note

THE DEMOGRAPHY OF GENOCIDE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975-79, and East Timor, 1975-80

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ABSTRACT: In this research note Ben Kiernan, director of the Genocide Studies Program at Yale University (www.yale.edu/gsp), scrutinizes estimates of the number of people killed in the two most recent cases of genocidal mass murder in Southeast Asia: Cambodia and East Timor. He concludes that the two cases were proportionately comparable, though many more people died in Cambodia. Each tragedy took the lives of over one-fifth of the population.

The two most recent cases of genocidal mass murder in Southeast Asia share a roughly contemporaneous time frame and a combination of civil war, international intervention, and UN conflict resolution. But ideological crosscurrents abound. The goal of Cambodia's Khmer Rouge communists was revolution. Jakarta pursued anticommunism, with the goal of territorial conquest. U.S. policymakers supported the invading Indonesians in East Timor and the indigenous Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Both perpetrator regimes exterminated ethnic minorities, including local Chinese communities, as well as political dissidents. Indonesian anticommunist counterinsurgency and Cambodian communist revolution thus brought similarly horrific results. The scale of the death tolls has been the subject of scholarly discussion, but it is now possible to state that the two cases were proportionately comparable, though many more people died in Cambodia. Each tragedy took the lives of 21-26 percent of the country’s population.
Cambodia’s Population before and after the Khmer Rouge

Cambodia’s last census before the Khmer Rouge came to power in April 1975 was held in 1962. It counted the country’s population at 5.729 million. The demographer Jacques Migozzi, in the most extensive study of Cambodia’s population, considered this an undercount, and came up with an estimate of 7.363 million for 1970. Migozzi anticipated in 1972 that the population would continue to increase at 2.9 percent per annum (p.a.), despite the ongoing 1970-75 war, and he predicted a 1975 population of 8.5 million. But the war took a substantial toll and also slightly reduced the natural population growth rate. A mid-1974 United Nations (UN) estimate produced a figure of 7.89 million, representing growth of 2.46 percent p.a. The UN estimate was corroborated at the time by an independent statistician, W.J. Sampson, then working in Cambodia.

Demographers Judith Banister and Paige Johnson estimate the April 1975 population at 7.3 million; Marek Sliwinski estimates 7.566 million. These two figures seem low in the light of Migozzi’s estimate for five years earlier, those of 1974, and concurring higher estimates for later years (see below). More recently, the demographer Patrick Heuveline of the University of Chicago calculated a population of 7.562 million for April 1970, and assuming 300,000 excess wartime deaths in 1970-75, postulated a figure of 8.102 million by April 1975.

The mid-1974 estimates suggest a similar April 1975 figure of 8,044,000. After its victory, Pol Pot’s new Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime quickly expelled 150,000 ethnic Vietnamese residents. I have therefore calculated a population of 7.894 million remaining in Cambodia in April 1975; Heuveline’s figure would be 7.952 million. A Cambodian statistician working for the DK regime also learned in 1975 that the population was “about 8 million” in that year.

From a base figure of 7.894 million, the harsh living conditions that the DK regime immediately imposed probably restricted Cambodia’s 1975-79 natural population growth rate (births minus “normal” deaths) to around 1 percent p.a. This would project an “expected” January 1979 population of 8,214,528 — minus “excess” deaths since April 1975.

Documentary evidence for not only excess deaths but actual population decline after April 1975 includes an official, published DK figure of 7,735,279 in March 1976. In August 1976, another official DK source gave a confidential estimate of 7,333,000, a statistical loss of over 400,000 in just six months. It is clear not only that the lower estimates for the pre-1975 population are wrong, but also that the post-1975 population was declining.

The most detailed post-genocide population figure is a government count of 6,589,954 people at the end of 1980, documented by the Cambodian Department of Statistics in 1992. From this, Banister and Johnson have calculated a population figure of 6.36 million for the end of 1978. This means a statistical loss from the projected early 1979 figure (8,214,528) of around 1,854,528. Alternatively, a figure of 1,671,000 results from calculating and combining the different estimated tolls for Cambodia’s various ethnic and geographic communities. Marek Sliwinski calculates the 1975-79 nationwide toll at 1.843-1.871 million. We may safely conclude, from known pre- and post-genocide popula-
tion figures and from professional demographic calculations, that the 1975-79
death toll was between 1.671 and 1.871 million people, 21 to 24 percent of
Cambodia’s 1975 population.

Evidence from Mass Graves?

Against this, on the basis of a survey of locations of DK-era mass graves, Craig
Etcheson has suggested that the death toll could have been as high as 3 million.
His assertion arises simply from a partial, incomplete mapping (by 1999) of an
estimated 20,438 mass grave pits: “According to the Documentation Center of
Cambodia, these mass graves contain the remains of 1,110,829 victims of execu-
tion.” Etcheson adds that with location of all the Khmer Rouge-era mass graves,
“it is likely that the estimate of the number of victims in mass graves will rise sig-
ificantly….The total could reach as high as 1.5 million.”

However, the precise figure of “1,110,829 victims of execution” is quite impossible to substantiate
without exhumations of all the mass grave pits, a count of all bodies in them,
and forensic determination of the causes of each death. Nor does the estimate
result even from a sampling. This figure for executions is based on assertion
alone: “The twenty thousand mass graves mapped so far are virtually all located
at, or near, Khmer Rouge security centers. Eyewitnesses at most of these mass
grave sites have testified that the graves contain victims brought there by Khmer
Rouge security forces, and that the victims were murdered….Thus one can con-
clude that virtually all of the mass graves contain victims whose cause of death
was execution by the Khmer Rouge.”

Note the wording here. Etcheson is grammatically careful not to state that the
mass graves contain only victims of execution. Though necessary for his case,
that is impossible to demonstrate. But employing that very assumption, Etche-
son goes on to suggest accepting the undocumented count of “1,110,829” bod-
ies as a figure for executions alone. To this he adds an additional figure for vic-
tims of “other causes of death during the Khmer Rouge regime, such as
starvation, disease and overwork.” Thus, proceeding from the presumption
that executions caused only 30-50 percent of total DK deaths, he triples the un-
documented figure of 1.11 million executions. He suggests alternatively that it
should be merely doubled if the number of bodies in mass graves reaches 1.5
million. “It begins to look possible that the original Cambodian estimate of 3.3
million deaths during the Khmer Rouge regime might be very nearly correct.”

This baseless calculation not only ignores all the Cambodian demographic data
surveyed above, it relies totally on two false assumptions: that all bodies in the
mass graves have been counted and that all are victims of execution. The mis-
leading language (“all of the mass graves contain victims whose cause of death
was execution” — possibly true but still unproven) by no means establishes the
cause of death for all “1,110,829” uncounted corpses. Nor can eyewitnesses
from “most” of the sites, even if they witnessed every single death at many of
them. Etcheson carefully makes neither of the claims necessary for his case. Nei-
ther is close to being demonstrated. He overlooks the evidence of Pin Yathay
that in Pursat in 1976-77, for instance, graves were dug for the victims of hunger
and disease, not execution.\textsuperscript{15} Such sloppiness is unworthy of the Documentation Center of Cambodia. Exaggerating a horrific death toll, it contributes to the ethnic auctioneering of genocide research.

\textbf{Cambodia's Cham Muslim Minority}

In 1990 the \textit{Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars} published an exchange between Michael Vickery and myself on the size of the Cham Muslim population in Cambodia and its demographic losses from 1975 to 1979. Vickery suggested that the 1975 Cham population was around 191,000, and in 1979, approximately 180,000, representing a death toll in the DK years of 11,000 or more.\textsuperscript{16} My estimate of the 1975 Cham population was higher — 250,000. To this I applied the very low 1 percent p.a. population growth rate (births minus "normal" deaths) for 1975-79, calculating a projected 1979 population of 260,000. From this I subtracted my estimate of the number of survivors in 1979 (173,000) to arrive at a figure for "excess" deaths, a loss of over 87,000, more than 36 percent of the 1975 Cham population of Cambodia.\textsuperscript{17} This was double the death rate suffered by the country’s ethnic Khmer majority, around 18.7 percent.\textsuperscript{18}

In a recent publication, \textit{Oukoubab: Justice for the Cham Muslims under the Democratic Regime}, Ysa Osman has challenged our assessments by asserting that the Cham population in Cambodia in 1974 "comprised 10 percent of Cambodia’s population (roughly 700,000 of the country’s 7,000,000 people)."\textsuperscript{19} Osman cites much higher figures for both the Cham population and the genocide. He states that either 138,607, or possibly, 200,000 Chams survived in 1979, and that the demographic losses were thus approximately 500,000 to 560,000, or 71-80 percent. However, there is no reliable evidence for the assertion that as many as 10 percent of Cambodians were Cham; this percentage more than triples the true proportion.

An 1874 French census counted 25,599 Chams in Cambodia, or 3 percent of the population. A July 1936 official count produced a figure of 73,465 Chams, which the French expert Marcel Ner revised upwards to 88,000. Ner considered the official count a 20 percent underestimation.\textsuperscript{20} If the Cambodian population was 3.1 million in 1936,\textsuperscript{21} the 88,000 Chams would comprise 2.84 percent (73,465 would be 2.37 percent).

A 1955 official tally of Cambodian adult males counted 29,786 Cham men on Cambodia’s electoral roll.\textsuperscript{22} This minimum figure suggests a Cham population of at least 59,572 men and women aged twenty-one or older, and from this can be calculated a total Cham population in Cambodia of 152,126 in 1955.\textsuperscript{23} The national population in 1955 was around 4.8 million, of whom Chams thus comprised 3.16 percent.\textsuperscript{24}

Migozzi offers a 1968 figure of “about 150,000.”\textsuperscript{25} This represents 2.14 percent of the population, far too low to reconcile with the three previous figures approximating 3 percent or more. Migozzi seems to have been unaware of the 1955 count of Cham adult males. From the more precise and reliable 1955 figure of 152,126, using Migozzi’s estimated national population growth rates for 1955-60 (2.65 percent), 1960-65 (2.83 percent), and 1965-70 (2.95 percent), we may calculate a Cham population of 230,531 in 1970, or 3.16 percent of the
national population, precisely consistent with previous estimates. This would suggest a population in April 1975 of 249,450.

Unfortunately, Cambodia’s official records had not only accepted the low 1936 figure of 73,000 rejected by Marcel Ner, but also, inexplicably, continued to cite it as the size of the Cham population as late as 1955, acknowledging no population growth at all in the intervening decades. Migozzi cites no source for his low 1968 figure of 150,000, but it was probably based on the official 1936 figure as restated for 1955. That initial underestimate, and the failure to update it for twenty years, may understandably have provoked countervailing exaggerated claims on the part of Cham leaders, who probably knew that the Cham population had increased significantly from 1936 to 1955. But like the underestimates, their exaggerations could not be documented, and never were.

In 1974, for instance, the Central Islamic Association of the Khmer Republic published a much higher claim: “The Chams or Khmer Muslims…represent more than 10 percent of the Khmer population of the capital of Phnom Penh and the provinces of Kandal, Kampot, Kompong Cham, Pursat, Battambang and Kompong Chhnang. Other small Cham villages are found throughout the rest of the Khmer territory…”

What Cham population size was being claimed here? No figure was given, but rough calculations are possible. In 1968, the populations of Phnom Penh and the six provinces named totaled 4.005 million, or 57.3 percent of Cambodia’s total population of 6.995 million. Assuming for the moment that Chams did comprise 10 percent of Phnom Penh and the six provinces, they would have numbered 400,500 in 1968, and 452,000 in 1975 (5.73 percent of 7.89 million). Accepting the claim of “more than 10 percent,” and adding inhabitants from the “other small Cham villages” in the remaining thirteen provinces, one might reach a figure of 500,000 for 1975. Were these claims better documented, that would be an absolute maximum. Though high, these 1974 official Cham estimates are careful not to claim a nationwide percentage of 10 percent, for which there is no documentary evidence whatsoever. Thus, a figure of 700,000 is impossible to sustain. It is based entirely on retrospective claims advanced in 1999-2000 by interviewees asserting that in the early 1970s they had “seen statistics” or “heard an announcement,” or on the undocumented “memories of Cham elders.”

No other document suggests that Chams comprised as much as 10 percent even of the six provinces and the capital, let alone of the whole population. To the contrary, all existing documentary evidence consistently indicates that Chams comprised around 3 percent of the national population in 1975.

In November 1975, secret DK reports mentioned 150,000 Chams in the Eastern Zone (Prey Veng and Svay Rieng provinces, and the eastern part of Kompong Cham). This is not a precise count but seems to be an estimate, comprising round figures of 50,000 and 100,000. We have inadequate pre-1975 Cham population data from those specific provinces to compare fruitfully with this. There is therefore no way to extrapolate from this 150,000 to any nationwide 1975 figure, certainly not to 700,000.
The next figure for the Cham population in Cambodia was reported in December 1982: 182,256. Had the Cham population grown at the estimated national rate of over 2.8 percent p.a. for the preceding four post-DK years, the surviving Cham population in January 1979 would have been under 163,200. Adding the 11,700 who fled abroad, we reach a maximum of 174,900 Cham survivors of the genocide. The improbable figure of 138,607 for January 1979 (first published only in 2002) is simply too low to reconcile with the 1982 count of 182,256 only four years later. Conversely, rough estimates of 200,000 survivors in 1979 are clearly too high.

Thus, the statistical loss from the projected 1979 Cham population of 260,000 (assuming only 1 percent natural growth from 1975) was over 85,000, or 34 percent of the 1975 Cham population. To these 85,000 “excess” Cham deaths, I would add another 5,000, or 28 percent of the 17,750 Chams statistically likely to die naturally in 1975-79 given a crude death rate of 1.73 percent p.a., but who most probably died prematurely within that period due to harsh DK policies that especially impacted those same at-risk groups — the aged, infirm and infants. This suggests a total of 90,000 Cham deaths from causes attributable to the DK regime, comprising 36 percent of the 1975 Cham population.

Estimates of the East Timorese Population

The last census in East Timor before the December 1975 Indonesian invasion was carried out by the Portuguese colonial rulers in 1970. This produced a figure of 609,477 people in the territory. In 1974, the Catholic Church provided a count of 688,771, indicating a population growth rate over 3.0 percent p.a., compared to the 1.8 percent that has been postulated for the 1960s and if continued would have produced a population of 654,558 by 1974. However, the Portuguese authorities carried out post-census sampling on a quarterly basis, and in 1974 they produced a population figure of 635,000, representing an increase of only 1 percent p.a. since 1970. We can assume this to be an absolute minimum. An annual growth rate of 2.2 percent in this period was “the lowest increase in Southeast Asia.” In 1970 the Cambodian growth rate reached 2.9 percent. There is no reason to assume an East Timorese rate below 2.2 percent, which would produce a 1974 population of 664,906. Robert Cribb has pointed out that “there is prima facie more reason to imagine that the figures provided by the Portuguese administration are actually under-stated, because Portugal collected an unpopular poll tax which would have given the East Timorese every reason to avoid being counted. The same is true of the church figures. In 1975, fewer than 50 percent of the East Timorese population was Catholic, and any church estimate of the population must be seen in the light of its incomplete access to society.” The 1974 church estimate included figures of 460,112 animists for only 220,314 Catholics. Portuguese officials considered the census, for its part, to be a 5 percent undercount. There is no reason to believe that the census data overstate either the numbers or the population growth rate from 1970 to 1974. Though the much higher 1974 church count may also be incomplete, for the purpose of calculating a safe conservative estimate, I use it here as a possible maximum.

If we increase the minimum 1974 figure of 635,000 by the low 1960s’ estimate of 1.8 percent annual growth suggested by both John Taylor and Robert Cribb (citing a demographer), we arrive at a 1975 population figure of 646,430. If we assume the 1974 figure was for midyear rather than December 1974, and increase it again by 0.9 percent to arrive at a December 1975 figure, we get 652,250. The same calculation for the higher church figure produces a December 1975 maximum of 707,500. The conservative range of possibilities thus seems to be between 652,250 and 707,500.

From this we must subtract the numbers of those killed in the August-September 1975 civil war (usually estimated at between 1,500 and 2,000); the defeated UDT soldiers and their families who fled to Indonesian West Timor in September-October (3,000); the 140-50 prisoners killed by Fretilin in December 1975 immediately after the Indonesian invasion; and the 4,000 Timorese who fled to Australia and other countries. The total population loss to the territory by December 1975 was thus around 9,000. The minimum figure for the surviving population in East Timor in December 1975 is therefore 643,250, and the real figure possibly as many as 698,500.

**East Timor under Indonesian Rule**

The first Indonesian estimate of 329,271 in December 1978, naturally “aroused alarm,” as Robert Cribb has written, and “was apparently revised upwards” to attempt to include the large numbers of people still living under Fretilin administration in the hills. This produced a figure of 498,433 for December 1978. That month, Indonesian forces surrounded and killed Fretilin president Nicolau Lobato, completing the decimation of the resistance. Military pressure continued to drive Timorese into Indonesian-controlled areas until April 1979, when the flow “slowed to a trickle.” A June 1979 Indonesian count produced a population figure of 523,170. A 1980 Catholic Church count came up with only 425,000 survivors. But the 1980 Indonesian census found a population of 555,350, which Cribb regards as “probably the most reliable figure of all, but it is not clear that it takes into account those Timorese who had managed to evade Indonesian supervision in the interior.” Taylor estimates the latter in 1980 at several thousand, including about 1,200 resistance fighters (personal communication, April 2003). This would put the East Timorese population of the territory at around 560,000 in 1980. This seems corroborated by the 1981 Indonesian count of 567,000. Given the low June 1979 tally, the census figure for 1980 may be too high, but it does not appear to be an undercount.

But Cribb placed greater reliance on “the Indonesian investigation led by Professor Mubyarto [which] concluded that the population in 1987 was 657,411,” in light of which, Cribb argued, “the 1980 census figure of 555,350 becomes all the more implausible.” Cribb considered the latter too low, because it “implies a population growth rate of about 2.5 percent — very high given the difficult circumstances in Timor.” The lower 1980 church figure of 425,000 requires even higher subsequent growth rates to conform to Mubyarto’s 1987 figure. Cribb rightly ruled it out. The official Indonesian counts of 498,000 for 1978 and 523,000 for 1979 are harder to dismiss.
For the population figure of 657,411, Mubyarto cited the official Indonesian publication, *East Timor in Figures, 1987*. But that total clearly includes Indonesian transmigrants who arrived between 1980 and 1987. Mubyarto’s report estimated that 20 percent of the population of East Timor — “Protestants, Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists” — were “relatively recent immigrants.” Animists were not mentioned; clearly all indigenous East Timorese were now being classified as Catholics, except perhaps the Muslims native to the territory, who numbered under a thousand before 1975. If we subtract 20 percent from Mubyarto’s total, indigenous East Timorese in the territory in 1987 would have numbered only 526,000. Mubyarto offers a consistent 1990 figure of 540,000 Catholics in East Timor.

Who were the rest? From 1980, 500 Javanese and Balinese families began to arrive in East Timor in an officially sponsored transmigration program. By 1984 about 5,000 Balinese had been settled across the territory. More arrived before 1987 and all would need to be subtracted from Mubyarto’s figure of the East Timorese population for the purposes of measuring its natural growth rate since 1980. The most precise figures available are presented by the Indonesian analyst Soewartoyo, in a monograph published by Jakarta’s Center for Strategic and International Studies. According to Soewartoyo’s figures, a total of 14,142 transmigrants arrived in East Timor in the period 1980-85 alone. Another 15,550 arrived in 1986-88, of whom possibly one-third arrived in 1986, making a total of around 19,000 transmigrants for the period 1980-86, before Mubyarto’s population figure was tallied in 1987. After subtracting return and outward migration from the territory, Soewartoyo gives a total of 12,193 “lifetime” transmigrants to East Timor by 1985. Extrapolating for the period 1985-1986, a figure of 15,000 seems reasonable.

We may also need to subtract from the 1987 population figure any unofficial transmigrants included in the tally. While Soewartoyo counts 33,618 “lifetime” transmigrants by 1990, Frédéric Durand estimates total transmigrants in East Timor then at 85,000. The official 1987 population figure of 657,411 must be reduced to around 642,000 by subtracting at least 15,000 “lifetime” transmigrants. Consistent with this, a 1980-87 annual growth rate of only 2.0 percent would have increased the 1980 population of 560,000 to 643,000 in 1987. But the growth rate might have been much lower. Including unofficial arrivals, the total 1987 transmigrant population could well have reached 60,000, with possibly fewer than 600,000 indigenous East Timorese.

It may be impossible to determine the exact number of indigenous survivors and their offspring. What is clear is simply that the official 1987 East Timor population figure includes tens of thousands of transmigrants. It is therefore not so high a count of the indigenous population as to rule out the 1980 census figure (along with the 1979 Indonesian count) as an underestimate.

Even a post-1980 population growth rate of 2.5 percent p.a. (excluding the arriving transmigrants) may be unlikely but is not impossible, especially after a massive loss of life had occurred from 1975-80. There is no reason to dismiss the 1980 census figure on the grounds that annual growth of 2.5 percent is out of the question. We have already seen that the Catholic Church count of the 1974
population implies a 3 percent p.a. increase after 1970. Cribb writes that the demographer suggesting a pre-1975 growth rate of 1.8 percent “as a likely figure in a relatively stable agricultural society,” also noted “that rates like 3.5 percent were possible (and were known from the Philippines), but that they should be regarded as exceptional, a consequence of improved disease control (though not necessarily prosperity), social disruption and rural economic opportunities caused by capitalist penetration…, and the availability of major towns and cities as absorbers of population.”

To factors favoring rapid population growth we must also add the East Timorese context: the rebuilding of families after large-scale losses in 1976-80. The pre-1970 Cambodian growth rate was 2.6 percent or even 2.95 percent in 1970. And following the proportionately comparable genocide there, growth rates in 1981-88 reached “an extraordinary 4 per cent per year,” before leveling off to 2.8 percent by 1988.

A 1981-87 annual population growth rate of 2.5 percent from the 1980 census figure would suggest a 1987 population of at least 660,000, higher than the official total. The difference could be explained by the 1981-82 famine and documented mass killings that continued from 1981 to 1987. For instance, in September 1981 massacre southeast of Dili, Indonesian troops reportedly killed 400 people. In August 1983, sixty men, women, and children were tied up and bulldozed to death at Malim Luro near the south coast. On 21-22 August 1983, troops burned alive at least eighty people in the southern village of Kraras, and then made a “clean-sweep” of the neighboring area in which another five hundred died. The 1980 census figure of 555,350 can therefore easily be reconciled with Mubyarto’s 1987 official maximum even without allowing for the tens of thousands of transmigrants and without presuming the possible annual population growth rate of 2.5 percent.

There is every reason to accept the 1980 census figure. So by then, the territory’s population must have fallen to 560,000 from the December 1975 minimum of 643,000, to which any births (minus “normal” deaths) from 1976 to 1980 should be added. We may accept that the famine and terror conditions of 1976-80 could have reduced this “normal” population growth from at least 1.8 percent to as low as 1 percent p.a. Starting from the minimum 1975 population of 643,000, if we apply to the five-year period 1976-80 only the very low natural growth rate of 1 percent p.a. (as I have assumed for the DK period in Cambodia), the total population of East Timor should have reached 675,799 in 1980. But the number of survivors was no more than 560,000. The 1975-80 population loss, above the normal death rate, was at least 116,000.

On the other hand, if we accept the 1974 church count instead of the Portuguese census quarterly updates, the 1975 population of 698,000, increasing in 1976-80 by only 1.0 percent p.a., should have reached 733,605 by the end of 1980, suggesting a loss of 174,000. Increasing annually at even 0.5 percent p.a., it should have reached 715,625 by the end of 1980, which means a loss of 155,625. The low order of magnitude of the 1975-80 toll is therefore within the range of 116,000 to 174,000. A median estimate would be 145,000. Cribb is correct to specify that for the 1975-80 period “the figure of 200,000 should be
dropped,” but a toll of 150,000 is likely close to the truth. If we include victims of post-1980 massacres and of the 1981-82 famine, the figure is substantially higher. Gabriel Defert, assuming a 1970-75 growth rate of 2.2 percent and 1.1 percent for 1975-81, calculates a toll of 170,000 deaths by December 1981. This would represent 24 to 26 percent of East Timor’s 1975 population.

This is all consistent with estimates of the death toll from various Indonesian sources. The president of the pro-Indonesian provisional government of East Timor, Lopes da Cruz, announced on 13 February 1976 that 60,000 people had already been killed “in the six months of civil war in East Timor,” suggesting a toll of over 55,000 in just the two months since the invasion. A late 1976 report from the Indonesian Catholic Church estimated that 60,000 to 100,000 Timorese had perished. In March 1977, Indonesian foreign minister Adam Malik conceded that “50,000 people or perhaps 80,000 might have been killed during the war in Timor.” On 12 November 1979, Indonesia’s new foreign minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja estimated that 120,000 Timorese had died since 1975.

Notes


11. Banister and Johnson, in Kiernan, Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia, 90.
24. “Estimates of total population for 1955 varied from approximately 4,800,000 (by the United States Department of Commerce) to 5,125,000 (a projection by Canada’s Department of Mines and Technical Surveys figures, based on a sharp increase since 1946 of approximately 2.5 percent per year). The official Cambodian government figure of 4,740,000 for 1958 is used in this book.” Steinberg et al., *Cambodia*, 28.
26. Steinberg writes: “In 1955 the combined estimate of Chams and Malays was about 73,000, or one percent of the total population” (Steinberg, *Cambodia*, 45). Apparently derived from this incorrect figure is that of “about 80,000 Chams in Cambodia” in the late 1950s, in F. P. Munson et al., *Area Handbook for Cambodia* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), 56.
27. Migozzi thus suggests Chams comprised 2.2 percent of the Cambodian population (Migozzi, *Cambodge*, 42).
31. Marcel Ner recorded in 1941 that a quarter of Cambodia’s 88,800 Chams lived in just two districts of eastern Kompong Cham Province: 22,113 in Suong and Krauchhmar (Ner, “Les Musulmans,” 176-77). In the 1950s, well over 20,000 Chams lived in Krauchhmar alone (J. Delvert, *Le paysan cambodgien* [Paris: Mouton, 1961; L’Harmattan, 1994], 605, 610-11), when the nationwide Cham population was 152,000. It is quite possible that three-fifths of Cambodia’s Chams — 150,000 of 250,000 — lived in the eastern zone in 1975.
32. Banister and Johnson write: “The year-end 1980 count of children at ages zero and one is higher than expected….The apparent rise in fertility in 1979 indicates that underlying mortality conditions may have improved somewhat dur-
ing the latter part of 1978 and in 1979.” The 1979 total fertility rate of 5.8 births per woman suggests a population growth rate of 2.8 percent; that of 6.3 births per woman in 1980, around 3.1 percent. The growth rate for 1980-90 was estimated to average 2.8 percent p.a. (“After the Nightmare: The Population of Cambodia,” in Kiernan, Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia, 86. See also J. Huguet, “The Demographic Situation in Cambodia,” Asia-Pacific Population Journal 6, no. 4 (1992): 79-91.) Patrick Heuveline estimates 3.2 percent for the early 1980s (personal communication, 30 May 2003). Other sources cite various rates: 1.9 percent for 1980, 4 percent for 1980-81, and for 1981, “4.6-5.2 percent — one of the highest in the world.” If the latter figure is actually the crude birth rate, subtracting the crude death rate of 1.76 percent suggests a population growth rate of 2.84-3.44 percent for 1981. In 1982, Cambodia’s Ministry of Health estimated the crude birth rate at 45.6 per thousand (a fertility rate of 5.8 births per woman) and the death rate at 17.6: again, a population growth rate of 2.8 percent. Grant Curtis, Cambodia: A Country Profile (Stockholm: SIDA, 1989), 7; Kimmo Kiljunen, Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide (London: Zed, 1984), 34, 44, n. 17; Banister and Johnson, in Kiernan, Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia, 93.

33. Osman, Oukoubab, 2, n. 5.
34. Sliwinski variously cites the Cham toll as 33.7 percent and 40.6 percent (Sliwinski, Le Génocide Khmer Rouge, 77, 144).
37. Migozzi, Cambodge, 212.
40. James Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1983), 321-22, 180, 305, 178, 322; Desmond Ball and Hamish McDonald, Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2000), 175. Heinz Arndt cited a figure of 40,000 Timorese refugees living abroad or in other parts of Indonesia, but this is considered exaggerated. Waddingham, “East Timor,” 5, 10; Dunn, Timor, 322; Robert Cribb, e-mail, 10 October 2001; John Taylor, personal communication.
41. This supports Waddingham’s early estimate (in 1980) of between 656,000 and 693,000. Waddingham, “East Timor,” 10.
45. Gabriel Defert, Timor-Est. Le Génocide Oublié: Droit d’un Peuple et Raisons d’Etat (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1992), 148, cites the figure of 567,000 from Statistik Indonesia (1983), which apparently refers to December 1981. Defert assesses the annual population growth rate from December 1975 to December 1981 at 1.1 percent, suggesting a toll of 170,000. Thanks to Peter Carey for drawing this to my attention.


52. Frédéric Durand, *Timor Lorosa'e: Pays au carrefour de l'Asie* (Bangkok, IRASEC, 2002), 87. Soewartoyo’s figure for the 1990 population of East Timor is 747,557. A 1995 estimate for transmigrants is 180,000 (Mauro di Nicola, *Uniya*, spring 1995). In March 1997, the vice-rector of the University of East Timor, Armando Maia, indicated to Peter Carey that there were 161,095 non-Timorese inhabitants of East Timor at that time in the 15-60 age group. I am grateful to Carey for forwarding these 1995 and 1997 statistics; personal communication, 19 May 2003.


56. My conclusion, reached before reading Waddingham’s 1980 article, “East Timor: How Many People Missing?,” confirms his toll range of 133,000-217,000, “at least one-fifth” of the population.

