U.S. Policy and Practice Regarding Multilateral Peace Operations

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This chapter describes and seeks to explain the cycle through which United States policy toward multilateral peace operations has traveled over the past decade. After President Bush and President Clinton in 1992-1993 articulated policies of strong support for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, Congress forced the Executive to back away from providing such support and the Administration increasingly relied on regional organizations to conduct peace operations. Clinton’s policies, while leaving the nation better prepared to conduct and support NATO peace operations, helped weaken the UN politically and economically and did not significantly strengthen UN military peacekeeping capabilities. This chapter identifies some of the key factors that shaped U.S. policy and argues that the U.S. failure to strengthen UN peace operations has undermined other stated American foreign policy objectives.

Three main ironies characterize the Clinton Administration’s approach to peace operations. While the Administration conceived of support for UN peacekeeping as a way to limit American military involvement overseas, influential Members of Congress feared UN peacekeeping as a potential expansion of U.S. military commitments. As Ivo Daalder points out, Clinton’s promotion of multilateralism and UN peacekeeping was borne of a

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1While peacekeeping is not the equivalent of peace operations, for variety in this paper the terms are used interchangeably. Peace operations include both traditional peacekeeping taken pursuant to Chapter VI of the UN Charter and peace enforcement operations authorized under Chapter VII. For more on differing definitions, see the United Nations, An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992, p. 4 (where peacemaking and peacekeeping are distinguished) and the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington: GPO, 2000, pp. 346-347. The U.S. military defines peace
desire to free his energies for domestic politics, yet the effort foundered on domestic
diplomacy. Finally, while U.S. policy was premised on the need to strengthen UN capabilities,
the U.S. simultaneously (along with other nations) pushed the UN far beyond its
operational and conceptual reach.

The harsh realities of the difficulty of conducting peace operations, congressional-
executive tensions, partisan politics, Administration miscalculations and competing
priorities, and an underlying ambivalence within the broader body politic about America’s
global role all contributed to a reshaping of U.S. peace operations policy as it had originally
been conceived by the Clinton Administration. These dynamics produced an outcome that
neither President Clinton nor peacekeeping foes had intended: the United States
increasingly took the lead in organizing and conducting the most nettlesome humanitarian
interventions.

While the benefits of UN peacekeeping have been uneven, operations in places such
as Macedonia, Mozambique, El Salvador, and Eastern Slavonia demonstrate the
contributions that UN missions can make to international peace and security. Nonetheless,
by the mid 1990’s, the United States had pushed to curtail UN operations and fallen further
behind in paying its assessments for UN peacekeeping. The Administration began
expanding the use of American troops for peace operations largely through the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is not surprising, nor necessarily problematic, that
the globe’s leading power prefers to run the humanitarian interventions to which it
contributes heavily. After all, NATO remains the only institution truly capable of
undertaking complex and militarily challenging operations. The problematic aspect of this
trend was the neglect of UN peacekeeping.

Toward the end of the decade, the Administration found its own calculations of
interest dictating renewed support for ambitious UN operations. International instability
and international politics inevitably drew the United Nations back into challenging peace

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enforcement as including sanctions enforcement and other uses of force that may not be primarily
humanitarian. See also footnote 106.

2 Ivo H. Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping,” in UN
Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J. Durch, Basingstoke:
operations. Since June 1999, the U.S. has supported five new UN operations and a doubling of UN forces in the field to almost 40,000 troops, even as Congress kept the country deeply in arrears to the world body.

This neglect of UN peacekeeping has had significant costs. The United States lost an opportunity to help the United Nations expand its legitimacy and effectiveness in promoting international security, a goal of both the Bush and Clinton Administrations. As a result, the U.S. has been unable to accomplish the oft-stated objectives of increasing international burden sharing and reducing demands upon American military forces. American policies helped prevent UN action in some instances deserving of a response, most notably the 1994 genocide in Rwanda — for which President Clinton subsequently apologized. In underpaying its bills and using the United Nations as a political scapegoat, Washington weakened both the UN’s reputation and its capacity relative to its expanded peacekeeping responsibilities. These policies increasingly were mirrored by other militarily and financially powerful industrialized nations, further diminishing the legitimacy and capabilities of UN peacekeeping. To the extent that the UN broadly, and UN peacekeeping specifically, advances American interests, U.S. policy has undermined both. It has undoubtedly reinforced international concerns that the world’s leading power focuses on narrowly defined interests at the expense of broader international security goals.

President George W. Bush will confront a world filled with demands for military intervention. Not all of these demands can be met by U.S. (or NATO) forces. Nor can all crises be ignored without jeopardizing other U.S. policy objectives. The new President will inevitably find himself asking the UN to address lesser-order international security problems in order to satisfy international political demands, to help keep chaos from spreading, and to limit the exposure of American troops. Unfortunately, U.S. policies since the mid-1990’s have made it less likely that the UN will be able to accomplish these objectives.

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3 See UN peacekeeping website http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/ dpko/ ops.htm
U.S. Multinational Peace Operations Policy and Practice

Evolution of UN operations

During the Cold War, the United Nations undertook a relatively small number of peacekeeping operations, most of which involved “classical” peacekeeping: the stationing of unarmed monitoring forces with the consent of the local parties. These UN interventions often aimed to stabilize areas of Cold War competition. Accordingly, the Security Council’s permanent five members generally refrained from contributing peacekeeping troops, while providing significant financial, and occasionally logistical, support. Peacekeeping was a tool of finite value, useful once the parties had reached an agreement and needed a neutral, watchful eye.

But by the later 1980’s, requests for UN intervention had surged. The goals of peace operations began to change from observing cease-fires to facilitating political transitions. In 1989, the UN monitored Namibia’s first free election and the withdrawal of external forces, an effort heralded as a great success. The UN also enjoyed enhanced credibility both within the United States and worldwide, through its association with the Persian Gulf War. The end of superpower ideological conflict further encouraged faith in the UN’s potential to enhance international security.

By the early 1990’s, UN peace operations had been transformed both in number and purpose. Increasingly, UN forces were sent to provide humanitarian relief, to usher in new political arrangements after long wars, or to facilitate the cessation of hostilities. The UN sought to distinguish between lightly armed neutral monitoring forces — dispatched pursuant to Chapter VI — and troops deployed to “enforce” a settlement under Chapter

VII. U.S. doctrine similarly came to draw a line between peacekeeping ("...military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties....designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement") and peace enforcement ("...the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions."). In practice, the lines often blurred. Blue helmets — often woefully incapable or unprepared — increasingly encountered hostile host governments, uncontrolled insurgent armed groups, unclear lines of demarcation, and civilians who viewed the UN as the enemy. As UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali said in 1994, "...peace-keeping has to be re-invented every day. There are as many types of peacekeeping as there are confrontations. Every major operation provokes a new question." Policymakers failed to understand or accept the difficulties inherent in the ever-expanding tasks they assigned to the United Nations and the inherent limits of the UN's capabilities.

**Bush Administration Policy**

As the Cold War and Gulf War drew to a close, President George Bush began focusing on ways to help the UN assume a greater role, an approach designed to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives in a new era. He made a pragmatic case to expand and improve peacekeeping capabilities to help shape a world consistent with American values and U.S. interests. "As conflicts are resolved and violence subsides," he declared, "then the institutions of free societies can take hold. And as they do, they become our strongest

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6 Although peacekeeping is not mentioned specifically in Chapter VI.
safeguards against aggression and tyranny. Bush’s concept of a “new world order” governed by the rule of law required an effective UN peacekeeping capability. So in January 1992, he urged the new UN Secretary-General to examine ways to strengthen UN peacekeeping, pledging full American support.

That summer, President Bush ordered a policy review that culminated in National Security Directive (NSD) 74 of November 1992. This directive, the first U.S. policy statement since the Truman Administration to advocate active U.S. support for UN peacekeeping, recommended a variety of U.S. and UN initiatives. Ivo Daalder reports that, in deference to the Defense Department’s view that the U.S. should contribute only “unique” military capabilities necessary for the success of a UN mission, the policy did not call for expanding participation of U.S. forces. The final Bush Administration National Security Strategy committed the U.S. only to helping plan and support UN operations. Nevertheless, given subsequent Republican hostility toward UN peace operations, the administration’s enthusiasm for both the UN and blue-helmeted peace operations seems virtually heretical.

President Bush summarized his new policy in a September 1992 address to the UN General Assembly, in which he urged delegates to “think differently about how we ensure and pay for our security in this new era.” He called on nations to develop and train military units for possible peacekeeping duty and to make them available on short notice, and he advocated multinational planning, training, and field exercises to better prepare UN peacekeeping forces. He said he had directed his Defense Secretary “to place a new emphasis on peacekeeping,” and particularly on the “training of combat, engineering, and logistical units for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian activities.” He pledged

12 Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No,” p. 38.
13 Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No,” p. 62.
14 This was roughly the same time period in which former Republican President Ronald Reagan called for a standing UN army in a speech at the Oxford Union. Joanne Merriweather, “Reagan Calls for Military Action in World’s Hot Spots,” United Press International, 4 December 1992, International sec.
that the United States would “work with the United Nations to best employ our considerable lift, logistics, communications and intelligence capabilities” and would “offer our capabilities for joint simulations and peacekeeping exercises to strengthen our ability to undertake joint peacekeeping operations.”

President Bush also called for the development of UN planning, crisis management, and intelligence capabilities for peacekeeping. He offered to provide U.S. military expertise to the United Nations and to broaden American support for monitoring, verification, reconnaissance, and other UN peacekeeping requirements. He further noted the need for “adequate, equitable” financing for UN peacekeeping, and promised to explore new ways to ensure adequate American financial support for UN peacekeeping.

Reactions to his address ranged widely. Some diplomats and observers were surprised at this “hijacking” of the recommendations contained in Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 document, *An Agenda for Peace*, which responded to President Bush’s initial challenge to strengthen U.N. peacekeeping. Officials in the Pentagon were reportedly startled by the implications for their work. One newspaper concluded: “If fully implemented, the President’s proposals would profoundly change Washington’s relationship with U.N. peacekeeping forces, and some diplomats probably assumed that the U.S. was throwing its weight behind UN peacekeeping. Others remained skeptical, given U.S. arrears to the UN and Bush’s failure to propose a solution to this funding problem.

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17 This pledge was realized in the form of U.S. military officers seconded to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
Bush, of course, never implemented his policy. It would appear, given his decision to enhance UN peacekeeping generally and his commitment of U.S. forces to a UN-authorized relief operation in Somalia, that he was headed for many of the same challenges that the Clinton team would face. Indeed, Congress was reluctant to authorize the Somalia relief operation and rejected Bush's request for a UN peacekeeping assessment contingency fund, signaling major challenges ahead.

**Development of Clinton Administration Peacekeeping Policy**

During the campaign, candidate Clinton had expressed support for UN peacekeeping primarily as a way to reduce U.S. security costs. While stating that he would never turn U.S. national security over to the United Nations or any other international organization, he simultaneously called for a UN rapid deployment force to be used for purposes beyond traditional peacekeeping. The expansive internationalist rhetoric of the incoming President and his officials seemed to adumbrate a deeper commitment to peace operations and the United Nations.

In the spring of 1993, National Security Council staff drafted Policy Review Document (PRD) 13, which had the stated aim of improving UN peacekeeping. The Pentagon created a new position of Assistant Secretary for Democracy and Peacekeeping and requested defense dollars from Congress to pay for U.S. participation in peace operations, to improve the UN's peacekeeping headquarters, and to train foreign peacekeeping troops. The Administration pressed the United Nations to launch an operation to relieve the bulk of U.S. forces in Somalia and began discussing potential UN operations in Haiti and Bosnia. The President said the United States would express its "leadership through multilateral means, such as the United Nations, which spread the costs

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and express the unified will of the international community. That June the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, outlined a policy of “assertive multilateralism” in testimony before Congress.

PDD 25

The Clinton Administration PRD 13 review took Bush’s NSD 74 as a starting point, adopting its emphasis on improving UN planning and intelligence capabilities and ensuring adequate UN financing. The review differed, however, in its willingness to consider direct U.S. troop participation in all aspects of UN operations. Clinton’s draft policy would consider deploying regular combat units, not just providing “unique” capabilities such as logistics, intelligence, or transportation. Early in the policy review process there apparently was a proposal to create a standing UN army or its “light” version, an on-call brigade-sized unit for rapid reaction. This proposal was killed by the Pentagon before interagency representatives met to review the initial draft document.

Otherwise, the content of the policy changed relatively little during its year-long gestation, retaining the following core elements: a list of factors for the United States to consider when contemplating support for multilateral peace operations; proposals to improve UN peacekeeping; conditioned support for the conduct of peace operations by regional organizations; a call for reductions in the cost and U.S. share of financial support for UN peace operations; and a policy on command and control of U.S. forces participating in UN peacekeeping operations.

28 Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No,” p. 43-44. Thus, candidate Clinton’s endorsement of a UN rapid deployment force appears to have been abandoned prior to the formal first policy review draft. NSC officials later inserted language that could be said to satisfy the President’s campaign commitment; PDD 25 supported a rapidly deployable UN headquarters unit as well as the UN’s standby forces arrangements. See Clinton, “Major Foreign Policy Speech, Foreign Policy Association,” Comment on UN rapid deployment force found on p. 7 of Lexus-Nexus version.
The biggest substantive changes in the document concerned a proposal to pay for peace operations ("shared responsibility" between the Departments of State and Defense — having Defense pick up part of the costs) and a section on consultations with Congress added late in the process. Policy regarding American forces under foreign command and the list of factors to consider in U.S. decisions concerning peace operations changed slightly. By its final draft, the policy document also painstakingly spelled out many of its underlying assumptions in order to dispel myths that had grown up during the year of virtual Administration silence about PRD 13. Thus the document ultimately stressed that peace operations did not define the national security strategy of the United States and that operations likely to involve combat would be evaluated according to traditional war-fighting criteria.

The final policy, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 established a generally sound and workable framework for U.S. peace operations policy. Taken at face value, it should not have become the lightening rod for a host of real, imagined and unrelated congressional concerns. Nor can the document fully explain the specific actions and missteps of the Clinton Administration. It was largely a pragmatic policy. It was criticized both by those who feared its implied activism and those who feared it would justify U.S. inaction.

Some critics, largely in the press, non-governmental organizations, and from foreign countries, objected to the policy’s "factors for consideration" in making decisions about specific peace operations. They argued that the "factors" had become so demanding that the United States would never support or participate in UN operations. In reality, the factors

29 The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (referred to as PDD 25 in following instances) proposed "shared responsibility" between the State and Defense Departments, a division of responsibility between the agencies for funding obligations for and primary policy control of certain types of operations. The innovation was proposed primarily in hopes of solving the peace operations funding crisis. Department of State, PDD 25, p.2.
30 The Joint Staff, which had the lead on the command and control aspect of peace operations policy, removed an earlier condition that American troops could disregard a foreigner's command if it were militarily unsound. Such a loophole would not only have jeopardized the integrity of UN operations; it would have created a precedent that would have haunted U.S. command of multinational operations. Department of State, PDD 25, pp. 9-11.
31 Department of State, PDD 25, p. 5.
had not changed dramatically during the policy’s development. More importantly, they remained highly subjective and were written explicitly to serve as a checklist for consideration, not to impose a policy straightjacket. Thus, from the outset PDD 25 necessarily begged critical questions related to U.S. support for specific UN operations. Interagency debates about prospective missions amply demonstrated that each factor (e.g., whether the U.S. had sufficient interests at stake or whether international support for an operation existed) was open to interpretation. One perceptive analyst concluded that “PDD 25 is designed to provide the Clinton administration with the greatest possible flexibility in addressing international crises.”

One of PDD 25’s most important contributions, in the eyes of a seasoned Clinton Administration official, was promoting the limited application of force as an “antidote to the Powell/Weinberger doctrine of overwhelming force.” This was, of course, something that worried many in Congress and the U.S. military — that the U.S. would become simultaneously more active and less effective in its application of military force. And their objections later were transformed into concerns about the effects of participation in peace operations (albeit not necessarily UN operations) upon the readiness of the U.S. armed forces to fight and win the nation’s wars.

By the time PDD 25 was unveiled, its tone and pitch had changed significantly. PDD 25 concluded that, “Properly constituted, peace operations can be one useful tool to advance American national interests and pursue our national security objectives. The U.S. cannot be the world’s policeman. Nor can we ignore the increase in armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars

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32 Additional Powell-Weinberger criteria were added as factors for consideration for U.S. participation “when there is the possibility of significant U.S. participation in Chapter VII operations that are likely to involve combat” (Department of State, PDD 25, p. 5), but these were implicit in any commitment of U.S. forces to possible conflict. Factors that “lowered the bar” for participation or support (e.g., that consideration of the cost of not acting be weighed) were also added to the list following consultations with Congress, despite the fact that most members of Congress urged more stringent criteria.

33 Department of State, PDD 25, p. 4. President Bush’s January 1993 farewell address also seemed to reject the application of “rigid criteria” to decisions about the use of force. See MacKinnon, The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy, p. 19.

and the collapse of governmental authority in some states — crises that individually and cumulatively may affect U.S. interests. This policy is designed to impose discipline on both the UN and the U.S. to make peace operations a more effective instrument of collective security.36

The rhetorical change reflected progressive developments in Administration thinking, the result of real world experience, and, most significantly, the mounting congressional criticism. In September 1993, National Security Advisor Lake had stressed in a major policy address that specific peace operations in Somalia and Bosnia did not define America’s broader strategy in the world. Days later, President Clinton lectured the United Nations that it would have to ask “harder questions” about proposed peacekeeping missions, warning that if the U.S. is to say yes to peacekeeping, “the United Nations must know how to say no.”37 The press, Michael Mackinnon observes, “began to speak of a policy in ‘retreat’.38 Lake explained at the policy’s May 1994 unveiling that the Administration some nine months earlier “began to ask harder questions at the United Nations and to try to work more closely with the Congress.” The policy, he concluded, expresses a more coherent version of the Administration’s philosophy.40

The Administration launched an unprecedented (for a presidential decision directive) series of briefings on Capitol Hill. They emphasized that PDD 25 was not a blank check for peace operations, did not support a foreign legion, promoted caution in decision-making, and required that NATO or another capable force do the difficult interventions. By stressing the constraints, the Administration hoped to regain congressional support for “more effective and selective” peace operations.

35 Interview with Lee Feinstein, who served as Deputy Director of the State Department Office of Policy Planning and in the peacekeeping office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, author’s notes, 30 January 2001.
36 Department of State, PDD 25, p. 15.
Unfortunately, critics in Congress remained unmoved by the “new” policy, even as the wider world worried that the United States had signaled its disengagement from peace operations. While PDD 25 as a policy still called for strengthening UN peacekeeping, the Administration encountered increasingly less political room to maneuver.

Congress Balks

Congressional antipathy toward peace operations congealed during the first year of the Clinton Administration. By late October 1993, Somalia had become the poster child for the failure of UN peacekeeping. Many Members, and particularly Republicans, feared that the Administration’s peacekeeping policy was too proactive, overly supportive of the UN, and divorced from U.S. national interests. The Pentagon’s proposed Assistant Secretary position was abolished following congressional objections to the nominee. Congress rejected Defense Department’s peace operations budget requests. The United States fell further behind in its peacekeeping payments to the United Nations, and Congress developed legislation designed to hamper U.S. involvement in UN operations. The Administration expended significant time parrying legislative restrictions, and succeeded in blocking the most pernicious initiatives. But the strategy became one of seeking to minimize political costs, accommodating Congress wherever possible. Unwilling to elevate the stakes, the Executive increasingly lost control of the issue.

Democratic Senator Robert Byrd was an early leading opponent of Clinton policies, questioning both the wisdom of, and the presidential prerogative to, commit U.S. troops to “nation-building” in Somalia. When President Clinton announced a plan to pull out U.S. troops after the October 3, 1993, Byrd nonetheless pushed through legislation mandating the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

41 “…[I]t has taken him less than a year to retreat from the bold multi-lateralist approach to the world’s post-Cold War troubles that he called for during his campaign,” Fletcher, “US Retreats from Role as World’s Policeman,” The Times of London.
During 1994, Republican leaders Robert Dole and Newt Gingrich elevated opposition to UN peace operations to a major party issue. Dole made his anti-UN peacekeeping “Peace Powers Act” a top priority for Senate action, and Gingrich included similar provisions in the “Contract with America,” the Republican election platform for regaining control of the House of Representatives. After the GOP triumph, the document provided a legislative blueprint for the Congress.

The victorious Republicans quickly pushed measures to prohibit U.S. forces from serving under UN command; to require a further reduction in the U.S. share of UN peace operations assessments; and to require reimbursement for U.S. military actions taken “in support of” UN Security Council authorizations. The net effect of such provisions would have been to end U.S. support for UN peace operations. In order to assert control over U.S. peace operations policy, Congress increasingly turned voluntary offers from the executive branch (e.g., to provide regular briefings, advance notifications, additional documentation) into legislative requirements and transformed even minor issues (such as providing limited equipment to UN forces) into matters of principle. Congressional requirements complicated and often delayed actions ranging in importance from the provision of U.S. logistical support to formal UN Security Council decisions about peace operations.

While some attempts to legislate restrictions either dissipated or were defeated, two issues continued to dominate the debate during the 1990’s: the payment of UN assessments and specific U.S. troop deployments. Congress’ most damaging actions concerned the payment of past and current UN bills, including those for peacekeeping. As UN peace operations surged, so did U.S. assessments for these activities. Historically,

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\text{\footnotesize 43 For a discussion of congressional restrictions and reasoning see Johansen, “U.S. Policy Toward U.N.,” pp. 13-19.}
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\text{\footnotesize 44 For example, the Administration in 1994 began regular consultations on peace operations on Capitol Hill. Congress soon demanded extensive reporting requirements in advance of Administration actions.}
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\text{\footnotesize 45 These included legislative proposals regarding command and control and reimbursement for costs “in support of” UN resolutions.}
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peacekeeping costs had been relatively predictable, around $50 million annually through the mid-1980's. But between fiscal year (FY) 1988 and FY 1989, the country's peacekeeping assessment more than quadrupled, from $43 million to $195 million.

By FY 1992 the costs had nearly tripled again to about $565 million. By the summer of 1993, the Administration faced the prospect of becoming nearly $1 billion in arrears on peacekeeping by the end of FY 1994. Some members of Congress sympathetic with UN peacekeeping urged the President to treat it as a higher priority, making a personal appeal for more funding. In 1994, Congress did agree to pay past UN dues. This was due in part, Jeremy Rosner argues, to legislators' perception of the issue as one of past debts rather than future obligations. But the victory was short lived. U.S. peacekeeping arrearages quickly surged again (see Figure 1), as Congress failed to approve the Administration's initial funding requests or supplemental appropriations for UN peacekeeping assessments. (Administration requests for supplemental funding for the deployment of U.S. forces had greater success.) In October 1995, Congress capped U.S. payments at 25 percent instead of the UN assessment rate of 30.4 percent, guaranteeing that future bills would be underpaid.

Facing mounting international criticism as the world's biggest UN deadbeat, the Administration ultimately decided to back Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as he negotiated a funding deal with the Committee's Chairman, Republican Jesse Helms. Because Helms was a longstanding opponent of both the United Nations and UN peace operations, it was no great surprise that the eventual deal contained onerous conditions.

The 1997 "grand bargain" allowed for the phased payment of the majority of U.S. arrears, but only if UN member states agreed to make significant changes in the institution and its procedures. Had any other nation made these demands — including for a reduction

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47 See Figure 1. Note that FY 1994 saw the historic high for U.S. assessments for UN peacekeeping of about $1.26 billion.
49 Not the "disputed arrears" stemming from the 25 percent cap on UN peacekeeping assessments. See also discussion in p. [ ] and footnote 57.
of just one nation’s peacekeeping assessment and limits on UN budgets — the United States would have found it laughable. Instead, Congress sought to impose them unilaterally upon the world body. To make matters worse, Helms could not deliver on his end of the bargain: anti-abortion activists in the House initially killed the State Department authorization bill containing the grand bargain.

Over the next years, the Administration sought to make the substance of the deal less objectionable and more politically achievable, while struggling to delink the issue of UN dues from family planning. Clinton Administration officials also attempted to improve “understanding” between the United Nations and Congress, bringing UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to Capitol Hill and sheparding U.S. legislators to the United Nations headquarters in New York. This process culminated at the outset of 2000, when Jesse Helms used an unusual audience before the UN Security Council to lecture the United Nations about its proper place in global affairs.

**NATO Assumes Center Stage**

As the 1990s progressed, Washington gradually moved away from participating in UN operations, and even from politically supporting UN operations in cases that were not deemed to be of sufficiently direct interest to the United States. In explaining why PDD 25 mattered, Ambassador Albright implied that it had been instrumental in blocking overly ambitious UN operations in Burundi, Georgia, and Angola. Instead of relying so heavily on the UN, the U.S. began promoting regional organizations and coalitions of the willing as

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50 Ambassador Holbrooke would later say “We have also changed congressional attitudes to some degree...by the most intense exchange of visits between the U.N. and the Congress....I think we’ve had somewhere in the neighborhood of 60 to 70 members of Congress here...I won’t say there’s been a sea change, but there’s been a significant improvement in congressional relations.” Kitfield and Hirsch, “In Holbrooke’s View, ‘We Have a Stake’,” National Journal, p. 2730.


the solution to international crises, even when such entities were clearly ineffective or biased.53

The Administration did manage to preserve its freedom to deploy U.S. forces for peace operations when the President deemed it important. In Haiti, the U.S. deployed a large independent force that was authorized by the UN, and only later blue-helmeted (under an American commander). In transforming the operation into a UN peace operation, the U.S. obtained political legitimacy, financial support, and a graceful way out of what was essentially an American occupation. In Macedonia, the United States placed a company of soldiers under UN command to help deter the spreading of conflict in the Balkans. But increasingly, participation in a UN force was perceived to be politically and practically untenable. With the political heat turned up, it was more feasible to defend action in the context of NATO than the baggage-laden UN. Therefore if the U.S. were to commit significant forces, NATO would need to be in charge of military operations, even if the United Nations ultimately ran other aspects of the overall effort. Accordingly, it was through NATO that U.S. forces came to participate in peace operations in Bosnia and later Kosovo.54 (see Figure 3)

Each large U.S.-led peace operation met with popular skepticism and strong congressional opposition. Historically, legislators had demanded consultation prior to U.S. military deployments and had criticized particular operations. During the Cold War, Congress had usually avoided straight up or down votes on the commitment of forces, considering these too risky and unpatriotic. But with those historical constraints eroded, votes to oppose peace operations became common. These were usually non-binding and often inconsistent, seemingly demonstrating disarray in U.S. foreign policy. Congress typically was reluctant to dictate withdrawal or to impose a completely rigid deadline for an operation, and legislators generally provided much of the requested supplemental funding.

53 For example, neither ECOMOG troops in Liberia nor CIS forces deployed throughout the former Soviet Union were successful or acted in a manner consistent with minimum standards of military responsibility.
54 It is noteworthy that President Clinton stated as early as September 1993 that he would only deploy U.S. forces to Bosnia under NATO command. See Friedman, “Clinton Rebuffs Bosnian Leader,” New York Times, p. A1.
Thus the President preserved what he considered his essential prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief. Congressional action appeared designed to put the President on notice that any deployment would be his failure, and that any nominal successes could be his, too.

In retrospect, it is remarkable that the Administration was able to keep U.S. troops so highly engaged in peace operations. But there were changed terms: no Americans would be placed under UN command. The U.S. would have to run the show. The UN ultimately paid the price for the underlying political accommodations that preserved the Administration’s freedom of action.

**Full Circle by the Decade’s End**

It was not until late in 1999 that President Clinton compromised on the abortion issue that had tied up the grand bargain to pay UN debts. While the legislation provided some relief in the near term and many of its terms have been met, the U.S. could not meet 100 percent of the conditions — specifically the reduction of the U.S. peacekeeping assessment share to 25 percent.

Richard Holbrooke, appointed U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations in 1999, made reducing U.S. assessment rates his top priority. On December 22, 2000, he astonished observers by negotiating an agreement in principle to reduce the U.S. share of the UN regular budget from 25 percent to 22 percent and the share of the UN peacekeeping budget from 30 percent to 27 percent.\(^{55}\) Senator Helms decided to support changing the law to permit release of the second tranche of UN arrears payments (over $580 million), despite the fact that, in his view, the “U.N. missed the [assessment reduction] target.”\(^{56}\) However, an additional $244 million is to be paid contingent upon other conditions, and Congress still must resolve the outstanding issue of “disputed arrears,” which has resulted in UN claims.

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of a U.S. debt of approaching $500 million. Congress also has declined to fund specific UN peace operations, such as those in Western Sahara and the Central African Republic. Today's newspaper leads mirror those from the early days of the Clinton Administration: "UN peacekeeping in question; GOP, opposed to growing mission, wants to cut funds." Unless the Administration addresses these issues and finds a way to ensure full future payments, arrears will continue to climb.

Since 1999, the UN has authorized ambitious operations in Kosovo and East Timor and a mission to monitor the Ethiopian-Eritrean cease-fire. The UN also has expanded or changed operations in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Lebanon. Clinton Administration officials argue that they have promoted better diplomatic agreements, required greater responsibility of the parties on the ground, and otherwise improved the shape and mandate of these operations. The scale of planned UN operations is not likely to return to the 1993 high of almost 80,000 fielded forces, but the costs of UN peacekeeping are predicted to climb near the record levels that originally fueled congressional revolt. The requirements of several missions, including administering territories and recreating devastated state structures, are reminiscent of the very "nation building" objectives that damaged the UN's reputation only a few years ago. The UN remains little better prepared operationally for these challenges than it was a decade ago, when President George Bush stressed the need to improve its capacities.

57 Congress' 25 percent cap on peacekeeping assessments was incorporated into the Helms-Biden "grand bargain" and the resulting gap between UN assessments and US payments will likely remain a contentious issue.
59 GAO, Costs of Peacekeeping Is Likely to Exceed Current Estimates, p. 4.
A host of factors combined to move the United States away from its espoused goal of enhancing UN peacekeeping. These include Administration political priorities and calculations, congressional opposition politics, the structural tensions between Congress and the Executive, and the lack of national consensus about the U.S. role in the world. These factors help explain why the Clinton Administration’s policy galvanized such vehement opposition in Congress (including among some Democrats) and why the Executive chose not to fight with the vigor reserved for other issues.

**Clinton Administration Actions**

While the Clinton Administration initially wanted the United Nations to play a more assertive security role, Washington fundamentally underestimated the difficulty of the new “peace enforcement” operations. This was perhaps predictable and inevitable. The United States had little experience in traditional peacekeeping and did not understand the more challenging operations that lay on the horizon.

Somalia. On December 9, 1999, President Bush sent U.S. forces to provide humanitarian relief in the midst of ongoing conflict. The UN was to provide the follow-on force, although Bush officials had discussed placing a significant number of U.S. logistics forces under UN command. The UN took over in the spring.

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60 I say this as a former Clinton Administration official who initially argued that the UN should be able to assume a peace enforcement role. Today it is obvious that operations in which significant combat can be anticipated are beyond the UN’s reach and likely to remain so.

The UN Security Council’s subsequent decision to call for the capture of General Aideed, a local Somali warlord, flowed from a legitimate desire to respond to his killing of Pakistani troops and to protect the UN’s reputation. But the end result of that decision left the UN more vulnerable than before, in no small part because of the U.S. reaction to its military role in the effort.

The Clinton Administration had strongly backed the call to arrest Aideed and provided specialized U.S. forces (under separate American command) for this purpose. On October 3, 1993, eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed in a firefight with Aideed’s forces. As television broadcast Somalis dragging a U.S. soldier’s body through the street, domestic political criticism rained down upon Clinton policies, permanently tarring the UN and peacekeeping.

It is tempting to speculate about what might have happened had Aideed been captured, or had the Somalia peace operation simply ended without tragedy. But while Somalia certainly fueled congressional opposition to — and Administration distancing from — UN peacekeeping, it caused neither. Prior to October 3, the Clinton Administration already had begun to adapt its policy in response to ongoing operational experience and challenges from Congress. Congressional opposition would, in all probability, have continued to grow along with the pace and scope of UN operations. There were many events that contributed to or might have crystallized concerns about UN peacekeeping: The about-face of the USS Harlan County when it encountered angry mobs on Haitian shores, the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR in stopping the carnage in Bosnia, the murder of Belgian soldiers sent to monitor a peace agreement in Rwanda, and later, the shame of Srebinica, where blue helmets stood by as tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslim non-combatants were summarily executed. Strong political leadership to acknowledge mistakes, learn from them, and move on would be required in each case.

President Clinton’s response to these early events in Somalia was critical, then. He ended the U.S. commitment to the operation, sought compromise in Congress, and wrongly implied that the UN was to blame. The Administration already had become uneasy about

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62 See Bowden, Black Hawk Down, for an account of the UN force’s rescue of the Rangers.
the Somalia commitment, and the October 3 event provided impetus for an exit. But instead of underscoring the value of the Somalia intervention, and placing the soldiers’ deaths in the context of a nobler purpose — saving thousands of lives — the President’s actions made it appear that the UN mission had not been worthwhile. Moreover, he seemed to blame the United Nations for the deaths of the U.S. servicemen, when the latter had actually operated under an independent U.S. chain of command.

Overreaching at Home and Abroad. Peacekeeping policy offers another cautionary tale of the early days of the Clinton presidency. Like the issue of gays in the military or health care policy, the Administration plunged ahead on peacekeeping without having a firm sense of the political terrain. In terms of both crafting U.S. policy, and pushing the UN into peace operations, the Administration’s initial approach to promoting change actually harmed the underlying policy objectives.

The Administration began by looking at peacekeeping policy in a curiously technical way. First, it appeared to assume that Bush Administration policy provided a solid foundation on which to build. Second, it barely considered the policy’s political ramifications or the impact upon Congress, where the issues were considered central to Congressional prerogatives.

Because it had not yet resolved the issue of how to pay for peacekeeping, the Administration failed to brief, let alone consult with, legislators on the development of peacekeeping policy. “As funding issues dragged out,” one official recalls, “suspicions grew on the Hill about what was in the presidential directive, and people were able to plant rumors — that it was going to call for sending U.S. troops into more peacekeeping operations, etc. Suspicions and fears grew because they weren’t being talked to about it.”

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63 Clinton: “My experiences in Somalia would make me more cautious about having any Americans in a peacekeeping role where there was any ambiguity at all about what the range of decisions were which could be made by a command other than an American command with direct accountability to the United States here.” White House “The President’s News Conference,” p. 2068.

64 Rosner, The New Tug of War, p. 70.

65 The Administration believed that war powers issues could be separately addressed through an alternative policy review.

66 Rosner, The New Tug of War, p. 84.
The bloodless issue of financing U.S. assessments procedurally held the Administration’s broader policy hostage, even though Congress ultimately never implemented the proposed “shared responsibility” arrangement between State and DOD.67

The most politically controversial aspect of PDD 25 — the participation of regular U.S. units in UN peace operations — was infrequently implemented under Clinton. Yet preserving the possibility that U.S. servicemembers would be placed under UN command, even though the armed forces agreed with the administration on this narrow point, helped politically to doom other efforts to strengthen UN peacekeeping.

Early in the Clinton Administration, U.S. officials frequently looked to satisfy short-term policy goals via the UN, sometimes regardless of the consequences for the organization or other longer-term U.S. objectives. For example, Washington was so eager to bring home U.S. forces from the initial Somalia operation, it pushed the UN to take over operations before New York had recruited necessary forces or staffed UNOSOM II’s administrative structure. Likewise, an Administration desire to “do something” about atrocities in the former Yugoslavia led the United States to back UN Security Council resolutions that stood little chance of implementation, eventually at great cost to civilians on the ground. In an effort to make the UN appear to address unwieldy political or security challenges, Washington often pushed the UN beyond any reasonable expectations, and then stepped away when the UN failed.

Administration Priorities. Bill Clinton was elected to focus on domestic politics using the campaign mantra: “It’s the economy, stupid.” The President rarely threw his political weight behind a foreign policy initiative. Advancing U.S. support for UN peacekeeping necessarily required strong support from the top, but there were few bureaucratic impulses to change the President’s calculations. Although specific peace operations consumed many senior officials’ days, the issue as a matter of overarching policy was not anyone’s single highest priority. The biggest push to promote the Administration’s overall foreign policy

occurred in September 1993, but the Somalia debacle followed shortly thereafter, and debate about peace operations became more deeply partisan.

The Administration’s retrenchment on peacekeeping, one Senator observed, was “…a recognition of the political reality of the moment. Congress believes the American public doesn’t want to get bogged down in military adventures whose benefits don’t seem to justify the casualties and costs. To ignore that would be to squander political capital and good will that the president needs for his top domestic agenda.”

The fate of the Administration’s proposal to have DoD assume payment for some UN peace operations reveals Clinton’s domestic priorities. As Jeremy Rosner reports, the 1994 meeting between the President and defense legislators to discuss “shared responsibility” was delayed — and ultimately canceled — while the White House focused on health care reform. In the words of one Pentagon official, “The president never touched it. The involvement from the top levels of DOD was half-hearted, sporadic and late. So the legislative people completely didn’t push it because it was in the ‘too hard’ category — it undermined their efforts on their other priorities.”

Shortly after the U.S. deaths in Somalia, Madeleine Albright, then U.S. Ambassador to the UN, told Congress that it was essential to re-establish a politically sustainable consensus on peacekeeping policy. The Administration’s strategy increasingly seemed to consist of agreeing with critics of the UN wherever possible while fighting tactical battles for specific peace operations. Eventually, the Administration compromised on the principle that the U.S. owed its UN dues unconditionally. Clinton drew the line only around the President’s commander-in-chief prerogative to deploy U.S. forces.

Many officials rationalized this accommodation as unavoidable; after all, Congress controlled the purse strings. One official who had worked on PDD 25 later justified its constraints on U.S. support for multilateral military action, saying, “…the document is

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68 See Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No,” pp. 55-56.
essential if Congressional [sic] support is to be sustained for any UN peacekeeping operations at all. Yet it is not clear what support Executive branch concessions bought.

At the same time, it is difficult to know whether a more combative Administration approach might have succeeded. The President could have decided that enhancing UN peace operations capabilities was as important to national security as NAFTA or NATO expansion, launching a public offensive, deploying agency “principals,” and courting key members of Congress. While even the most forceful campaign might not have changed congressional calculations about certain issues (particularly placing U.S. forces under U.N. command), it might have yielded payment for UN dues or greater acceptance of a UN role in peacekeeping. But it would have been costly.

Instead, a tacit bargain emerged during the mid-1990’s. The Administration purchased from Congress the freedom for the United States to conduct important operations abroad, at the price of giving up its support for new UN peace operations. This bargain certainly was better than refusing both to support the UN and to lead independent peace operations. At the same time, the net effect was to undermine — in practice, if not by Administration design — the United Nation’s role in promoting international peace and security.

**Congress**

Congressional Prerogatives. Institutional interests played an important role in galvanizing congressional opposition to peace operations, particularly among Democrats who might otherwise have supported their President. The decision making process for peace operations — that is, decisions cleared within the executive branch, negotiated in New York, and presented to Congress as a fait accompli — were abhorrent to defenders of legislative prerogatives. There had been little controversy when UN peace operations had been fairly few, uneventful, and inexpensive — and when they had rarely involved U.S.

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72 Even today, this remains a hot button issue, the focus of proposed legislative restrictions, and the campaign pledge of President George W. Bush.
forces. But changes in the pace, character, and cost of peace operations vastly increased the stakes for Congress.

Now, a presidential commitment of U.S. troops to peace operations threatened to destroy any pretense of a congressional role in placing American forces in harm’s way. Democrats, who had traditionally asserted congressional war making prerogatives to restrain the executive branch, were now in the awkward position of looking the other way as Republicans began invoking the Vietnam-era War Powers Resolution to limit the President’s power.

Diplomacy in New York had begun to feel like executive branch imperialism, since U.S. votes at the UN would generate an assessment bill, which the Administration would present to Congress as a supplemental budget request. There was nothing new about this process, but again the scope and import of decisions had changed dramatically. It was not surprising that Congress refused the Administration requests to provide advance funds for future UN assessments. Legislators already had a virtual rubber stamp role.

The parochial congressional committee structure complicated the funding challenge. Assessments for UN peacekeeping are incorporated into the State Department budget, falling under the jurisdiction of the Commerce-Justice-State Subcommittee, where they compete with regular State Department funding. Besides putting the Secretary of State in an awkward position, this means that peacekeeping funding also is weighed against Justice and Commerce Department priorities like new courthouses or seizing illegal aliens. It was obvious to congressional appropriators which sets of issues were more important back home.

Partisans. The institution of the United Nations remains “code” for many fears that, while they cross party lines, resonate most strongly among Republican Members of Congress. The United Nations in some circles is virtually synonymous with potential world

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74 U.S. participation in small numbers is also governed by the UN Participation Act (22 USCS § 287d-1). Once U.S. participation became significant, however, there was no legislative framework for addressing the commitment of U.S. forces to a UN operation.

75 Rosner, The New Tug of War, pp. 76-77. See especially the discussion of a memo to Secretary of State Christopher regarding cuts that might be needed in the Department of State’s operating budget to meet peacekeeping needs.
government, global taxation, and unelected bureaucrats and illegitimate rules impinging upon Americans and U.S. sovereignty. These fears, symbolized by the UN, combined with other predominantly Republican priorities — in particular protecting U.S. military readiness — to make opposition to UN peacekeeping resonate broadly among GOP members of Congress. These substantive objections fused seamlessly with partisan politics. UN peacekeeping, as espoused by a Democratic president with weak military credentials, became a unifying target for Republicans, and a prominent GOP theme during the 1994 elections.

After regaining control over the House and the Senate, the GOP sought to use peacekeeping as a foreign policy sword to slay President Clinton. As Rosner notes, congressional Republicans “used attacks on peacekeeping to support a larger critique of President Clinton’s stewardship of U.S. national security.” It became almost reflexive. During the Clinton presidency, partisanship seemed to grow stronger at the water’s edge.

Public Opinion, Congress, and the Vocal Minority Robert Johansen concludes that during the 1990’s, two-thirds of the U.S. public “quite consistently” endorsed UN peacekeeping, and U.S. participation in such missions enjoyed, on average, the “fairly consistent” support of 58 percent of Americans. Not surprisingly, public support for U.S. participation in specific operations often decreased depending on the nature of the mission, the role of U.S. forces, the likelihood of success, and other factors. Even before the death of U.S. Rangers, for example, support for U.S. forces in Somalia had declined from 84 percent to 43 percent, presumably due to perceptions that the original mission (humanitarian relief) had been achieved and to misgivings about seeking to end the civil war. Yet in the days following the incident, 58 percent still favored U.S. participation in UN operations. Months after the Somalia debacle, 84 percent of the U.S. public said they supported UN

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76 Rosner, The New Tug of War, p. 68.
78 Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No,” p. 65.
Steven Kull in Chapter [] discusses further this consistent and durable majority of American to support for UN peacekeeping and U.S. participation.

Perhaps more surprisingly, polling indicates that a majority of Americans support placing U.S. troops under UN command and creating a standing UN army — two of the most controversial issues on Capitol Hill. Yet legislators continue to cite “public concerns” about U.S. involvement in peacekeeping to justify their opposition. What might explain this apparent disconnect?

First, peace operations are hardly a burning issue for the electorate, and the breadth of support for such missions is not matched by its depth. Accordingly, members of Congress face few incentives from constituents to support peace operations either generally or in specific instances. There is no strong peace operations lobby or constituency exists to promote or educate members about U.S. involvement.

Given thin public support on an issue, a vocal minority of opponents can wield disproportionate influence in the political process. A Member of Congress is more likely to get mail opposing than supporting a UN peace operation, and critics are more likely to get press coverage than proponents. The same principle is mirrored within the House and Senate. If a handful of members feel very strongly about opposing U.S. participation in peace operations, they can greatly increase the costs of supporting a U.S. role. There are virtually no negative electoral or other political ramifications for failing to support the UN or peace operations; indeed, opposition to such missions can provide inexpensive “protection” against critics on the right, buying political space for other objectives. Thus, support for peace operations appears to carry few benefits, but offers significant risks, especially if the operation turns sour.

Ambivalence about America’s Global Role

As Mats Berdal has written, peace operations policy engages “a central dilemma of U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War: how to articulate interests and maintain a moral

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foundation for policy in the absence of direct threats to U.S. strategic interests.\textsuperscript{a} During the Cold War, interests and values often coincided nicely. Today, their congruence is less apparent, particularly when the U.S. policy community continues to define interests narrowly.

Rather than challenging a distinction between values and interests — or broadening the conception of “national interests” — the Clinton Administration stated the case for peace operations in the language of traditional interests. Many remained unconvinced by these arguments. In the summer and early autumn of 1993, prominent Republicans launched an onslaught of criticism. Henry Kissinger, for example, charged the Administration with abandoning U.S. interests altogether in pursuing peace operations, warning: “The implication that the absence of any definable national interest is a viable criterion for risking American lives could erode the willingness of the American people to support any use of military power for any purpose.”\textsuperscript{b} Likewise, Jeanne Kirkpatrick described Clinton’s policy as one “from which national self-interest is purged.”\textsuperscript{c} Until the country achieves a broader consensus about the nature of American global leadership and its responsibilities, peace operations will continue to be a lightening rod for the nation’s underlying ambivalence.

The debate about ends was mirrored by ambivalence about means. Congress does not object to “multilateralism” per se. It supports NATO, where commonality of interests is assumed and U.S. control is significant. But critics tend to see the UN, despite the U.S. veto on the Security Council, very differently. Multilateralism as embodied by the UN remains suspect. Jean Kirkpatrick argued that the pursuit of multilateral means implied the pursuit of multilateral (rather than national) goals. She also charged that the “…reason the Clinton administration’s foreign policy seems indecisive is that multilateral decision-making is characteristically complicated and inconclusive. The reason Clinton policy seems ineffective

\textsuperscript{a} Berdal, “Fateful Encounter,” p. 35.
\textsuperscript{b} Kissinger, “Cooking Up a Recipe for New World Chaos,” Houston Chronicle, p. 1.
is that UN operations—in Bosnia or Somalia or wherever—are characteristically ineffective. 84

The debate about national interests and the means to pursue them is far from resolved, and multilateral peace operations remain a contentious issue. Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush vowed never to put Americans under UN command. 85 He rejected President Clinton’s retrospective view that the United States should have acted to prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, 86 and he said that he would stop deploying U.S. forces to conflicts that did not affect U.S. strategic interests. 87

U.S. Interests in UN Peacekeeping

In the new millennium, two underlying realities persist. The first is that the United States remains more heavily engaged in multinational — if not UN — peace operations than anyone would have predicted in 1994. Peace operations offices remain ensconced throughout the bureaucracy, including the Pentagon. Congress eventually saw the wisdom of helping foreign countries improve their peacekeeping capabilities so that the United States would not have to respond to all crises alone. The U.S. military slowly kicked into gear, developing training and doctrine and processing lessons from peace operations. Launching peace operations became a formal role for NATO, in official documents and on the ground. Even as official U.S. strategy continued to downplay the importance of peace operations, they remained the primary activity of the U.S. armed forces. This is a major accomplishment of the Clinton Administration.

The second reality is that, after a significant hiatus, international security and political demands have pushed the United Nations back into the peace operations limelight, and the United States has found it in its interests to support this expansion of the UN’s role. “Coalitions of the willing” have been unwilling or unable to address continuing civil strife and regional wars, particularly in African nations of no strategic or economic interest to stronger nations. Even when a coalition or nation has agreed initially to take the lead (e.g., NATO in Kosovo, Australia in East Timor), UN involvement has been attractive for a

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variety of reasons. The UN can provide a collective mechanism for financing the operation, a mantle of political legitimacy, an umbrella for other states to participate and share the burden, and a route towards disengagement for the lead nation.

As Jeffrey Laurenti writes about the recent surge in UN peace operations, “Washington had resisted U.N. intervention in all these troubled spots, but ultimately concluded that there was no alternative to a United Nations mission.” It turned out that even if a UN operation were not of great importance to the U.S., it might well be a priority for close allies or whole regions of the world whose support in other contexts might be critically important to the U.S. Washington could not block the UN from serving broader international security interests without paying different types of costs in bilateral relations and U.S. international standing generally. While American political leaders rarely discuss the degree to which political horse-trading and compromise are integral to policy-making, support for UN peace operations is necessary to satisfy certain nations and communities so that they can help advance American interests in other arenas.

Even where the U.S. has decided it has strategic interests, as, for example, in Kosovo, the UN proved critical. For example, Jeffrey Laurenti concludes, “Only by accepting U.N. administration of Kosovo could Washington get Russian support and extricate NATO from a lengthy air war.” And of course the UN is indispensable for a wide range of U.S. foreign policy objectives ranging from the containment of Iraq to the regulation of air traffic. For all of these reasons, a policy that undermines the institution’s most visible public role — peace operations — is costly.

The Clinton Administration by the middle of the decade had sought to avoid reliance upon the UN, but this approach proved inconsistent with broader U.S. interests. So by 1999, President Clinton acknowledged before the General Assembly that the United Nations remained the world’s “indispensable” institution. His Administration once more advanced an agenda of expanded and strengthened UN peace operations, describing these as essential to both the U.S. and to entire the world community. “The most important thing

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92 Clinton, “Remarks to the UN General Assembly,” 21 September 1999.
for the United States is to recognize that, flaws and all, the U.N. serves our national interests because it deals with problems that we do not wish to take on unilaterally,” Ambassador Holbrooke declared. “In my personal view, the U.N. has a significant role to play in certain parts of the world which are beyond the immediate reach of American strategic interests, but are nonetheless part of our interests.”

**Missing the Post Cold War Moment**

Institutional change in world politics often requires an unusual confluence of events. The early 1990’s provided a significant opening for enhancing UN peacekeeping. In 1992, Secretary of State James Baker had described UN peacekeeping as a “national security priority,” and “pretty good buy.” The world’s leading power was committed to enhancing the UN’s capacity for peace operations, seeking to help the organization fulfill its promise of enhancing international peace and security.

The United States subsequently failed politically, militarily, and financially to keep this pledge. The UN foundered repeatedly in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and most recently in Sierra Leone. In the eyes of the world, including our closest allies, the United States played an important role in these failures, weakening an institution that should have assumed a more prominent role in the post Cold War world. U.S. reluctance to strongly support the UN has cascaded into hesitation on the part of other western powers and has even engendered a bitter reaction to the Brahimi Report from nonaligned and developing

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94 Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, State Department Fiscal Year 1993 Funding Proposal. Sec. Baker’s comments may be found on p. 6 of the Lexus-Nexus version.
95 Europeans were frustrated for years by the U.S. desire to control policy toward Bosnia while refusing to contribute troops to UNPROFOR. Many observers blame the U.S. for the UN’s failure in Rwanda, including the French parliament which issued a report accusing the U.S. of opposing a sizeable UN response “for both political and budgetary reasons,” throwing down numerous “administrative obstacles” that blocked reinforcements to UNAMIR, and playing a “primarily negative” role in the crisis. “French Parliament Blasts US over Rwanda genocide,” Agence France Presse, 15 December 1998. The same criticisms can be heard with regard to Sierra Leone: “European officials have ... privately complained that an international response has been curbed by the Clinton
nations. There are serious questions regarding whether the squandered opportunity to enhance UN peacekeeping can be recaptured.

**Weakening UN Peacekeeping Capabilities**

During the 1990’s, the United Nations improved the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has created a situation room and information gathering capabilities, and has improved its recruitment, training, and equipping of forces. The UN has sought to learn from its mistakes, issuing clear-eyed reports detailing its failures in Rwanda and Srebinica. Yet the organization today, while marginally better prepared to execute the peace operations it is assigned, is still woefully inadequate.

Strengthening DPKO remains the serious challenge it was a decade ago. As U.S. Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke complained, “They’re running worldwide operations and they’re stretched to the bone. They work around the clock. They don’t have sufficient technical expertise. No serious military force would have been sent out with the command and control and communications structures that the U.N. has sent into some areas.”

The May 2000 rebel killing and capture of UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone underscored the continuing problems in both the tasking and execution of UN peace operations. These chronic problems prompted Secretary General Kofi Annan to appoint an independent panel led by Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi to reassess UN peacekeeping. The “Brahimi Report,” released in August 2000, included recommendations to improve the UN’s (not so) rapid deployment capabilities; the design, management, and financing of peacekeeping missions; the capacities and performance of DPKO; and — not least — the support that member states give UN peacekeeping operations.

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report contains many excellent recommendations, many of them variations on longstanding proposals, there is, unfortunately, little evidence to suggest that they suddenly will be heeded.

The UN’s weaknesses stem, first and foremost, from the divergent views and policies of its diverse member states. These includes not only powerful members focused on advancing their own agendas, but also less developed or repressive states that, for differing reasons, fear foreign intervention with a UN imprimatur. The latter has blocked legislative reform of DPKO and helped end the Western practice of supplying “gratis” military officers to DPKO; resentment of disproportionate Western influence in the Department apparently was greater than concern about the severe staffing shortage caused by this policy change. The UN also suffers from institutional weaknesses, including its bureaucratic staleness, culture of “peace,” conceptions of peace operations, and personnel practices.

The UN’s ineffectiveness is not principally Washington’s fault or responsibility, and the United States has helped in some modest ways to overcome specific weaknesses (for example, by seconding military personnel and providing an architecture for computer upgrades). But by the most important measures discussed below, the world’s leading nation has fallen short.

U.S. Funding. As Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst detail in Chapter [], congressional actions, such as insistence upon zero UN budget growth and refusal to pay assessments, posed great challenges for the UN just as it assumed a larger role in international security. As early as 1993, Richard Thornburgh, then U.N. Under-Secretary General for Administration and Management, reported that the UN’s ongoing finances were in crisis and that “peacekeeping funding is still much like a financial ‘bungee jump’, often undertaken strictly in blind faith that timely appropriations will be forthcoming.”

At the end of 1998, the UN owed over $1 billion to member states for their participation in peacekeeping, while the United States accounted for over 60 percent of

100 Holt, Briefing Book on Peacekeeping, p. 10.
the almost $1.6 billion that nations owed for peacekeeping assessments. U.S. arrears contributed to delays in UN reimbursements to nations that contributed peacekeeping troops. These delays have frustrated U.S. allies and provided a disincentive for poorer nations to participate in peace operations. Budget crises also have resulted in freezes on certain types of activities, including hiring staff to administer peace operations. This has resulted in further delays in peace operations purchases and deployments.

U.S. policy toward UN financing policy has other operational implications. Less developed nations have argued that DPKO staff slots formerly filled by “gratis” officers should be funded through the regular budget, but the U.S. objects to increased costs. In fact, while the Clinton Administration was supportive of the Brahimi Report, it was concerned about the Report’s request for additional resources in light of the USG policy of zero nominal budget growth. The impact of Congress’ fiscal straightjacket cannot be underestimated.

U.S. Military Support. If U.S. political support is a prerequisite for UN approval of a peace operation, almost any type of U.S. military support can help encourage or enable other nations to participate. This is particularly salient because even many of the more militarily powerful UN members can no longer perform brigade-level missions, cannot deploy themselves over significant distances, and often lack necessary equipment. As we have seen, however, congressional opposition meant that the United States largely stopped sending combat forces to participate in blue-helmeted operations. The U.S. even failed to provide sufficient logistical support or equipment to certain UN missions. By charging standard “leasing” rates on its airlift and other equipment, the U.S. has effectively discouraged the UN from calling upon a reliable, fast, and the most capable transport option. Internal U.S. Government procedures sometimes have made it difficult for UN forces to obtain necessary equipment. It would cost relatively little to ease the restrictions on such provision of goods and services, strengthening the UN and earning the United

102 GAO, Status of US Contributions and Arrears, p. 15.
States considerable goodwill. But Congress requires reimbursement for, and imposes other conditions on, all DOD contributions to UN peace operations.106

**Blocking Efforts to Protect International Peace and Security**

The Administration occasionally blocked the UN from undertaking peace operations. Some objections reflected valid concerns such as the lack of a clear mission or an overly ambitious UN role. But because the U.S. did so little to enhance UN capabilities or otherwise support UN peace operations, American caution on substantive grounds was viewed with skepticism by other nations. As one critical foreign paper reported, “The opportunity to create a genuinely global system of peace-keeping and peace-making has been lost, largely because the U.S. decided that it could not sustain any commitments that were not clearly in American interests, and were not wholly under its control.”107 Washington did not appear to understand that the UN was intended to protect international peace and security.

The most forceful example is the case of Rwanda in 1994. Washington became a vocal advocate for pulling the small UN peacekeeping contingent out as the genocide began sweeping the country. There were legitimate concerns about the deteriorating situation and its implications for the impartial, Chapter VI mandate, to which troop-contributing nations had committed. But the U.S. appeared uninterested in shaping an appropriate response; the Administration had just promised congressional leaders in briefings on PDD 25 that the new policy was to be “selective.”

When the genocide unfolded, the United States could have pushed for a new or augmented UN force, lobbying Belgium, Canada and other nations with troops on the

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106 This helps explain why the Clinton Administration differentiated between DOD voluntary support for UN peace operations and other UN-authorized operations. The Clinton Administration did not regard the Iraq no-fly operations as peace operations, despite the fact that many government budget guardians and DOD terminology would seem to indicate otherwise. The distinction therefore has been incorporated into the budgetary chart (Figure 1).

ground to accept a different mission. At a minimum, it could have agreed to provide willing nations with the necessary lift, equipment, and logistical support to respond. Even after the UN finally authorized an expanded UN force (after the bulk of the killing had subsided), the Defense Department refused to waive the costs of transporting foreign troops to Rwanda.

At a more subtle level, weaknesses in UN peace operations capabilities have restricted the options for less powerful counties or parties in conflict. The UN often cannot be counted on either as a counterweight or as a protecting force; it can only confirm and help implement whatever deal a weak party might be offered. If the UN offered a more capable military force, Security Council member states might be better able to shape diplomacy in meaningful ways. Take the example of Sierra Leone. The UN’s inability to protect the government contributed to pressures to sign a reprehensible peace agreement that brought a war criminal into government, assigning him de facto control over the nation’s resources. The United Nations was then powerless even to enforce this bad deal, resulting in yet another humiliation involving the murder and taking hostage of UN peacekeepers. There is considerable scope for the UN to expand its capabilities while still eschewing the more difficult peace operations that should be conducted by NATO or a coalition of the willing.

**America’s Image**

Few nations expect (or perhaps, at bottom, want) the United States to conduct peace operations only under UN command. In fact, other leading nations increasingly are uneasy about committing troops to UN operations. But it would be mistake to equate the issue of American soldiers donning blue helmets with that of U.S. support for UN peacekeeping.

108 A larger, more capable force with a Chapter VII enforcement mandate would have been required.
109 The U.S. will not waive or reduce costs on airlift. See Crossette, “U.S. Ambassador to U.N. Calls for Changes,” New York Times, p. A8. This rigidity originally stemmed from State-DOD battles on the provision of “in kind” U.S. support for peace operations, and later was legislated by Congress. The U.S. ultimately spent hundreds of millions of dollars providing relief to refugees who both fueled and fled the Rwanda crises. But they were not DOD dollars.
The fundamental problem, from the perspective of other nations, is not that the U.S. wants to do its own thing, but that it has failed to take significant financial, political, logistical or other steps to strengthen the collective option of UN peace operations.110

This U.S. inaction is doubly frustrating for foreign observers that understand both that UN peacekeeping often serves direct American interests (e.g., in the Middle East, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo), and that the UN has a mandate to promote international, not just American, peace and security. Foreign editorials and news reports chronicle the wider world’s disillusionment with American views of its global security role. “Everywhere in Europe you bump into the thesis that America is the ‘rogue superpower,’” bemoans one commentator.112 While there are many sources of this attitude, U.S. reluctance to support UN peace operations contributes to perceptions that the U.S. is unwilling to assume its share of common international responsibilities.

President Clinton understood that the U.S. failure to pay UN dues created a political problem for him in diplomatic circles.113 It makes it more difficult to explain other aspects of American international security policy that are necessarily unilateral or controversial. And as one respected journalist reported: “...[D]iplomats, including Americans, say that anger toward the United States [regarding UN arrears] is beginning to erode support on issues vital to Washington....”114 Apparent U.S. unwillingness to support UN peacekeeping may also undermine what Joseph Nye terms America’s “soft power,” the invisible strength a nation can derive from the values and beliefs it embodies. To those who believe that U.S. dominance is a largely preferable state of world affairs, the implications are troubling.

110 See The Economist’s coverage of U.S. peacekeeping policy. The magazine was particularly critical of Congress’ “brattish conditions” for payment of international dues obligations. See “Pay up and Play the Game,” The Economist, p. 20.
111 Brock, “Faltering White House,” Times of London, quotes an “embittered NATO official” as calling Clinton a “flake who has lost control of his legislature.” Says, “‘PDD 25’ therefore marks a retreat from America’s old superpower role.”
Conclusion

U.S. policy toward multinational peace operations has come full circle during the past decade for reasons that are unlikely to change. The demand for intervention will continue to outpace the desire or capacity of regional organizations or key states to respond. In many instances, the UN will remain the vehicle to which other nations — even the United States — look to address crises. By failing to strengthen UN peacekeeping, Washington finds itself in a curious place: increasingly reliant on a tool it has weakened.

The U.S. will continue to approve or to encourage UN intervention in a variety of circumstances. Washington may be unable to ignore a crisis but not wish to send U.S. forces and see no other option. Alternatively, key allies may seek UN involvement in an area of special interest. Washington may at times need to support a UN peace operation for instrumental reasons having to do with Security Council politics or bilateral relations. Or it may find a UN operation critically important for political legitimacy, for burden sharing in post-conflict reconstruction, or for allowing U.S. disengagement (as in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo).

If the United States chooses not to strengthen UN peace operations capabilities, it should assume the responsibility for, and costs of, limiting the demands member states place on the organization. Otherwise, the cycle of disillusionment will continue — states will set the UN up to fail, undermine its international standing, and confirm its critics’ predictions. Eventually, the United States might find itself with a choice between assuming the UN’s responsibilities or allowing entire regions of the world to become consumed by conflict.

This dilemma — a choice between ignoring spreading violence or becoming the world’s policeman — is precisely what President Bush and President Clinton had hoped to avoid by strengthening United Nations peacekeeping capabilities.
The U.S. government and the UN use separate methodologies in calculating assessments for UN peacekeeping operations. The resulting inconsistencies between U.S. and UN assessment figures stem from three main contributors. First, the UN has traditionally assessed the U.S. for 30.4 percent of peacekeeping expenses while the U.S. Congress capped U.S. contributions at 25 percent in 1994. Second, the UN peacekeeping budget runs from July to June while the U.S. fiscal year runs from October to September. Finally, assessments are not presented in yearly bills but rather at intervals determined by internal UN processes (such as mission mandate approval in the Security Council). For a useful elaboration of these various factors, see General Accounting Office, United Nations: Costs of Peacekeeping Is Likely to Exceed Current Estimates.
Completed United Nations Peace Operations

Missions Begun Prior to 1990
- UNTAG Namibia/Angola 4/89-3/90
- UNGOMAP Afghanistan/Pakistan 5/88-3/90
- UNIMOG Iran/Iraq 8/88-2/91
- UNAVEMI Angola 1/89-5/91
- ONUCA Central America 12/89-1/92

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- UNAVEMI Angola 1/89-5/91
- ONUCA Central America 12/89-1/92

1990 1995 2000
Ongoing United Nations Peace Operations

Contributions of Troops in Formed Military Units* to UN and non-UN Peace Operations, Including Contributions of Permanent Members of the Security Council (illustrative example during May-June 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top Ten UN Troop Contributors</th>
<th>Troops Provided to UN-led Operations</th>
<th>As Percent of 27,466 UN Troops Deployed</th>
<th>Five Permanent Security Council Members and Other Top Contributors to non-UN Operations</th>
<th>Troops Provided in Formations to UN-led Operations</th>
<th>Troops Provided in Formations to SFOR and KFOR</th>
<th>As Percent of 67,100 Troops in SFOR and KFOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3,957</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,400</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3,231</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>8,100</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2,217</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1,842</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1,509</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1,438</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>2,220</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18,043</strong></td>
<td><strong>66%</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,802</strong></td>
<td><strong>51,670</strong></td>
<td><strong>77%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Not individual observers or police.

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