What is Security?¹

Principles or definitions of security are a well-established institution of international politics. They are of great importance, in particular, to the ceremonials of reconstruction after large international wars. When Descartes died in Stockholm in the winter of 1650, he had recently completed the verse text for a ballet called “The Birth of Peace,” which was performed at the Swedish court in celebration of the Treaty of Westphalia, the birthday of Queen Christina, and the “golden peace” that was to follow the Thirty Years’ War.² All the great postwar settlements of modern times have since been accompanied, at Vienna in 1815, at Versailles in 1919, and at San Francisco in 1945, by new principles of international security. One principle has been thought to echo to the next, across the turbulent intervening times. Harold Nicolson set out in 1919 for the Conference of Paris with a “slim and authentic little volume” about the Congress of Vienna; he addressed his own account of the Versailles proceedings, some years later, to “the young men who will be in attendance upon the British Commissioners to the Conference of Montreal in 1965.”³

The Cold War was also a large international conflict. Like the two world wars and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, it came to an end with momentous changes in the political configuration of Europe, and it, too, has been followed by a new political interest in principles of security. The principles of the incipient post-Cold War settlement have no Woodrow Wilson (or no Castlereagh) and no imposing Congress. But they already have

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an epigram in the idea, much discussed since 1989, of the security of individuals as an object of international policy: of “common security” or “human security.” This essay will look at the proposed new principles in a historical and critical perspective. They are not conspicuously new, as will be seen, and they suggest troublesome questions about what it means to have (or to act on) a “principle of security.” They are neither concise statements of received wisdom (like Castlereagh’s “just equilibrium”), nor inspirational (like the self-determination for “well-defined national elements” of Woodrow Wilson’s Four Principles); they have not been embodied in new international organizations (like the settlement of 1945). But this disorderliness is also a strength; the international politics of the post-Cold War world is itself disorderly, verbose, and only intermittently inspirational. It is closer, in this respect, to the politics of the Congress of Vienna than to Versailles or San Francisco; it is particularly close, as will be seen, to the pluralist politics of the generation that preceded the new world order of 1815.

The war against the French Revolution has been taken as a standard, at least since Henry Kissinger’s encomium to Metternich and Castlereagh, for the long Cold War. But it is the ideas of the Revolution itself, or at least of its early and liberal supporters, that have become newly conspicuous in the post-Cold War settlement. The “liberal internationalism” of the 1990s—a liberalism disengaged, in Stanley Hoffmann’s words, from its nineteenth-century “embrace of national self-determination”—is close to the liberalism of Kant, Condorcet, or Adam Smith. So is the commitment to an international “civil society.” The essence of a revolutionary situation is its self-consciousness,” Kissinger wrote; “principles,” in such a situation, “are so central that they are constantly talked about.” My objective is to describe the distinctively self-conscious principles of the 1990s, and their possible political consequences. These principles are evocative, as will be seen, of the liberal ideas—including ideas of security—of the end of the eighteenth century. But they also hold out the promise of a different liberal theory; of a theory that is freed, in particular, from the dichotomies so characteristic of the 1815 settlement, of English versus French liberalisms, or of domestic versus international politics.
EXTENDED SECURITY

The ubiquitous idea, in the new principles of the 1990s, is of security in an “extended” sense. The extension takes four main forms. In the first, the concept of security is extended from the security of nations to the security of groups and individuals: it is extended downwards from nations to individuals. In the second, it is extended from the security of nations to the security of the international system, or of a supranational physical environment: it is extended upwards, from the nation to the biosphere. The extension, in both cases, is in the sorts of entities whose security is to be ensured. In the third operation, the concept of security is extended horizontally, or to the sorts of security that are in question. Different entities (such as individuals, nations, and “systems”) cannot be expected to be secure or insecure in the same way; the concept of security is extended, therefore, from military to political, economic, social, environmental, or “human” security. In a fourth operation, the political responsibility for ensuring security (or for invigilating all these “concepts of security”) is itself extended: it is diffused in all directions from national states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local government, and sideways to nongovernmental organizations, to public opinion and the press, and to the abstract forces of nature or of the market.

The geometry of the proposed new principles is in these terms of dizzying complexity. But something close to this scheme has become virtually a commonplace of international political discussions in the 1990s. The emphasis on the security and sovereignty of individuals, for example, was of conspicuous importance in the Eastern European revolutions, and in particular to Václav Havel (following John Stuart Mill); “the sovereignty of the community, the region, the nation, the state,” Havel wrote, “makes sense only if it is derived from the one genuine sovereignty—that is, from the sovereignty of the human being.” The foreign policy speeches of the Clinton administration contained repeated references in 1993 and 1994 to extended or “human” security, including to “a new understanding of the meaning and nature of national security and of the role of individuals and nation-states.” The international Commission on Global Governance was the exponent, in 1995, of
vertically extended security: “Global security must be broadened from its traditional focus on the security of states to the security of people and the planet.”9 The United Nations Development Program took as the principal theme of its 1994 Human Development Report the transition “from nuclear security to human security,” or to “the basic concept of human security,” defined as safety from “such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression,” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions.”10 The United Nations Secretary-General called in 1995 for a “conceptual breakthrough,” going “beyond armed territorial security” (as in the institutions of 1945) towards enhancing or protecting “the security of people in their homes, jobs and communities.”11

These ideas of extended security are hardly new in the 1990s. They are a development, to take one example, of the idea of common security put forward in the 1982 Report of the Palme Commission. Common security was understood, in the Report, in a quite restricted sense. It was presented as a way for nations to organize their security in the presence of nuclear weapons: “states can no longer seek security at each other’s expense; it can be attained only through cooperative undertakings.” But the Report also pointed towards several more extensive conceptions. One was that security should be thought of in terms of economic and political, as well as military objectives; that military security is a means, while the economic security of individuals, or the social security of citizens “to chart futures in a manner of their own choosing,” or the political security that follows when “the international system [is] capable of peaceful and orderly change” were ends in themselves. Another was that lasting security should be founded on an effective system of “international order.” As Cyrus Vance wrote, “the problems of nuclear and conventional arms are reflections of weaknesses in the international system. It is a weak system because it lacks a significant structure of laws and norms of behaviour which are accepted and observed by all states.” A third conception was that security is a process as much as a condition, and one in which the participants are individuals and groups—“popular and political” opinion, Olof Palme wrote in his introduction to the Report—as well as governments and states.12

The new security ideas of the early 1980s were the reflection, in turn, of many earlier discussions. “Over the past decade or so a
vast array of public interest organizations have begun to put forward alternate conceptions of national security," Richard Ullman wrote in 1983 of the debate in the United States over extended or redefined security.13 Such proposals were indeed an intermittent feature of the entire Cold War period, and even of the preceding postwar settlement. The historian E. H. Carr had thus argued in 1945, in Nationalism and After, for a "system of pooled security" in which "security for the individual" was a prime objective, and in which it would become possible to "divorce international security and the power to maintain it from frontiers and the national sovereignty which they represent." Carr's view of the previous 1919 settlement as "the last triumph of the old fissiparous nationalism"—"we shall not again see a Europe of twenty, and a world of more than sixty, 'independent sovereign states'"—was hardly prescient; nor was his confidence in the diminution of national sentiment in existing "multinational" states (the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Soviet Union). But his "social" or "functional" internationalism is strikingly close, nonetheless, to the extended security of the 1990s: its premise is a "shift in emphasis from the rights and well-being of the national group to the rights and well-being of the individual man and woman. . .transferred to the sphere of international organization."14

PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY

The new political preoccupation with these old ideas corresponds, in the 1990s, to new political interests. "It is not profitable to embark on the fine analysis of a definition unless we have decided on the purpose for which the definition is wanted," John Hicks once said of the economists' dispute over the definition of capital.15 One purpose of principles or definitions of security is thus to provide some sort of guidance to the policies made by governments. Principles of security may be derived or described by theorists, but they are followed or held by officials. This is what could be described as the "naive" view of the debate over principles of security, in that it assumes that principles are indeed important in the organization of policy. It is this view that was dismissed with condescension by Castlereagh in his famous State Paper of 1820 about the "principles" of intervention by one European power in
the internal affairs of another (in this case, the constitutional revolution in Spain). Great Britain, Castlereagh said, “is the last Govt. in Europe which can be expected, or can venture to commit Herself on any Question of an abstract character. . . . This country cannot, and will not, act upon abstract and speculative Principles of Precaution.”

A second purpose of principles of security is to guide public opinion about policy, to suggest a way of thinking about security, or principles to be held by the people on behalf of whom policy is to be made. Castlereagh gave as the reason for his prudent “maxims” the peculiar circumstances of British politics: “a System of Government strongly popular, and national in its character,” and one in which “public opinion,” “daily Discussion in our Parliament,” and “the General Political situation of the Government” are of decisive importance for foreign policy. But public opinion is itself influenced by principles or concepts. Some crises are “intelligible” or recognizable to the public mind, in Castlereagh’s description, while others are not, and the process of recognition is influenced by ideas about security. The quest for principles or epigrams of foreign policy has for this reason (among others) been of fairly consistent interest to nineteenth and twentieth-century statesmen, and to their intellectual adjuncts. Equilibrium was “Castlereagh’s favourite word,” according to J. A. R. Marriott. Even the idea of nuclear deterrence was most compelling as a popular idea; an idea which provided “reassurance,” to use Michael Howard’s term.

A third, related purpose of principles or definitions of security is to contest existing policies. To dispute the foundations of policy is one way—an often effective way in a strongly popular system of government—to subvert public support for policies to which one is opposed. The interest in new concepts of security was thus encouraged, in the late 1970s and 1980s, by quite disparate groups. Critics of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) nuclear weapons policies, for example, questioned whether current deployments and doctrines provided security, even against the threat of nuclear war, and supported different and less confrontational policies (such as “confidence-building measures”). Other critics were opposed to all “offensive” military deployments. Yet others, particularly in the United States, favored domestic over interna-
tional commitments; economic and environmental security were described as more fundamental objectives than military security, and expenditure on defense was compared to expenditure on other, civil (and often domestic) objectives. The politics of extended security is substantially different in the 1990s, in that it has engaged the theorists as well as the critics of military establishments. If security is the objective of military and intelligence organizations, and if the sources of insecurity have changed in character (with the end of the Cold War), then a condition for redefining the role of the “security forces” is redefining security: to contest old policies and to promote new ones.

The fourth and crudest purpose of principles of security is to influence directly the distribution of money and power. A public interest organization concerned with environmental programs, for example, might hope that by promoting ideas of environmental security, it would bring about a change in government policy such that less money was spent on military deployments, and more on environmental programs. A change in the objectives of policy from military to economic security would bring a change in government expenditure from ministries of defense to ministries of commerce or of foreign relations. A change in the definition of military security to include the prevention of conflicts by the deployment of peacekeeping forces would bring an increase, or prevent a decrease, in expenditure on military forces. The keenest proponents of extended security, in the 1990s, include officials of organizations (such as the United Nations and its development agencies, or humanitarian, nongovernmental organizations) that would benefit from changes in international policy towards expenditure on civil objectives. They also include academics who have benefited from the fairly resilient support by US and European foundations for projects on extended security (including the projects for which this essay was prepared); several of these foundations, in turn, have had the objective of influencing or contesting existing security policies.20

The main concern of this essay is nonetheless with the first purpose of principles of security, as described above: with the naive, or naive idealist, position that principles, including abstract principles, do matter to international policy. Castlereagh himself, in speaking of the maxims of British prudence, was setting out the
principles of a policy that repudiated abstract or systematic principles. Such principles are perhaps especially important to a government whose “general political situation” depends (in Castlereagh’s words) on the “public mind.” One of the presumptions of eighteenth-century liberal thought was that people tend to think in principles; Adam Smith suggested to statesmen that they “will be more likely to persuade” if they evoke the pleasure that people derive from beholding “a great system of public police.”

As Friedrich Gentz wrote in 1820 of Castlereagh’s memorandum, it was well suited to a government, such as England’s, which “owes an account of its conduct to Parliament, and to a nation which is not satisfied with an order of business in the gazettes, which wants to know the why and the wherefore of everything (‘le pourquoi du pourquoi’).”

“Politics would be led into frequent errors, were it to build too confidently on the presumption, that the interest of every government is a criterion of its conduct,” Gentz himself wrote a few years earlier. One reason was that “the true interest of a nation is a matter of much extent and uncertainty; the conception of which depends greatly upon the point of view in which it is contemplated, and of course upon the ability to choose the proper one.” Another was the intertwining of the public and the private: “it must likewise be confessed, that even the immediate interests of states are oftener sacrificed to private views and passions, than is generally imagined.” There is a naive realism that is at least as misleading as the naive idealism of the unending search for principles, including principles of security.

WHAT IS SECURITY?

The idea of security has been at the heart of European political thought since the crises of the seventeenth century. It is also an idea whose political significance, like the senses of the word “security,” has changed continually over time. The permissive or pluralistic understanding of security, as an objective of individuals and groups as well as of states—the understanding that has been claimed in the 1990s by the proponents of extended security—was characteristic, in general, of the period from the mid-seventeenth century to the French Revolution. The principally military sense of the
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word “security,” in which security is an objective of states, to be achieved by diplomatic or military policies, was by contrast an innovation, in much of Europe, of the epoch of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. But security was seen throughout the period as a condition both of individuals and of states. Its most consistent sense—and the sense that is most suggestive for modern international politics—was indeed of a condition, or an objective, that constituted a relationship between individuals and states or societies.

“My definition of the State,” Leibniz wrote in 1705, “or of what the Latins call Respublica is: that it is a great society of which the object is common security (‘la seureté commune’).” For Montesquieu, security was a term in the definition of the state, and also in the definition of freedom: “political freedom consists in security, or at least in the opinion which one has of one’s security.” Security, here, is an objective of individuals. It is something in whose interest individuals are prepared to give up other goods. It is a good that depends on individual sentiments—the opinion one has of one’s security—and that in turn makes possible other sentiments, including the disposition of individuals to take risks, or to plan for the future.

The understanding of security as an individual good, which persisted throughout the liberal thought of the eighteenth century, reflected earlier political ideas. The Latin noun “securitas” referred, in its primary classical use, to a condition of individuals, of a particularly inner sort. It denoted composure, tranquillity of spirit, freedom from care, the condition that Cicero called the “object of supreme desire,” or “the absence of anxiety upon which the happy life depends.” One of the principal synonyms for “securitas,” in the Lexicon Taciteum, is “Sicherheitsgefühl”: the feeling of being secure. The word later assumed a different and opposed meaning, still in relation to the inner condition of the spirit: it denoted not freedom from care but carelessness or negligence.

Adam Smith, in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, used the word “security” in Cicero’s or Seneca’s sense, of the superiority to suffering that the wise man can find within himself. In the Wealth of Nations, security is less of an inner condition, but it is still a condition of individuals. Smith indeed identifies “the liberty and
security of individuals” as the most important prerequisites for the
development of public opulence; security is understood, here, as
freedom from the prospect of a sudden or violent attack on one’s
person or property.27 It is in this sense the object of expenditure on
justice, and of civil government itself.28 There is no reference to
security, by contrast, in Smith’s discussion of expenditure on de-
fense (“the first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the
society from the violence and invasion of other independent soci-
eties”).29 The only security mentioned is that of the sovereign or
magistrate as an individual, or what would now be described as
the internal security of the state: Smith argues that if a sovereign
has a standing army to protect himself against popular discontent,
then he will feel himself to be in a condition of “security” such
that he can permit his subjects considerable liberty of political
“remonstrance.”30

The security of individuals in this sense—the sense of freedom
from the prospect, and thus the fear, of personal violation—has
been of decisive importance to liberal political thought.31 The
word “security” in fact assumed a new public significance in the
early, liberal period of the French Revolution. The natural rights
of man, in Tom Paine’s translation of the Declaration of the
Rights of Man of August 1789, consisted of Liberty, Property,
Security, and Resistance of Oppression. Security—or “sûreté”—
was still a condition of individuals: it was a private right, op-
posed, during the Terror, to the public safety (salut) of the Com-
mittee for Public Safety. In Condorcet’s outline of a new Decla-
ration of Rights in 1793, “security consists of the protection which
society accords to each citizen, for the conservation of his person,
his property, and his rights.” Security was conceived, still, in terms
of freedom from personal attack; the constitutional scholar Alengry
explained Condorcet’s conception of security, in 1904, as “close
to the Anglo-Saxon idea of habeas corpus.”32 It was to be ensured,
henceforth, by society: by the “social pact” or the “social guaran-
ete” of a universal civil society.

The guarantee of security was extended, in the reform proposals
of the same period, to include protection against sudden or violent
deterioration in the standard of living of individuals. Leibniz had
urged the rulers of Germany after the Peace of Ryswick in 1697 to
turn, once the (military) “security” of their countries was ensured,
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to a project of social insurance against accidents, an “Assecurations-Casse”; a republic or a civil society, he said, was like a ship or a company, directed towards “common welfare.” Condorcet’s project of social security, almost a century later, had a wider political objective. The new schemes for social insurance, to be provided either by public or by private establishments, were intended to prevent misery by increasing “the number of families whose lot is secured,” to bring about a different sort of society, or “something which has never before existed anywhere, a rich, active, populous nation, without the existence of a poor and corrupted class.” The economic security of individuals was itself of political significance, as the condition for an active political society. The central idea of liberalism, in Judith Shklar’s description, is that all individuals should be able to take decisions about their lives “without fear or favor.” Fear, and the fear of fear, were for Condorcet the enemies of liberal politics. If people were so insecure as to live in fear of destitution, in his scheme, then they were not free to take decisions, including the decision to be part of a political society.

Individual security, in the liberal thought of the Enlightenment, is thus both an individual and a collective good. It is a condition, and an objective, of individuals. But it is one that can only be achieved in some sort of collective enterprise. It is quite different, in this sense, from the inner and introspective security of Roman political thought. It is different, too, from the security with which individuals can be endowed, by a benevolent or charitable or humanitarian authority. It is something that individuals get for themselves, in a collective or contractual enterprise. The enterprise is in turn something to be endlessly revised and reviewed. Security is not good in itself, without regard to the process by which it is achieved. The state (together with powerful small collectivities such as guilds or communities, operating under the protection of the state) can be a source both of insecurity and of a security that is itself oppressive. Its most important function is to ensure justice for individuals: “of all the words which console and reassure men,” Condorcet wrote before the Revolution, “justice is the only one which the oppressor does not dare to pronounce, while humanity is on the lips of all tyrants.”

The new idea of security as a principally collective good, to be ensured by military or diplomatic means—the idea that came into
European prominence in the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars—was strikingly different. Individuals and states had been seen as similes for one another, at least since Grotius’s earliest writings on natural rights; individuals were thought to be like states, just as states were like individuals.38 The security of states against external, military attack, too—the “Sicherheit” or the assecuratio pacis of the Münster deliberations before the Treaty of Westphalia—had been a commonplace of political discussion in Germany throughout the eighteenth century.39 Herder indeed spoke sarcastically, in 1774, of the continuing preoccupation with “Order and Security,” with the security of Europe and the world (“Ordnung und Sicherheit der Welt”), and with “Uniformity, Peace and Security” (“Einformigkeit, Friede und Sicherheit”).40 But in France, as in England, the collective sense of the words “sûreté,” “secrète,” and “security” was an innovation, most conspicuously, of the very end of the eighteenth century.

It was in the military period of the French Revolution, above all, that the security of individuals was subsumed, as a political epigram, in the security of the nation. Rousseau described the social contract, much like Locke or Montesquieu, as the outcome of the desire of individuals for security of life and liberty: “this is the fundamental problem to which the institution of the state provides the solution.”41 But the ensuing collectivity was itself like an individual, with a unique or individual will. International order—like war, in Rousseau’s description—was a “relation between states, not a relation between men.”42 For Kant, both individuals and states seek “calm and security” in law: in the case of states, in the public security (“öffentlichen Staatsicherheit”) of a cosmopolitan system.43 Condorcet himself, who was profoundly opposed to Rousseau’s conception of a general will as the foundation of political choice (and to his idea of national education to inculcate patriotic virtues), was caught up in the new rhetoric of military security. He too spoke by 1792 of the security or “sûreté” of the collectivity: France would accept peace, he said, if it were compatible with “the independence of national sovereignty, with the security of the state.”44

Paine’s translation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1791 can be seen, indeed, as one of the last great uses of the word in the old sense. The great public uses of “security” in the new,
national sense can be dated even more precisely. Before the Congress of Vienna assembled in 1814, the victorious Allies signed the First Peace of Paris with the newly restored King of France. In the words of the Treaty, France was once again to become, under the “paternal government of its Kings,” a guarantee of “security and stability” ("un gage de sécurité et de stabilité") for Europe. The object of the coming negotiations, the new French government stated at the formal opening of the Congress, was to “ensure the tranquillity of the world”; the epoch was now one in which the great powers had joined together to restore, in the “mutual relations of states,” “the security of thrones” ("la sûreté des trônes").

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

The new security principles of the end of the twentieth century constitute a rediscovery, of sorts, of this late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century politics. One of the celebrated political metaphors of the post-Cold War period is Gunter Grass’s, of the unfreezing of the germs of European nationalism, conserved for half a century in the ice of Cold War confrontation. But there is another, less biotic metaphor, in which it is the politics of liberal internationalism that has been unfrozen: not after half a century, but rather after two centuries of confrontation, between militant (and military) revolution and militant conservatism. “It was the Revolutionary power more particularly in its Military Character,” Castlereagh said in 1820, that was for the Alliance the “object of its constant solicitude,” and against which, exclusively, “it intended to take Precautions.” The identification of revolution with its military character, or with its prodigious and offensive military success—the memory of Custine’s and Napoleon’s armies, and the transposition of this memory into the identification of Revolutionary France and Soviet Russia—has been a continuing preoccupation of subsequent politics. It is only with the final disintegration of Soviet military power, or rather with the disengagement, in the early 1990s, of Russian military power from the Soviet rhetoric of revolution, that the long militarization of continental political confrontation has come to an at least temporary end.
It was “the problem of peace and war,” for François Furet, that in the course of the French Revolution “prohibited, in people’s minds and in events, any liberal solution to the political crisis.”

The political prospects of 1791 are poignantly incongruous in the retrospect of two centuries of militarized or militaristic revolution: the proposed governments, for example, in which Condorcet was to be Minister of Finance, and Talleyrand Minister of Foreign Affairs. But the liberal solutions envisaged in the early 1790s are perhaps more convincing now, at least in international relations, than they have been for much of the intervening period. This seems to be the opinion, in any case, of liberalism’s opponents, if not of its (characteristically) muted supporters. “Liberalism is the real enemy” was the title of an article in 1992 by the English conservative critic Peregrine Worsthorne, in which he recounted the “regimental reunion” in East Berlin of “the remaining old guard of Encounter”: the conclusion, he said, was that “worrying about communism intellectually—as against militarily—was a gigantic red herring, deflecting intellectual attention from liberalism, which was a much more dangerous enemy of civilisation.”

The two principal constituents of “human security” or “common security” in the 1990s—the insistence on human rights and the preoccupation with the “internationalization” of politics—were also the preoccupations of late Enlightenment liberalism. For János Kis, to describe something as a question of human rights is to identify it as of concern to the international community: “as human rights of a particular kind, minority rights belong under the protection of the community of nations.” “Our policies—foreign and domestic,” Václav Havel says, “must grow out of ideas, above all out of the idea of human rights.” The opponents of such policies present them as the outcome, or last hurrah, of a half century of Western hegemony, of the epoch that began, for one leading political figure in Singapore, with the imposition on a temporarily powerless international society of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. But the human rights of 1948 are also the rights of the American and French Revolutions, or what Condorcet, speaking of the influence of the American Revolution in Europe, described as “the natural rights of humanity.” These rights begin with “the security of one’s person, a security which includes the assurance that one will not be troubled by
violence, either within one’s family or in the use of one’s faculties,” and proceed, through “the security and the free enjoyment of one’s property,” to the right of political participation. The new political rhetoric of human security in the 1990s is also the old rhetoric of natural or international rights.

The politics of “internationalization,” in the post-Cold War period, is also oddly evocative of older political discussions. One of the preoccupations of liberal thought in the late Enlightenment was with the extension of rights to individual security, or rights of humanity, to individuals who were not citizens of the state in which the rights were being asserted: to women, to children, and to the propertyless and dependent within the territory of the state. Laborers, shop assistants, or women, in Kant’s account, could not be citizens or “co-lawmakers.” But they were nonetheless free (as human beings) and equal (as subjects); they were entitled to the protection of law as “co-beneficiaries,” or partners in protection. The next stage, in this extension of rights, or at least of the right to protection, was its further enlargement to individuals outside the state or political territory. If the public security of the state, in Kant’s phrase, was to be achieved only in a cosmopolitan (a “weltbürgerlichen”) system, then individuals in one state must be co-citizens or co-partners, in some sense, with individuals elsewhere.

The international politics of individual security was indeed seen, much as it has been seen in the 1990s, as the consequence of an exorable “internationalization” of political, economic, and social life. If one thinks of the half century from the 1770s to the 1820s as a single epoch—the epoch of Condorcet and Talleyrand, for example, and not the epoch in which the Revolution “cut time in two”—then it was a period of intense interest in new international relationships of different sorts. It was a time, for example, of tremendously increased information about events in other countries, and of quite self-conscious reflection on the political consequences of this information. The dissatisfaction of the English public with cursory official gazettes—their interest in “le pourquoi du pourquoi”—was an essential element in Castlereagh’s politics, as Gentz wrote. In Germany, too, the last quarter of the eighteenth century saw an explosion of journals concerned with “the internal affairs of states and with international relations.” Condorcet
himself spent much of the Revolution as a journalist, for which he was excoriated by Robespierre: “hack writers hold in their hands the destiny of peoples,” Robespierre said, and Lafayette, supported by Condorcet, would have risen to power surrounded “by an army of journalists,” and lifted on “a pile of pamphlets.”

A second preoccupation was with the increase not only in international information—the knowledge that people in one country had of events in other countries—but also in international influence. The actions of people in one country actually caused events in other countries. Herder, in his denunciation of the international culture of information (what he described as the “Papierkultur!”), spoke of the “shadow” of Europe over the entire world, and of the “power and machines” of modern times: “with one impulse, with one movement of the finger, entire nations can be convulsed.” It was not only princes and sovereigns who exercised new, distant influence, but ordinary citizens (or ordinary trading companies) as well. “The prodigious increase of the commercial and colonial system in all parts of the world,” Gentz wrote, was the most significant development “in the political world since the Treaty of Westphalia.” It had transformed continents, and it also transformed Europe itself: “it has even been the groundwork in the interior of states, of a great revolution in all the relations of society.”

A third concern was with the increased effectiveness, in international relations, of official policy. Castlereagh concluded that the Spanish crisis of 1820 did not constitute “a practical and intelligible Danger, capable of being brought home to the National Feeling,” and was not sufficient, therefore, to justify military intervention by the British. But he emphasized that Britain could indeed have undertaken such an effort if she had wished to do so. Britain had “perhaps equal power with any other State” to oppose an intelligible danger: “she can interfere with effect.” One source of this new power was Britain’s own military superiority, following the defeat of France. But for other states, too, the possibilities of international interference were greatly increased. Condorcet, looking ahead in 1792 to the formation of an independent federation of small German states, pointed out that new canals would make possible the rapid movement (if requested for the defense of the new federation) of “troops” and “munitions” from France. He
also foresaw a fearsome world of multiple military interventions: “There would be no more freedom or peace on earth, if each government thought it had the right to employ force to establish in foreign countries the principles which it considers to be useful to its own interests.”

The fourth and most evocatively modern concern was with the increased scope of international politics itself. Castlereagh insisted on the intelligibility of international problems as a precondition for international interference—on the requirement that they should mean something to what he describes repeatedly in his state paper as “public sentiment,” “public opinion,” “the public mind.” To have information about some foreign event is a necessary condition, evidently, if an individual (or “the public”) is to recognize that event as being of political importance. To have the possibility or power to “interfere with effect” is also necessary; political obligations, like moral obligations, are bounded by the limits of the possible, or of what Castlereagh called the practical. To have the sentiment that one stands in some sort of causal relationship to the event in question—the relationship of influence, for example—is of further political importance. We are inspired to passion, Hume said, by that which “bears a relation to us” or is in “some way associated with us”; “its idea must hang in a manner, upon that of ourselves.”

The societies for the abolition of slavery in the 1780s and 1790s—Condorcet’s Amis des Noirs, for example, in which the pamphleteer William Playfair saw “the first step” to revolution—provide a good illustration. Slavery, even outside the colonial territory, was recognized as a political problem by British and French public opinion in part because it was so evidently related to British and French policy, to British and French laws and commerce, and even to the tastes of British and French consumers (the taste for sugar, which British abolitionists—or “Anti-Saccharites”—refused in one of the first political revolts of modern consumers). This recognition of the political importance, or at least of the political intelligibility, of the destinies of distant individuals was indeed a principal indicator, in some of the greatest liberal thought, of political enlightenment itself. “The spectacle of a great people where the rights of man are respected is useful to all others,” Condorcet wrote in his observations on the influence of the Ameri-
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can Revolution in Europe: “It teaches us that these rights are everywhere the same.” Kant used the same image of a spectacle, a few years later, in speaking of the French Revolution. An “occurrence in our own times,” he wrote, has revealed a view “into the unbounded future.” The occurrence was a disposition; it was the sympathy of disinterested spectators for the French Revolution, in which “their reaction (because of its universality) proves that mankind as a whole shares a certain character in common.”

EXTENDED SECURITY AND EXTENDED POLICIES

The obvious shortcoming of the new ideas or principles of security of the 1990s, as was suggested earlier, is their inclusiveness: the dizzying complexity of a political geometry (“tous azimuts”) in which individuals, groups, states, and international organizations have responsibilities for international organizations, states, groups, and individuals. This inclusiveness, or incoherence, was also a characteristic of the earlier liberalism of international (and individual) security. One much discussed problem was that of psychological incoherence. If the individual is expected to recognize the rights of all other individuals, however remote, then she may disregard other, less remote individuals, or find herself so overburdened by the process of (political) recognition that she does nothing about anything: this is the old charge against liberalism (Edmund Burke’s charge, for example), of coldness, or irresolution, or both.

The second and more serious problem is of political incoherence. The principal connotation of individual security in modern political thought, as has been seen, is as a relation between the individual and the state: security is an objective of individuals, but one that can only be achieved in a collective or political process. Even the idea of national or state security, in the sense that became widespread after 1815, refers to a collective process in which the participants are themselves states: the Westphalian settlement, or Kant’s cosmopolitan federation, or the equilibrium of Europe. But the “human security” of the new international principles seems to impose relations that are only tenuously political. The security of an individual in one country is to be achieved through the agency of a state (or a substate group, or a suprastate organization) in another country. The individual is thereby very much less than a
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co-lawmaker, in Kant’s sense, in the political procedure that en-
ures security. She is less, even, than a co-beneficiary (like a wife or
a shop assistant); she is not even a partner in being protected.

The nonpolitical character of the new principles poses evident
problems. To have a right means very little, in the liberal political
theory with which we have been concerned, if one is not conscious
of the right. Adam Smith, like Hume, criticized the theory of a
tacit or original contract for individual security on the grounds
that it ignored the consciousness of individual political subjects:
“they are not conscious of it, and therefore cannot be bound by
it.” For Condorcet, if individuals were not conscious of their
rights, or did not understand them, then their rights were not
“real”; this was one of his principal arguments for universal public
instruction. But the beneficiaries of the new international policies
are not especially likely to be conscious political subjects in this
sense. The individual who is “troubled by violence” does not
know who to ask for protection (which agency of the United
Nations, which nongovernmental organization, and in what lan-
guage?), and she has no political recourse if the protection is not
provided. The interposition of poorly understood and only incipi-
ently political rights is even more insidious, in some circumstances,
if the assertion of a new international right has the effect of
subverting a local and potentially more resilient political process.
One of the charges made against the humanitarian policies of the
1990s is indeed that by depoliticizing procedures of emergency
relief, they tend to subvert the local politics in which individual
subjects are conscious participants, and which constitutes the only
consistent source of continuing security.

My suggestion, nonetheless, is that the new policies of indi-
vidual and international security are likely to be a continuing
feature of politics in the post-Cold War period. The effort to make
sense of them, and in particular to make them less inclusive, is
thereby of continuing importance. The changes that led in the late
eighteenth century to a new preoccupation with international-
ation—the increase in news, in economic and cultural interdepen-
dence, in the effectiveness of international intervention, and in the
consequent political recognition of distant events—are also the
preoccupations of the end of the twentieth century. There is very
little, still, that corresponds to an international politics in which
distant individuals are co-citizens, or co-participants. But there is an international political society, of sorts, and it imposes some form of reflection on the principles of international justice.

Policies for the prevention of violent conflict provide one illustration. The idea of the prevention of nuclear war, as distinct from the deterrence of nuclear offense, was of central importance to the Palme Commission's idea of common security. A similar distinction can be made now between the cooperative enterprise of prevention and the frightening or forceful enterprise of deterrence: the deterrence of injustice or insecurity, or the enforcement of rights. The discussion of new policies for collective security has been concerned to a considerable extent, since 1991, with principles of "intervention": with the circumstances under which (in Condorcet's terms) governments should employ force to establish principles in foreign countries. If there are well-trained international forces, it is argued, prepared to intervene at the early stages of crises, then military conflicts will be less likely to begin; if conflicts do begin, they will end earlier and with less violence. This is deterrence, of a new, enlightened, and internationalist complexion. But it is not the same enterprise as prevention, or as the effort to ensure, whether with military or nonmilitary instruments, that there will be no need to intervene.

One of the distinctive characteristics of prevention is that it takes place under conditions of imperfect information, or before one knows with certainty that a particular conflict (or a particular disease, in preventive public health) will occur. This makes it a very difficult objective for international cooperation. It is easier, often, to agree that a particular international problem is intolerable—that something must be done about it—than to agree either on predictions as to the probability of future problems, or on general principles of international policy. There are different explanations for the interest of people in one country in "doing something" about injustice or insecurity in other countries: that the problem is something they know about, for example; that it is something they care about or identify themselves with; that there is something they can do about it. But these explanations, or criteria, are difficult to describe in a circumstanceless, universal idiom. One does not know that one cares about something, or reflect on what one has it in one's power to do, until one knows
about some particular injustice or crisis: until the crisis, that is to say, has already been described, or until (as Castlereagh said) it is no longer a question of venturing to commit oneself on an "abstract" question, and there is something "intelligible and practicable" to be done.

It is particularly difficult, therefore, for countries to agree in advance on the "resort to force" by the international community. As Castlereagh also said, of the prospect of "unanimity and supposed concurrence upon all political subjects" among the allies of 1820, "if this Identity is to be sought for, it can only be obtained by a proportionate degree of inaction in all the States."\(^\text{73}\) There is thus no evident relationship between the extent of consensus about a particular military intervention and the efficiency of the intervention in question. It is indeed often much easier to intervene efficiently at a very early stage in a conflict, or when there is considerable uncertainty about its future course; it is much more difficult, at that stage, to agree that intervention is needed. The choice or use of nonmilitary instruments is, under these circumstances, of considerable importance. It is difficult to conceive of agreeing, in advance, to have military force used against one. This was one of the (several) unconvincing features of early post-World War II schemes for international government, in which recalcitrant participants were to be sanctioned by the punitive use of force, including nuclear weapons. It is less difficult, perhaps, to agree on less coercive policies. National states do not, after all, rely only or even principally on the use of force to ensure security for their citizens. The incipient international society, too, should have recourse to civil policies for preventing conflict.

Nonmilitary policies can be constructive as well as coercive. They include, for example, policies for recognizing (or refusing to recognize) new sovereignties. Recognition can be made conditional on guarantees for individual rights, including the rights of members of minorities and other groups; countries can agree in advance to give themselves a space for reflection, of the sort that was missing in the early stages of the current Balkan crisis, at the time of the European Community countries’ decision to recognize Croatia in 1991. They can also agree on policies to support individual rights, as distinct from punishing violations of these rights. These are policies in which people in the countries where rights are
at risk are co-participants with people elsewhere. It is expensive, in many cases, to guarantee minority rights, to build schools in which children can be educated in their first language, or to provide trilingual education for all children. Such policies could also pose familiar problems of “moral hazard” (in that they would tend to reward countries in which the rights of minorities are thought to be at risk). But international expenditure on education is nonetheless an important component of policies for individual security. It would be in the spirit of the plans of the 1780s and 1790s: of Condorcet’s project of public instruction, for example, in which children would be instructed in their own language, in an international language, and in a third language of local importance. The international society of the 1990s should be in a position, eventually, to provide material support for these old liberal projects.

Policies for demilitarization provide a related illustration. The new security principles have been presented, since the end of the Cold War, as especially suited to a period of postwar reconstruction. The problems of demobilization in the 1990s are indeed similar to, and in some respects even more serious than, those of earlier peace settlements. The period of intense economic (and political) mobilization lasted for about four years in World War I, for about seven years before and during World War II, and for twenty-three years, intermittently, during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars; the Cold War mobilization lasted for more than forty years, and it is correspondingly difficult to undo. But in other respects the present postwar period is strikingly different. The Cold War was indeed a long international conflict, but it was not a conflict that ended in the exhaustion, celebration, and revulsion from the use of military force that was characteristic of 1815, 1919, and 1945.

The God of War is defeated in Descartes’ ballet of 1649, and the personification of Earth, whose limbs have been torn apart in an early scene, reappears restored and renewed. The Cold War has been followed, in contrast, by a rediscovery of military force—by a demobilization of certain (principally nuclear) forces, and by remilitarization of international relations. On the one hand, the military forces of the two superpowers are more “usable” (in the Gulf, or in Chechnya). On the other hand, military conflicts within or between other, lesser powers are uninhibited by the prospect of
an eventual superpower confrontation. The promise of the end of the Cold War has been understood, since the earliest negotiations for nuclear disarmament, as the promise of a world of peaceful political competition. It is the demilitarization of the long conflict between a proto-revolutionary “Left” and a proto-reactionary “Right” that has made possible the revival of liberal internationalism. But the post-Cold War conflicts have turned out to be at least as violent as the many small wars of the previous generation. They are newly visible to (Western) public opinion, at least in the case of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia; they constitute a new challenge to the incipient institutions of international order in that they have demonstrated the powerlessness of even a relatively united international community, undivided by the superpower competition.

The process of demilitarization is, under these circumstances, of high priority for policies of human, individual, or common security. It is of particular importance in states that are themselves at peace, but that are the source of means of violent destruction elsewhere. Individuals in Russia, the United States, France, or the United Kingdom “bear a relation” to distant wars (in Hume’s phrase) in that they are residents of states that license or encourage very large-scale arms exports. One way to make conflicts less violent is thus to sell and produce less military equipment. Both Somalia and the former Yugoslavia have been important locations, for many years, of military-industrial transactions. Yet the effort to reduce transfers of conventional arms is of strikingly little political interest in the post-Cold War world. “The right inherent in society to ward off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions,” for John Stuart Mill, included a right to impose precautions on the sale of articles, such as poisons, of which both proper and improper use could be made (or which are “adapted to be instruments of crime”). The seller, he says “might be required to enter in a register the exact time of the transaction, the name and address of the buyer, the precise quantity and quality sold; to ask the purpose for which it was wanted, and record the answer he received.” There are similar precautions in respect to articles that are adapted to be instruments of war: they should be an important component of government and other groups’ policies for international security.
The most troublesome illustration of the new policies has to do with nongovernmental organizations, or with what has been described rather grandly as the "civil society strategy." The dislike of government power has been at the center of all liberal thought. Its "historic beginning," in L. T. Hobhouse’s description, is to be found in protest, even in "destructive and revolutionary" protest, against the "modern State." Condorcet’s idyll, at the height of his revolutionary career in 1792, was of the "virtual non-existence" of government, or of "laws and institutions which reduce to the smallest possible quantity the action of government." This dislike has been accompanied, for many liberals, by a liking for that which is not government, and in particular for elective or voluntary associations, for the "professions," "divisions," "communities," and "callings" that the not notably liberal Adam Ferguson described in his *Essay on the History of Civil Society*. (The electiveness, at least for early liberals, was more important than the nonidentity with government. For Adam Smith, as for Turgot and Condorcet, the coercive nongovernmental organizations of the eighteenth century—apprenticeship guilds and corporations, for example—were even more insidious than government itself.

Relations between nongovernmental organizations (and nongovernmental individuals) have been of central importance to the internationalization of political life in the late twentieth century, as in the late Enlightenment. The increase in news and information is the work of nongovernment, of very large private companies, very powerful individual proprietors, professional societies with their codes of conduct, public relations companies, and so forth. So also, to a great extent, is the increase in economic and cultural influence. The power of individuals in one country to cause economic and social change in other countries is the work of private companies (including the companies that export military equipment) far more than of governments: much as it was, indeed, at the time of Grotius’s defense of the (Dutch and English) view “that private men, or private companies, could occupy uncultivated territory.” The increased effectiveness of policy is itself a characteristic of the policies of nongovernmental organizations as much as of governments and international organizations. There are pri-
vate organizations who negotiate cease-fires and hostage exchanges: private charities (and large airlines) deliver emergency humanitarian relief, and compete with government agencies for public (or government) funding to do so.

The novel aspect of nongovernmental organizations in the 1990s is their new political self-consciousness, or self-importance—the beginning of a political theory of the “NGO.” The nongovernmental organization is identified, in such a theory, as the uncorrupt, the uncynical, or the unbureacratic. Relations between individuals in different societies—including the relationship between recipients and donors of foreign assistance—are supposed to be conducted, wherever possible, through NGOs rather than through governments (even when the NGOs are licensed by governments, funded by governments, and organized by past and future government officials). The “civil society strategy,” in this setting, consists of the effort to organize international relations on the basis of exchanges between organizations. It “assumes that formal democracy is not enough.” Its objectives include “funding independent media” as well as “judiciary and police,” “developing charitable and voluntary associations,” and “developing nongovernmental channels” for government assistance.83 At its most specific, it involves material support from private foundations in the United States to voluntary organizations and professional societies in Russia.84 At its most imposing, it involves the effort “to provide more space in global governance for people and their organizations—for civil society as distinct from governments.”85

The new international politics of civil society, like the politics of individual security, is founded on old and important political ideas. The most profound of these ideas, and one that has been conspicuous in all the great peace processes of the twentieth century, is the idea of multiple, overlapping identities. The engagement of individuals in organizations, professions, clubs, and societies has been seen, at least since Montesquieu, as a principal sign of civilized and peaceable political life. For Turgot the characteristic “of being citizens” was to be found, above all, in the “free associations” or “societies” of which “England, Scotland and Ireland are full.”86 This peaceable citizenship was thought to provide some sort of security, in turn, against international conflict. E. H. Carr spoke before the end of World War II of “a system of
overlapping and interlocking loyalties which is in the last resort
the sole alternative to sheer totalitarianism.” His “social” or “func-
tional” internationalism was to be founded on what was earlier
(and later) described as civil society: “local loyalties, as well as
loyalties to institutions, professions and groups must find their
place in any healthy society. The international community if it is to
flourish must admit something of the same multiplicity of authori-
ties and diversity of loyalties.”

World War I, too, was a period of anxious reflection on the
politics of civil society. Leonard Woolf, in a report prepared in
1916 for the Fabian Society, saw in the “extraordinary and novel
spectacle” of international voluntary associations the prospect of
“true International Government.” The increase in such organiza-
tions, some of which (like the “Association Internationale pour la
Lutte contre le Chômage”) included as their members “states,
municipal authorities, private individuals, and every sort and kind
of national group, society, and association,” corresponded to the
newly international life of the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies. Woolf wrote that “A man’s chief interests are no longer
determined by the place he lives in, and group interests, instead of
following geographical lines, follow those of capital, labor, profes-
sions, etc.” Like Gentz, a century earlier, he looked with some
coolness at the assertion of national interest: “Over and over
again, when we analyze what are called national interests, we find
that they are really the interests, not of the national, but of a much
smaller group.” The geometry of the new international security, as
in the 1990s, was to be distinctively variable. In the association
against unemployment, for example, Woolf found “both forms of
representation, the vertical or national and geographical and the
horizontal or international, provided for.”

Woolf describes himself as trying to edge away from the “ter-
rible precipice of Utopianism” (or from what Carr, during the next
world war, identified as the “idealistic view of a functional inter-
nationalism,” which “would be utopian if it failed to take account
from the outset of the unsolved issue of power”). He concedes that
the delineation of the “international” is a matter of practical
politics, and he takes as an “actual example” the situations of “the
Bosnian” and of “the Englishman” in Ireland: “it is impossible to
say exactly when the Balkans became, and when Ireland will
become, an international question.” But his own political ideas, of the reinforcement of the “system” of international conferences to protect the security of national minorities, and of international cooperation to protect the economic security of individuals and groups, were themselves put into a sort of practice in the postwar settlement. One of the principal themes of reconstruction after World War I, in the words of the Peace Treaty, was to prevent “such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled”; the decision of the Great Powers to begin their Versailles deliberations by considering international labor legislation “produced a degree of surprise that almost amounted to bewilderment.”

The idyll of multiple, minimal identities is of poignant importance to European political thought. It is described elegiacally in Robert Musil’s description of the “negative freedom” of “Kakania,” or of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy of 1913: “the inhabitant of a country has at least nine characters: a professional, a national, a civic, a class, a geographic, a sexual, a conscious, an unconscious, and possibly even a private character to boot. He unites them in himself, but they dissolve him....This permits a person all but one thing: to take seriously what his at least nine other characters do and what happens to them.” But the innocuousness of the unserious is too slight, in the end, as the foundation of civilized life. Musil’s prewar world is also the world of which Freud wrote in 1915 in “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death” that its loss was the source of “our mortification and our painful disillusionment.” “The citizen of the civilized world,” Freud said, must now “stand helpless in a world that has grown strange to him,” with his great European fatherland disintegrated and “his fellow-citizens divided and debased.” “We had hoped, certainly, that the extensive community of interests established by commerce and production would constitute the germ of...a compulsion” towards morality, Freud said of the civil society of the prewar world; he found, instead, that “nations still obey their passions far more readily than their interests. Their interests serve them, at most, as rationalizations for their passions.”

The elective institutions of civil society were not enough, in the 1910s, to prevent the violent enmity of war, and they are not
enough, in any liberal theory, to ensure the security of individuals. The new political theory of the NGO—the self-identification of nongovernment groups as the privileged source of human or individual security—is in this respect particularly odd. The organizations that constitute international civil society can play many important political roles. They can provide the international (and local) information that is at the heart of the new politics of security; they can cooperate in the schools, museums, and rights organizations that contribute to policies for preventing violent conflict; they can put pressure on governments to reduce arms production and exports; they can make possible the process of international political discussion, which is a precondition for international politics. But one of the things they cannot do is provide security. The essential characteristic of security is as a political relation, which is not voluntary, between the individual and the political community. Security (or the opinion of security, in Montesquieu’s account) is the condition for political freedom. But it is the political choice to live under the rule of law that is in turn the condition for security.

The doubting mood of the late Enlightenment tends to make one skeptical, in general, of the presumption that NGOs are preternaturally other-regarding or uncorrupt. Adam Smith reserved his coolest dislike, and his most cheerful demonstrations of hidden self-interest, for the ostentatiously public-spirited: parish overseers, university teachers, or Quaker slave-owners. The new principles of security of the 1980s and 1990s have been put forward with special enthusiasm by NGOs, and they are consonant with the not particularly hidden self-interest of these organizations. The “civil society strategy,” too, can be seen as the outcome of a coalition between governments that wish to disengage from foreign assistance (despite the opposition of substantial minority opinion) and organizations with an interest both in improving other people’s lives and in their own advancement.93 NGOs are also, of course, a kaleidoscopically heterogeneous political form. “Independent media” are identified as a suitable object of support in a civil society strategy, and the presumption (in the case of assistance to the former Soviet Union) is that they are to be independent of the state. But are they also to be independent of large international oligopolies? Or of large and powerful proprietors? “War between
two nations under modern conditions is impossible unless you get a large number of people in each nation excited and afraid,” Leonard Woolf wrote in 1916. News media, dependent and independent, are rightly thought (as Condorcet thought, and as Robespierre denied) to constitute the core of a free civil society. They play a central role in (for example) the prevention of famine. But they play a central role, too, in the frightening process whereby very large numbers of people become excited and afraid.

The main objection to NGOs as a source of security is even more foundational. It may be reasonable to assume that individuals in NGOs are more public-spirited, in general, than individuals in the public or the private for-profit sector (if only because of the relentless vilification of public service in the 1980s and 1990s, and the similarly relentless glorification of the pursuit, within the private sector, of individual profit). But the serious problem with the new political theory of NGOs has very little to do with the psychological circumstances of individuals. It is a political problem, and it follows from the defining characteristic of the NGO as a voluntary organization. There is a stark inequality of voluntariness, in particular, between the “donors” and the “recipients” of security. An international relief charity operating in the zone of a civil war or a distant famine, for example, is made up of individual volunteers (including people who have volunteered to be employed at low salaries) and funded by voluntary contributions (including voluntary contributions, from governments, of tax revenues). The individuals who receive relief are in circumstances of the most extreme lack of voluntariness; they are as far as one can be from the self-sufficiency of the individual will that is at the heart of, for example, Kant’s political theory.

The oscillation between the public and the private is a continuing and prized quality of civil society. The new, multiple woman of late twentieth-century political thought (the new mulier civilis) is a doctor, let us say, as well as a Belgian, a Protestant, a volunteer, a mother, a member of an international organization, a Walloon, a professional in private practice. Her theory, above all, is to be found in Albert Hirschman’s Shifting Involvements, with its evocation of public action, overcommitment, and private disappointment. But the richness of her public life is juxtaposed, under certain circumstances, to the impoverishment of politics in very
poor countries (or even in very poor parts of rich countries). African Rights, in its harsh criticism of international “humanitarianism” in Somalia, contrasts the public accountability of official agencies with the voluntariness of NGOs: “while agencies such as UNICEF and WHO have a duty to be present, the presence of NGOs is a privilege.” The relationship between people who provide and people who use “social services and health care” is thus one of “goodwill” rather than of “contract.” Individuals become “passive recipients” of charity, and they are thereby made even more insecure: “the insecurity of the relationship that results can also undermine the effectiveness of the programme.”

The resilience of the metaphor of the political contract is associated, in eighteenth-century liberal thought, with the implied equality of the contracting parties, with the circumstance that the parties to the contract or agreement are all more or less the same sort of men, whose “intentions” and “reasonable expectations” can be the subject of reasoned discussion. The earlier world of “status” (or of security as something to which one is entitled by virtue of one’s status) was a world in which men were unequal by their birth. In the imagined world of Condorcet and other late eighteenth-century liberals, men and women are equal at birth, and their subsequent equality as reasoning parties is made possible by public instruction. This is enlightenment in the most literal sense, or freedom from the darkness in which one cannot see through other people’s intentions. But the world of “goodwill,” or of security as something that people enjoy not through status, and not through contract, but rather through the good offices of civil society, is inimical to this politics of enlightenment. The insidious characteristic of guilds, for Adam Smith, was that they were protected by “public law,” yet were impervious to public scrutiny. Only a beggar, he said, “chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens.”

The international civil society, in a liberal theory of this sort, is a source of enlightenment, civility, or of the investment in schools and museums that might tend to prevent conflict, but not of individual security. To the extent that civil society and the politics of states (or empires) are opposed to each other, as strategies or as models of postwar reconstruction, then security, both individual and collective, belongs to the domain of the political. “Civil soci-
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ety and markets alone did not assure the stabilization of Western democratic societies after 1945,” as Charles Maier has said, and “they seem increasingly unlikely to do so after 1989.”99 They are even less likely to assure the invention of democratic society, or the common security of individuals.

FREE AND EQUAL DISCUSSION

Liberalism is a political theory, not an idiom of political discussion. The word “liberalism,” according to Judith Shklar, “refers to a political doctrine, not a philosophy of life. . . . Liberalism has only one overriding aim: to secure the political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal freedom.”100 The new politics of individual security (of “personal security” for Boutros Boutros-Ghali) is in this sense a perfectly liberal enterprise. It is most new, and most odd, in its international extent, in its insistence that the persons whose freedom is to be secured include very remote persons, or political foreigners. The liberal wishes to secure certain political conditions for himself, and for persons whom he recognizes to be co-participants in a political enterprise (to be the same sort of men). The international liberal has the same objective, but he recognizes the oddest sort of people—here, there, and everywhere.

It has been suggested that the “civil society strategy” is an insufficient source of individual security because it is insufficiently political. The civil society is (by self-definition) nongovernmental; individual security is (by the definition of liberal political theory) both the objective of and the justification for government. The civil society is the domain of the voluntary; individual security is the justification for coercion. But the nongovernmental society is itself of notably increased political importance in the post-Cold War world. The new political theory of the NGO is indeed the assertion of a new politics: the assertion that the “we” of civil society, or the nongovernmental and the noncoercive, is a constituent, and even a defining constituent of political life.

The presumption of this essay has been that the idea of an international politics is, if not straightforward, at least recognizable in a general sense. But the connotation of the political—and thereby of the “political conditions” that Judith Shklar refers to as
the overriding aim of liberalism—is the subject of familiar, persistent disagreement. In one sense, the political is indeed the domain of organizations, individuals, and their political discussions. This is the sense asserted in the new theories of civil society; it is Cicero’s sense, too (or one of Cicero’s senses), of society as a place of teaching, learning, communicating, discussing, and reasoning, and of citizenship as a matter of public places, temples, streets, laws, voting rights, friendships, and business contracts. In a different sense, however, the political is the domain of formal (and coercive) political arrangements, of the “formal democracy,” which in the civil society strategy is “not enough,” and of the state more generally, with its laws, treaties, and declarations. In a further sense, the political is the domain of political power, or the extent of what states can do, or can arrange to have done.

A great deal of modern political thought is concerned, as it was between the 1770s and the 1820s, with the relations between these three domains: with the circumstance that the different domains of politics are not coextensive, but change in extent over time. The fundamental characteristic of the state is as the location of political homogeneity; the nation is defined by homogeneity of birth, race, blood, culture. But political homogeneity is a matter of (political) culture, of discussing and reasoning, as well as of formal political arrangements. The extent of political power is very much less than the extent of formal political arrangements, for some states, and very much greater for others. Condorcet’s prospect of governments that impose principles by force in other countries was made possible by the new political power of several European governments. This power had rather little to do with formal political engagements. It was instead a consequence of technologies (such as canals), economic circumstances (such as the power to raise taxes or borrow money), and political and military conditions (such as the absence, at the time, of powerful opponents). Castlereagh proposed to limit Britain’s policies of intervention—her policies beyond the domain of formal political arrangements—to the “intelligible and practicable.” The intelligible corresponds to the political in Cicero’s sense, of the subject of discussion and concern within a political society. The practicable is the political in the sense of present power, or of that which corresponds to the
circumstances of political power, at the present time and as understood by the presently powerful.

The great liberal theory of the nineteenth century assumed a more orderly relation between these three domains of the political. John Stuart Mill argued, in support of “free and popular local and municipal institutions,” that “the management of purely local business by the localities” should be subject only to the most general superintendence by “general government,” including the provision of information and the residual power of “compelling the local officers to obey the laws laid down for their guidance”; the result should be “the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency.” Formal political arrangements were to be organized in an orderly hierarchy of interests and duties, and the domain of these arrangements was coextensive with the domain of political power. The wider political culture, too, was both influenced by and an influence on formal political arrangements. Mill was uncompromisingly opposed—and in this he followed closely Condorcet’s arguments on public instruction—to the idea of political education. But he saw in the practice of local politics the source of the “habits and powers” that are the foundation of a “free constitution.”103

Mill’s conception of political order has been of profound importance to subsequent liberal thought. It is even reflected, in the European law of the 1980s and 1990s, in the idea of “subsidiarity.” There is an orderly and liberal core to this turgidly obscure notion: there are different levels of government, of differing generality, and each political function is to be undertaken at the lowest (or least general) level that is compatible with efficiency or practicability.104 It is this hierarchy of political processes that has broken down in the new international politics of the 1990s. There are two reasons, in English political thought, to respect some version of the principle of subsidiarity. One is the Burkan or historicist respect for convention; certain functions have in the past been performed by certain levels of government, and the costs of constitutional change are likely to be prohibitively high. The other, which is closer to Mill’s, is founded on reason: the functions of government should be subject to continuing review in the light of changing circumstances, and they should be assigned to the least general level that is efficient in these conditions. The rationalist view of
subsidiarity is the more compelling one. But it imposes an unending reflection on constitutional principles, much as Leonard Woolf's system of conferences imposed an unending reflection on the delineation of the international. It also imposes a great deal of reflection on changing international circumstances; on the circumstances that have changed so prodigiously in the 1980s and 1990s.

The politics of individual security, inside and outside Europe, is a case in point. On the one hand, because of the increase in international information, the general interest in the security of distant individuals is great; people know about distant horrors while they are still happening, or while there is still time to prevent them from happening. On the other hand, because of increased information, again, and because international interventions are no longer inhibited by the prospect of intercontinental military conflict, the power of distant states is also relatively great in relation to these horrors. The power of local states, meanwhile, is very much diminished in many modern local conflicts. The distant states may therefore be more "efficient" in protecting personal freedom, to use Mill's term, than the local, formally constituted political authorities. The counterpart of the mulier civilis (the new political woman of civil society) provides a dismal illustration. If one is a Bosnian Muslim woman, then one's security is not protected by virtue of one's political identity as a resident of a local community, as a citizen of the old Yugoslavia, or as a citizen of the new Bosnia. One's other identities—as a European, as a member of an international religious community, as an individual with rights, or as a woman with rights—provide weak protection. But the European Union, NATO, the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the UN High Commission for Refugees may actually have more power to ensure one's personal security than any local or municipal political institutions.

The difficulty, in very general terms, is of a divergence between the different domains of the political. The extent of international political discussion and power has increased enormously. But (formal) political institutions—the hierarchy of international, national, regional, and local government—have increased only minimally, and in many cases have become, as in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Chechnya, drastically less efficient. One prospect, therefore, is of an extension and improvement in the formal institutions of
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international government. This is the point of policies for the prevention and demilitarization of conflict, and it is of particular importance in relation to policies for individual or common security. Formal (contractual) commitments to international programs of political and educational investment, formal restrictions on military transactions, formal agreements in respect of the recognition of sovereignty, and formal procedures for the protection of internationally recognized rights constitute the germ (to use Freud’s word) of a compulsion to international government. I am not referring to Leonard Woolf’s “true International Government” of 1916, made up of voluntary associations; I mean something even more currently unfashionable, in the form of international laws and international authorities with the power of compelling other officers to obey those laws.

The state, including the incipient international state, has been the object of criticism in the 1980s and 1990s by an imposing political coalition of the Right and the Left. Its commitments are very often no more than scraps of paper; there is “overwhelming evidence that modern national governments cannot and will not observe international treaties or rules of international law when these become burdensome or dangerous to the welfare or security of their own nation,” E. H. Carr wrote in 1945.105 But there is little alternative, at least in policies for individual or common security, to the reconstruction of state authority. The single most important element in this reconstruction, for international state institutions, would be the power to raise tax revenues, or at least to receive, “automatically,” some share of the revenues raised by national, regional, or local governments. The most important form of coercion, in the historical development of national states, was the coercive power of fiscality; it would be the most important power of international institutions as well.

In The Man without Qualities, Musil says that the timid diplomat Tuzzi “regarded the state as a masculine subject one did not discuss with women,” and the political objective of rediscovering the state is quite remote from the objectives of the new, multifarious civil society.106 But the state itself is distinctively multifarious in the post-Cold War world. One consequence of the extension of international political society, or of political discussion, is thus a new disrespect for the prior wisdom of states and their officers.
When Castlereagh speaks of different policies as "practicable" or "impracticable"—or when Mill speaks of the "efficient" dissemination of power—the tone is of privileged insight into government finances and opportunities. This tone of effortless self-confidence has been repressed, perhaps beyond recovery, in the past decades of criticism of all the nonmilitary activities of the state (at least in England, the United States, and the former Soviet Union). The state is also a largely and increasingly feminine institution at the end of the twentieth century. The traditionally masculine functions of collecting taxes and organizing wars have been conspicuously in retreat. It is the traditionally feminine state functions of local government, education, and social security that are most resilient; it is these functions, too, that would be reproduced in the new institutions of international government.

The international politics of individual security would be more orderly, in some respects, if the institutions of formal political commitment were extended in this way. But the international political society will still impose a new and prodigious tolerance for political disorder. There is some interest, among the theorists of civil society in the 1990s, in the Stoic metaphor of political identity as an array of concentric circles, in which the individual feels progressively less committed to her progressively more general political identities (as a member of a family, a local community, a region, a nation, an international community, and so forth). Adam Smith took some interest in this metaphor, too, at least as a way of questioning the Stoic idea of universal political benevolence.107 But the modern identities with which we have been concerned suggest that the array of commitments is very much less orderly than the metaphor would indicate. It is a set of ellipses, perhaps, or an Epicurean universe, in which the location of the "I" swerves and lurches over time. It leads to a politics, in turn, that is subject in a quite novel respect to whim and to chance.

"Men are vain of the beauty of their country, of their county, of their parish," Hume says in his account of the relation between objects and passions; they are also vain of climate, of food, "of the softness or force of their language," of the qualities of their friends, of the beauty and utility of distant countries (based on "their distant relation to a foreign country, which is formed by their having seen it and lived in it"). But the modern politics of related-
ness is more disordered, or more accidental, than in even Hume’s imagination. For Hume, “a beautiful fish in the ocean, an animal in a desert, and indeed anything that neither belongs, nor is related to us, has no manner of influence on our vanity.”108 In the modern theory of international (environmental) security, even the beautiful fish is related to international politics. It is quite plausible, for example, that the individual participants in the new civil society should feel related, and even passionately related to far-off fish in distant oceans. It is plausible, too, that these voluntary passions should come and go with the accidents of information. One joins the society for the protection of fish because one happens to have lived, as a child, near the zoo. Or one votes for a party that supports environmental assistance because one saw a television program about fish the night before the election.

The accidental politics of the 1990s poses new and serious difficulties for political theory and practice. Some of these difficulties were anticipated in earlier periods of political turbulence: Condorcet, for example, devoted great ingenuity to devising constitutional schemes whereby decisions could be drawn out, delayed, or reversed. Other difficulties are very largely new: they are such as to set the impartial regulation of broadcasting and of the new television, communications, and newspaper oligopolies at the very center of present politics. But the most disturbing of the new requirements is to discover a new tolerance for the accidental in politics. This is a very Humean politics, and Hume indeed observed (in his account of accidents from the point of view of the theory of knowledge) that “the custom of imagining a dependence has the same effect as the custom of observing it would have.”109

Politics, like everything else in life, is a kingdom of emotions and customs, of the aesthetic and the accidental. A politics of this sort is profoundly disconcerting in the terms of even the most minimal liberal thought. For liberalism, like the new politics of the 1990s, is about security: about ensuring the conditions for personal liberty. And security requires the predictability and repetitiveness that are the endless propensities of the state. That is why the rediscovery of the (international) state is at the heart of the politics of individual security. But the state to be rediscovered will be a very different sort of state—more Humean and more complicit in an unpredictable political society.
"All the Gods who are deliberating on peace" in the last part of Descartes' ballet about the Treaty of Westphalia decide that Pallas, or wisdom, is their only recourse: "Our interests are so diverse/That we are not to be believed/In anything to do with glory/And the good of the entire universe." Pallas is the personification of Queen Christina, and she combines "prudence" with "valour," and is thereby free of the risk of "too much assurance" or "too much warmth."\textsuperscript{110} These quite minimal political virtues are also the useful virtues of the present postwar world. It is the disengagement of politics from militarism, or from military assurance, that has disengaged the old liberalism of the late Enlightenment. There is a "crisis of liberal internationalism" in the 1990s, and there is an even more serious crisis of conservatism, which revered nothing in the state, excepting only its military power.

The disorderly world of the new international politics—of politics in the sense of an international political society—is full of danger for this sort of conservatism. But it is full of hope for liberals. François Guizot, one of the great nineteenth-century liberals (and conservatives), wrote of the "epoch of transition" of the 1850s that democracy "is habitually dominated by its interests and passions of the moment" and is, of all social powers, the "most obedient to its present fantasies, without concern for the past or the future."\textsuperscript{111} But this disorder is also the condition for the entire, subversive enterprise of political liberalism. In Mill's famous words, "liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion."\textsuperscript{112} We have very little idea, still, of what free and equal discussion amounts to, between groups and societies as well as between individuals. But we are in the process of finding out.

ENDNOTES

\textsuperscript{1}Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the initial meeting of the Common Security Forum in 1992, and at the 1993 Oslo meeting of the Commission on Global Governance. I am grateful for comments from James Cornford, Amartya Sen, and Gareth Stedman Jones, and for discussions with Lincoln Chen, Marianne Heiberg, Mary Kaldor, and the late Johan Jørgen Holst. I would also like to thank the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for support to the Centre for History and Economics and to the Common Security Forum.
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Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (London: Constable, 1933), 32.


See, for example, the speech by President Clinton at the United Nations on 27 September 1993, and speeches by Under Secretary of State Timothy E. Wirth at the United Nations on 30 March 1994, and at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. on 12 July 1994.


The United Nations was founded 50 years ago to ensure the territorial security of member states. . . . What is now under siege is something different,” or “personal security”—Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Let’s get together to halt the unravelling of society.” International Herald Tribune, 10 February 1995.


John Hicks, “Maintaining Capital Intact: a Further Suggestion,” Economica IX (New Series) (34) (May 1942): 17; a Begriffsgeschichte, or a history of concepts, is also a history of who it is who has the concepts.


Ibid., 627–29, 632.
Emma Rothschild


26“securitatem autem nunc appello vacuitatem aegritudinis, in qua vita beata posita est”—Cicero, “Tusculan Disputations,” V. 42; Lexicon Taciteum, ed. Gerber and Greef (Leipzig: 1903). Tacitus does also use “securitas” in something closer to the modern, collective sense when he speaks of giving “safety and security” to Italy (“salutem securitatemque Italiae”): Hist.III.i.ii.


28“Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all.” Smith, Wealth of Nations, 715. It is interesting that Condorcet, writing in the same year, had a different view: “It is not only to defend those who have something against those who do not that the laws of property are made; it is above all to defend those who have a little, against those who have a lot.” Condorcet, Réflexions sur le commerce des blés (1776), in Oeuvres de Condorcet, vol. XI, ed. A. C. O’Connor and M. F. Arago (Paris: Didot, 1847–1849), 189.

29Smith, Wealth of Nations, 689. Smith does say later, in discussing expenditure on justice, that when defense becomes very costly, it becomes necessary “that the people should, for their own security,” contribute through taxes to the sovereign’s costs. Ibid., 718.

30“The security which it gives to the sovereign renders unnecessary that troublesome jealousy, which, in some modern republics, seems to watch over the minutest actions, and to be at all times ready to disturb the peace of every citizen.”
Ibid., 707. The individual security of the sovereign is again a Roman preoccupation: Seneca, addressing the Emperor Nero in De Clementia, commiserates with Nero for his misfortune in not being able to walk in the city unarmed, but assures him that he would be better protected by the love of his fellow citizens than by mountains and turrets; a policy of clemency would provide "more certain security," or the security that comes from a mutual contract in security ("securitas securitate mutua paciscenda est")—Seneca, De Clem., I.viii.2–6, I.xix.5–6.

31 As Stephen Holmes says, "security was the idée maitresse of the liberal tradition." See Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 245.


36 For Condorcet or Smith, as for Hayek in The Road to Serfdom, there is a good and a bad variety of individual security, associated respectively with "the commercial and the military type of society." The good security, for Hayek, includes "the certainty of a given minimum of sustenance for all"; the bad security is "the security of the barracks." See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1944), 120, 126–27.

37 "Réflexions sur le commerce des blés" (1776), in Oeuvres de Condorcet, vol. XI, 167.


41 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Du Contract Social" (first version) in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Oeuvres Complètes, vol. III (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 290. See also Rousseau's description of the social pact: "The first object which men have proposed to one another in the civil confederation has been their mutual security, that is to say the guarantee of the life and liberty of each by the entire community." Jean-Jacques Rousseau, " Fragments Politiques," in Rousseau, Oeuvres Complètes, 486.

42 War is thus in no respect a relation between men, but a relation between States, in which individuals are only enemies by accident, in no respect as men or even
as citizens, but as soldiers.” Rousseau, “Du Contract Social,” 357. Hume expressed doubt, considerably earlier, about the respects in which nations could be considered to be like individuals: “Political writers tell us, that in every kind of intercourse, a body politic is to be considered as one person; and indeed this assertion is so far just, that different nations, as well as private persons, require mutual assistance; at the same time that their selfishness and ambition are perpetual sources of war and discord. But though nations in this particular resemble individuals, yet...they are very different in other respects.” David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 367.


45“Projet d’une exposition des motifs” (1792), in Oeuvres de Condorcet, vol. X, 454.


46“Experiments” in constitutional reform, and even the extension of “Democratic Principles” (“then as now, but too generally spread throughout Europe”) were thus not in themselves a sufficient reason for international intervention. Castlereagh, “State Paper,” 626–27.


48Elisabeth and Robert Badinter quote a manuscript note of Condorcet’s from 1791, in which the composition of two different cabinets is considered, with reshuffling of Sieyès, Rochefoucauld, and Roederer, but with “Talleyrand and Condorcet keeping the same portfolios.” Elisabeth Badinter and Robert Badinter, Condorcet: un intellectuel en politique (Paris: Fayard, 1988), 347.


51Havel, Summer Meditations, 98.


53“De l’influence de la révolution d’Amérique sur l’Europe” (1786), in Oeuvres de Condorcet, vol. VIII, 5–6, 14. The language of 1948 is similar: “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience. ...Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights (December 1948) (New York: United Nations, 1986), art. 1 and 6.

54They were “Schutzgenossen”: Immanuel Kant, “Theorie und Praxis” (1793), in Kant, Werkausgabe, vol. XI, 150–51; Reiss, ed., Kant’s Political Writings, 77–78.
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57 The object of the leaders of the French Revolution, in Tocqueville’s famous phrase, was to “cut in two their destiny,” or to separate “by an abyss” what they were to become from what they once had been. A. de Tocqueville, _L’ancien régime et la révolution_ (1856), ed. J.-P. Mayer (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), 43.

56 Adam Smith wrote scathingly in the _Wealth of Nations_ of the citizens of prosperous empires who in wartime “enjoy, at their ease, the amusement of reading in the newspapers the exploits of their own fleets and armies.” Smith, _Wealth of Nations_, 920.


60 Ganz, _On the State of Europe_, 38–39.


62 “Aux Germains” (1792), in _Oeuvres de Condorcet_, vol. XII, 155–56; “La Nation française à tous les peuples” (1793), in Ibid., vol. XII, 510.


64 Hume, _Treatise_, 303, 307.

65 William Playfair, _A letter to the Right Honourable and Honourable the Lords and Commons of Great Britain, on the advantages of apprenticeships_ (London: T. C. Lewis, 1814), 31.


68 Emmanuel Kant, “The Contest of Faculties” (1798), in Reiss, ed., _Kant’s Political Writings_, 182, 184–85.


75 This was Olof Palme's position, for example, at the signing of the first Helsinki accords in 1975: when Giscard D'Estaing said that the countries of Europe could now stop quarrelling, Palme argued that "now we have agreed not to kill each other, we can really begin to quarrel."


81 See Emma Rothschild, “Adam Smith, Apprenticeship and Insecurity” (Cambridge: Centre for History and Economics, 1994).


83 Ignatieff, “On Civil Society.”


85 Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood, 256.


87 Carr, Nationalism and After, 49, 59.

88 L. S. Woolf, International Government (New York: Brentano, 1916), 152, 170, 352–53, 357. The association against unemployment, for example, "numbers among its members": 8 governments, 59 towns, 12 unemployment funds, 8 provinces, 15 scientific societies, 6 employers' federations, 30 labor federations, and individuals from 23 countries.

89 Woolf’s "practical standpoint" thus leads him to ask "whether there is, this side of the year of our Lord 2000, the slightest possibility of the British Empire and Russia entering an international system in which the future position of Indians, Irishmen, and Finns in the respective Empires is to be decided at some sort of international conference." Woolf, International Government, 34–38, 357; Carr, Nationalism and After, 50–51.

90 Quoted in Douglas Galbi, “International Aspects of Social Reform in the Interwar Period” (Cambridge: Common Security Forum, Centre for History and Economics, 1993); the reference to peace and harmony is in the preamble to part 13 of the Treaty.
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93 African Rights, in its critique of “Post-Cold War Humanitarianism,” says that “Western donors’ strategic and commercial interest in poor countries is declining; their chief concern is increasingly to avoid bad publicity at home from humanitarian crises once they have hit the television... relief agencies are expanding into a void left by the contracting power of host governments and the declining political interest of western powers.” African Rights, *Humanitarianism Unbound?*, 6.


96 African Rights, *Humanitarianism Unbound?*, 18, 23. Gareth Stedman Jones quotes the view of Sir Charles Trevelyan, “the doyen of relief experts and a veteran of the Irish famine,” on charity to the London poor in 1870: “By passing through official hands... the gift loses the redeeming influence of personal kindness and the recipient regards it, not as charity but as a largesse to which he has a right.” This is also the relationship described by Marcel Mauss: “to give is to show one’s superiority... To accept without returning or repaying more, is to face subordination, to become a client and subservient”: Gareth Stedman Jones, *Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship between Classes in Victorian Society* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1984), 244, 252–53.

97 See, for example, Smith, *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, 87–102, 318–21.


101 “docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, iudicando”—Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.50, 1.53.


104 “Community institutions should only be given the powers they require to perform those tasks which they can carry out more effectively than the individual Member States... subsidiarity is a principle based on political pragmatism and aimed at organizing Community activity effectively by bringing it closer to the

105 Carr, Nationalism and After, 30–31.
106 Musil, The Man without Qualities, 211; the chapter, which is about a discussion of “the idea of a Global Austria,” is called “Antagonism sprouts between the Old and the New Diplomacy.”
109 Ibid, 222.
110 Descartes, La Naissance de la Paix, Ballet Dansé au chateau Royal de Stockholm le jour de la Naissance de sa Majesté (Stockholm: Jean Janssonius, 1649), 4, 11.