The Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in the Netherlands: Divergent Trends between and Polarization within the Two Groups

Author(s): Maurice Crul and Jeroen Doomernik


Published by: The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc.

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30037785

Accessed: 26/05/2009 09:48

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cmigrations.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in the Netherlands: Divergent Trends between and Polarization within the Two Groups

Maurice Crul
University of Amsterdam
University of Groningen

Jeroen Doomernik
University of Amsterdam

This article examines the socioeconomic and sociocultural status of the second-generation Turkish young people in the Netherlands, comparing them to their Moroccan counterparts. The comparative perspective can better highlight the characteristic features of the Turkish second generation. The educational status of both the Turkish and the Moroccan young people is still weak, especially by comparison with their ethnic Dutch peers. The obstacles that second-generation migrants encounter in their educational careers are many and diverse, and these derive both from inside their own groups and from institutional structures and other forces in Dutch society. Among the latter has been the delay in introducing professional second-language training, which resulted in Dutch language deficiencies and poor primary school achievements. This, in combination with early school selection mechanisms at age 12, has consigned the vast majority of second-generation children to short, dead-end lower vocational or secondary school tracks. Unemployment is extremely high among the second-generation migrants with short educational tracks, and discrimination in the labor market hits this group especially hard. Despite all this, the number of second-generation young people who have succeeded in getting a better education is growing, and they are now well equipped to seek employment. An important factor in their success has been the mutual help and support they have received from family and community networks.

The Netherlands has a long history of the successful incorporation of immigrants. The prototypical success story of Dutch integration policies in recent times has been that of the second generation of immigrants. This long tradition is now being challenged. The article aims to contribute to a better understanding of these developments.

The authors would like to thank Rinus Penninx and Jules Peschar for their comments on earlier versions of this article.

© 2003 by the Center for Migration Studies of New York. All rights reserved.
times is the absorption of a vast group of Dutch Eurasians after World War II. In the aftermath of that war, the centuries-old Dutch colony now known as Indonesia gained independence after a short but bloody conflict. Hundreds of thousands fled to the Netherlands. Some were of Dutch ancestry; others were born of mixed marriages (often referred to as Dutch Eurasians) or were Indonesians who had worked for the colonial government or army. Upon their arrival in the Netherlands, a strong emphasis was placed on integration. True to the spirit of the times, government agencies adopted a patronizing undertone as they helped the immigrants adapt to the “Dutch way of life.” Now, some 50 years later, the vanguard of the third generation of Dutch Eurasians is successfully entering the labor market.

Newer ethnic groups that arrived in later waves of immigration in the late 1960s and early 1970s are now seeing their second-generation offspring enter the labor market. The four largest of these groups originated in Turkey and Morocco in the Mediterranean and in the Dutch colonies of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles in the Caribbean. Initially, the integration of the Surinamese immigrants, whose migration had been driven chiefly by economic motives, was viewed with considerable apprehension. The flamboyantly dressed young Afro-Surinamese men who flocked to the Netherlands in the early 1970s especially were an object of public concern. Some of them dealt drugs and committed street crimes. Looking back from our present vantage point, however, we can confidently characterize that period of immigration as a transition phase. By now, the school achievements of both the Surinamese second-generation children and their Antillean counterparts rival those of ethnic Dutch children (Tesser and Iedema, 2001). A further example of the smooth incorporation of immigrants in the recent past is the integration of smaller Mediterranean groups from southern Europe and their offspring (Lindo, 2000).

This article focuses, for international comparative purposes, on the second generations of two quite different groups, both of whom came to the Netherlands almost simultaneously with the Surinamese and Antillean immigrants. The Turks and the Moroccans share similar migration histories, as well as similar socioeconomic and religious backgrounds. We should keep in mind that we have chosen to study the two groups whose integration is now considered the most problematic of the five largest recent immigrant groups in the Netherlands. There are two major characteristics that set the Moroccan and Turkish migrants apart from their Dutch Eurasian, Surinamese and Antillean counterparts and make their situation more difficult: 1) the Turks
and Moroccans originated in far more disadvantaged socioeconomic circumstances, and 2) they did not share common elements of history and language with the Dutch, as the colonial immigrants did.

**THE TURKISH AND MOROCCAN COMMUNITIES COMPARED**

We will first briefly introduce the Moroccan and Turkish communities and identify some similarities and differences between these two immigrant groups. The first Turkish and Moroccan labor migrants came to the Netherlands on their own initiative. Many had worked briefly in Belgium or Germany before trying their luck further north. The continuing demand for low-skilled workers in the Dutch textile and metal industries triggered a process of chain migration by relatives and friends from their home countries. In 1964, the Netherlands signed official agreements on labor migration with both Turkey and Morocco. The peak of labor migration occurred between 1970 and 1974, after which official migration was halted.

Dutch industry had needed low-skilled labor, and indeed the majority of these first-generation Turkish and Moroccan “guestworkers” were recruited from the lowest socioeconomic strata in their home countries. In the rural areas where most originated, virtually the only educational opportunities were at primary-school level. The vast majority of first-generation Moroccan men had finished no more than primary school or Koran school; most Moroccan women had even less schooling or were illiterate. The Turkish men and women of the first generation were somewhat better educated; more women had attended primary school, more men had completed primary school, and some men even had a little more schooling (Crul, 1994). After arriving in the Netherlands, most men worked for fifteen to twenty years in factories, shipyards or the cleaning industry before industrial restructuring in the 1980s put many of them out of work. Today some 80 percent of the Turkish and Moroccan male population aged 50 or older are outside the Dutch labor market. The majority of families live on minimum incomes (Martens and Weijers, 2000:73), and many second-generation children grew up with fathers who were unemployed by the time the children were entering secondary school.

Though arriving simultaneously and bringing with them similar socioeconomic characteristics and religious beliefs, the Turkish and Moroccan communities have developed in rather different directions. To introduce the two communities, we provide a brief ethnographic description of each, based on
two Dutch cities where each forms a sizeable group. The observations will be empirically founded in the paragraphs to come.

Utrecht is one of the four largest Dutch cities and is host to a vast Turkish community. The Lombok district is the center of community life. Shops with Turkish names create a unique streetscape. Turks have the highest self-employment rate (10% of the working population) of any of the large ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands (Dagevos, 2001b:65). Lombok’s main thoroughfare has a Turkish grocery shop on every corner with vegetables displayed outside. Everywhere in the street you can smell the Turkish pide coming out of the oven. At the end is a small mosque that regularly fills the street, predominantly with Turkish men. Like other cities with large Turkish communities, social life abounds. Weddings commonly attract 500 to 1,000 guests. Relatives and former villagers visit each other almost daily, and people keep up with Turkish news through satellite television and regular phone calls to family in Turkey. The strong social cohesion is also reflected in the high degree of membership in Turkish cultural, religious and sports organizations. Turkish people watch Turkish news more often than Dutch news, and the majority regard themselves first and foremost as Turks. The more successful segment of the younger generation can be found in professions that confer status, such as law, medicine or accountancy. The richest community members run wholesale businesses or job agencies. Such successful people still live very much within the community and observe its traditions.

Amsterdam-West is the “capital” of the Dutch Moroccans. Far fewer Moroccan shops are in evidence, however, and the district has become known for its deviant, trouble-making youth. Reported crime rates show a dramatic overrepresentation of Moroccan adolescents and young men (Junger-Tas, 1998:14-15). Some public squares in the neighborhood are notorious for the groups of Moroccan boys who hang around, provoking regular police sur-
veillance. Second-generation Moroccan women, in contrast to the young men, have attracted favorable notice in Dutch society. They are now entering higher education in greater numbers than Moroccan men and in far greater numbers than Turkish women. Many have presented themselves in forums and interviews in the media as emancipated women and have openly criticized the behavior of their male counterparts. Moroccan youth is in a hurry, wrote Obdeijn and de Mas (2001) in a recent essay, and they often want to take two steps at a time to get what they want. They fight their way into Dutch society. And they do so with a multitude of voices – not only as petty criminals or successful female students, but also as writers, politicians, journalists, internationally known fashion designers or television presenters. A young Moroccan-Dutch woman became the European female kickboxing champion; and the winner of the prestigious Libris book prize in 2003 was a successful young second-generation Moroccan writer. Such distinctive personalities are now nationally known through their regular appearances in the media – a realm where Turkish second-generation youth (whose immigrant community is numerically somewhat larger) are virtually absent. The Moroccan community is considerably more diverse than the Turkish one. It has less community spirit, more debate and conflict – between fathers and their rebellious sons and between young men and their socially mobile girlfriends.

Benzakour (2001), a well-known Moroccan-Dutch columnist, has aptly portrayed the two ethnic groups: Moroccans are modern individualists, Turks are old-fashioned collectivists; Moroccans support the Dutch social-democratic prime minister and Turks support Öcalan, Demirel or Erbakan; Moroccans are Ajax or Feyenoord fans, Turks are fans of Galatasaray.

**GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO IMMIGRATION**

During the era of guestworkers, the integration of immigrants was not a policy issue of any substance. Their integration into the labor market was already considered complete; integration into other areas of society was deemed unnecessary by government and migrants alike, given the presumed transitory nature of their stay. Things changed radically once it dawned on the authorities that the termination of guestworker recruitment in 1974 had not generated the expected massive return to the countries of origin, but had triggered more immigration instead. By 1981 the Dutch government had formulated policy goals that were meant to facilitate the return of those who wished to do so and to expedite the integration of those who stayed. For the latter process, the authorities defined certain target minorities, including the
former guestworker groups, the colonial immigrants from Surinam, the Dutch Caribbean islands and the Moluccans (Indonesia), refugees, and (somewhat idiosyncratically) mobile home dwellers, Roma and Sinti (cf. Pennenx, 1988).

In its efforts to promote minority integration, the Dutch government initially relied on quintessentially Dutch principles of social and political organization. The emancipation of traditional native minorities, notably the Roman Catholics, during the first half of the twentieth century had been achieved through a framework that came to be known as religious pillarization. It involved separate Protestant, Catholic and secular schools, universities, broadcasting corporations, trade unions and employer’s organizations, to mention the major institutional forms. This is to say that Dutch society was traditionally founded on denominational pluralism (or in the terms of Lijphart, 1977, “consociational democracy”). Even though by the 1970s this system had largely been eclipsed, it was still embedded in many of the Dutch legal and institutional structures. These were now put to work to promote the integration of the “new minorities.”

The system permits, and even encourages, immigrant groups to organize their communities around their religious needs. As a consequence, the Netherlands now has hundreds of mosques and temples, more than thirty Islamic primary schools, several Hindu schools, as well as Islamic and Hindu broadcasting corporations. With the exception of the places of worship, most such institutions receive full state funding. An additional aim of the minority policies was to create a stronger legal basis for the swift integration of newcomers. The idea was that providing a more secure residence status, and an opportunity for naturalization after five years of legal residence, would further facilitate integration.

The 1990s saw significant shifts in Dutch integration policies. The government began putting more emphasis on citizenship, emphasizing not only the rights of new citizens but also the duties (e.g., learning the Dutch language and getting to know Dutch society). Simultaneously, new policies were launched to promote migrant integration into the educational system and the labor market. Unemployment among migrants, then at one of the highest rates in Europe, formed a major stimulus to government action.

**EDUCATION**

Education has long accounted for the bulk of the money spent on immigrant integration in the Dutch national budget. The year 1985 saw the launch of the
Educational Priority Policy. The cornerstone of this policy was the strong financial support it gave to schools with high percentages of migrant pupils. Schools were to receive 1.9 times more funding per Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillean pupil than for Dutch middle-class or upper-class children. This provided schools with many migrant children a far more generous budget than schools with few migrants. In primary schools, the extra revenues were spent mostly on creating smaller classes. In addition to the national government funding, supplementary funds became available through the municipal authorities. Schools must submit program proposals to claim such funding. The municipal revenues have been spent mostly on newly developed materials for teaching Dutch as a second language and on training the teachers to work with these materials (Tesser and Iedema, 2001:154-167).

We begin this section by documenting the current position of the Turkish and Moroccan second generations in terms of their educational careers. We then compare this situation to the educational attainments of the first generation. Finally, we try to explain the gap between the second generation and its ethnic Dutch peer group, as well as discussing some of the remarkable differences between the Turkish and Moroccan second generations.

The Position of the Second Generation in Education

An impressive amount of research is carried out in the Netherlands to assess and explain the socioeconomic status of migrants and their children. The research effort is promoted directly and indirectly by the public authorities. Several periodic surveys (PRIMA, SPVA, CBS surveys) are conducted to gather data for developing and evaluating government policies. The most important survey that assesses migrant educational status is the Social Position and Use of Facilities by Ethnic Minorities Survey (SPVA), conducted nationwide every three to four years since 1988 (see Roelandt, Roijen and Veenman, 1992). The most recent survey at this writing dates from 1998. The data enable us to assess the socioeconomic status of the four largest migrant groups in the Netherlands and (since the arrival ages of both parents and children are known) to pinpoint the second generation. The categorization of ethnic groups corresponds to the definition used by the Dutch interior ministry. Ethnic origin is determined on the basis of the place of birth of one or both parents. The definition thus also includes second-generation offspring with one immigrant parent.

Second-generation migrants are, predictably, overrepresented in the younger age cohorts. In 1998, the dividing line between those born inside
and outside the Netherlands was around age 15. In both the Moroccan and Turkish communities, 90 percent of the youth under age 15 were born in the Netherlands. By contrast, in the 15-30 age category only 23 percent of the Moroccans and 30 percent of the Turkish qualified as second-generation migrants according to the demographic (birthplace) criterion (Veenman, 1999:28). In the SPVA surveys and, as a result, in the tables presented below, a sociological criterion for the second generation is used. The most important issue for the sociological definition is whether or not children started their school careers in the Netherlands. The second generation in the tables thus refers to the children who arrived before the age of 6, the beginning of primary school.

Table 2 depicts the second-generation young people (according to the sociological definition) who had already ended their educations by 1998. It shows their levels of educational attainment compared to those of their ethnic Dutch counterparts.

**TABLE 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest Educational Attainment</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
<th>Dutch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary school at the most</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower vocational education (Vbo), lower general secondary education (Mavo)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior secondary vocational education (Mbo), senior general secondary education (Havo), preparatory university education (Vvo)</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher professional education (Hbo), university (WO)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SPVA 1998, ISEO/EUR

Note: *The top row of Table 2 represents individuals who finished primary school only (normal age 12). Mbo is equivalent to Havo, because both diplomas give access to higher vocational school (Hbo).

The majority of second-generation migrants in Table 2 are situated at the lowest three educational levels (primary school, Vbo, Mavo). Diplomas from these levels do not afford good job opportunities; an Mbo diploma is generally considered the minimum for a productive start on the labor market. The starkest contrasts between migrant and ethnic Dutch young people can be seen at the two extremes of the table, particularly in the high rates of second-generation youth who finished primary school only. However, because the young people who are still enrolled in secondary and tertiary education are not represented in the table, the third and fourth rows do not adequately account for the final attainments of those who will later complete their educations. This applies to the migrants in particular, who are predominantly
between 15 and 25 years of age (whereas the Dutch are evenly distributed throughout the 15-35 category). Although the later attainments may temper the contrasts somewhat, distribution data on pupils still at school indicates that more than three quarters of second-generation secondary school pupils are enrolled in Vbo (31%) or Mavo (51%), the two lowest educational tracks (Crul, 2000a:8). A small but nonetheless significant minority is to be found in the more demanding tracks, Havo and Vwo (18%). Differences between the Moroccan and Turkish second generations are small. Moroccans achieve slightly better on the upper rungs of the educational ladder, and Turks are found rather less at the bottom – that is, more on the middle rungs.

A second key indicator of second-generation educational status is the dropout rate. Within the 15-35 age category, it is the Turkish second generation that is plagued by the highest dropout figures. Some 17 percent of the males and 25 percent of the females have been found to leave school without diplomas, against 11 percent and 13 percent of the Moroccans (both sets of figures are two to four times higher than in the comparable Dutch age group).

Many children quit school very early indeed, even before the legal school-leaving age of sixteen. Although the high Turkish dropout rate may seem at odds with the higher percentage of Moroccans completing primary school only (Table 2), a larger proportion of Moroccans aged 15-35 are thought to be still studying and therefore not represented in the table (a similar outcome is reported in the article on second-generation migrants in Belgium). In the 18-22 age category, 65 percent of second-generation Moroccans have been found to be still enrolled in education compared to only 49 percent of their Turkish counterparts (Veenman, 1999:71). Since the calculated dropout rate represents the percentage of pupils leaving school without secondary diplomas over the entire 15-35 age group (rather than the group who have ended their education as shown in Table 2), it shows that a larger proportion of the entire Turkish age group drop out of school without diplomas than is the case in the Moroccan group.

In sum, the two indicators together show a wide gap between the Turkish and Moroccan second generations and their ethnic Dutch age peer group, as well as slightly higher educational attainments for the Moroccans in comparison to the Turks.

**Positions of Generations Compared**

To gain more insight into the dynamics of educational progress within the migrant communities themselves, we will now compare the second genera-
tions to the first. Table 3 reflects the extremely low educational status of the Turkish and Moroccan first generation fathers. Of the Turkish mothers, 77 percent have only gone to primary school and of the Moroccan mothers 89 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest educational attainment</th>
<th>1st gen. Turkish</th>
<th>2nd gen. Turkish</th>
<th>1st gen. Moroccan</th>
<th>2nd gen. Moroccan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary school at the most</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower vocational education (Vbo), lower general secondary education (Mavo)</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior secondary vocational education (Mbo), senior general secondary education (Havo), preparatory university education (Vwo)</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education: higher professional education (Hbo), university (WO)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SPVA 1998, ISEO/EUR

The large majority of the first generation fathers attended primary school at most. The Moroccan first generation had a lower educational background than its Turkish counterparts. Intergenerational mobility for the Moroccans has therefore been more pronounced – see their 22 percent increase over the first generation in middle and higher educational levels (rows 3 and 4) as compared to the 8 percent increase for the Turkish second generation. Despite the Turkish head start, the Moroccan second generation has now taken a slight lead.

Explaining Differences between the Second Generation and the Comparative Dutch Age Group

The gap between the second generation and the Dutch age group is still large. The comparison, however, does not take into account the socioeconomic disparities between the groups. Moroccan and Turkish parents constitute very low-level and homogeneous socioeconomic groups; as seen above, the majority finished only primary school or had no formal education at all (Crul, 1994:173). A study by Veenman (1996) did take the parents’ low socioeconomic status into account by comparing the educational status of the second generation to their expected status. The factors used to estimate expected educational status were age, gender, parents’ education, and the available space per person at home. Moroccan second-generation children performed as
expected, while 90 percent of Turkish second-generation educational status was explained by the above factors (Veenman, 1996:27). Parental socio-economic status thus appears to be a crucial explanatory factor for the poorer educational attainment of second-generation migrants as compared to native children.

Such a conclusion, however, still does not shed much light on the mechanisms that drive the processes leading to such outcomes. Low parental educational status has different implications for Dutch children than for Moroccan or Turkish children. While all such parents may have comparable difficulties in helping their children with practical schoolwork, they differ considerably in other respects. Many Moroccan or Turkish parents without diplomas never had the opportunity to go to school. Their Dutch counterparts did have educational opportunities, but either they lacked the abilities or discipline to finish school, or they lived in extremely unfavorable circumstances. Hence, Dutch parents without diplomas are a group with highly specific background characteristics. Another major difference is that most Turkish and Moroccan parents have an insufficient mastery of the Dutch language and insufficient knowledge of the Dutch school system. They may also differ significantly from poorly educated Dutch parents in the educational and life goals they set for their children.

In the analysis to follow, we will try to establish at which junctures and in what respects the educational careers of second-generation Moroccan and Turkish children take different turns from those of ethnic Dutch children. To unravel the nature of the hurdles that second-generation pupils may encounter in school, we examine all the important selection points in the education system. Much of the comparative research up to now has focused on just one point in children’s school careers, usually the end result, thereby overlooking any cumulative effects that may occur (Crul, 2000a:27).

In the final year of primary school, the scores for Dutch language skills of ethnic Turkish and Moroccan pupils are comparable to those of ethnic Dutch children two years younger (Tesser and Iedema, 2001:65). Research has shown that Turkish and Moroccan children already have Dutch language deficits when they enter primary school in the first place. The deficits of the Turkish children are most pronounced (Tesser and Iedema, 2001:65). This is probably because Moroccan, and even more so Turkish, children mainly speak their mother tongues at home; Moroccan children are more likely than Turkish children to speak Dutch with their older siblings. Moroccan and Turkish children are also underrepresented in pre-school and kindergarten
programs. As a consequence, many of them scarcely speak any Dutch at all when they arrive at primary school. One Turkish youth explained:

Every migrant has a Dutch language deficit. If you talk Turkish at home, you miss out on Dutch. Sometimes when I'm home we speak Turkish for five hours in a row. This has got to affect your Dutch. When I first went to primary school, I couldn't understand a word of Dutch. I spoke Turkish fluently (Crul, 2000a:82).

Especially in the 1970s, but even into the 1980s, many parents valued the learning of the mother tongue more than Dutch, because most families still had plans to return. Many Moroccan and even more Turkish parents sent their second-generation children to Turkey or Morocco for one or two years to learn the language better. About one in eight Turkish second-generation children spent a lengthy period of time in their parents' home country. This interruption of their school careers had a devastating effect on their final primary school results (Crul, 2000a:86-87). Almost all such children received recommendations for very low secondary school types.

The wide gaps in language scores between ethnic minority and ethnic Dutch children at the close of primary school show that schools have still not succeeded in remedying the initial Dutch language deficits. The extra funding earmarked for compensation programs in the early school years was spent mainly on reducing class sizes, with the idea that teachers could then spend more time with each individual pupil. This did not work out in practice (de Jong, 1997:160-163). If ten or fifteen pupils need additional help with Dutch as a second language, teachers still cannot give individual attention. A broad consensus now exists that improvement will have to come from new language teaching methods. Not only the quality of language tutoring is under discussion, but also the overall quality of education in schools with many migrant children (Tesser and Iedema 2001:98-114). Such schools perform worse even after adjustment for parental socioeconomic status. Quality differences show up in mathematics as well as in language scores. The poorer quality of "immigrant schools" is partly a consequence of lower standards applied to migrant pupils there. Because teachers know by experience that many such pupils cannot handle the full study load received by the children of Dutch parents, they consciously or unconsciously lower their standards. The mechanisms involved here were reported by the national education inspectorate, which monitors schools on a regular basis.

The segment of the second generation over age 15, which is the focus of this article, attended primary school in the 1980s. To reconstruct the effects of ethnic minority concentrations in primary schools for this group,
we should recall the situation in that decade. In the space of a few years, the primary schools in many Dutch working-class neighborhoods were transformed into schools where migrant pupils were in the majority. This plunged them into a long-term crisis. Teachers complained that it was impossible to teach adequately because of the wide differentials within the classes in terms of age, language abilities and years of Dutch schooling (de Jong, 1986). As a Turkish father explains in retrospect:

My children all went to the same primary school, but the school changed dramatically in five years' time. When the oldest in the family arrived, there were three migrant children in the school. With his youngest brother, it was the other way around. There were only two Dutch children in his class. Because of this change the school changed a lot, too. My oldest always received a lot of attention from the teachers. They stimulated him to improve his grades. As a parent, I also had good contacts with the teachers. I really had the idea we were working together. But that all changed when the school changed (Crul, 2000a:89).

Clearly, the second-generation young people we are studying here attended primary school at a dramatic moment in time. Only after they left did the schools begin to adjust by introducing new programs and giving teachers special training to work in multicultural environments.

The lower achievements of Turkish and Moroccan pupils in primary schools created a vast wave of children in the 1990s who entered the lowest types of secondary schools (Vbo and Mavo). In Vbo, the most popular streams were mechanics for boys and textile or care work for girls. Vbo has often been described as the garbage can of the education system. It takes on all children that were unsuccessful in higher streams (often because of behavioral problems), and it also absorbs newly arrived immigrant children over age 12 (who, of course, have their own specific problems). The resulting school climate is little conducive to school performance. Pels (2001:6) has depicted teacher-pupil interaction in a Vbo school. She counted about 80 admonitions during one mathematics lesson. Crul (2000a:139) reported on the prison-like climate and the regular fights that break out in Vbo schools, sometimes even between pupils and teachers. Drop-out rates in Vbo are high. The pupils in the lower general secondary education stream (Mavo) more often succeed in attaining diplomas. Both the diploma of Vbo and of Mavo give access to Senior Secondary Vocational Education (Mbo). A considerable group of second generation Turks starts at the senior level, but fails to finish it.

The selection mechanism at age 12, towards the end of primary school, is more or less decisive for most of the children's educational careers. Two thirds of the children who are not in school anymore either dropped out
without a secondary education diploma or only received a diploma from the lowest levels of secondary education (Vbo or Mavo) and did not continue, or failed at the senior level.

Despite their parents’ poor schooling and low literacy and all the other major hindrances, a substantial segment (one third) of second-generation young people from both the Turkish and the Moroccan ethnic groups still have managed to pursue successful educational careers (rows 3 and 4 in Tables 2 and 3). Most research to date has focused one-sidedly on the educational deficits of second-generation young people. Seldom have explanations been offered for why some young people do succeed in such difficult circumstances. Parents of successful pupils have been found not to differ in their socioeconomic characteristics from parents of unsuccessful ones (Crul, 2000a:20-22). Another noteworthy finding has been that most of the successful ethnic minority pupils had not yet achieved success by the end of primary school. Some of the successful students went to secondary schools with transition classes (in these classes pupils with different advices are in the same classes the first two years) rather than to a school with only low level educational streams. Although they got a low advice from primary school, they were able in these two years to work their way up to more prestigious levels.

Others first finished their lower school type before going on to a higher type. Successful students almost unanimously report having been stimulated by others to take this step, and many also received help with homework and extra tutoring in problem subjects. Both qualitative and quantitative research have shown that the quality of familial and extrafamilial networks is very important for explaining success. The most crucial help comes from older brothers and sisters, aunts, uncles and cousins (Crul, 2000b; Hustinx and Meijnen, 2001). These are often persons who stand somewhere between the parents and children in terms of generations. Help is more effective when there are more experienced siblings in the family, especially if they are studying in higher educational tracks (van der Veen, 2001). Educational levels of older siblings and significant others thus seem to be stronger determinants of the quality of educational resources within families than the parents’ low education levels. A Moroccan university student told of the help she received from her older sister during secondary school:

I always had a lot of support from my sister. I could always ask her for help. My mother couldn’t help me. My sister helped me with Dutch, French and English. She explained to me how to make a summary and she corrected my mistakes. For me the language subjects were the biggest problem, and she was very good at them. She helped me a lot and advised me on all sorts of things (Crul, 2001:42).
Explaining Differences between the Moroccan and Turkish Second Generations

We have seen that the Turkish second generation is now being outperformed in education by its Moroccan counterparts. The most salient factor is the high dropout rate among second-generation Turkish girls. The literature contains overwhelming evidence that parental attitudes towards girls’ schooling are often ambivalent, especially among Turks (Crul, 2000a; Lindo, 2000; Coenen, 2001). Coenen has explained such attitudes in terms of the past experience of parents, who grew up in rural societies where education for girls was unimportant. But this also applies to Moroccan parents. It seems the attitude towards education for girls in the Turkish community is changing at a different pace than it is in the Moroccan community. The way of thinking in the Turkish community is more resistant to change. A number of reasons connected to the stronger social cohesion in the Turkish community can be put forward. Gossip within the tight networks has been portrayed as a strong weapon in keeping members of the community in line (de Vries, 1990). Parents fear gossip in the community in the event of “misbehavior” on the part of their unmarried daughters. An early marriage can thus ward off shame on the family. A further consideration is that parents can reap better short-term payoffs from an early marriage, especially with a family member from Turkey, than if their daughter extends her educational career. A marriage brings benefits in terms of both extended family income (the income of the young couple augments that of the family household) and status in the community back home (close relatives who are able to send their son to the Netherlands through the marriage). The weaker bonds between Moroccan community members in the Netherlands and the weaker ties with people in the home country make it easier for Moroccan parents to give their daughters room to study and postpone marriage.

At present, some 15 percent of the Turkish second-generation women aged 19 and one quarter of those aged 21 are already married (Alders, Harmsen and Hooghiemstra, 2001:47), and their first child arrives soon afterward (de Vries, 1990:112). Marriage at a young age usually means the end of any school career. Some second-generation women who are qualified for higher types of education are even prevented from continuing their schooling (Crul, 2000a:135-138). Although female education also meets with some resistance in the Moroccan community, this does not lead to extreme dropout figures; dropout rates for female Moroccans are only slightly higher than for male Moroccans. Turkish men also tend to marry young, although at older ages
than women. They are then often obliged to leave school or college to pro-
vide income for their families (Alders, Harmsen and Hooghiemstra, 2001:47). In particular, those youths who find school difficult or who behave badly may be pushed by their parents to get married and find jobs instead. Early marriage is one sign that Turks stick to tradition more than do Moroc-
cans.

The educational climate within the Turkish community seems to be slowly shifting in recent years in favor of longer schooling for girls and boys alike. The importance of education for a future in the Netherlands is first defended inside families by children of the in-between generation and by elder siblings of the second generation. Elder siblings mediate between the worlds of parents and younger children. Younger sisters in the family, so it seems, are more likely to be allowed to extend their studies, or they at least face less resistance from their parents (Crul, 2000a; Coenen, 2001). The experiences of the in-between generation may be critical. Many in-between-generation males were unsuccessful in school. They later suffered unemployment and had great difficulty supporting their families. Women married young, often to someone they hardly knew. This led to conflicts and divorces that brought shame on their families – precisely what the parents had hoped to avoid by marrying their daughters off at a young age. Parents have learned from such experiences and begun reassessing the importance of education; their viewpoints have moved slowly but surely towards those of their children (Coenen, 2001; cf. Gibson and Bhachu, 1988:246). Because such processes take place in many families simultaneously, a daughter in higher education is no longer an exception in the community. That makes it easier for the parents to consent to their daughters’ extending their studies. These experiences show that the dynamics between generations are important for explaining processes of cultural change (Crul, 2000b; cf. Foner, 1997:960).

**LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION**

Labor market participation has always been a central concern in the general framework of Dutch integration policy (Doomernik, 1998). A whole series of government policies have been introduced in recent decades that were specifically designed to raise the employment levels of immigrant groups. Probably the oldest example stems from the mid 1980s, when a quota of public-sector jobs was set aside for the Moluccan ethnic minority. The national government has been endeavoring since 1987 to increase the relative numbers of ethnic minority employees in public-sector institutions. Although this policy has not
achieved the desired effects in all areas, it did help to double the number of young Turkish and Moroccan public employees in 1987-1989 and in 1993-1995 (Tesser and Veenman, 1997:134). Similar initiatives have been taken by municipal governments.

Employers in the private sector, meanwhile, resisted committing themselves to a similar effort until 1990, when the government threatened to introduce quotas for ethnic minority recruitment. A pact called the STAR agreement was then signed, which was to increase the numbers of ethnic minority employees in private industry by 60,000 between 1990 and 1995. But the employers' readiness to implement the STAR agreement was never great. Ultimately it seems that more general policies designed to facilitate labor market access for all long-term unemployed people and for recent school graduates brought more success to the second-generation ethnic minorities than the policies that targeted them specifically. The first such scheme was launched in 1995 and has since created tens of thousands of jobs (73,000 people were employed under the scheme in 1996 alone). Employers are eligible for incentives (through measures like reduced taxes and social insurance contributions) for hiring long-term unemployed people who might not be fully productive right away. The ambition underlying such programs is that no one should be out of work for a prolonged period without entering retraining programs or other types of education.

*The Second Generation in the Labor Market*

The group of second-generation young people who have entered the job market is still small, both in relative and absolute terms. As we have seen, many are still at school or college. Turkish women are proportionally the smallest group still studying. In the 15-24 age group, almost half of the second-generation Turkish women who are not in the labor market are managing a household as their principal activity, compared to only 30 percent of the Moroccan women (Tesser, Merens and van Praag, 1999:287).

A disproportionate share (about one third) of the group of second-generation Turks and Moroccans now entering the labor market is represented by those who left school without any qualifications. Particularly in the case of the Moroccan second generation, the current labor force consists disproportionately of males with short educational careers. Another third of the second-generation school-leavers in both ethnic groups is comprised of young people with low-level diplomas (Vbo or Mavo). As pointed out above, any level lower than Mbo is considered a serious handicap for those entering the
labor market. Because the first group that entered the labor market was a very specific group, the results shown here should be interpreted with great caution. As an initial indicator for labor market position, let us look at the levels of the jobs now occupied by second-generation Moroccans and Turks.

**TABLE 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Level</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-level</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-level</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher-level</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SPVA, 1998, ISEO & SCP

If we compare the results in Table 4 with those from Table 2, we can see that both second-generation groups are working roughly at the job levels that might be expected on the basis of their school diplomas. Although slightly greater percentages appear to be working at higher levels, that is probably because Table 4 only contains those people who have jobs, and people with higher credentials have greater chances of being employed. As seen in Table 5, unemployment among the second generation is considerable.

**TABLE 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-between</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SPVA, 1998, ISEO & SCP

Note: The unemployment figure shown here is the percentage of the labor force that is out of work and registered with a government employment office as actively seeking work for more than twelve hours a week.

The first thing that attracts notice in Table 5 is that the situation of the second generation seems even worse than that of the in-between generation. A possible explanation is that many in the second generation are still involved in a transition from school to work, whereas the in-between generation has already been active on the labor market for some time. In other words, the transition appears very problematic. Since there is only 4 percent unemployment among people of Dutch descent aged 15-64, the jobless rate for second-generation Turks and Moroccans is 5 to 7 times higher.

An explanation for this high level of unemployment could be sought in some of the characteristics of the second-generation Turks and Moroccans who have entered the labor market up to now, such as the high percentages
of school dropouts. Dagevos and Veenman analyzed data from the 1994 SPVA to find out whether age, gender or education affected unemployment levels. Nearly a third of the variance was explained by these three characteristics (Dagevos and Veenman, 1996:51). This means that additional factors exist that account for the higher jobless rate. One such factor may be prejudice. As Bovenkerk, Gras and Ramsoedh (1994:52) have convincingly shown in a case example of young Moroccan men searching for semi-skilled work, discrimination is widespread. For those who have reached higher educational levels, discrimination is a less pervasive, but still a relevant factor (Bovenkerk, Gras and Ramsoedh, 1994). Other research has shown that the networks of second-generation youth only give them access to their own marginal economic circuits, often in the informal sectors of the labor market (Dagevos and Veenman, 1996:57, 93-98).

SOCIOCULTURAL INTEGRATION

A growing body of research is developing on the sociocultural status of second-generation migrants. All this data together generates a picture that more or less resembles the youth we see and hear on the streets and at school. Characteristic for the second generation of Moroccans is that the young women have taken the lead in matters of emancipation and intercultural exchange. They demand the right to an education and to have interesting careers. They expect to work three to four days a week. Before getting married, they increasingly prefer to live with their partner first, postponing marriage until a later age (now 24). They want to continue working after having children. Similarly to Dutch women, more than 80 percent expect a future husband to equally share household tasks and childcare. This image emerges both from a number of different surveys and in statements made in forums and interviews. If Moroccan men cannot live up to their expectations, they will also consider marrying a Dutch partner. One quarter already do so.

In the Turkish second generation, it is the men who stand out. They cling to traditional family values, they are politically conservative, and they have the least contact of all subgroups with ethnic Dutch people. It therefore comes as no surprise that three out of four young Turkish men opt for brides from the old country. They attend their local mosques on a regular basis, and one quarter of them have taken part in some religious organization in the past year. Most are quite active in Turkish ethnic organizations, and they are very much oriented to the political and cultural life of their parents' home country.
Building upon this general picture, we shall turn now to some of the more specific research findings on sociocultural issues, beginning with social contacts. Dagevos (2001a) constructed a scale of social integration that assesses several different components of immigrant attitudes and behavior towards the native (Dutch) population.² He found that the Moroccan second generation had changed the most vis-à-vis the first generation in their attitudes and behavior towards the Dutch. The changes were twice as great as for the Turks. Other indicators of sociocultural integration were Dutch language mastery and intermarriage. The Moroccan second generation reported using the Dutch language to a greater degree than its Turkish counterparts, and its proficiency was also better. Some 78 percent of the Moroccan youth spoke Dutch to siblings, compared to 59 percent of the Turkish youth.

Qualitative research partly explains these differences. Most Moroccans in the Netherlands do not normally speak Arabic, but one of the Tamazight dialects that have no written tradition. As a consequence, there are no newspapers or satellite television programs in their mother tongue. Another explanation is the lively community network among Turks, which prompts them to spend much more time with their own ethnic group than Moroccans do (Aarssen, Boumans and Nourtier, 2002:306-307). The Moroccan second-generation young people are far more inclined to marry outside their own group than their Turkish counterparts (Hooghiemstra, 2002:26) and also to oppose their parents in claiming the right to choose their own partners (Phalet, Lotringen and Entzinger, 2000:93). In the Turkish community, almost no differences are seen between intermarriage rates in the first, in-between and second generations. Many second-generation Turks (nearly three out of four) marry partners from Turkey (Hooghiemstra, 2000:26). It is usually someone from their native village, often a cousin. All these indicators suggest that the social integration of the Moroccan second generation is proceeding at a far more rapid pace than that of their Turkish counterparts.

A similar pattern emerges if we look at the cultural integration of the respective second generations. If we follow Dagevos (2001a) in taking modernization as the core process in Dutch society, we can assess the extent to which Moroccan, Turkish and Dutch people espouse values, norms and atti-

²The characteristics assessed by the Dagevos social integration scale are as follows: frequency of visits from ethnic Dutch neighbors or friends; proportion of leisure-time contacts with Dutch people and your own ethnic group; degree of neighborhood contacts with Dutch people and your own ethnic group; attitude towards your children associating with Dutch friends; and attitude towards your children choosing a Dutch marriage partner.
tudes inherent in the concept of modernization. Every successive wave of immigrants (first, in-between and second generation) shows a gradual shift towards embracing modernization. Nevertheless, the second-generation Moroccan and Turkish young people still remain closer to their parents’ ideas than to those of their Dutch peer group. Overall differences between Turks and Moroccans are not very wide, except in two key areas of thinking: the equality of men and women (or the status of traditional family values) and secularism. The vast majority of second-generation Moroccan males and females prefer both partners to work. Only slightly more than 10 percent of the Moroccan young women say they would stop working after having children – a far lower percentage than even their Dutch peers. For Turkish young women, the figure is almost double. The overwhelming majority of second-generation Moroccan females and a small majority of males believe that childrearing, childcare and cooking are equal tasks for men and women. The percentages for their Turkish counterparts are far lower, although females also agree in majority. Unmarried cohabitation is also more widespread in the Moroccan second generation. At the age of 25, some 13 percent are cohabiting, compared to 7 percent of the Turks (Alders, 2001:48). Fertility levels provide a further indication of the pace of change among Moroccan women – numbers of children per woman have dropped from five to two in ten years’ time, surpassing the Turkish second generation. Sticking to traditional family values seems to be just as characteristic for the Turkish second generation as change is characteristic to the Moroccan one. This is highlighted most clearly, perhaps, by the fact that Turkish second-generation adherence to traditional family values now equals that of Moroccan immigrants of the first generation (Phalet, Lotringen and Entzinger, 2000:92).

The more traditional outlook of the Turks is also evident in religious practice. Secularization has advanced far more rapidly among Moroccans than among Turks. Nearly half of the Muslim Moroccans of the second generation never attend a religious ceremony – a dramatic shift in comparison to their parents. Although religious involvement typically increases as young people mature, this is still a surprisingly high percentage. In contrast, 86 percent of the second-generation Turks now attend religious ceremonies, only slightly fewer than in the first generation (92%). Moroccan youth are also less likely than Turkish youth to observe fasting during Ramadan (Dibbets and Meder, 2002:36,37).

Differences in sociocultural status between the Turkish and Moroccan second generations in the Netherlands appear at first to be wider than their
educational differences. Yet such a conclusion has to be tempered as soon as gender is taken into consideration. The educational trajectories of young Turkish men appear less tightly interwoven with traditional ideas in the Turkish community than the trajectories of the young women. Among the Turkish second-generation women, there is a large group that stays behind. More than for their male counterparts, their decisions to drop out of school or not to pursue education are based on non-academic considerations like early marriage, having children and becoming full-time housewives. Moroccan second-generation women have gained more freedom to continue their education and to postpone marriage and childbearing. This leads to better secondary school achievement, which in itself motivates them to persevere and move on to tertiary education. Once they have completed higher levels of schooling, they will obviously be keen to convert their diplomas into meaningful employment. In this way, education has become a driving force for young Moroccan women to achieve equality in other areas of life as well. Their strong motivation, in comparison with the formidable obstacles faced by many young Turkish women, constitutes what is perhaps the most remarkable contrast between the Turkish and Moroccan second generations in the Netherlands.

CONCLUSION

The educational status of second-generation Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands is still weak compared to the children of ethnic Dutch parents. Many of the former are relegated to short, vocationally-oriented educational tracks or drop out of school altogether without diplomas. Unemployment among second-generation young adults with short educational tracks is very high, and discrimination in the labor market seems to hit this group particularly hard. At the same time, the number of students that are successful in education is also growing, far faster than one would expect given the background characteristics of their parents. Such young people are well equipped to make a successful entry into the job market. Some degree of polarization within migrant second generations therefore seems unavoidable.

The hindrances that second-generation pupils encounter in school are many and diverse, and they derive both from inside their own groups and from institutional structures and other forces in Dutch society. First we will look at institutional hindrances. They arise at different stages of their educational careers. Dutch language deficiencies in Turkish and Moroccan children entering school lead to poor achievement in primary school. Second-language
teaching methods and the corresponding teacher training were not implemented on any sufficient scale until the early 1990s. In effect, the bulk of the early second generation acquired its basic education while lacking an adequate foundation in the Dutch language. Underachievement in primary schools in the 1980s and 1990s was also a consequence of the faltering adaptation process of schools confronted by a sudden influx of migrant pupils. Many Dutch parents in districts of ethnic minority concentration abandoned such schools and sought schools outside the neighborhood. This “white flight” exacerbated school segregation. Policy proposals to counter segregation were dismissed at an early stage in the political debate, and the principle of free school choice prevailed — one of the political dogmas inherent in the Dutch pillarization system. Research has demonstrated that ethnic minority concentration adversely affects school achievement.

The cumulation of educational deprivation during the primary school years was to have an insidious and lasting effect on the school careers of second-generation Moroccan and Turkish young people. It was further aggravated by the early selection mechanisms in the Dutch school system. Low achievement in primary schools resulted in a massive inflow of migrant children into the lowest vocational tracks of secondary school. In larger cities, vocational training schools have now basically become ethnic minority schools. They now face the same problems with the sudden influx of ethnic minority pupils that the primary schools had to deal with a decade ago. Because the grim atmosphere at school is detrimental to learning, dropout rates are high.

In this way, the routine selection mechanism applied in Dutch schools at the age of 12 has become more or less decisive for the future school careers of second-generation migrant young people. By channeling them into poorly functioning, dead-end educational tracks at an early age, the school system effectively blocks their way to more challenging educational opportunities.

Our comparison of the Turkish community to the Moroccan community has highlighted some of the characteristic features of the Turkish second generation that impede the educational careers of its members. The differences between these two communities are greatest if we compare the Turkish and Moroccan women. A salient distinction between the two second generations as a whole is that the Turkish seem more inclined to adhere to the norms and values of their own ethnic community (in areas such as religious practice, marriage, gender roles and traditional customs). Tightly knit social networks play an essential role in the Turkish community. Strong social control prevails, and the behavior of girls and young women is closely monitored. Both tradi-
tional gender thinking in the Turkish community and the practice of early marriage pose formidable barriers to the education of second-generation Turkish girls. A quarter of them leave school without any secondary diploma, most to soon become full-time housewives. At the same time, the slowly growing group of Turkish young people who have achieved academic success illustrates how a shift in educational messages gradually comes about. The children from the in-between generation and the older second generation are the first to challenge their parents’ viewpoints on the importance of education, both for males and for females. Yerden (2001:17) has already argued that education is increasingly becoming the new status symbol in the Turkish community. The new generation did not so much change its ideas (as assimilation is often conceived), but it developed its ideas in relation to the new circumstances in which the younger generation was growing up.

REFERENCES


Dagevos, J.


Dagevos, J. and V. Veenman

Dibbets, H. and T. Meder

Doomernik, J.
1998 The Effectiveness of Integration Policies towards Immigrants and Their Descendants in France, Germany and the Netherlands. Geneva: ILO.

Foner, N.

Gibson, M. and P. Bhachu

Hoek, J. van der

Hooghiemstra, E.
2002 Trouwen over de Grens. Achtergronden van Partnerkeuze van Turken en Marokkanen in Nederland. Rijswijk: SCP.

Hustinx, P. and W. Meijnen

de Jong, M.

de Jong, W.

Junger-Tas, J.

Levi, M.
Lijphart, A.  

Lindo, E.  

Martens, E. and Y. Weijers  
2000 *Integratiemonitor 2000.* Rotterdam: ISEO.

Obdeijn, H. and P. de Mas  

Pels, T.  
2001 “Student Disengagement and Pedagogical Climate.” Paper delivered at Sixth International Metropolis Conference in Rotterdam.

Penninx, R.  

Phalet, K., C. Lotringen and H. Entzinger  

Roelandt, T., J. Roijen and J. Veenman  

Tesser, P., F. van Dugteren and A. Merens  

Tesser, P. and J. Iedema  

Tesser, P., J. Merens and C. van Praag  

Tesser, P. and J. Veenman  

van der Veen, I.  

Veenman, J.  

---


de Vries, M.  
1990 *Roddelt naar Beschouwd.* Leiden: COMT.

Yerden, I.  