The *Pax Americana* and the Middle East: U.S. Grand Strategic Interests in the Region After September 11

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The Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies
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Seldom are wars good things, but good things often come from them. Wars have caused profound social change in Western societies, increasing political rights, literacy, educational opportunities, and numerous technological advances from radar to antibiotics. Equally important is the fact that war presents opportunities for the victors to advance their interests in international politics. For Israel, the wars in 1967, 1969-1970, and 1973 laid the foundation for peace with Egypt and Jordan. Despite adverse elements, the war in Lebanon was instrumental in the long struggle to force the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to recognize Israel. The United States benefited equally in its modern wars. The woeful condition of its military as it entered World War I rapidly improved and its professionalism developed to the point where it could fight modern, industrialized war against great power enemies. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 was a great shock to the country and a disaster for its navy and army in the Pacific. Nonetheless, victory in World War II gave the United States the opportunity to remake Northeast Asia and much of Europe, turning former adversaries into allies and creating a U.S. presence where none had been. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) were as great a shock as Pearl Harbor. Like the former attack, the war on terror declared by the administration of George W. Bush in the aftermath of 9/11 provides the opportunity for the United States to advance its interests in the Middle East, to eliminate adversaries and expand its power.1

This study explores how the war on terrorism declared by the Bush administration after 9/11 will greatly expand American influence and

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presence in the Middle East. This, in turn, may lead to a transformation of the region in the direction of America’s liberal ideology: the development of and support for freer governments and markets. Just as World War II and the Cold War created the opportunity for a permanent American presence in Europe and Northeast Asia, the war on terrorism provides the opportunity to increase significantly American military and economic power in the Middle East, which has profound implications for regional allies and adversaries of the United States. The major argument of this study is that the *Pax Americana* should greatly expand in the Middle East because by so doing it protects its traditional interests in the region and is also able to advance new interests.

The study begins with an assessment of the grand strategy of primacy and an analysis of the United States’ traditional strategic goals in the Middle East during the Cold War and the decade before 9/11. Grand strategy is how a state defines its interests, the threats to them, and the means to address those threats. The grand strategy of the United States is primacy or hegemony. Hegemony is a condition of international politics where one state dominates the rest as a result of its military strength. Hegemony of the United States gives it the ability to advance its diplomatic, economic, and military interests, but also the ability to advance its ideas to shape the international environment by setting standards of international conduct and acceptable political systems to reflect its values. Hegemony also can create stability in international politics and in particular regions, as the *Pax Romana* and *Pax Britannia* did, and the *Pax Americana* has thus far in Europe, Latin America, and much of Asia.

During the Cold War, the grand strategic goal of the United States in the Middle East was to ensure the free flow of oil from the region to its allies in Europe and Asia as well as to itself. As is still true today, oil was a critical component of the economies and militaries of the industrialized democracies. Without it the economies would be severely weakened and the militaries unable to fight the Soviet Union. Of course, the USSR had a distinct advantage over the West because its oil sources were indigenous.

To meet this objective required strong support for allied regimes such as Egypt, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, to prevent Soviet expansion in the region. The importance of oil as a strategic goal remains in the wake of 9/11, as does support for US allies. But the conditions are favorable for an expansion of U.S. power in the Middle East. The Bush administration should seize the opportunity presented by the war on terrorism and victory over Iraq to reshape the Middle East and expand radically the American presence in the region. While the administration advanced the ambitious goal of bringing about “regime change” in Iraq, its goal should be even bolder: the United States should bring about “regional
change”—using American power to create pro-American regimes in the Middle East as it has done in Asia, Europe, and Latin America.

Although the United States is the most powerful state in international politics it must act quickly to bring about the expansion of American power in the Middle East for two reasons. First, the Bush administration has a window of opportunity to make these changes but the length of the window is governed to some degree by the election cycle of American politics. The administration will only be in power until 2004 or 2008, but it nonetheless has the chance to commit the U.S. to the Middle East in a manner its successors will have difficulty modifying substantially.

However, a more important cause is the current condition of the international system. There is no peer competitor to balance U.S. power as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. The absence of a peer competitor in the Middle East gives the United States primacy in international politics and thus a window of opportunity to advance its goals and influence before this happy situation changes with the rise of a competitor.

To cause regional change, the agenda of the Pax Americana must include the following items. The first, already reached, was the liberation of Iraq in a bold and rapid campaign—Operation Iraqi Freedom (also known as Gulf War II). The overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime is thus complete, but Iraq must be secured in order to realize the objectives of the United States in that country: the creation of a pro-American government in Baghdad and the establishment of bases to facilitate power projection.

Second, the United States must place pressure on Iran and Syria to change specific policies that threaten the goal of regional change. Iran must stop supporting terrorism and must end its nuclear program. Syria must end its support for terror. To accomplish this, the United States must have a permanent military presence and larger basing structure in the region to support its military and intelligence operations against Iran and Syria.

Third, the United States must defeat or substantially weaken al Qaeda. A critical method for achieving this goal is linked to changing or reforming the governments of Iran and Syria. Over time, as state support and societal change occurs in the Middle East, the strength of the organization will be diminished. Its attacks against the United States for almost a decade before 9/11 demonstrated that al Qaeda is a serious threat to the interests of the United States, and so is rightly targeted by the United States. There are other terrorist groups in the Middle East that may affect the interests of the United States at some point. However, at the present time, Washington does not seek the destruction of Hizbullah in southern Lebanon, and other groups that target Israel, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The U.S. should adopt a more careful assessment of the threat posed by Hizbullah. American analysts often consider these groups to be similar in motivation: nationalism. While the U.S. should not become
involved in the nationalist struggle between Israel and Hamas or PIJ, the U.S. must watch Hizbullah closely and prepare to destroy it due to its capabilities, its nascent but growing relationship with al Qaeda, and its support from Iran and Syria.

Fourth, the United States must support a Palestinian state that does not threaten Israel’s security. The expanded American presence offers a significant opportunity to improve Israel’s security and strengthen the U.S.-Israeli relationship. However, it also has the potential to exacerbate tensions in the relationship. The most significant of these is the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The Bush administration must learn from the experience of the Clinton administration and not force the creation of a Palestinian state prematurely. The conditions necessary are not yet present on the Palestinian side, its leadership cannot accept Israeli security requirements, and to force the issue of Palestinian statehood would require placing unacceptable pressure on the government of Israel. Palestinian political leadership is evolving in a positive direction but these elements are not yet strong enough to control a Palestinian state against those who would seek to harm Israel.

The following analysis is organized into two major sections. The first reviews traditional U.S. grand strategic interests in the Middle East. The second explains why the United States has the capabilities to expand its power and why it should do so—advancing the agenda just discussed. Underpinning these sections is the realist theory of international politics. Although it has many variants, realism is fundamentally concerned with a state’s power and how it is used to advance and defend a state’s interests. Realism can resemble the arguments of neoconservatives in the United States, such as Andrew Bacevich or Max Boot. Like realists, the excellent arguments of the neoconservatives have a healthy respect for American power. The thrust of the neoconservative argument is that American power should be used to spread liberal ideas and, concomitantly, the American political and economic system. If you will, replacing bad governments with good ones. No realist would object to this necessarily. Realists recognize the value of having similar ideas and political systems across the state system. This is especially useful for the hegemon as it makes its power more effective because the similarity of interest is generally greater and so resistance is less likely. Thus, realists also desire the spread of the American political and economic system and culture, and indeed realist and neoconservative arguments dovetail in many respects.

However, the realist argument of this study does differ from a neoconservative perspective on an important point. Realists are willing to work with any state or any type of government in order to advance the strategic interests of the United States. For realists, the strategic interest is primary. Once that is secure then it is possible to advance other desirable and important goals such as spreading the free market system and
democratic government. There need not be tension between America’s strategic goals and the spread of its ideology, but if democracy undermines the strategic goals of the country, for example, by undermining the stability of an important ally like Egypt, then for the realist the choice is clear. It is critical to maintain the ally, and, however lamentable it may be, not to advance a subordinate goal of spreading democracy.

In this study, there is no illusion that allies such as Egypt, Turkey, or a nascent Iraqi government desire to adopt the economic, cultural or political system of the United States. They support, however weakly (or even at times oppose), American policies because it is in their national interest to do so. Were the European Union or China the hegemon today, these states would support it however strongly or weakly as their national interest dictated. Thus, the United States must be careful. Its military, economic system, and ideology are very powerful, and it should strive to advance democracy and a free market system, but not at the cost of undermining friendly regimes in the Middle East or elsewhere. Undemocratic regimes will probably increasingly become democratic, but in most cases this change should be evolutionary, caused from within, not revolutionary, imposed by an outside power.

As a final introductory note, it is important to emphasize that the central focus of this study is on the grand strategic objectives of the United States in the Middle East. Therefore, there is no need to address in detail what may be termed the “immediate goals” of the U.S., such as the stabilization of Afghanistan and Iraq. While such immediate goals are important and certainly may be both demanding and difficult, as well as necessary steps to ensure the achievement of grand strategic goals, the focus of this study will nevertheless be on the long-term, constant goals of the United States in the region.

I. U.S. Interests in the Middle East During the Cold War: Oil and “Five Pillars” of Support

What is remarkable about the involvement of the United States in the Middle East during the Cold War is that its presence was modest while its influence was great. In no other region was this true, except Latin America, and unlike that region, U.S. presence and influence were purchased without the history of extensive interventions and occupations in the region. The central interest of the United States in the region consisted of securing the free flow of oil to world markets so that the Western industrialized nations, Japan, and South Korea would have an inexpensive source of energy.

U.S. influence was extending efficiently and cheaply for several reasons. First, the Soviet conventional threat to American interests in the
region was modest for much of the Cold War.\(^7\) Soviet conventional power-projection capabilities and naval presence in the region were not significant until the 1970s. While the Soviets did have significant allies in the region, such as Iraq and most importantly Egypt and Syria, these allies were always watchful of their Soviet advisors and support. Their relationship with the Soviets was mercurial and varied and both were suspicious of the Soviet presence in their countries with the nadir for the Soviets being Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s expulsion of Soviet advisors in 1972.

Due to the modest Soviet conventional threat in the Middle East and as a result of prodigious demands for a U.S. military presence in other regions of the world—Europe, Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia—the United States had the luxury of meeting its goal of the free flow of oil from the region to world markets by depending on the British to police the Middle East.\(^8\) Yet, the British Empire had reached its nadir, and this decline entailed significant consequences for the United States.

By the early 1960s it was clear to U.S. policymakers that British power was waning throughout the world. In December 1965, Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s government informed President Lyndon Johnson that British economic weakness required “readjustments” in the British defense posture “East of Suez.” The British would abandon the crown colony in Aden, the support of the Gulf sheikdoms, their security responsibilities in the Indian Ocean and Singapore. As a result of the British withdrawal, there would quickly be a serious security shortfall in the region.

Consequently, the U.S. turned to what the Johnson administration called the “two pillars” policy, Iran and Saudi Arabia, to police the Gulf in the aftermath of the British withdrawal.\(^9\) The protection of U.S. interests in the Gulf would largely rest upon them, although other states, such as Israel, were important at times as well, for example, containing Nasser’s expansionist objectives. In June 1966, in a meeting with Saudi King Faisal, Johnson promised significant military aid, and thus began close and uninterrupted security cooperation between the two states. But Iran was the real prize due to its large, highly-skilled population, oil wealth, and relatively advanced economy. Saudi Arabia could never be as strong a pillar as Iran appeared to be. So an even more fruitful and tighter defense relationship was thus begun with the Shah, with whom the United States shared some of its most advanced conventional weaponry. The Shah was a loyal ally of the United States, who used his power to advance U.S. interests, the most important of these was eliminating Soviet intrusions. As an “American deputy sheriff,” the Shah was not slow to act. For example, in 1973 Iran sent 1,200 commandos to Dhofar province in Oman to crush a Soviet-backed uprising. This happy situation for the United States ended abruptly with the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
Although not explicitly termed “pillars,” the U.S. presence in the Middle East rested on three more. One pillar—Turkey—had been a strong U.S. ally since the end of World War II when the United States had helped Ankara resist Soviet pressure for the eastern Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan, which Moscow claimed were traditionally Russian. The Soviet Union also wanted bases in Turkey, and the abandonment of the Montreux Convention governing Soviet passage through the Straits. U.S. support allowed Turkey to resist Stalin’s bullying and its admission into the NATO alliance in February 1952 solidified the Turkish pillar.

Two more pillars were added at about the same time—Israel and Egypt—to strengthen the U.S. position in the Middle East. The U.S. relationship with Israel greatly warmed after the 1967 war. An important factor was the U.S.’s desire for Israel to serve as a strong anti-Soviet bulwark. Israel had demonstrated its military prowess—and thus value to the U.S.—by defeating two Soviet allies and thus was in possession of territory from the Suez Canal to the outskirts of Damascus. This became even more important after the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran. The tension in the relationship that had existed in the Eisenhower and Kennedy years over the Israeli nuclear program was eliminated as Washington tacitly accepted a nuclear Israel. The “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy was adopted by both states on the nuclear issue. The stage was thus set for the solid relationship that continues to this day.

From the mid-1970s, Egypt has been an ally due to Cairo’s need for U.S. economic and military aid to stabilize the regime, and to use Washington as a pivot to exert pressure on Israel. For the U.S., Egypt is strategically important due to its control of the Suez Canal, its leadership of the Arab world, and its role in furthering peaceful relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Winning Egypt away from the Soviet Union was one of the great triumphs of the U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. Its value remains after the Cold War, and continues to protect it from criticism concerning the condition of Egyptian democracy.

Indeed, in the 1960s and for most of the 1970s, it seems that the interests of the United States were well supported by five solid pillars. Consequently, no significant U.S. military presence was thus necessary, to the relief of a conventional military stretched thin by commitments to the NATO alliance, Japan and Korea, and involvement in the quagmire of Southeast Asia.

As long as the Soviet threat was less intense in the region, it was possible to depend on “five pillars” to advance and protect U.S. interests. But the United States could no longer afford to rely on allies to protect the supply of oil as the Soviet conventional threat increased by the end of the 1970s with the growth in Soviet power-projection capabilities, its expansion in the Horn of Africa, and its invasion of Afghanistan. Coupled with the fall
of the Shah, it seemed like the balance of power was shifting against the United States.

To improve this situation, the Carter administration developed the Rapid Deployment Force, the precursor to the present United States Central Command, to give the United States the ability to transport light military force rapidly to the Gulf to protect oilfields. The expansion of this capability in the 1980s—adding heavier land forces and more air and naval assets—was an indication that the U.S. had to have a formidable capability to check Soviet or Iranian expansion in the Gulf. Only U.S. military power would allow it to protect its own interests in the face of the Soviet threat. Simultaneously, the United States recognized the value of its regional allies and so strengthened the conventional weaponry of the remaining four pillars.

The United States was able to protect its grand strategic interest in the Middle East for most of the Cold War by relying on other states. Such a situation was largely positive for the United States because it permitted it to place more military power in Europe and Asia where the Soviet threat was greater. But the lack of a substantial U.S. presence in the Middle East and the existence of the Soviet Union as a peer competitor precluded eliminating enemies in the region or placing significant pressure on those states to change their domestic politics, economics, and societies. But conditions change in international politics, and the world is now different. Opportunities that were once denied in the context of the Cold War now may blossom.

II. Expanding U.S. Power in the Middle East

The death of the Soviet Union gave the United States its “unipolar moment”. This section of the study explains why the conditions are propitious for the United States to expand its power in the Middle East while continuing to protect its Cold War interests: ensuring the world’s oil supply and protecting its allies in the region from external threats. Moreover, the rationale for why the United States should do so is presented. Finally, specific American interests in the region are addressed.

The United States stands at the pinnacle of its influence in international politics for three reasons: the unique position of the hegemony of the United States in the international system, the regional allies of the United States, and the power of U.S. military and intelligence community. First, since the end of the Soviet Union there is no peer competitor in the international system. In the future, a new peer competitor surely will arise, most probably China, and it will use its power to balance against the interests of the United States. But for the foreseeable future—the next
twenty years—the United States will dominate the international system without an equal or near-equal to offset its power. To be sure, other forms of balancing against the United States are certainly possible, such as the “soft” balancing conducted by four European states—Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg—as it pushed for war against Iraq. This case is illustrative precisely because such a coalition was not strong enough to prevent the United States from taking the action it wished. Such “soft” balancing coalitions may develop in the future as a tangible expression of a group of countries’ displeasure with a course of action taken by the United States, but the result will effectively be the same.

Second, when one examines the allies of the United States in the region, it is remarkable that so many states support the U.S. The pillars that the United States had in place at the end of the Cold War, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, remain in place. Moreover, from Morocco to the Gulf, most of the smaller states in the Arab world are allied with the United States. Jordan is a reliable ally, as is Morocco. This provides the United States with a powerful, regional foundation from which to exert influence within and outside of the Middle East. Of all the states in the Middle East, only Iran and Syria remain outside the orb of U.S. influence.

The war with Iraq revealed that there is significant tension in the American relationship with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This is worrisome but should not be exaggerated in either case. The U.S. is concerned that the Saudi population is becoming increasingly radicalized and anti-American. It supports groups like Hamas that conduct terrorism in Israel; it has not cooperated with the FBI’s investigation of the Saudi National Guard and Khobar Towers bombings in 1995 and 1996, respectively; and after 1995, it has cooperated with al Qaeda, bribing it not to attack Saudi Arabia or its interests. The latter has actually proved to no avail as evidenced by the bombings in May 2003 of residential compounds in Riyadh and the arrest also that month of three men planning to hijack an airliner and crash it into the National Commercial Bank in Jeddah. Also, Saudi Arabia has refused American requests to withdraw its F-15S fighter aircraft from Tabuk air base, near the Israeli border. The fighters moved to the base before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom allegedly to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraqi attack, although it would have been extremely unlikely that any Iraqi aircraft would have been able to escape the attention of U.S. fighter aircraft, if indeed they had even been able to sortie.

Significantly, the U.S. has moved bases from Saudi Arabia and is prudently searching for alternative sources of energy supply such as from Canada, Central Asian states, Russia, Mexico, Nigeria, and others, including domestic supply from the United States itself. However, it is simply a fact of life that with 264.2 billion barrels of proven oil reserves—about one-fourth of the world total—and perhaps as many as one trillion barrels of
recoverable oil, with one of the cheapest costs of production per barrel, and easy access to the sea for shipment, Saudi Arabia is the most important actor in world oil markets. Moreover, it is a powerful force for price moderation in global markets and a reliable supplier since 1933, with the notable exception in 1973-1974 to punish the U.S. for its support for Israel in the 1973 war. While difficult, the relationship with the Saudis will continue, as it is the mutual interest of both states. Nonetheless, as analyzed below, a pro-American government in Iraq does allow the U.S. to offset Saudi Arabia should the worst happen and an anti-American government come to power in Riyadh.

Turkey earned a rebuke from the United States for not allowing the passage of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division through its territory, delaying the opening of a northern front in the Iraq war. United States Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz called the Turkish decision “a big disappointment” and many commentators speculated that the relationship hit its lowest point. It is clear from Wolfowitz’s remarks that the ruling AK Party in Turkey is viewed with suspicion in Washington, and it is no stretch to think that similar opinions concerning AK exist in the Turkish General Staff. In July 2003, the U.S. military detained and interrogated for 60 hours 11 Turkish commandos in Suleimaniyah in northern Iraq. The men were suspected of plotting to kill a Kurdish governor and of aiding Turkish Turcoman-Front members who are opposed to the Kurds. Yet, from Washington’s perspective, relations improved when the Turks decided in October 2003 to contribute troops to the multinational stability force in Iraq.

Despite visible problems, the relationship is too important for present and future concerns to dwell on the past. There is similarity of interest between Washington and Turkish powerbrokers concerning stability in Iraq, the threat posed by Iran, confronting terrorists, whether they are al Qaeda or the PKK/KADEK (Kurdistan Workers Party/Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan), and Turkey needs the aid of the United States for its major foreign policy goals, such as the admission of Turkey into the European Union and maintaining a divided Cyprus. For these reasons, while the American-Turkish marriage may be in counseling, there will be no divorce.

Third, United States conventional military power is supreme. This will not change in the near future because no great power or practical coalition of great powers will have sufficient capability to offset U.S. conventional military power. To further heighten U.S. conventional military power, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his supporters have touted what has become known as the “Rumsfeld Doctrine.” The essence of this is to use lighter, more mobile, joint forces to fight wars supported by more effective intelligence and command and control capabilities including force multipliers such as space assets, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).
As Rumsfeld explained to a military audience in Baghdad in the immediate aftermath of the Iraq war: “We do need to be quicker on our feet. We need to be able to do things in hours and days instead of weeks and months…. [and] with somewhat smaller footprints.”

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General Richard Myers, has echoed this. He has emphasized that the new “American Way of War” is now having a joint and flexible force that is able to see the enemy, plan, act and assess the battlefield situation faster than ever before. Consequently, the “sensor-to-shooter” time delay is greatly reduced from hours or days during Operation Desert Storm to minutes today. The famous example of the B-1B bomber attacking a Mansour command center during Operation Iraqi Freedom is now an archetype. When intelligence received an indication of a regime leadership meeting, the aircraft was redirected and made its attack, all within 38 minutes. Such ability is more impressive because it was no one off event or a capability only reserved for leadership targets of high value. It is reported that coalition air forces struck more than 500 targets as a result of re-targeting while in the air.

The persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are so impressive that even in a dust storm, the Iraqis could not hide from ISR platforms like the U-2, RC-135 Rivet Joint, E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) as well as the ten types of UAVs used in that war. As a result of this truncated time delay and excellent ISR capabilities, U.S. forces are able to enter the decision-making cycle of the adversary, and thus permitting American forces to disrupt the enemy’s plans, neutralizing his combat effectiveness. For Myers, “the essence of … [the American Way of War] is just much better integrated service capabilities into a joint team, enabled by a decision cycle—command and control, intelligence, surveillance/reconnaissance decision cycle that is agile and very fast. So we can always be inside our adversary’s decision loop even as he tries to adapt to a changing environment.” In sum, “battlespace” is replacing “battlefield.” A joint air, land, sea, space environment knowledge is massed, allowing the use of smaller formations that can use lethal and non-lethal force quickly and asymmetrically, and are governed by a flexible and dynamic command and control structure. Due to the profound advantages held by the United States in intelligence, communications, weapons, joint doctrine, training, and manpower, for the first time the enemy’s center of gravity may be attacked quickly, accurately, and directly, bypassing most of his conventional forces and minimizing U.S., enemy, and noncombatant casualties.

Indeed, modern U.S. military capabilities coupled with the imbalance of military power between it and rival states allows the abandonment of the traditional “American Way of War,” defined by the military historian Russell F. Weigley as a strategy of attrition directed
against enemy conventional forces in order to annihilate it. This approach was adopted by the pinnacle of American military leadership: seeds planted by Washington fully flowered in Grant, Lee, and Eisenhower. But the old “American Way of War” lacked flexibility, required tremendous mobilization by the State of men and resources, and led to high casualties for friend and foe, as well as for civilian populations.

The invasion of Iraq yields evidence of the fruition of the new approach. In the immediate aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States Army V Corps commander, Lt. Gen. William Wallace, reflected on the abilities of U.S. forces after the bulk of the fighting was over. He stated: “it continually took Iraqi forces a long time—somewhere on the order of 24 hours—to react to anything we did.” This was because of profoundly superior U.S. capabilities, so that “by the time the enemy realized what we were doing, got the word out to his commanders and they actually did something as a result, we had already moved on to doing something different.” Wallace neatly summarized his satisfaction with that situation: “For a commander, that’s a pretty good thing—fighting an enemy who can’t really react to you.” The result of American military capabilities was the rapid collapse of Iraqi conventional forces leading to the collapse of the regime while casualties—whether American, coalition, civilian or Iraqi military—were minimized as was damage to Iraq’s infrastructure. Moreover, the ability of Iraq to retaliate against the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey or other states was crushed. While he acknowledged the importance of chance in war, the Elder von Moltke once said that militaries make their own luck. So it is with Operation Iraqi Freedom. Much went right for the United States in the campaign due to its intelligence and military capabilities, training and planning, diplomatic skill, and the quality of the U.S. military’s service members.

Of course, as with every war, substantial criticism was voiced. In particular, retired military officers and pundits argued that the size of the ground component was too small and this hindered the ability to protect logistical and other support forces during the war and the suppression of looting and other criminal acts in the wake of the conflict. As retired Army Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, the former commander of the 24th Infantry (Mechanized) division in the first Gulf War, argued during Operation Iraqi Freedom: “In my judgment, there should have been a minimum of two heavy divisions and an armored cavalry regiment on the ground—that’s how our doctrine reads.” The criticisms were particularly acute as army-supply columns were ambushed by Iraqi irregular forces, and as a sand storm also hindered the re-supply of the division. Fortunately, neither proved able to stop the advance of U.S. forces.

It appears as well that the vaunted “just-in-time” logistics generally worked well too, with such improvements over the 1991 war as the limited
deployment of the movement tracking system that allowed efficient allocation of supplies. But there are still difficulties, and they were present in almost every campaign from the drive of Patton’s 3rd Army across France to the drive of the 3rd Infantry Division from Kuwait to Baghdad. As the deputy commanding general for logistics during the war, U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Vincent Boles, noted keeping up with rapidly moving forces is still a problem: “The last 100km is still tough.”

Upon reflection, the risk incurred with a smaller U.S. ground component was acceptable. However, Pentagon planners would probably be loath to repeat a future invasion in similar conditions because they recognize that they got away with one, most of the breaks went their way. While the outcome would never be in doubt, a sufficient force structure helps to minimize the risks incurred by soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen in the performance of their duties.

II. A. Why the United States Should Exert Its Influence in the Middle East

This part addresses a critical, normative issue—why the United States should exert its influence in the region to bring about regional change. It begins with the observation that the United States is an imperial power and this drive is a profound part of what makes the United States a dynamic country. The rapidity of the expansion of the United States from thirteen colonies in 1776 to a hegemon some two hundred years later is startling, and a large part of the explanation of this expansion lies with the recognition that the United States has long been imperialistic, it has long had the dream of empire that has now been fulfilled. The desire to spread the creed or ideology of America has animated the politics and political figures in the United States from the earliest years. Thomas Paine summarized this spirit: “From a small spark, kindled in America, a flame has arisen, not to be extinguished. Without consuming…it winds its progress from nation to nation, and conquers by a silent operation,” and when Men know their rights they are free, and despotism is destroyed because “the strength and powers of despotism consist wholly in the fear of resisting it.”

But the spread of the flame of the American ideology through Paine’s “silent operation” never has been sufficient for destroying those deemed despots by American leaders. Few Americans realize how expansionistic their country historically has been. Indeed, even before it had declared its independence it coveted Canada and attempted to seize it. In 1775, Congressional President John Hancock ordered General Philip Schuyler to conquer Montreal. This failed, as did many subsequent attempts. The desire to conquer was not solely the passion of Yankees. The Confederate States of America had aspirations to conquer the Caribbean and
much of Latin America once the Civil War was over. Had positions been reversed at Appomattox, one wonders what the political divisions in the Western Hemisphere would be today. But it took time for American capabilities to match its ambitions.

Nevertheless, through great vulnerability in its early years and adversity, its expansion and rise to its present status in international politics was made possible by a desire to conquer and expand and share its values. Two additional elements were present. The weakness of its neighbors is important to acknowledge, as is the distraction or support of those European great powers that possessed the ability to arrest American expansion but did not.

Although the United States has an informal empire, controlling lesser powers largely without directly occupying them, American decision-makers are right not to call attention to it as this would only increase balancing forces against it and thus ultimately be self-defeating. The United States must be careful. It should follow the advice of French statesman Léon Gambetta who wrote of the German-occupied provinces of Alsace and Lorraine that it was the duty of the French to “think of them always, but speak of them never.” So it is with the American Empire, the foreign policy community must think of how to expand and maintain it but never tout or gratuitously boast of it.

The United States has the correct values—democracy, individualism, and free market economy—to impose, the capabilities to impose them over time, but it also must have the courage to impose them. Fortunately, the current Bush administration does. President Bush explained, in May 2003, why the US seeks to expand U.S. power in the Middle East when he declared that it is the obligation of the United States to use the “influence and idealism” of the U.S. “to replace old hatreds with new hopes across the Middle East.”

While this statement was greeted with some skepticism and wry smiles from the old guard of experts in the Middle East, it is consistent with the administration’s remarks since the Bush Doctrine was announced on June 1, 2002 at the United States Military Academy at West Point, and later codified in *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, published in September 2002. The essence of which is to use American power to protect its interests, maintain its dominance, and spread American principles. While it may not be successful on all accounts, the Bush administration is determined to increase the U.S. presence in the Middle East to new levels and far beyond its state during the Cold War.

The Bush Doctrine has three central tenets. First, it postulates that the United States is no longer able to rely on containment and deterrence as it did during the Cold War to address the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Rather, it must now preempt threats and “take the battle to the enemy,
Preemption is necessary because weak states and terrorists have the capabilities to launch catastrophic attacks against the United States. While no one would doubt that preemption is a course of action fraught with risk, it is also the case that it may be less costly than inaction.

In the wake of the successful invasion of Iraq, Bush again stressed the necessity of actively confronting states and terrorists. On May 1, 2003 aboard the aircraft carrier *U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln* on her return to port from participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom, President Bush stated: “Any person, organization, or government that supports, protects, or harbors terrorists is complicit in the murder of the innocent, and equally guilty of terrorist crimes. Any outlaw regime that has ties to terrorist groups and seeks or possesses weapons of mass destruction is a grave danger to the civilized world—and will be confronted.”

Second, the United States will do what is necessary to remain the world’s sole superpower. As Bush plainly said: “America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge.” By possessing such power, the United States furthers peace. It makes “the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limit[s] rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”

Third, the U.S. will actively advance its principles in international politics. In 2002, at a West Point address, Bush presented an agenda for action. The United States will “extend a just peace,” in international politics, “by replacing poverty, repression, and resentment around the world” with the “single surviving model of human progress.” For Bush, this model is anchored upon the following principles: a respect for human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and private property, free speech, equal justice and religious tolerance. They are “non-negotiable” and universal: “The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa, Latin America, and the entire Islamic world” because “the peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their government should listen to their hopes.” The emphasis of the administration clearly is on the Middle East. Latin America has largely been remade to accord with America’s principles, and one suspects that Africa might have been placed in the speech for rhetorical purposes only, given the relative lack of importance of black Africa in this administration.

Almost a year later, in the May 2003 Victory over Iraq speech, Bush continued his emphasis on outreach to the Arab world: “And anyone in the world, including the Arab world, who works and sacrifices for freedom has a loyal friend in the United States of America.” Amplifying the desire to expand freedom in the Middle East, Bush argued only days later in a commencement address at the University of South Carolina, “the expansion of liberty throughout the world is the best guarantee of security throughout
the world. Freedom is the way to peace.” Indeed, expanding freedom in
the region is a responsibility of the United States and one it will keep, Bush
has argued, through the development of economic and educational ties,
judicial reform, and the fostering of the rights of women.

Using military power to advance American interests and values is
not only the right thing to do but what the United States has done since
Schuyler’s failed invasion of Canada. But the sword must be wielded
carefully. The threat or application of military power should never be
exercised without serious consideration of the strategic interest to be
advanced, as well as the consequences of failure. In his autobiography,
Colin Powell, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explains that
Madeleine Albright, the ambassador to the United Nations for the new
Clinton administration, wanted to use the U.S. military for social work. He
writes that Albright “asked me in frustration, ‘What’s the point of having
this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?’ I
thought I would have an aneurysm,” because “American GI’s were not toy
soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board.” Indeed,
the United States military should not be used for social work. Rather, its
proper use is to advance American interests and to deter and destroy
America’s enemies.

After the victory in Iraq, the United States Secretary of State Colin
Powell spoke of a “new strategic environment” in the Middle East as one of
the major implications of the victory. The American military created this
environment. We are dominant and must be recognized as such by other
states. But announcing a new environment does not make it so. Only acting
upon the momentum the U.S. has created to address other dangers to
American hegemony will ensure that, in fact, such an environment is
created.

A major step in remaking the Middle East began with Operation
Iraqi Freedom. It may indeed be considered Powell’s “new strategic
environment,” or it is better thought of as a regional earthquake, profoundly
altering the political landscape of the region. As a result of the success of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is possible to bring America into the Middle
East to cause change in the region. This change should be along the
following parameters: It should give regimes opposed to the interests of the
United States a chance to reform or be removed. It should involve spreading
democracy in the Middle East as this can be accomplished without hurting
existing regimes. The United States should bring about regime change,
regional change, to promote liberal democracy around the world. The more
liberal democracies there are in the world, the more congenial for the United
States and the easier it is for the United States to maintain its hegemony.
But what is fundamentally important is that the governments are supportive
and respectful of the interests of the United States. Accordingly, if there is
tension between democracy and maintaining a pro-American government, such as a modern day Pharaonic government in Egypt, then the latter is the right choice for the United States.

While the United States has never been as powerful in the Middle East as it is today, threats remain. Administration officials have articulated them forcefully if necessarily ambiguously. Stabilizing Iraq must be accomplished. Failure to do so jeopardizes American domestic support for the expansion of American influence in the region. Next, it is necessary to cause regime change in Iran and to encourage Syria to reform. Thirdly, terrorism is a significant threat as well and inextricably linked to problems of Iran and Syria. Indeed, senior administration officials emphasize this point. For example, in wake of the U.S. victory in Iraq, Vice President Richard Cheney declared that terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction, the “outlaw” states that back them, and “rogue states developing or already possessing these weapons…constitute the gravest threat to America’s national security.”40 Finally, it is critical that the U.S. ensures the security of Israel, even at the cost of delaying Palestinian statehood.

II. B. The U.S. Agenda in the Middle East: Iraq—A Pro-American Government and Bases

The American victory in Iraq provided significant advantages for the United States. Only by invading Iraq could the United States reach its strategic objectives in the region. Before the war, the Bush administration argued that “regime change” was necessary for four reasons. First, Iraq was developing nuclear weapons. In a widely quoted intelligence assessment, the foreign intelligence agency of the German government estimated that Iraq could develop a nuclear weapon between 2004 and 2008. While in the aftermath of the war it certainly seems the earlier dates were out of the question, nonetheless a program did exist that would ultimately lead to a weapon. A nuclear Iraq might have been emboldened to invade or coerce Kuwait and other Gulf states. It would hinder U.S. efforts to project power in the region, and would give Iraq the capability to inflict considerable destruction on the American homeland. In sum, it could deter the United States in certain circumstances. The invasion of Iraq destroyed the Iraqi nuclear program.

More broadly, the successful invasion and occupation of Iraq eliminated all of its biological and chemical weapons facilities. One lesson of the unhappy and decade-long experience of the United Nations’ inspectors in Iraq is that a few hundred individuals cannot stop sophisticated weapons programs. The country is simply too big, the programs too complex and dispersed, and the Iraqi intelligence agencies too effective at penetrating the United Nations inspection agencies. Only by occupying the
country can the nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs be eliminated with the certainty required.

In the wake of the war, concern was voiced in Europe and the United States about the lack of hard evidence for these weapons. There is no doubt that U.S. intelligence analysts lack sufficient hard data about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction after U.N. weapon’s inspectors left the country in 1998 but it appears that each of the programs continued. Nonetheless, it is fundamentally immaterial whether they were destroyed by the regime itself at some point immediately after its defeat in February 1991, or by the U.N. inspectors armed with critical intelligence after the defection of Hussein Kamel and his brother to Jordan in August 1995. The brothers were sons-in-law to Saddam Hussein and Hussein had intimate knowledge of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. It is conceivable that they might have been destroyed in the course of the war, perhaps they were shifted to a third country, or they may have existed only as shell-programs—shadows of their former selves—by March 2003, with the knowledge and plans to produce and weaponize the chemical or biological agents preserved but the actual weapons destroyed. The United States could only be certain these programs were terminated through the occupation and thorough search of the country.

Second, the administration was concerned about links between the al Qaeda terrorist organization and the Iraqi government. The administration stressed that it had evidence of present ties between Iraq and al Qaeda but this claim has been greeted with considerable skepticism in the United States because of the secular nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the ideology of al Qaeda—which is directly opposed to these regimes—whether they are in Iraq, Egypt, Syria, or Turkey. Indeed, al Qaeda considers their rulers apostates.

However, despite such doubts, it was possible that such links might have developed. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks the administration wants to prevent above all else another attack using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Iraq had biological and chemical weapons, and would have acquired nuclear weapons if not stopped. The administration also has expressed concern that Iraq may supply biological or chemical weapons, or in time nuclear weapons, to al Qaeda. Because of the obvious consequences, a nuclear, biological, or chemical 9/11 must be prevented at all costs. Al Qaeda would certainly use those weapons to attack the United States, even weapons supplied by an apostate regime. Moreover, al Qaeda is a clever and evolving terrorist organization. While in the past an Iraqi-al Qaeda alliance was unlikely, administration planners cannot discount the possibility of future cooperation with Iraq to strike at what al Qaeda considers “the head of the snake”—the United States.
Third, the Bush administration declared Saddam Hussein to be a great gambler, an individual willing to take enormous and often ill-conceived risks based on his decision-making as a ruler. Thus, he might have struck at the U.S. or its interests in the region irrespective of the likelihood of American retaliation. Of course, when the empirical evidence is examined, the record of Saddam Hussein’s decision-making is mixed—he is cautious and yet willing to take risks. Whether with the Kurds, Iran, or the United States, he has made significant mistakes in decision-making. It is exceedingly difficult to predict what he will do in the future. He might have forged an alliance with al Qaeda to attack the United States or U.S. allies or he might have been deterred. Clearly, the Bush administration decided not to depend on his moderation or rational decision-making.

Fourth, the administration overthrew the Iraqi government in order to build democracy in the post-Saddam Iraq. Of course, it is no surprise that creating democracy in Iraq is a difficult task given that Saddam Hussein has ruled for a generation, systematically destroying the political life of the country. Iraq differs significantly from Germany or Japan after World War II, the two cases of successful U.S. occupations, and widely but wrongly mentioned as templates for Iraq. In both cases, there were other centers of political power in both countries that could be used by the allies as a foundation for building democracy. The Bush administration has said that the United States will have to occupy Iraq for at least two years. It will be no surprise if it takes longer. For years to come a nascent Iraqi democracy will be highly dependent on the United States for protection against internal and external threats like Shi’a or pro-Saddam guerrillas or Iran, and for the aid required to rebuild any damage to the economy resulting from the war.

In addition to the reasons the administration discussed publicly, there are other reasons it chose to remove the Iraqi regime. These reasons are not difficult to discern and surely must be considered by the administration, but cannot be stated openly due to their impact on the American people, specific countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the international community more broadly.

The first of these unstated reasons is that the American occupying authority will establish military and intelligence bases on Iraqi soil. Once established, a pro-American government in Baghdad will be necessary to maintain the facilities. The U.S. presently uses four bases: the Baghdad International Airport, Tallil in southern Iraq near Nasariyah, H-1 airstrip in the west and Bashur airfield in the Kurdish area. These bases allow U.S. helicopters and aircraft to support stabilization and humanitarian efforts, hunt for weapons of mass destruction, and combat the surviving supporters of Saddam Hussein and Shi’a guerrillas. They also serve as logistical centers for ground forces, just as Bagram airbase in Afghanistan or Camp Bondsteel...
in Kosovo have done, and enable those forces to be well quartered and protected.

In sum, these bases will give the U.S. a permanent presence in the heart of the region from which it can project power and will also be useful for holding the country together, keeping the borders of a post-invasion Iraq as they were ante bellum. The Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi’a sections of Iraq will not be allowed to become independent states and centrifugal political forces with centrifugal designs will be defeated. This has greatly reassured the Turkish government who fear the creation of a “Kurdistan” and thus a secure base of operations for the Kurdish terrorist organization PKK/KADEK and its supporters. The three pieces of Iraq will stay together in what may be an unhappy but at least functioning family.

Second, the bases will be useful in confronting Iran. As discussed below, Iran is a greater supporter of terrorism than Iraq. The Iranians have long supported Hizbullah in Lebanon and the Shi’a in Iraq. They certainly encourage Hamas in their struggle against Israel. Moreover, they have official ties to al Qaeda, and al Qaeda and Taliban forces remain in Iran. Iran also has a nuclear weapons development program that is expanding, as well as chemical weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 they have been strongly anti-American with a theology that blames America for many of their woes. Iran was one of the troika of the “Axis of Evil”—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—named by President Bush in his state of the union address in January 2002. All of the reasons the Bush administration has provided overtly for attacking Iraq apply with greater force to Iran. If Iran is the next state to be confronted, then bases in Iraq will be necessary. Other bases in the region, in Central Asia, Afghanistan, or even in the Gulf are not sufficient to confront Iran.

Third, a pro-American government in Iraq is a substitute for Saudi Arabia. As was widely noted before the war, the relationship of the United States with the Saudis has declined sharply in the wake of 9/11. From Washington’s perspective, this is because many in Saudi Arabia support al Qaeda directly or financially. It seems at times that commentators in the United States never tire of pointing out that 15 of the 19 hijackers who executed the 9/11 attacks were Saudis. The Saudis also refused to help the United States overtly in Operation Iraqi Freedom although they did assist the U.S. in other ways, such as by allowing aircraft and cruise missiles to use their airspace. Moreover, the United States recognizes that the Saudi kingdom is vulnerable due to the “youth bulge” in Saudi Arabia—the population is growing younger, and many of the men are increasingly radicalized. If the pro-American government in Riyadh does fall, then Iraq is even more important to the United States as a location for bases and as a secure supply of oil, especially when coupled with the oil of the Gulf states and bases in the Gulf and the expanding American presence in Yemen. For
the United States it is best to ensure that Saudi Arabia remains an American ally, but its interests compel it to plan for a future without a pro-American government in Riyadh. But because the United States was surprised by the fall of the Shah of Iran, it has learned to hedge its bets in the region.

In the post-Saddam Iraq, the objectives of the United States are that it must stabilize the country, suppress the centrifugal ethnic and religious pressures, and create a pro-American government in Baghdad. Ideally, the government and society that arise will be thoroughly democratic, and in time perhaps it will be, as its economy, society, and educational system are reworked and support for the U.S. grows. Nonetheless, this situation is unlikely at the birth of the new state. It will have a façade of democracy. That is sufficient for now.

What is crucial at the present time is that an Iraqi government be created that is allied and helps the United States meet its strategic objectives in the Middle East. The postwar Iraqi regime needs to allow the United States access and basing rights so that the U.S. has the ability to project power within Iraq as well as beyond it. The four bases used by the U.S. are important not just for Iraq. They offset losses incurring at present as the U.S. is withdrawing in Saudi Arabia—the U.S. presence there being reverted to a training force as it was during the Cold War. Also they help replace restricted bases in Germany and elsewhere in the “Old Europe,” and Incirlik airbase in Turkey, due to Turkish restrictions placed on the base during Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Turkish request for reduction in U.S. forces at the conclusion of the war and of Operation Northern Watch. U.S. forces at that base were quickly reduced to a skeleton crew of 1,400 after the war.

Fortunately for the United States, bases are available in the region. Iraq should become the rock upon which the United States projects power, but looking at the region broadly, in the Gulf alone there is a large U.S. presence. Kuwait obviously was host to the largest U.S. force presence in the 2003 war with Iraq. At considerable expense, the Kuwaitis are building Camp Arifjan, about 40 miles south of Kuwait City, to replace Camp Doha by 2005. It is expected to be the principal American base in Kuwait, and it played a large part in the logistics of Operation Iraqi Freedom even though it was under construction. When it is finished it will host an advanced command center and will have the capacity to accommodate thousands of soldiers. In Qatar, U.S. forces are stationed at Camp As Sayliyah and Al-Udeid air base. Camp As Sayliyah is significant because it was Central Command’s battle command headquarters during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Al-Udeid is also important because of the lack of constraints placed on its use by the Qataris and because it houses the Central Command’s Combined Air Operations Center, the regional air force headquarters, formally located at Prince Sultan air base outside Riyadh. Al-Udeid is a modern base built
in late 2001 to support operations in Afghanistan and in the Gulf. The headquarters of the U.S. 5th Fleet is at Manama, Bahrain, and Sheik Isa air base was important in both wars with Iraq. The United Arab Emirates is host to Al Dhafra airbase. Oman permitted the U.S. to fly B-1B bombers, C-130 cargo aircraft, and AC-130 gunships from Masirah, Seeb, and Thumrait air bases. Bases located in Central Asia may be expected to become more important for the U.S., such as the bases at Bagram, Kandahar, Khost, Lwara, Mazar-e-Sharif and Pul-i-Kandahar in Afghanistan, and other bases in Georgia (Vaziani), Kyrgyzstan (Manas), Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (Karshi-Khanabad). Finally, British-controlled Diego Garcia, in the Indian-Ocean, is a critically important combat and logistical base for the United States.

In addition to bases in southwest Asia, the “New Europe” offers important opportunities. These include Powidz and Krzesiny air bases in Poland, at the Mihail Kogalniceanu airbase, the Babadag training range, and the Black Sea port of Constanza in Romania, and in Bulgaria, the Bezmer, Graf Ignatievo, and Sarafovo military airfields, the Koren and Novo Selo training areas, and the ports of Agia and Burgas. Forces may be based in Lithuania as well. The advantages of these bases are significant. First, they are closer to immediate security threats in the Middle East. These bases are about halfway between Berlin and Baghdad. Second, there is no need to gain permission for overflight rights from countries like Austria or France that might deny them or place undue restrictions on the transit of U.S. forces or aircraft. Third, operations are less expensive at these bases, environmental constraints are less restrictive, and expansion is possible, unlike present bases in Germany or Belgium.

The bases in the “New Europe” will be particularly important if the vision of “lily pad” bases held by Rumsfeld and European Command combatant commander Gen. James Jones is realized. In this concept, a few Main Operating Bases (MOBs) in existing, strategically important sites, such as Ramstein Air Base in Germany, are lightly staffed. Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in eastern Europe are augmented by personnel who come to it on temporary duty assignments. Individuals on such assignments are unencumbered by their families and the complete infrastructure necessary to support family life—they would be “bare bones” bases. As Jones said on 28 April 2003, these locations “you can go to in a highly expeditionary way, land a battalion, train for a couple of months with a host nation,” perhaps conduct “an operation,” in theater, “and then leave and then come back maybe six months later.” The bases would exist principally to support forces operating in the Middle East, the Caucasus, or Central Asia. They might be strengthened by the addition of “cache sites,” or sites where heavy equipment, such as tanks, is prepositioned. These sites would be in addition to similar, existing sites in Diego Garcia and elsewhere, and would
either be part of the FOB or discretely located. In addition to MOBs and FOBs, Jones envisions Forward Operating Locations (FOLs). These bases are likely to be located principally in Africa, and would be used almost exclusively by rotational forces for a specific mission. Upon its completion, units would depart, leaving behind a caretaker force, and so the American footprint would be extremely small.

Another factor making bases in the “New Europe,” attractive to the United States is that the host governments want the U.S. presence. Commenting on the changing bases, a senior American military official has been quoted as saying: “This is a purposeful effort to possibly leave places where they may not want us or they are snubbing us… The Eastern Bloc countries have reached out to us… They are looking for partnership.”

With respect to the occupation of Iraq, the United States has made considerable progress stabilizing the country since the end of the war. But it is increasingly clear that the United States made a mistake immediately after occupation. That was the best time to establish itself, to set the rules, to declare that a new constitution and laws will be written, install mid- and lower-level officials to run the country, and to declare that a U.S. occupying presence would be in the country for a considerable time, ten or fifteen years, gradually leading to a transition of power to a pro-American government. Why the United States did not do this is understandable, it desired to avoid its perception as an imperial power thus provoking a xenophobic reaction among the Iraqis. Nonetheless, because the United States did not do this, it became easier for resistance to become organized and spread. However, even with some difficulties, the U.S. military and its coalition partners will be able minimize guerrilla activity and win more support from the Iraqi people, who may not yet be convinced that Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party will not yet return to power should the United State withdraw from Iraq.

II. C. The U.S. Agenda in the Middle East: State Threats—Iran and Syria

Iran is the greatest danger faced by the United States in the Middle East—greater than the problem of terrorism or other states like Syria. This is the case for three reasons. First, Iran has ties to al Qaeda and harbors the terrorist group and remnant Taliban forces, as Rumsfeld has stressed many times and the Iranians themselves have acknowledged. Intelligence officials in Pakistan have stated that the operational center of al Qaeda has shifted from Pakistan to Iran since the arrest of the terrorist organization’s operations chief, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, in February 2003, and that there are at least 250 al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives in Iran. There is no doubt that Iran knowingly harbors al Qaeda and Taliban forces, including
senior figures in both organizations. Tehran has admitted that it holds Seif al-Adel, who is believed to be the head of military operations and the third most important figure in al Qaeda with a $25 million bounty on his head, its spokesman, Suleiman Abu Gheith, and Saad bin Laden, Usama bin Laden’s third-eldest son. Washington suspects that Tehran also has custody over other senior figures, including Abu Hafs, known as “The Mauritanian,” Abu Musab Zarqawi, who is suspected of being a link between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, and Mohammed al Masri, who is involved in its East African operations. The Iranians must evict the Taliban immediately and allow the U.S. and Karzai governments to interrogate each one, taking into custody those deemed a threat. Al Qaeda forces must be handed over to the United States immediately.

Second, Iran supports resistance movements to the U.S.-backed government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan. It does this by supporting the Hezb-i-Islami led by famed Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Iranian support means that U.S. and U.S.-supported forces in Afghanistan will face better equipped, organized, and trained, guerrilla attacks. News reports make it clear that the Hezb-i-Islami is growing in size, due to the additions to its ranks of Chechen and Uzbek volunteers. Additionally, the organization has supporters in the Afghan national army. These individuals may turn at any time or share intelligence about operations with Hezb-i-Islami or other groups and thus hinder the effectiveness of the army as it conducts operations. In time, as Hezb-i-Islami weakens and the professionalism of the army increases, the problem will be reduced but the significant U.S. presence in Afghanistan must remain until such time.

Third, and most importantly, there is strong suspicion in the international community that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, and that it may have these in eight to ten years without external assistance from another nuclear state like China, North Korea, or Pakistan, and obviously much sooner, perhaps even by 2005, if it does receive significant help from these states, as has been widely reported. This suspicion exists despite Iranian appeals that its program, first, is peaceful; second, that they have provided the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a complete accounting of the nuclear program and will continue to do so; and third, Iran claims to have been completely transparent in their dealings with the rest of the international community.

The suspicion exists because Iran very carefully has laid the foundation for the complete nuclear fuel cycle. Once nuclear material is produced, it may then be turned into a nuclear weapon relatively easily. Second, despite claims about openness and transparency Iran has been forced to admit the existence of facilities and material it had never mentioned. Third, although Iran is a country blessed with the abundance of oil and natural gas, it claims that its nuclear program is intended for the
cheaper and greener production of electricity to meet the needs of its 66 million people. Indeed, it is estimated that their major nuclear facility will produce less energy than the amount of natural gas they burn off on an annual basis. Nonetheless, Iran has claimed it would like to generate 7,000 megawatts of electricity from nuclear power plants by 2022. Fourth, security is the major reason a state develops nuclear weapons, and it is clear that as part of the “Axis of Evil” announced by Bush, the present government in Iran is threatened by the military power of the United States as well as regional enemies and rivals such as Israel and Turkey. From the Iranian perspective, the United States has declared it to be an enemy with the “Axis of Evil” declaration. It is surrounding Iran with bases in the central Asian republics to the north, the Gulf sheikhdoms to the south, Afghanistan to the east, Iraq, and Turkey to the west. Tehran blames Washington for internal unrest, such as the 2003 student unrest that has rocked the government of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Thus, the acquisition of nuclear weapons will allow Tehran to deter the threats it confronts as well as to act more aggressively once the leadership knows it is secure.

Iran is advancing along both paths to nuclear weapons: the production of the uranium and plutonium isotopes necessary for nuclear weapons (U235 and Pu239). It has made significant progress on its gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. At the Natanz plant, Iran has a pilot scale “cascade” of 156 centrifuges, components for another 1,000 on-site and to be running by the end of 2003, and plans to install ultimately almost 5,000 by the end of 2005. The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the political arm of the leftist Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK, People’s Mujahideen) resistance organization, revealed the existence of the Natanz facility in August 2002. IAEA officials were surprised at the elaborate facility when they first visited in February 2003—the director of the IAEA Mohammed El Baradei characterized the facility as “sophisticated.”

Moreover, part of the facility has been built underground, leading to speculation that this is to protect it from attack, foreign intelligence observation, and to make possible the secret expansion of the facility to include tens of thousands of centrifuges—50,000 is the number that has been reported—in five to ten years. This would provide Iran with about 500 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium annually, and at 15-20 kilograms a weapon this would yield about 25-30 nuclear weapons a year. Moreover, the underground section of the facility suggests that it may covertly be larger than what the IAEA has seen. Iran has also said that tests of the centrifuges’ rotors have been conducted at Amir Khabir University and at the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran. In July 2003, environmental samples taken at Natanz contained traces of enriched uranium leading to concern that enrichment may have begun.
A previously undisclosed facility, called the Kalaye Electric Company, in Tehran, is suspected of conducting research and development work for Iran’s uranium enrichment gas centrifuge program. Iran protests that the facility is a peaceful company involved in watch manufacturing as well as other activities, but it is widely suspected that it is a front company. Iran has refused the IAEA access to parts of Kalaye and refused to allow it to take environmental samples at and near the facility.

There are reports that in 2003, 1.9kg of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas, imported from China possibly as early as 1991, had been tested at Kalaye Electric to troubleshoot the process for the larger centrifuge plant at Natanz. The IAEA notes that 1.9kg of UF6 is missing, but Iranian officials say this is due to leaking valves on storage containers. According to David Albright and Corey Hinderstein of the Institute for Science and International Security, a small centrifuge testing program could use as little as 1 to 2 kilograms of UF6. In any event, the UF6 is part of a larger shipment of 1,000kg of UF6 from China about which Iran never told the IAEA.

Beijing also provided Tehran with 400kg of uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) and 400kg of uranium dioxide (UO2) which are stored at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL) located near the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. In 2000, Iran says it converted most of the UF4 to uranium metal at JHL, but because metallic uranium is not normally used in commercial power programs, this might be strong proof of Iran’s nuclear weapons ambition.

It is also possible that Iran has developed enrichment facilities at other sites. The NCRI has suggested that two new gas centrifuge facilities exist at Ramandeh and Lashkar-Abad. It is reported that at least one of the facilities has extensive physical security, which would be unnecessary if the sites were involved in agricultural and medical work as Iran claims. These facilities show that Iran learned the lessons of the 1981 Israeli attack on the Iraqi Osirak reactor complex since they have been created, at least in part, to duplicate the operation of the Natanz in an effort to decentralize the program and thus remove the threat of the halting of the nuclear program by a single attack against one facility. The Natanz facility at the time of this writing does not appear to be a violation of Iran’s safeguard agreement because it appears that no nuclear material has been introduced into it.

While these developments are worrying, there is the real danger that Iran’s path to nuclear weapons will be accelerated by external assistance. The timelines for a nuclear Iran typically do not incorporate foreign assistance for the program. This is difficult to understand given the history of the development of nuclear weapons. In almost every case, the emerging nuclear state received aid from another country. The U.S. was helped by Britain, Canada, and German and other European émigrés. The U.S. assisted Britain and France. France helped Israel, and in turn Israel aided South
Africa. Spies in the Manhattan Project aided the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union helped China, China helped Pakistan, and Pakistan helps North Korea. Given this history, and the facts on the ground, we should expect that North Korea helps Iran and so we may expect a nuclear Iran within this decade if its program is not stopped or greatly retarded.

There is evidence of extensive assistance from North Korea. From April to June 2003, Iranian cargo aircraft have visited Pyongyang about six times.\(^{62}\) This is a significant increase from previous accounts of one or two visits a year. Air shipments are safer from interception than seaborne transit, given North Korea’s recent experience, when a North Korean ship carrying missiles to Yemen was intercepted by the Spanish navy in December 2002. It seems that the Iranians are willing to run the risk of interception as Iranian cargo ships have docked at North Korea’s Ha’eu port 120km south of Pyongyang in 2003, presumably to acquire missile parts and other military equipment. It would surprise few if North Korea were helping Iran with its nuclear program given the penury of North Korea. Nuclear and missile technology knowledge and materials are the few things it has to sell, and it has done so before, exchanging missile technology for nuclear technology with Pakistan. Also, there is a long history of cooperation between the two countries. North Korea has provided extensive assistance to Iran for the development of the intermediate range Shahab-3 missile, which could reach Israel.\(^{63}\)

There is also U.S. concern about a facility under construction near Arak, 250km south of Tehran that will be used for heavy-water production. On May 6, 2003 in a speech to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the head of Iran’s atomic energy program, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, stated that Iran will be building a 40MW(th) Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU)-design heavy-water reactor not far from the heavy-water production facility. This reactor is expected to operate under IAEA safeguards.\(^{64}\) Construction will begin in 2004, and it will be called the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor-40.\(^{65}\) Spent fuel from this type of reactor is ideal for the production of plutonium and indeed it could produce 8-10kgs of plutonium annually—enough for about two nuclear weapons each year—and provides the reason for being of the Arak heavy-water facility. Heavy-water may be used in reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium, which would then be reprocessed and turned into nuclear weapons. An advantage of heavy-water reactors is that they use natural uranium, an element Iran is mining according to a February 2003 declaration by Iranian president Mohammad Khatami. Moreover, the use of natural uranium is harder to monitor than enriched uranium.

On March 4, 2003, the secretary-general of Iran’s National Supreme Security Council, Hassan Rohani, announced that a uranium processing plant near Isfahan, 350km south of Tehran, will begin operation in 2003.
This plant will process uranium from nearby mines (such as the Saghand mines), turning it into UO2, UF4, and UF6. These materials might then be transferred to Natanz, to be further processed and enriched to weapons-grade uranium. But it is also possible that the UO2 from the Isfahan plant will be used to manufacture nuclear fuel for the heavy-water reactor at Arak.

The Russian-built, low-enriched uranium, light-water reactor at Bushehr (Bushehr I, a 1,000 MWe, VVR-1000 reactor) is much less efficient for plutonium production, a heavy-water reactor is much better suited for that purpose. But while the Bushehr facility seems to be proliferation-resistant, it is not benign. Under an $800 million contract, the Russians have helped the Iranians build the facility and it is expected to begin full operation in 2004. Bushehr benefits an Iranian nuclear program by yielding experience in reactor operation and maintenance, as well as in access to dual-use technology that may be diverted into an Iranian nuclear weapons program. It is also possible that the second reactor (Bushehr II, a 1,300 MWe reactor) at the facility may be completed, and that Russia might back away from its demand that Iran return to it the spent fuel in Bushehr to be reprocessed at Russia’s Mayak plant. It is conceivable that Iran will steal or offer to buy some or all of the fuel at a handsome price. Nonetheless, it is gratifying to the United States that Russia has agreed not to fuel Bushehr until Iran signs an additional protocol with the IAEA allowing it to inspect all sites, not just those Iran declares, and to conduct surprise inspections. By October 2003, Iran has accepted these demands, and agreed to freeze its uranium enrichment program. It remains to be seen whether Iran intends to implement this decision or whether it is playing for time.

The U.S. must coerce the Iranian government into terminating its support for al Qaeda, Afghan rebels, and its nuclear power program. Time is of the essence in each case, although clearly, preventing a nuclear Iran is most important for U.S. policy. There is a window of opportunity to stop the Iranian nuclear program and that window is closing rapidly.

Complicating the Iranian nuclear weapons issue is the North Korean program. It is necessary to stop the North Korean nuclear program because if Pyongyang’s effort is not arrested, they may sell the weapons or technology to Tehran. The North Korean nuclear program then is simply another avenue through which Iran may acquire nuclear weapons.

Fortunately, bases in Iraq greatly aid the confrontation with Iran. Iraq will play the role of a South Korea in the confrontation with North Korea. That is, it will provide the territory from which massive conventional power may be supplied and deployed against the enemy. To be sure, confrontation with Iran need not mean its invasion or military strike. The invasion of Iraq was difficult enough, Iran is more formidable. But invasion or military strikes cannot be ruled out. The U.S. is strong enough to do either.
A superior option, however, would be if Israel could strike and destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities. Israeli destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities would eliminate a great danger to Israel. As Israelis often note with great concern, 70 percent of its population is concentrated in the kill radius of a single strategic nuclear weapon. Moreover, such an attack is well within Israeli military capabilities. It is possible to execute, given the skill of the pilots, weaponry, and the refueling capability Israel possesses. Israeli aircraft could penetrate through Jordan and Iraq to conduct the attack. The United States could ensure secretly that air corridors were open. Perhaps special operations forces or Mossad’s covert forces would be used in conjunction with air strikes or discretely to ensure that the facilities are destroyed either through bombing or effective sabotage.

An Israeli attack would free the United States from undertaking such action, allowing it to focus its attention on the present unrest in parts of Iraq and the looming confrontation with North Korea. For the United States, the threat posed by North Korea is the greater danger due to the type of regime in Pyongyang and the fact it now has nuclear weapons and is rapidly gaining more. The clock is ticking. Thus, at the present time, Iran is less of a danger for the United States. For Israel, the positions are reversed.

Such a division of labor—the U.S. confronts North Korea and Israel destroys Iran’s nuclear facilities—would be a significant help to the United States because both Tehran and North Korea would be confronted in a relatively brief period of time, and time does matter for stopping nuclear programs; second, Iranian animus would be principally directed against Israel, not the United States; third, the U.S. would be able to condemn publicly the Israeli action as it did after 1981; fourth, the U.S. would be able to plausibly deny involvement, given the profound threat Iranian nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems pose to Israel. To be sure, many in the Muslim world would see the U.S. as the instigator of the attack, but the U.S. would not face the full force of Muslim rage in response to such an attack.

The final benefit of this division of labor is perhaps the most important. An Israeli attack would reduce the risk that Iran would retaliate against oil tankers in the Gulf. Sinking or damaging oil tankers to hinder the flow of oil from the Gulf should be expected to be the principal mechanism of Iranian retaliation against the U.S., if in fact the United States attacks Iranian nuclear facilities. The Persian Gulf states possess about two-thirds of proven, conventional oil reserves—about 32 percent of the world total—and about 90 percent of the world’s excess oil production capacity—oil supplies that may be brought online to compensate for oil supply disruption in other places such as Nigeria or Venezuela. Interruption of much of the world’s oil supply and excess oil production capacity is a great danger for the world’s economy and is sufficient to give a United States president pause.
In the short-run, in the earlier hours, days, or even weeks of confrontation, Iran would be able to restrict severely oil shipping traffic in the entire Gulf—this includes the shipping from Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. To make matters worse, the Iranians might reduce or stop their own oil supplies to world markets, making a disastrous situation worse. In the long run, the navy and other services would be able to destroy most of Iran’s cruise missile launchers and aircraft, but this would not stop the damage done to the world economy, for which the free-flow of oil is a *sine qua non*. And the Gulf is critical for the free-flow of oil. About 13.6 million bbl/d (barrels per day) of oil transits the Strait of Hormuz each day, and in any given year, two-fifths of all world-traded oil passes through it on its way to Asia, Europe, and the United States.

Iran obviously has a long coastline from which to launch attacks, and it essentially possesses control over the 34-mile wide Strait of Hormuz due to its coastline and control over three islands in the Strait—Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. In response to Iranian action, the U.S. navy would not be able to protect the tankers in the Gulf due to several factors. The first is the geography of the region. The ability of the navy to maneuver in tight confines, with significant shipping traffic and large number of surface and subsurface contacts is limited, given the small number of U.S. navy ships and even aircraft that could be deployed for the mission.

Second, in a U.S. confrontation with Tehran, the Gulf would be the most dangerous maritime environment for civilian and military vessels. Given the small confines of the Gulf, Iran would almost certainly know the location of ships and be able to launch large numbers of cruise missiles against them. While not all missiles would strike their target, some would, with predictable results for insurance rates and oil prices, and for the economies of the West and Japan. The advanced radar on navy ships is only able to detect cruise missiles after they have crossed the horizon, and given the speed of cruise missiles, this does not provide much time for the ship to react and destroy the missile, not to mention the problems encountered if, as is likely, many missiles were launched at a single target.

Third, there probably would be few naval air assets in the region, valuable carriers would stay away in the Arabian Sea, restricting air support for surface combatants. It is not certain that other air assets would receive permission to fly combat missions against Iranian targets from the countries in the region.

Certainly a strike against Iran would carry risks for Israel. However, the risks are acceptable, and certainly more acceptable than the 1981 strike. Due to the imbalance in military effectiveness, it is unlikely that the Iranians would attempt a conventional strike against Israel. Nonetheless,
if such an attempt is made it would be met by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). More probable is an Iranian effort to use Hamas, PIJ, or Hizbullah to retaliate. Each of these groups is hindered by their capabilities and it is not clear that Iran could augment them successfully. Nonetheless, Israeli security services have the first two terrorist groups under pressure already and Hizbullah might think twice about doing Tehran’s bidding this time due to its desire to avoid falling into the sights of the American military.

However, military action should not occur immediately. The United States must first apply diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran. This is already happening. The U.S. is attempting to isolate the Iranians by putting pressure on the Russians, so far unsuccessfully, concerning Bushehr and nuclear cooperation. In contrast, it was successful in convincing the Japanese to threaten termination of a $2 billion arrangement to develop the part of the Azadegan oilfield in Khuzestan province, Iran’s largest at a massive 26 billion barrels. In addition, covert support to dissident movements inside or outside of Iran must be increased in order, ideally, to bring about a rapid fall of the present regime. But this is unlikely. Support for dissident groups is still useful because they are critical sources of intelligence and the source of leaders after a regime change. The U.S. should resort to force only if the dissident movements evince no sign of the ability to overthrow the regime as rapidly as the 1979 Revolution, and the stern diplomatic and economic efforts to achieve these objectives fail.

While it would be better if other avenues succeeded, the coercion of Iran is likely to come from threats of military action or the actual use of the military instrument due to the time pressure the United States confronts. Above all, the U.S. must stop the nuclear program and so it should set a date. If the program is not stopped by 2005 the U.S. should attack Iran’s nuclear facilities as Israel acted against Iraq. The U.S. must also move against North Korea to terminate that country’s program. Given that North Korea already has nuclear weapons, and Iran does not, acting against North Korea must receive priority for military action.

Even if it is necessary to overthrow the government in order to ensure that the nuclear program is stopped, this may prove a risky move. Regime change is of a difficult and unpredictable nature — it may produce a pro-Western, democratic government or precisely its opposite. When regime change is successful, then the U.S. becomes responsible in the eyes of people in the region and any perception that a new government is a puppet government will be enormously damaging to it. What is especially important is that the U.S. does not become the focus for any group or person with a grievance against the new rulers.

With respect to Syria, the U.S. must press Damascus on the following issues: eliminating support for terrorism and evicting those groups headquartered there, sealing the borders with Iraq, and eliminating its
weapons of mass destruction. U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz threatened Syria on April 5, 2003 when he announced: “There has got to be ‘regime change’ in Syria.”71 A month later, Wolfowitz repeated this message for Syria and Iran: “Keep your sticky fingers off. That’s the first requirement. They shouldn’t be making trouble in Iraq.”72

Having made the threat, the administration’s rhetoric cooled somewhat shortly after Wolfowitz’s warning. President Bashar Assad’s government has been helpful in the war on terrorism. It has helped the United States locate and arrest al Qaeda operatives, including Muhammad Haydar Zammar, the individual who is believed to have recruited Mohammed Atta, the operational leader of the 9/11 attacks. Damascus also aided Washington by providing intelligence that is believed to have thwarted an al Qaeda attack against U.S. interests in the Gulf in 2002. In July 2003, some of its forces in the Batroun region and Akkar in northern Lebanon were redeployed to Syria, as have about 1,000 troops from the Beirut suburbs of Khaldeh and Aramoun. It has also stopped support for the PKK under military pressure from Turkey.

Despite this aid to Washington, Damascus has failed to recognize that a new strategic reality exists in the Middle East. It will have to do more to placate Washington. This is especially the case due to Syria’s support for Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Syria was the major conduit for arms into Iraq before and during the war. It is suspected that Russian-made Kornet-E anti-tank guided missiles transitioned through Syria—although evidence of the Kornets in Iraq had not surfaced by July 2003—as did GPS jammers and power packs for T-62 and T-72 tanks.73 During the war, on March 28, 2003, Rumsfeld stated that night vision equipment had passed through Syria on its way to Iraq and demanded that Damascus stop the flow of arms, and he repeated this demand on April 3. After that, and due to the rapidity of the Iraqi collapse, it appeared that Syria stopped the arms flow. Syria also allowed senior Iraqi officials refuge, especially those who might implicate Syria’s aid for Iraq’s illegal weapons programs, and passage through its territory in the course of the war. Moreover, Damascus permitted Arab supporters of Saddam Hussein to pass through the country on their way to defend the collapsing regime. This behavior continued after the war as well. In the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom, there are reports that hundreds of militants have passed through Syria in order to attack U.S. troops and pro-American Iraqis, and that they are using Syrian territory as a sanctuary.74

Two critical requirements of Syria are an end to support for terrorist groups and terminating its WMD and ballistic missile programs. Syria has long supported the armed wing of Hizbullah in Lebanon to maintain its influence there and also to attempt to deny Israel security along its northern border.75 The United States has placed pressure on Syria to expel Hizbullah
and Palestinian terrorist organizations, including the Abu Musa faction, Ahmad Jibril group, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC), from their Damascus offices and other facilitates but Syria has yet to do so.

With respect to Washington’s proliferation concerns, Syria has a biological and chemical weapons program and is strengthening its short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), about 550 Scud B, Scud C, and Scud D (with ranges of 300km, 550km, and 650km respectively), using assistance from China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Syria is not a party to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, although it is a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of biological and chemical weapons in war. It is known that Syria has had a chemical weapons capability for thirty years. It received mustard gas from Egypt, and has sarin and cyanide as well. It also has the potent nerve agent VX, acquired from the Soviets, which it produces at facilities in Damascus and Homs. Syria is also believed to be developing an offensive biological weapons capability, although it is not known to have produced any biological weapons. It has signed but not ratified the 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, and has developed botulinum and ricin toxins and cholera and anthrax with Russian assistance.

Unlike Iran, the United States has more time to bring pressure to bear on Syria due to its absence of a nuclear weapons program. But it must move beyond the demand to expel terror groups from Damascus and rather present Syria with an immediate demand to terminate support for Hizbullah, to end its use as a conduit for Iranian support for that terrorist organization. Hizbullah must be weakened but simultaneously the U.S. must ensure that al Qaeda does not replace it as the dominant power in southern Lebanon. Ideally, the sovereignty of the Lebanese state should return to this area and indeed all of Lebanon. This would include a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. But not prematurely, that is before the Lebanese government could bring order and ensure that al Qaeda or similar groups would not find a new home there. Moving to terminate Syrian support for Hizbullah should be the first objective. It would be desirable if the U.S. could force Syria to terminate its weapons of mass destruction programs and permit international inspectors to verify their termination. But even though U.S. power in the region is significant now, it is best to advance the agenda with Syria one step at a time. Hizbullah is the greater, tangible threat to U.S. interests at this time rather than Syrian WMD. As long as the United States maintains a presence on Syria’s borders, it will have more leverage over Damascus than it ever has. If indeed Iran is confronted, then Washington will be able to force significant change in Syria.
II. D. The U.S. Agenda in the Middle East: Terrorist Threats—Al Qaeda and Hizbullah

The terrorist threat from al Qaeda to the American homeland and to U.S. forces and interests in the Middle East is great. Indeed, according to the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, terrorism is the principal threat. He has argued that the major threats of the 21st century are different from those of the 20th century. This is because the threats of this century are terrorist states armed with weapons of mass destruction, their relationship with terrorist groups, and the ungoverned areas of the world where terrorist groups like al Qaeda may flourish. One would add that the threats posed by states like China probably will be the equal of 20th century threats and surpass the threat posed by al Qaeda in the coming decades. Nonetheless, at the present time Rumsfeld is correct.

But the war against al Qaeda also provides the opportunity to legitimize the expansion of the American presence in the Middle East. Just as Pearl Harbor and the threat of Soviet expansionism legitimized the presence of U.S. power in Europe and Northeast Asia, so too does war against terrorism legitimize the American presence in the Middle East. Explaining the expansion of the American Empire in the Middle East in terms of fighting a war against the terrorists responsible for 9/11 legitimizes the expansion for the American people and much elite opinion in the United States. 9/11 is thus like Pearl Harbor, a tragedy for the United States but an event that also allows it to further its interests and advance its empire.

Two years into the Bush administration’s war on terrorism, significant progress has been made toward the goal of destroying the al Qaeda terrorist organization. The United States has created a potent coalition that includes strong allies like Great Britain and Australia as well as more recent but still important partners like Pakistan and Yemen. This coalition has caused the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan and placed al Qaeda under great pressure worldwide. The administration has labored to deny al Qaeda sanctuary; it has killed and arrested its members, disrupted its cells worldwide, diminished the power of allied terrorist groups, and attempted to weaken its ability to recruit and seize its finances. Most importantly, it has kept from them nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons.

The American victory in the war against al Qaeda begins by recognizing that terrorist organizations not only can be defeated but indeed often are. Almost all of the leftwing terrorist organizations of the Cold War were defeated—from the Weather Underground in the United States to the Japanese Red Army, the Red Army Faction in Germany, and the Red Brigades in Italy. The British fought the IRA to a standstill. The Algerians have successfully suppressed the GIA. The Israelis defeated the PLO, as did
the Jordanians. The Egyptians have broken the back of the Islamic Group and of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. So while it is true that al Qaeda should not be underestimated, due to its motivation, competence, and resilience, it does have vulnerabilities and can be defeated.

That said, it is likely to be a long war, perhaps as long as the Cold War, and one with many failures as well as successes. It is likely to end not with a bang but with a whimper as the organization splinters into impotence, and gradually dies as the social and political conditions in the Muslim world change, making it a dinosaur in the age of mammals, or perhaps—much like the Provisional IRA—al Qaeda will melt into established political life in the Islamic world. In spite of progress, much remains to be accomplished to defeat al Qaeda and win the war on terrorism.

To its credit, the administration is taking many of the right steps, and has labored assiduously to place as much pressure on al Qaeda as rapidly as possible in order to weaken it. It has evicted al Qaeda from its training camps in Afghanistan and has labored to cut off al Qaeda’s considerable financial resources. It is attempting to extinguish all of the known cells at once, from Germany to Kenya to Malaysia, by placing pressure on the governments to destroy the cells in their country.

The administration has talked about “taking the gloves off” to destroy al Qaeda and many of its actions have matched its rhetoric. Evidence of this is the admission by U.S. officials of adopting a policy of “stress and duress” for many of the 3,000 suspected al Qaeda members and their supporters detained worldwide since 9/11. This means known or suspected members have been “softened up” by U.S. forces, and some “rendered” or turned over to friendly intelligence services like the Egyptians or Moroccans to be tortured. This success includes capturing Ramiz Binalshibh in Pakistan, Omar al-Faruq in Indonesia, Abd Al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Kuwait, and Muhammad al Darbi in Yemen. All were seized as a result of intelligence gained during interrogation of their confederates.

Moreover, although the administration does not call attention to it, “taking the gloves off” also involves taking a page from the Israeli playbook: targeted killings of terrorists. Israel has openly relied on targeted killings since the second Intifada began in September 2000 in an effort to destroy Hamas, PIJ, and other groups. Israeli security services, most often the domestic security service or Shin Bet, successfully penetrate terrorist cells, identify terrorists, and then either kill them or capture some for intelligence purposes—to interrogate or turn them into double agents. The Israelis estimate that they prevent over 80 percent (and perhaps 90 percent) of attempted suicide attacks and this percentage is improving. They have concluded this is the most effective response in their war of attrition against Palestinian terrorist groups. We have witnessed targeted killing in November 2002 with the killing of one of the U.S.S. Cole bombing
masterminds in Yemen. No doubt there will be many other cases of targeted killings in this long war.

Al Qaeda has never been under as much pressure as it is now, and it is weakening. To further weaken it, the administration is laboring to sever al Qaeda from the support it receives from states. This aid can be indirect, such as from its followers in Saudi Arabia, but no matter how it comes, it must be ended to ensure al Qaeda does not receive financial assistance, refuge, or access to the weapons of mass destruction of these states. Even partners in the war on terrorism like Pakistan have to be watched closely to ensure al Qaeda supporters within the country—such as nuclear weapons scientists—do not assist it and that the Pakistani government does not turn a blind eye to such help.

However, as discussed above, the major state supporter of al Qaeda and remnant Taliban forces is Iran. The administration is largely silent on the issue of Iranian support for al Qaeda. Indeed, the major hole in the administration’s efforts to end state support for al Qaeda is Iran. This has to end. But the Bush administration’s silence is probably tactical. Perhaps, in the near future, we will see the administration move against Iran and it will loudly proclaim what we already know: Iran harbors and aids al Qaeda and sponsors terrorism. Indeed, if we judged the three states of the “Axis of Evil” by one criterion, support for al Qaeda and other terrorists, then Iran would be at the head of the queue for a U.S. attack, far ahead of Saddam’s Iraq or North Korea.

Another step the Bush administration must take is to require that the American bureaucracy takes terrorism seriously in deed and not simply in word. Certainly, in the wake of 9/11 the U.S. government has to put its best people on the war on terrorism and must be prepared to do so for a long time—perhaps 50 years. The truth is that counter-terrorism was a backwater for the CIA, FBI, and others before 9/11. With some exceptions, the best people did not work the issue, and it was a dead end for a career. This is changing, but the pace should be accelerated. Institutional change, such as creating a domestic intelligence organization, is important. But even more so is the message that should be sent thorough the American government that terrorism is one of the two principal national security threats the United States faces. The other is the growth of Chinese power. If the threat from China were to be made clear, the U.S. would be able to recruit the best and most ambitious people for the job. Recall that at the outset of the Cold War, the government had only a handful of Soviet experts. That changed rapidly once it was clear that being a Soviet expert was the path to the top. American universities expanded the teaching of Russian and introduced Soviet studies to the curriculum. The defense industry produced weapons tailored to fight the Soviet Union and the intelligence equipment to monitor it. Think-tanks studied the USSR so closely they developed the arcane
science of Kremlinology. Similar steps need to be taken today for an enemy as unknown and alien to the U.S. government and the American people as the Soviet Union was in 1945.

If we consider terrorism in the Middle East more broadly, there are two types of terrorist organizations in the Middle East that touch on American interests—the Palestinian terrorist groups and Hizbullah. Hamas and PIJ are threats to Israel and must be destroyed. But this is best done by the Israelis, not the United States, for two reasons. First, Hamas and PIJ are motivated principally by nationalism and have no substantial links to al Qaeda at this time. While they receive considerable support from Hizbullah, Iran, and Syria, and the United States should place pressure on each of these entities to terminate this support, nevertheless, at this time, Hamas and PIJ only indirectly touch on America’s interests in the Middle East because they are a low-intensity threat to Israel.

Second, the Israelis are able to address the threat posed by these groups. The Shin Bet is effective at stopping the majority of attacks against Israel before they occur. The efforts of Shin Bet must be one of the most successful counter-terrorism campaigns in history—if also one of the least acknowledged. While Israel is locked into an ugly war of attrition with these groups, as long as Israel maintains its will to win it will do so, due to its intelligence and military capabilities and the creation of an increasingly viable political alternative to Arafat. There is more that the United States could do to aid Israel in its struggle against these terrorist groups and this is considered below.

Unlike Hamas or PIJ, Hizbullah is a significant threat due to its capabilities and motivation. Its capabilities are formidable for a terrorist organization because it receives armaments from Iran and Syria. Shipments of Iranian arms for Hizbullah have passed through Syria, including the Zelzal-2 SRBM, 240mm “Katyusha” rockets, and Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 surface-to-surface missiles. But Hizbullah works assiduously to stay out of the United States’ crosshairs. It is well aware that there is a significant chance in the international politics of the Middle East after Operation Iraqi Freedom, and that it may be destroyed by the United States directly, or by Israel.

The U.S. has made three arguments against Hizbullah. First, that the organization has organizational and operational links to al Qaeda. If true, then the United States would act against it with the force and rapidity with which the U.S. has acted against groups with similar ties to al Qaeda such as Abu Sayyaf and Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines. Evidence in support of this argument is found in the presence of a relatively large number of al Qaeda and Hizbullah members and sympathizers in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay’s “tri-border area.” This is the location of much arms and narcotics trafficking and where a significant number of Lebanese and other Arab émigrés live and where Hizbullah has considerable support. In
addition, one of the FBI’s most wanted terrorists, Imad Mughniyeh, is in the region and he is suspected by some authorities to have acted as a liaison between al Qaeda and Hizbullah. It is known that he has acted in such a role between Hizbullah’s military intelligence branch and Iran and Syria, but there is no evidence publicly available to link him to al Qaeda.

Some analysts suggest that Hizbullah has little to gain by working with al Qaeda. Mats Wärn from Stockholm University, who has long studied Hizbullah argues: “Hizbullah has nothing to gain from working with Al-Qaeda,” because “it would only serve to tarnish their image as a responsible and popular movement with good working relations with the Lebanese government,” and “it would also make their relationship with the Syrians more difficult.”80 Furthermore, the Taliban and al Qaeda have conducted massacres against Shi’as, and this has enraged Iran and Hizbullah.

Second, Hizbullah is one of the major suppliers of funds and arms to Palestinian terrorist groups like Hamas, PIJ, and the PFLP-GC. The Israelis claim that it has a presence in the West Bank and Gaza and has served as a conduit between al Qaeda and Hamas and PIJ.81 Although such a connection is denied by Hizbullah and Hamas, as Imad al-Alami, a member of the politburo of Hamas states, to prove such a connection would greatly assist Israel: it would be “the greatest prize they [the Israelis] could imagine…to establish] a connection between Al-Qaeda and us, Hizbullah, Syria, Iran….There is no such connection.”82 There is concern that Hizbullah has growing links to al Qaeda because of the growing al Qaeda presence in Lebanon. The Esbat al-Ansar (League of Warriors) terrorist group is operating in a refugee camp of about 100,000 people near Sidon, and seems to have been penetrated by about 200 al Qaeda and Taliban members.83 In June 2003, the group attacked a television station owned by Lebanon’s prime minister, who in turn has ties to Saudi Arabia. The attack is being interpreted as an attack on Saudi interests, although it is worrisome for the United States because it suggests that Lebanon, including the area occupied by Hizbullah, may become a new safe haven for al Qaeda.

Even if the denial is true, there is no doubt that at a minimum, both Hizbullah and the Palestinian terrorist groups view Israel as a mortal enemy and there is strong sympathy and support between them. Hizbullah, PFLP-GC, and Fatah al-Intifada talk of a “strategic relationship” among them and they have cooperated in attacks against Israeli targets in southern Lebanon.84

Third, the organization is considered a direct threat to the United States and its interests in the Middle East. Most forcefully making this charge is U.S. Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) who called Hizbullah the world’s “most vicious and effective” terrorist organization that has killed American citizens since the 1980s and operates cells in the United States who are waiting to strike targets within the United States.85 It is true that Hizbullah has killed Americans and does operate cells in the United States.
However, Hizbullah did condemn 9/11 terrorist attacks, it lambasted al Qaeda’s interpretation of Islam a month after 9/11, and it appears that its U.S. cells are centered on fundraising rather than conducting attacks against American targets. Fundraising for Hizbullah in the United States is illegal since the State Department has declared it to be a terrorist organization. Despite its illegality, it is lucrative for the organization nonetheless. This must provide a powerful disincentive to attack since clearly any attack would cause a crackdown on its members and supporters in the United States and hurt its finances.86 Although it is suspect that funds raised in the West are becoming relatively less important due to the rise in the income trafficking in narcotics. Drug dealers using southern Lebanon must assist Hizbullah with the transfer of equipment and weapons in return for using Hizbullah-controlled territory. In December 2002, Israelis announced that nine Israeli drug dealers had been arrested. These individuals used Hizbullah-controlled territory in return for providing the terrorist organization with information about IDF deployments.87 In February 2003, Israeli authorities revealed the arrest of three Israeli Jews and eight residents of the Alawi village of Ghajar who were suspected of collaborating with Hizbullah. At that time, one of the eleven individuals stated that he had provided Hizbullah with pistols, maps, photographs, and other information in exchanged for the opportunity to traffic in narcotics.88

Hizbullah’s worldview seems to draw a significant distinction between the foreign and defense policies of the United States in the Middle East, to which it is adamantly opposed, and the U.S. as a state and society. In March 2003, Hizbullah secretary-general Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah drew this distinction, “‘Death to America’ means death to the American administration. I am not talking about the American people. America means the American project. America means American Zionism.”89

Given the ideology of Hizbullah, it is not likely to attack American targets in future, nor is there evidence that the organization has recently attacked American targets. However, the U.S. must continue to watch the Hizbullah closely to ensure that it does not attack American targets, to monitor its capabilities and trafficking in narcotics, and to examine who passes through and who resides in territory controlled by Hizbullah. Although it is unlikely at the present, the United States must ensure that the organization does not provide a nest for al Qaeda or al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist groups. Equally, the United States does not want the world’s drug barons to find safe haven in southern Lebanon. The best solution for Washington would be to have the Lebanese government regain control over its territory in southern Lebanon. But this will not happen as long as the terrorists remain as strong as they are and the government continues to be impotent. After the American agenda with respect to Iran is satisfied, it may be time for the United States to return to this area and strengthen the
government of Lebanon so that it may be returned to full control over its territory.

There is no doubt that Hizbullah remains a significant threat to Israel. Hizbullah denies Israel’s legitimacy and routinely attacks Israeli targets. The causes of Hizbullah’s animus toward Israel are twofold. First is the issue of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. It was the most resilient of guerrilla groups that fought against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon until the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000. Second, and more worrisome for stability, is the strong antipathy toward Israel that stems from its “occupation” of Palestine in the eyes of Hizbullah. For Hizbullah, Israel will never be a legitimate state because Israel’s existence by definition is illegitimate—the product of the “rape” or “usurpation” of Palestinian land by foreign aggressors. Nor will the organization accept Israel’s existence in time. According to a Hizbullah spokesman, “Even if hundreds of years pass by, Israel’s existence will continue to be an illegal existence” because justice, both human and divine, repudiate the concept that “al-batil” (falsehood) can become “al-haq” (righteousness) over time.

In addition, the aggression that spawned Israel continues even more forcefully if also more covertly. It is the perception of Israeli aggression that leads Hizbullah to term Israel “the greatest evil in the world” and the “greatest abomination of our era,” whose “nature” makes it “the central enemy of the umma’s civilisation.” Also, Hizbullah has rejected a negotiated settlement in the Israeli-Palestinian struggle because to do so entails a tacit recognition of Israel, the acceptance of a truncated Palestine, and their fear that a final agreement will be skewed in the favor of Israel. Thus, even with Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, the desire to liberate Palestine is the major source of Hizbullah’s attacks, and further violence against Israel must be expected.

The organization conducts overt operations against Israel, such as anti-aircraft fire along the border—which killed an Israeli citizen in August 2003, the first casualty inflicted by Hizbullah since Israel withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000—but also covert ones such as having contacts with Palestinian terrorists, operating spy rings in Israel, and executing “deniable” attacks in Israel itself. It has made many attempts to infiltrate Israel via the Lebanese border with that country, and many of the infiltration tactics adopted by the organization have been nothing short of creative. It has recruited civilians among Israeli Arabs and the Arabs living in the Golan Heights to aid the identification of targets within Israel, and for the positioning of weapons caches within Israel so that Hizbullah agents would
be able to penetrate Israeli borders unarmed. There is no doubt it is a wily foe.

Perhaps of greatest concern is Hizbullah’s ability to infiltrate Israel using Europeans or individuals of Arab or South Asian descent with Canadian or European passports. The first of these agents was Mohammed Hussein Miqdad (or Mikdad) who in April 1996 flew from Europe to Tel Aviv on a forged British passport. Fortunately, an explosive device in his possession had malfunctioned in his Jerusalem hotel room, seriously wounding him. In June 1998, he returned to Lebanon in a prisoner exchange. A German citizen was a Hizbullah agent who was arrested in 1997. He had intended to conduct a suicide bombing. A British citizen working for Hizbullah was arrested in January 2001. Six months later, a Canadian citizen was arrested by the IDF in Hebron. We have witnessed other terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, use third-party nationals to conduct attacks. Again, these individuals typically have been nationals of European countries. The two British citizens of Pakistani origin bombed the nightclub “Mike’s Place” in Tel Aviv in April 2003 that killed three and wounded 50. Hizbullah also has attacked Israeli targets far outside of the region. For example, it was responsible for a failed attempt to attack the Israeli embassy in Bangkok in May 1994.

II. E. The U.S. Agenda in the Middle East: A Palestinian State That Does Not Threaten Israeli Security

Yogi Berra once exclaimed that predictions were hard, especially about the future. The Israeli-Palestinian dispute seems to violate Berra’s dictum easily if one predicts more bloodshed. Nevertheless, the United States must hope for the best—a settlement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority that creates a prosperous Palestine that does not threaten Israel’s security. But it must prepare for the worst—a deepening of the war of attrition—or the continuation of the levels of violence seen since September 2000.

The Oslo process provided a glimpse of peace but it was premature. No doubt when a Palestinian state is realized, the Oslo process and the labors of Yitzhak Rabin will be viewed as a seminal. Nonetheless, Israel is locked into a violent struggle with terrorists: Hamas, PIJ, and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades of Fatah. Clearly, the parallels with the American campaign against al Qaeda are obvious. Israel seeks to defeat these terrorists by killing and arresting them, hindering their ability to recruit, finance, and to receive outside aid of money or material. At the same time, the creation and strengthening of a viable moderate alternative to Yasser Arafat is necessary to reduce the attractiveness of the terror groups. Israel is taking these steps while maintaining its will to fight terror.
If we consider the struggle between the Israelis and the Palestinians as a long struggle with peaks and valleys in intensity—like the Thirty Years War or Hundred Years War—then it becomes clear that some of the most important components in this difficult struggle necessary for peace are in place. The collapse of the Soviet Union denied the Palestinians a superpower patron, the removal of Saddam Hussein was a lesser but still significant event, and the evolution of Palestinian political thought since Israel’s foundation in a positive direction—toward the acceptance of the state of Israel. Although, encouraging such a development of Palestinian political thought may strike some as a Sisyphean task. Finally, and equally importantly, Israel’s resolve to resist terrorism remains in place despite some vacillations. The IDF is locked into a classic low-intensity war of attrition against a formidable and determined foe. But it is a war that Israel can win if the resolve of the Israeli public is steadfast. Indeed, the chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Moshe Ya’alon, stated in July 2003 that the end of the conflict was near and was a victory for Israel. While this may be the case, there is no doubt that the toll of human life in this war has been high. Through June 2003, about 810 Israelis and other nationalities have been killed in Palestinian terror attacks (567 civilians and 243 soldiers) and some 5,600 injured, while the Israeli Defense Forces estimate that approximately 2,330 Palestinians have been killed and 14,000 wounded.

The objectives of the United States should be the following. First, the United States must ensure that Israeli security is maintained. Israel is a true pillar upon which the American Empire in the Middle East rested during the Cold War and after. It is a valuable ally for ideological reasons and for practical reasons as well—the cooperation in intelligence, military, and political affairs. It is not transparent at this time that a Palestinian state would aid the security of Israel or the interests of the United States in the Middle East due to the fact that Arafat is still in control. Indeed, the greater threat to Arafat’s rule comes from the leadership of the terror groups, not from the moderate Abbas. At some point, perhaps so, but this is not the case now. The most effective way to execute this strategy is to allow the Israelis to determine the velocity and direction of the conflict to ensure that the conflict ultimately ends on conditions acceptable to Israel.

Second, due to its worldwide interests, the United States must take account of global opinion, particularly in the Arab world. Consequently, the United States must decry the humanitarian conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip while ensuring that the Palestinian leadership does not escape blame for those conditions. Furthermore, the U.S. must be seen to be active in furthering negotiations between Israel and the PA, as it has been with the “roadmap.” The U.S. must be perceived to be doing much to terminate the conflict, but in reality it should be going nowhere that threatens Israeli security. Just like the Red Queen in Through the Looking-Glass who had to...
run ever faster to remain in the same place, the U.S. must protect Israeli security—the Red Queen’s location—while being perceived to be pressuring both sides to accept the “roadmap”—the flamboyant activity of the Red Queen.

The “roadmap” peace plan for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was created by the “Quartet” of Middle East mediators, the E.U., Russia, the U.N., and the U.S. It was released on April 30, 2003. The plan calls for the creation of a Palestinian state at the end of a three-phase process. The first phase is intended to end violence and build confidence. The Palestinians must unequivocally reiterate Israel’s right to exist and stop all attacks on Israel through an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, confiscate illegal weapons and labor to disrupt terrorist groups. They must also hold free, open, and fair elections and restructure their security organizations so that they are under the control of the prime minister. The Israelis will affirm a commitment to a viable and sovereign Palestinian state, freeze Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, dismantle more than 70 Jewish settlement outposts erected since March 2001, end the demolitions of the homes of Palestinian militants, and “progressively” withdraw troops from those regions.

The second phase will establish a provisional Palestinian state by the end of 2003. In this stage, Israel will work to maximize the territorial contiguity for the Palestinian state within the constraints of Israeli security. The Palestinian constitution will be ratified and an international conference will launch a process that will culminate in the establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders. Quartet members will begin a campaign to promote international recognition for the nascent Palestinian state and U.N. membership.

Phase three calls for a second international conference to be convened in 2004 that will lead to a final status agreement in 2005. During this phase, many of the hardest issues will be resolved. It will determine the final status of Jerusalem, and set the final borders between the two states. Also to be resolved is the “right of return” issue, that is, determine whether Palestinian refugees are able to return to homes now in Israel and the question of Israeli settlements.

The Bush administration repeatedly has said that it wishes to see a Palestinian state come into being that will live in peace with Israel. Yasser Arafat is seen by the administration as an impediment to peace, and has strongly favored former prime minister Abbas and his head of security Muhammad Dahlan. Powell has referred to Arafat as “a failed leader.” In April 2003, White House spokesman, Ari Fleischer, dismissed Arafat as a “part of the problem” for not reaching peace. “I think Yasser Arafat had his chance and he walked away from it...when he walked away from an agreement that President Clinton worked very hard to reach. That was
Yasser Arafat’s moment of truth. And then the moment of truth became even worse when Yasser Arafat lied to President Bush about the Karine-A and actively worked on behalf of the terrorists, lying to the President of the United States about Palestinian support, led by Yasser Arafat, for terrorism. Simultaneously, Abbas received praise from the highest levels of the administration. President Bush described him as “a man I can work with.” Nonetheless, whether it is Arafat, Abbas, or their replacements in the PA’s leadership, it is incumbent on the Palestinian leadership to demonstrate that they have come to terms with the existence of Israel, as a Jewish state, and that they are not seeking to gain a state as a step to wage war more effectively against Israel.

A Palestinian state that would not hurt Israeli security is the best solution. If this fails to obtain, then the perception that the U.S. is working assiduously to create a Palestinian state while not damaging Israeli security is second best. But it is sufficient for now. The Palestinians abandoned the Oslo Accords, and the burden for peace ultimately rests with the Palestinian leadership. They must be under no illusion that the European Union will rescue them from their mistakes or be able to counterbalance American or Israeli pressure on them. It is they who must change their behavior if a lasting peace settlement is to be reached.

There is another, albeit inferior, solution to end the conflict. This would be to use U.S. or NATO forces to stabilize the conflict. In June 2003, two widely respected and influential United States senators, John Warner (R-VA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) have sent up trial balloons concerning a NATO/U.S. stabilization presence in the PA, and the application of NATO and/or U.S. military power to destroy Hamas. Warner and Lugar have separately suggested that the U.S. introduce NATO forces, including U.S. forces, to enforce an Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire. Lugar also mentioned that “international forces ought to be going after Hamas” and perhaps other terrorist groups as well. But the risks of this outweigh the benefits. Yet, the deployment of U.S. troops contains many risks and may be deleterious for American and Israeli interests. The United States has considerable peacekeeping obligations elsewhere, Hamas and PIJ would conduct suicide attacks against U.S. forces, there would be disagreements with Israel over the details and scope of retaliation, and there is always the risk of unintentional Israeli or American casualties resulting from Israeli military action.

While Israel and the United States have excellent relations, one central problem in the relationship is that the U.S. is a superpower with global interests, while Israel is not and may be concerned with the more direct consequences of its actions. The United States must be concerned with how the actions of Israel and its own actions are perceived by the rest of world, and particularly the Arab and Muslim world. The United States is
already widely perceived to be one-sided in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To combat this perception in the Arab or European media may require from time-to-time placing demands on Israel. For example, in the spring of 2003, the United States placed some pressure on Israel to reduce assassinations of senior terrorists and major incursions into Palestinian areas while ceasefire negotiations are occurring. But these actions must be understood as small disagreements among allies, and necessary to aid America’s worldwide interests.

The U.S. is right to favor Israel in the conflict with the Palestinian terrorists. Israel is a much more valuable ally than the Palestinian Authority could hope to be. Nonetheless, the perception of too great an imbalance adversely affects other critical relationships for the United States, for example, with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt, as well as with the state-building exercise in Iraq. For Israel, this clearly is less of a concern but must be well understood by Israelis. Despite occasional problems, the United States’ relationship with Israel is a solid one and this of course is how it should be since such a relationship serves the interests of both countries.

III. Conclusion

The war on terrorism and the condition of the international system at the present time—American hegemony—provide the United States with great opportunities. The American Empire may be expanded as it never has before into the Middle East with the result that anti-American regimes are replaced by pro-American ones, WMD programs are stopped, the terrorist threats of al Qaeda and Hizbullah are reduced, liberal political ideals are advanced, oil continues to flow to world markets, allies are supported, and the economies of states in the region are woven into the tapestry of the global economy to improve the standards of living and opportunities for these peoples.

This brief study provides a justification for expanding American power in the region and an agenda of what the United States should do. However, this will be difficult to accomplish, as there will be setbacks within the region and within the United States as well. The United States must have the will to persevere when confronted by adverse circumstances, as has occurred many times in its history. Notably, the demands these actions place on the U.S. military are profound. The U.S. is blessed to have the highest quality soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the world and who are provided with the best weaponry and logistical support, and backed by exceptional intelligence capabilities. Nonetheless, their burden will be great in blood spilt and therefore no administration can ever tire of explaining to them and to the American people the importance to the American political tradition of expanding American values and influence.
Finally, the American Empire is unique, not like previous imperial powers. It seeks to control without occupying, ruling through indigenous officials, with particular attention on remaking the ideas and values of the elites, but there are obvious lessons for the United States from previous attempts at empire. One of the most important is that power scares those without it, and in the correct conditions they will balance against the dominant power. Long before Operation Iraqi Freedom or Kosovo, going back to the collapse of the Soviet Union, this concern about American military power had been present but has been unable to congeal into an effective anti-American alliance due to effective U.S. diplomacy, and the interests of the potential balancers themselves—they have more to gain working with the U.S. than working against it, despite occasional meetings of Russian and Chinese leaders or E.U. and Russia officials where “hegemony” is decried.

Although it has been ineffectual thus far, balancing against the United States by adversarial states is a real threat—because U.S. military power scares many states, the United States must be careful whom it threatens. The United States must never be seen to make gratuitous threats. The Bush Doctrine and the publication of *The National Security Strategy of the United States* trumpet the American desire to stay dominant and to execute preemptive retaliation against states that are a threat to it. The latter message is stated again and again by the president: “By killing innocent Americans, our enemies made their intentions clear to us. And since that September day, we have made our own intentions clear to them. The United States will not stand by and wait for another attack, or trust in the restraint and good intentions of evil men.” Bush continued: “We are on the offensive against terrorists and all who support them,” and the United States “will not permit any terrorist group or outlaw regime to threaten…[the U.S.] with weapons of mass murder. We will act whenever it is necessary to protect the lives and liberty of the American people.” These words scare many worldwide due to the perception—however incorrect it is—that the U.S. is aggressive and when facing a problem it always draws first the military tool from the toolkit.

Despite the perception of U.S. aggressiveness in international politics, such fear is misplaced. The United States only targets states—such as Iran and North Korea—that threaten all major states—from Europe, to Russia, to Japan. Just as the Europeans, Latin Americans, South Koreans, and Japanese are far better off in terms of their political and economic systems than they were in 1945 due to American power, so too will be many of the people of the Middle East due to the American presence there. The critics of the administration in these countries must recognize that the destruction of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, and the weakening of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism will benefit them as well.
Equally, they profit from the expansion of the global economy and the spread of the values necessary for it to function. They should follow the advice provided by U.S. commercial aircraft pilots before departure: they should sit back, relax, and enjoy the flight. The United States will ensure that they arrive safely at their destination. While it must use its power wisely, this is the hour of the United States.
Endnotes

1 For this study, the geographical boundaries of the Middle East are Morocco to Iran, Turkey to Yemen.


3 Hegemony is a condition of international politics that describes a specific power relationship where one state is dominant over others due to substantial gaps in military and economic power. Hegemony may be termed unipolarity but this is misleading. Unipolarity means that power is concentrated into only one pole. This would change the ordering principle of the international system from anarchy to hierarchy. While America is dominant it is not unipolar. For discussion see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 88-101 and 129-31. William C. Wohlforth discusses American hegemony in terms of American unipolarity. See his “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41. Also see Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 23-33.


7 Although, of course, the Soviet threat to Israel was much greater during the Cold War. This was true both directly—such as in the War of Attrition—and indirectly—though massive arms transfers and diplomatic support for Israel’s enemies.

8 Relying on such allies did not prevent direct U.S. intervention when necessary, such as the 1958 intervention in Lebanon.


18 Ibid.


(March 19 to April 18, 2003). Almost 70% of all weapons used during the campaign were precision-delivered munitions, in contrast to about 9% in the 1991 war, 35% during Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia in 1999, and 60.4% in Operation Enduring Freedom. The accuracy of these weapons continues to improve.


27 Reginald C. Stuart, United States Expansionism and British North America, 1775-1871 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), p. 13. Stuart quotes correspondence from George Mason to Richard Henry Lee on July 21, 1778. What is particularly interesting about it is that it is typically American: America’s security requires complete dominance: “The Union is yet incomplete, and will be so, until the inhabitants of all the territory from Cape Breton to the Mississippi are included in it: while Great Britain possesses Canada and West Florida, she will be continually setting the Indians upon us, and while she holds the harbors of Augustine and Halifax, especially the latter, we shall not be able to protect our trade or coasts from her depredations.” Stuart, United States Expansionism and British North America, 1775-1871, p. 8.

28 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in the Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, May 9, 2003, www.whitehouse.gov.


31 See n. 29.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 There were high hopes that the administration and Powell specifically would utilize U.S. power to force a settlement of the civil war in Sudan. Unfortunately, this has not yet occurred. Like the Clinton administration after Somalia, the Bush administration has elected not to commit sizeable U.S. forces in Africa, preferring
instead to allow the U.N. or U.S. allies to carry a considerable part of the burden in Africa. The French have helped to redress instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo and surrounding states, and the British did so in Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, despite considerable European criticism of Robert Mugabe’s misrule in Zimbabwe, the administration has relied on the Secretary of State to condemn the regime from time to time. The White House is relatively silent on this issue. It is more active than previous administrations in providing social and economic aid to combat disease in Africa. The Bush administration has launched a $15 billion HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention program for Africa and the Caribbean.

35 See n. 30.

36 See n. 28.


38 Colin L. Powell, “Interview on CBS’s Face the Nation with Bob Schieffer,” May 4, 2003, transcript provided by the U.S. State Department at <statelists@state.gov>. Powell has also spoken of a “new dynamic in that part of the world” as a result of the military success of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Quoted in Toby Harnden, “America Plans Military Bases in Iraq to Apply Pressure on Middle East,” Daily Telegraph, April 21, 2003.

39 A thoughtful assessment concerning the ability of the United States to advance democracy in the Middle East is provided by Noah Feldman, After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003).


42 Al-Udeid will be the equal of the Prince Sultan airbase in its ability to support an air campaign in the region (technically, it meets the Block 10+ standard). For a thorough analysis of the CAOC’s (Combined Air Operations Center) capability at Al-Udeid see Mark Hewish, “Out of CAOCs Comes Order,” International Defense Review, May 2003, pp. 22-27.

43 The “lily pad” concept applies not just to European bases, but also possible bases in Africa such as Djibouti and Kenya, and in Asia, such as Australia, Thailand, and Vietnam.


Although it is little noted by the U.S. media, the U.S. military is expanding its presence in North Africa, Morocco and Tunisia in particular, some of the states of the Sahel, such as Chad, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, in East Africa—Djibouti and Kenya—and in sub-Saharan Africa—Senegal and Uganda in particular. Having a small presence in the region helps to ensure that al Qaeda or other terrorist groups do not find a home there.


The eight to ten year estimate is drawn from a January 2003 Congressional Research Service study. In February 2003, a Defense Intelligence Agency analysis argued Iran will have a nuclear weapon by 2010 if the program proceeds on pace. See Paul Kerr, “U.S. Levels Accusations against Iranian Weapons Programs,” Arms Control Today (June 2003), p. 47.

In June 2003, a Russian non-governmental research institute, PIR Centre, claimed that Iran might be able to develop a nuclear weapon within three years and would be able to threaten 20 million Russians living in the southwestern section of that country—in the Astrakhan and Volograd districts, as well as parts of Ukraine—if the nuclear weapon is mated to Iran’s 1,300km Shahab-3 missile. Andrew Jack, “New Warning on Iran Nuclear Threat,” Financial Times, June 16, 2003.


A good rule of thumb is that it takes about 2,500 centrifuges to make one nuclear weapon’s worth of highly enriched uranium each year.


David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Iran, Player or Rogue?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (September/October 2003), p. 54.
55 Koch and Ben-David, “Iran’s Nuclear Work Revealed,” p. 2.
56 Ibid.
57 Albright and Hinderstein, “Iran, Player or Rogue?” p. 56.
58 The IAEA’s board of governors found in June 2003 that Iran has made at least five violations of its obligations under its Safeguard Agreement. These are: 1) Iran failed to declare the import of natural uranium in 1991; 2) it failed to declare activities involving the processing and use of the imported natural uranium; 3) it failed to declare the facilities where such material (including any waste) was received, stored, and processed; 4) it failed to provide in a timely manner design information for the MIX facility (xenon radioscopy production facility) and for the Tehran Research Reactor; and 5) it failed to provide in a timely manner information on waste storage at Seaman and Anarak. See “Iran Failed to Comply with Nuclear NPT, IAEA Reports,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2003, p. 22.
59 Koch and Ben-David, “Iran’s Nuclear Work Revealed,” p. 2.
61 Albright and Hinderstein, “Iran, Player or Rogue?” p. 55.
63 Ze’ev Schiff, “‘Axis of Evil’ Stepping Up Mutual Cooperation,” Ha’aretz, June 18, 2003, www.haaretz.com. The missile’s range is about 1,300 kilometers or 810 miles, and its accuracy is poor, with a CEP of about three kilometers, the payload is about a ton. It was first tested in 1998 and is based on the Nodong-1 missile produced by North Korea and Pakistan’s Gharry-II. Iran has plans to develop even longer range missiles.
64 Kerr, “U.S. Levels Accusations against Iranian Weapons Programs,” p. 47.
65 Koch and Ben-David, “Iran’s Nuclear Work Revealed,” p. 2.
68 The author’s thinking on this aspect of potential Iranian retaliation has been influenced by Owen R. Coté, Jr.


75 An exceptional account of the thought of Hizbullah is found in Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002).


82 Ibid.


86 Hizbullah’s fundraising activities through front organizations and criminal activities in the United States is documented in Steven Emerson, American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us (New York: Free Press, 2002).


88 Sobelman, “Hizbullah Infiltrates Israel,” p. 27.

89 Quoted in Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn, ”Syria Retains Ties with Hizbullah Despite U.S. Pressure for Change,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 2003, p. 23.

90 Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah, p. 134.

92 Ibid.

93 Indeed, even during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Hizbullah continued to shell Israeli territory and fire on Israeli aircraft, and these behaviors continue. The organization did this even though they were worried that Israel would strike them while the world’s attention was focused on the war in Iraq.


96 Also worrying is the support the IRA has given to Palestinian terror groups (as well as to the FARC in Colombia). This support seems to be largely “mentoring” the Palestinian terrorists and providing expertise in bomb-making and placement, sniping and arms training, and communications.


100 The formal name of the “road map” is “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.”

101 It must be noted that five different Palestinian Authority security organizations remain under the direct command of Arafat. These are Force 17, General Intelligence, the National Security Forces, Military Intelligence, and the naval forces. Force 17 has been directly involved in terrorism against Israel. The implication of this is that Arafat retains separate and independent military power, apart from Abu Mazen’s control. Ze’ev Schiff, “Arafat Outmaneuvers Abbas on Road Map,” *Ha’aretz*, May 5, 2003.

